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ABSTRACT 
This research reports on an investigation into the utility of 
published accounting information to the most sophisticated user the 
investor. The approach adopted is to paramorphically represent the 
investor's decision making process by seeking to establish a set of 
causal relationships between accounting number based inputs to this 
process, and the outputs, viz relative share prices. Unlike previous 
studies in this area, this research explicitly recognises the 
con figural nature of human information processing activity. 
Application of an appropriate methodology to uncover and explore these 
con figural realtionships, Automatic Interaction Detector (AID), offers 
original insights into the share price fixing mechanism. More 
specifically the results obtained provide evidence on: 
1) the degree of association betHeen published accounting data and 
share prices and thus a measure of the value of accounting information 
to investors, 
2) the compexity of the investor's decision making process and 
3) the validity of certain established theories in finance. 
Whilst analysis highlights the strong relationship between historic 
accounting information and relative share values the evidence 
presented is consistent with the thesis that only a limited set of 
measureable accounts-based variables may be used in the assessment 
process, viz earnings, dividends, short-term liquidity and 
marketability. Moreover, the complex set of interactions identified 
between these variables confirms a priori expectations on the 
con figural nature of the investor's decion making process. A -close 
examination of these interactions reveals that although earnings and 
dividends may dominate relative share values, the extent of their 
influence varies with the underlying quality of earnings. These 
findings have implications for the theory of share . valuation, the 
dividends versus earnings controversy and the role of investment risk 
in the U.K. stock market. Empirical evidence relating to to the 
capital ｳｾｲｵ｣ｴｵｲ･＠ debate is also provided. 
Other areas of investigation encompass an examination of the most 
appropriate measures of relative share valuation for this type of 
research, a comparison of the merits of linear additive and configural 
analytical techniques, and the dimensionality and normality of 
financial ratios. 
The operational utility of the 'decision-usefulness' criterion in the 
evaluation of accounting numbers and the use of pragmatic empiricism 
in the application of this criterion are also critically appraised • . 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE RESEARCH 
L. Introduction 
In' recent years there haA bee n ｾ＠ slRnl ftCA nt ｨｾｮｒ ･＠ in &mphA SiA 
ｷｩｾｨｩｮ＠ the accounting profession away from the ｴｲｾ､ｩｴｩｯｮ｡ｬ＠
stewardship function and more towards a decision-usefuln ess parad i Rm. 
Official recognit ion of this cha nge ca n be found in both the U. K. 
(The Accounting Standards Steering Committee, 197 5) and i n t hp u.s . 
(American Accounting ａｳ ｳｯ｣ｩｾｴｩｯ ｮＬ＠ 1977). The objective j5 to 
enhance the , underlying utilit y of accounting i nformation to the Ｇ Ｌ ｳｾｲ Ｌ＠
which implies the need for changes in the formAt And cont ent of 
financial statements to make them more relevant to his pArticular 
decision making process. Howeve r, des pit e the he n('fitA (!I;:1t '''ou! '' 
accrue to financial statAment us e rs f rom some ｣ ｨ｡ｮ ｾ ･ ｳ＠ ] ittle prO); r r <: f' , 
has been made in overcomi ng the conceptual, th or tical And 0mpirf rnl 
contraints which prevent significant progress being mAdr in ACtl1 :1l 1 V 
meeting the user's informational needs . The ,rux of the prohl em 
stems from, on the one hand, the constraints lmposc d by trRditionn! 
accounting methods (eg. S.S.A.P.2) on the accountant and, on lh r 
other, the inability of us e rs to specify the Information t hat ｴ ｨ ｾｹ＠
r e quire from financial statements. Furthermore, even if it wer 
possible for all user groups to de tail all th e ir informational nce ds, 
, ｾ＠
it is unlikely that the accountant could proci ll c i-1 singl e rcpor (- I' 
cover all of these, nor could he reasonably ｾｲ ｧ ｵ･＠ that his func tion 
is to provide non financial information readily availabl e fr om ml'rr 
immedia te sources. However, although th e ob j c ti ve of bp i ng :'1hl e t f) 
satisfy all user needs may be unobtainable, lhrre is a dp-finjt e oc' pd 
to clarify the issue of the current utility of nc counti ng i.n r onn"l(' ion 
to the sophisticated user and thus provid e a fOLlndatlon IIpon whi,h 
improvements can be made. 
In this thesis we advocate the use of empiri c<J I r l"f: pa rrh ,,, " i , I Is 
development and believe that emphasis should be pL"1 r ed I)" 
understanding informational needs of the most so phi sf' leA /-N! IJ ', r 
g roup, namely the investment community. We h8ve chosen to for l i S 
1 
upon this group, wh o are generally consid e re d t he most skilled and 
dynamic of all us e r s , as this subsumes mos t othe r us e r groups 
(althought we r e cognise not all). Investmen t analys ts are r e port e d 
in many articles and fi nance t ex ts as usin g nccounting information in 
their decision making process, although, it is noted that of course 
this source of information represents only a part of . th e total amount 
of i nformation avai lAble t.o the ahslyet. ｔｨｵｾ＠ IH4 I1 rtr.t\ 1ft cV1.d'tl /j 
to indicate that published accounting informa tion is used by th e 
external analyst in company appraisal, it is reasonable to expect a 
relationship to exist be twee n the valuation of a company by an 
investor and the data produced in the annual accounts . This 
hypothesis ｨ｡ｾ＠ been examined empirically by a numbe r of r esea rche rs 
(see chapter IV for a review) to date and the ge ne r a l conclusion 
reached is that although certain accounting numbe rs seem to be 
related to sha re values , the re still exists a ve ry large gap in our 
understanding of character i stics of the equity decision process. 
Benston (1981) in a recent r eview of this area concludes : 
"While th es e Bndings are not tr i vial, they provide but limited 
conclusions about which specific data are used by investors." 
The aim of this thesis is to investiga te the utility of accounting 
" 
information to inves tors by examining the re lationshi p betwee n 
｡｣｣ｾｵｮｴｩｮｧ＠ numbe r s and rela t i ve share prices. Whilst this type of 
study is not designed to l ea d to r e commenda tions f or changes to the 
structure and cont ent of accounting reports, such exercises should 
contribute ｴｯｷ ｡ｲ､ｾ＠ provid i ng r elationships can be found to exis t, toward s 
clarification of the role accounting information plays i n the share 
price fixing mechanism. Furth e rmore, the establishment of a set of 
relationships of this nature can provide a basis for the examination 
of current theories on share valuation and: mClrket be haviour. 
Consequently the scope of this th esis cove r s import ant iss ues in both 
accounting and finance. On the one hand there is an attempt to 
insig,ht into investors' informational nee ds and on the other, an 
examination into how various f actor s , disclJssed at length in the 
finance literature, such as dividend pol icy, gearing , risk etc. 
actually appear to affect the investors share valuation process. 
2 
gain 
2. The Dynamic Nature of Accounting 
Tricker(1979) in his article on research in accounting describes 
accounting as "an adaptive subject res ponding to changing situations 
in the world it serves" and further indic8.te s that accou nttng must 
continue to adjust to the environment in which it is employed or it 
will become r edundant and worthless. This point of vJ cw is 
reinforced by Abdel-Khalik(1975) who sees the us e r s of accounting 
information as hl1vlng complex and dynamic ne -ds which eh nc ｯｵｮｴ ｛ ｾｮｴ＠
must respond to and try to satisfy. However, both these views on 
the function of accounting have a strong proviso, which is that when 
accounting does change to meet environment a l needs, the changes 
should be based upon systematic theory and a better understanding of 
the purpose for which accounting statements ' are employed. Without a 
sound conceptual framework and a thorough understanding of us e r 
informational needs, any changes introduced by the accounting 
professional suffer from the possibility of be ing unjustifie d, and a t 
worst misleading, and may serve merely to undermine the purpose of 
accounting statements in general. 
One of the key problems in the development of accounting pract ice is 
that it appears to be following a "flavour of the month" approach 
(taken from Tricker) in that proposed changes in accounting 
. , 
measurement have become so profuse that' the potential user of 
accounts becomes bemused or sceptical ahout "all" accounting 
information. This weakening in the ｰ･ｾ ･ｩｶ･ ､＠ utility of accounting 
statements is attributed to societal press ure to find quicker and 
better solutions to current perceived problems . One possible cause 
of this situation is the absence of emp irica l evid e nce to 
substantiate any proposed changes in ｡ｾ｣ｯｵｮｴｩｮｧ＠ princ i ples . Without 
empiricism there will always be the missing link be tween environmental 
needs and the accountants' response to satisfy thos e needs. 
Beaver(1979) in his paper on current tre nd s in ｾ｣ ｣ｯｵｮｴｩｮｧ＠ research 
argues that if information is to have a value t o the us e r, then it 
must be capable of altering be liefs such ｴｨｾｴ＠ actions are altered. 
Furthermore the author believes there' is a nen d to emphasise a 
"positive rather than normative" appronch to the problem and to be 
3 
"empirica l rathe r than analytical". As a r e sult Beaver suggests 
that security price re s earch is the most positive route forward to 
solve many of the import ant issues that r emain unanswered. 
In this thesis some of the empirical evide nce presented ma Y' he lp 
contribute towards providing a basis for und e rstanding some of the 
financial informational needs of investors. H it is possible to 
uncover an association be twee n accountin g in fo rma tion and the end 
result of an important deci s ion making proce ss th a t us es that 
information, then it is reasonable to mak e inf e r ences as to the 
nature of the decision maki ng process , th e i nformational requirement s 
of the user and possibly th e format and pres entation ' of financial 
statanents. Because of the dynamic nature of accounting any set of 
relationships may vary ove r time and require continual reassessment, 
but without , any formal structure it is not pos s i ble to readily 
determine the changes to the structure necessary to meet enviromental 
needs. For example, if in this study a stron g association were 
found between ce rtain accounting variables and re lative share pri ces, 
the consequences of redefining or excluding any of these variables 
from an annual report would be to modi f y the ut i lity of the accounts 
to the investor and result in him (unwillin gly) having to change his 
decision making process es. Thus one of th e be nefits that could 
result from this type of s tudy ·which at t emp t s to . cia rify the role of 
" 
accounting information in the investors decision making proce ss is 
ｾｨ｡ｴ＠ it could aid in the improvement of the conte nt of accountin g 
statements. 
3. The Research Design 
One of the principal criticisms in accounting and finance research 
made in the literature is that many studies which could prove 
valuable to advancing the body of knowledge employ a r e search design 
inappropriate to the topic under consideration. Abdel-Khalik(l975) 
suggests two main reasons for this behaviour by resea rche rs. The 
first is that they approach the probl em with a pure ly sci entific 
structure which often leads to "weak research design". The second 
reason stems from the dynamic nature of accounting and the constantly 
4 
changin g environment which mea ns that even "well planne d res ea rch may 
not lead to a known predictable outcome and the infe r e nces applicable 
in any given set t i ng are not neces sarily applicabl e to others". 
Consequently the results of such research be come con tinge nt on t he 
situation and mo st become s itua tion specific. 
Tricker(1979) examines two approaches to t his problem of r esea rch 
dE' Si gn. The fi r s t is th e classical de ductive approAc h where the 
f low of t' l'i! s es rch ｣ｯ ｭｭ ｧ ｮ ｃｑｾ＠ w:l, h fI l:!C:Hly Qf, ｾｲｩｐｗｾ Ｍ ｉＺＡｴＱｾｴｩ Ｎ＠ ｾＨｪ ｬｬ＠ t!loItJ!l hy t il t! 
formulation of hypotheses and finally ends with the t esting of t hose 
hypotheses . If the hypotheses prove to be suppor ted t he body -of 
knowledge is add ed to, if not, then nothing is achieved. This type 
of research structure is usually confined to the pure sciences such 
as physics and chemistry , whe re the failure to obtain positive 
results can , be considered as unimportant in th e advanc i ng of th e 
frontiers of knowledge . If this attitude is adopt ed in account i ng 
research i t will ofte n lead to a frustrated res ear c he r! 
The second approach is called the "feed-back" me thod (Tri cke r, 197 <) ) 
or the naturalistic approach (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinky a , 1979) and is 
more appropriate for accounting and finance re s ea rch as i t t a kes into 
consideration the less exac t nature of the social science c , of whic h 
accounting and financ e are members . Figure 1 shows how t h is 
approach has been adopted in this res ea r ch. 
The figure shows that the fi r s t step in t he process is to evaluate 
the current theories and r elevant empirical studies. I n this thesis 
this aspect is covered by a detailed ｲ ｾ ｶｩ･ｷ＠ of three, areas namely , 
the utility of accounting informa tion t o in vesto rs, th e ability of 
humans to process such information and th e conce ptual fram ework 
covering the many finance issues on share valuation th eory. In this 
way we are able to formulate a model that we would expec t to find i n 
the real world. Once the data has been collected and the 
environment for the analyses has been 'es t abl i s hed t he n the model is 
test,ed for its appropriateness. The process doe s not sto p he r e , 
however, as it would in strictly sci entific research, Eor t he results 
of the analyses are then used to reformula te the ori ginal mo del , 
which is then retested for robu s tness und e r differe nt conditions. 
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RESFAOCH DESIGN: TIlE NATURALISTIC APPROl\CH 
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RESULTS 
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OF KNa\TLE!X;E 
FEED 
B.l'\CK 
Figure 1.1 
In other words the res earch design allows for f eedback and continual 
reformulation of the basic model. Finally, when the model is found 
to be consistent with the empirical r e sults , that is a causal 
relationship has been establishe d, then it ma y be accepted as part of 
the body of knowledge. 
The important element of this flexible structure is the reformulation 
of the model and the retesting. Driver and Mock(197S) (quote d by 
Tricker) defined this flexible approach by stating that it leads to 
more narrowly defined models and aids in the building of theory . 
They also suggest tha t the sci entific approach in accountin g and 
finance research can lead to "sterility, dogma and excessive need to 
prove one's point". A view shared here as well as by 
Abdel-Khalik(1975). 
4. Research Perspective and Objec ti ves of this Study 
The underlying theme of this thesis, as el aborated above, is the 
establishment of a set of causal rela tionship s be twee n accountin g 
numbers and relative share prices to permit both the testing of a 
number of key finance th eories related to share valuation and for 
assessing the informational needs of investor s . This study,howe ve r, 
only relates to a small part of the broad spectrum of account i ng and 
finance research and therefore it is import ant to place it in 
perspective and to determine both its pote nt ia l contribution s and 
limitations. Tricker(l979) has reviewed th e nRture of re s erlr ch 1.n 
accounting and has conveniently provided a four group proj ec t 
taxonomy as follows: 
1) practical studies into the problems fa ce d by practione rs ego cost 
a llocation methods, consolidated statements, 
2) matters of accounting technology and th eo ry eg o inflation 
a ccounting, EEC harmonisation, disclosure of i nforma tion, value added 
statements, 
3) broader issues involving the use of accounting numbers ego 
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decision makin g and the i nf orma tion nee ds of us e r gr oups, human 
asset account i ng , and 
4) long t e rm con ce pt i ss ues eg o huma n inf ormat i on process ing , huma n 
value syst ems a nd th e ef fec t s of i n fo rma t ion. 
\ole ' can see tha t our re search ca n mai nl y be grou ped i n to th e t hi. r d 
type of proj ec t, t hat is th e a r ea of br oad e r i.ss ll es involv i. ng t he use 
of accountin g numbe r. s , althou gh our rCRul R c OIIJ d hAV \,mpL-l fl l on R 
for accounting th eo r y (typ e 2) a nd al s o fo r l ong te rm conce pt js s ues 
(type 4). Desp i t e thI s break down I nto the diff e r e nt types of 
research, each de finit i on s t i ll cove r s a vast spect rum of resea r c h 
topics and in orde r to a ppreci a t e th e s cope of t hi s t hcs j s it is 
ne cessary to be mor e s pecific . 
The starting point of our empirical work is th e e XCl min n t i on of t hl' 
degree of associat i on be t wee n published accountin g in f ormAti on Rnd 
r e lative share prices. Wh e r ea s thi s i s of i nt e r. es t i.n i t ,; OWII 
ri ght, both with r ega rd to accounting and huma n inf o rm,'l ti on 
processing issues, we will be using the mod e l s deve l np0 rl Lo 0x pln r e , 
in a novel way, a number of fundame nta l i ssu Ee' S n'l,'l l. in t o C O ITl P ; l ll V 
valuation and financing decisions. Al though a nllmlw r of ot. he r 
studies have also attempted to unra ve l the compl rx i t i ('s or I'he ,.; I " ,r, ' 
price fixing mechanism and to establish the link 1)(' 1 w, " ") ｾ ｬ ｃｃ ＨＩ ｬｊ ｮ ｬＮ＠ Lng 
information and share prices the results of th e se ｳｴ ｜ｬｲｬ ｨＢ ｾ＠ Ilrl V (' n () 1 
been very enlightening and have "adde d only rudime nta r y i lls i )', ht s in LI) 
the decision making processes of us e rs" (Abde J-Kha l i k, 197'» ). TIl(' 
reasons for this general lack of advance ment have be(' n rl U r i h l1i:(' rl t .l 
many factors ranging from conceptual problems , communL cClt i. on 
deficiencies and inappropriate methodology (Bens ton, 198 1) . 
Whilst we hope we have benefited in our endeavours f r om t he 
experiences of these earlier researchers we rec ogni. s e t hat t he r e Rre 
many key issues in the theory of finance that r emai n un rp rl: ;1 in ;l '-l d 
vague in practice (as opposed to theory), for example , dn ｊｩ ｶ ｴ ｲｬ ｣ ｮ ｲｬ ｾ＠
a ctually influence share prices, is the market ind ifferent t n ra pita l 
structure how is risk evaluated in the U.K. stockma r ke t Anrl whil f' rl r e 
the key factors that determine the rate at which th e mi-lrke t di. seou nts 
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earni ngs? Th is st ud y i s designed Lo aLLempt t o s hed some light on 
Some of th ese gr ey areas . 
Apart from employing a th eo r e tically de f en s i hl e and more r obus t 
framework, we be lie ve t ha t we have al s o nri opt ed a new and more 
appropriate me thodologica l approach. i\J 1 t he ex t a nt studies i n til i s 
a rea have employed l i nea r addit ive statlstjcn l tools . This means 
that any associat ion uncove r ed i s expla i ne d by a st ring of ｷ ･ ｩｾ ｨｴ ･ ､＠
variables and impli s that each varl :lbl e has D s pec i fie d contrlhu tion 
to the mod e l r ega rdl ess of the valu es of ot he r va r iables . 
Research into the way humans proce ss i nf ormation has r e vea l r d t hat 
this linea r additive approach i s not n t ru e r presenta tion of how 
input variable s are combine d within n decisi on making process ( g . 
Libby and Lewis, 1977, Bake r, 1977), and t hat t he inves tme nt dec i s i on 
process does incorporate ce rtain conf igura l r e lat ionship s ( Slov i c , 
1972). In other word s an analys t's i nt e rpre t ation of an i tem of 
information is likely to vary de pending up on th e nature o f ot he r 
information in his possession. For exa mpl E' , Sl ovic (l9 fJ9) found t hl1L 
a hi gh dividend yie ld was a mor e [rlvourabl c> Lndi crl to r thAn ] 0 i,.Id 
when the profit margin tre nd was down, \vh i.l e th e re ve r s is trllt ' 1,,11 ,' n 
tbe tre nd is up. This i nteraction be tween varlahl s ca n he 
explained quite rationa lly and th e r ero r e Crln be conside re d L be a 
f undamental part of the share price f i xi ng m·c ha n i s m . 
. drawback of the Slovic approach to und erst;ITldin g t he investme nt 
process is that it requ i re s the close mon j to r i ng or how th e r111 a 1ys t 
processes information and is limi t ed to t he num brr of analyst s t hat 
can feasibly be studied. Although this app r o;) ch r vea ls i nt e r es ting 
results it is fraught with potent i3 1 me thodol og jca l bias and 
misinterpretation of the ana lytical process Rnd conse qu entl y is 
severely limited from an inductive point o f vi ew. 
To overcome the deficiences of both approache s we ha ve use d a nove l 
methodology known as AID (Aut oma tic tnte r r.lc tion De·tector). In the 
first place AID permits large data baR e s to br analyse d i n a global 
manner, and secondly searche s and al lows f0 r i nterac tion between 
variables. Thus by applying this t echn jq \l E' i n the ap propriate 
manner it is possible to explain r e lations hip s be tween accounting 
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information and share prices in a way that would appear to be 
consistent with the cognitive processes of the s tock market. 
This broad outline of the issues exami ned in this thesis can be 
summarised in the fo rm of a set of specific objectives: 
a) to test the hypothesis that there is a relationship be twee n 
accounting numbers and relative share prices. 
b) to test the hypothesis ｴｨｾｴ＠ the cognitive processes of the ma rke t 
as a whole a r e i nt eracU.ve by nat ure . 
c) to study the applicability of the various theories on share 
valuation, dividend pol icy, capital structure, fundam ental ri s k and 
systematic risk in the U.K. stockmarket. 
Nevertheless, this thesis is not without its limitations. Firstl y , 
it is important to recognis e that accounting information repre s e nt s 
only a subset of the total information available to the investme nt 
community. The effect of this is that any conclusions we draw :Ire 
limited to the quantitative variables as opposed to qu a litative 
variables which are very difficult to measu r e and consequent ly not 
amenable to the type of analysis r epo rt ed in this thesis. Se condly, 
the results of this study are confined to one time period and 
therefore any conclusions drawn must be qualifie d in this re spect . 
Lastly, whilst we recognise that share prices are consid e r ed to be 
reflections of future expectations rather than his toric performanc e , 
we have employed a methodology that tries to ･ｸｰｬｾｩ ｮ＠ r e lative share 
values in terms of historic accounting information. Howev r, we 
would argue that by relating accounting information to re l:ltlve share 
values on the day after the publication of that information, that we have 
reduced this potential problem to a minimum. Furthermore , i n 
chapter IV some empiricalevidence is reported that sugg sts t hat the 
use of forecast data in this type of analysis is unlikely to 
significantly improve the models derived. 
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5. Outline of t h e Thesis 
In orde r to ach ieve our oh jec tive s de fi ned abov e' t h is th e s i s i s 
a rrange d as follows . Th e ne xt three cha pters de v e lop th e co n c<'ptua l 
and th eo r e ticAl issues und e rlying th e r e s earc h furth e r wi t h th e <lim 
of clearly id enti fyi ng t h e r e search task . I n c h:1 ptc r II th e purpose 
a nd uti lity of publi s h e d accounti ng i nf ormation i s hi ghll ght d with 
particular emp hasis on the "h i dden stre ng th s " o f accounti ng numb rs . 
The next c ha pt e r , c hHptcr Ill, a ddres s es t Il e jrnpli cations of huma n 
information processi ng i n acc ounting . This i n l ud es a n xH mi nntion 
of the nature of th e dec i sion ma king process [lnd fo rmulat e s a basis 
fo r the us e of mod e ls t o pa r a morph ically r e prese nt th p inves t o r's 
de cision ma k i ng process . I n cha pt e r IV we exa mi ne t h e x tn nt 
literature a nd current t h eories on t h e li nk b t w e n Acco un ti. ng 
info rmation a nd s h are prices . Th e obj e ctive of t his c hil pt e r is 10 
e stablish a , conce p t ua l fram ework as a n ai d to th subse qu nl mode l 
building. I n other words we attempt to ( o rmul;Jt c our mod I s on Lh 
ba ck of a thorou gh g rounding both in th eo r y and [rom a ､ ･ ｴ ｾＱ＠ i lr cl 
a nalysis of r ela t ed emp i r ica l work and thus prov ide PI s ound ba s i s f o r 
the interpretation of our r esults. I n thI s cha pt e r seve r a l 
hypotheses r elated to the th e ory of fi na nc e ar de ve lope d. 
The next part of thi s th e sis prese nt s the data nna l ys d, lhr 
e mpirical models fo rmul<lt ed a nd t hei r re l:1Uonsh i p wit h the 
conceptual framework. Chapt e r V prese n ts thC' da tPi <lila l yse d ilnd 
i nclude s the criter ia for se l ec ting compa n i es <t n" va ri :l l,l c s Ln c lud d 
i n the a nalyses, the various t es ts pe r fo rmed on t he da t;'! to assess 
its a me na bility to stati s tical a nalysi s and n" C'xn min ation of the 
d i mensionality of the variables . \ In chnpt e rs VI a nd V J1 the mod e ls 
developed are evaluated in t e rms of bot h th e ir , t <1lLst l ca l rL gour a nd 
the inferences they pe rmit about the Lss ue s in .<l(' co llnt ln g and fi na nce 
investigated and more specifically on th e acce ptability of our 
hypotheses. As an extension of the se a nalyse s c ha pt e r VIII 
discusses in detail the ut i lity of r isk to the inve stor . Finally 
the the sis is complete d with a summa ry of t h e conclusions , be nefits , 
limit:ations and constraints of the st lld y and points to areas whe r e it 
would seem further res ea rch could be ｣ｯ ｮ ､ｵ｣ｴ ｾ ､ Ｎ＠
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CHAP TER II 
THE PU RPOSE AND UTILITY OF ACCOUNTING I NFORMATION 
1. Introduction 
The origin of compa ny annual account s as we know t hem today dat es 
back to the Compani es Act of 1844 when l egisla ti on was introduced 
comp elling the mana gement of l imi t ed companies t o provide 
sha reholders with a r eport on how t hey had employed the funds under 
their control. The purpose of the Ac t was to provide support to 
management cla ims that the y ha d act ed honestly and in the 
sha r eholders' be st inte rest, and thus try to prevent the fraudul ent 
behaviour found in several joint stock compani e s around tha t time. 
The function of the annual accounts was simply to provide 
shareholders with a means for assessing the stewardship role of 
management. This idea of stewardship was not new, in fact it dates 
back to the Middle Ages (Guter & Guter, 1978), the 1844 Act merely 
formalised the type of report. 
Over the last ten · years the accounting profession has begun to 
examine the structure of financial reporting and accounting as a 
whole, the aim being to produce information that is more meaningful 
to the user. The purpose of accounting information has therefore 
r e ce ived a great amount of attention and many theories have been 
proposed, almost invariably argued on a normative basis, on how to 
change the content of accounts to meet these new goals. 
Unfortunately many of these theories have been divorced from an 
understanding of how accounting information is used in practice and 
therefore have little value. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide some empirical evidence on 
how accounting information appears to be used by a particular user 
/ 
group, name ly the investor, by the use of model building. From the 
evidence r evealed by this study it is hoped that we ma y be able to 
(1) shed some light on the informational needs of the investor and 
thus aid the construction of a framework upon which changes to the 
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ｦ ｯｲ ｾ ｡ｴ＠ and cont ent of f ina ncia l sta t eme nt s can be based , and (2) ga in 
a valua ble insight into t he na ture of the i nvestor 's de cision making 
plJoce ss which i n turn shou l d prov ide a bas is f or evaluating such 
pertinent issues in f inance as the i mpa ct of gea ring on share values , 
the r o l e of divide nd s i n the ma r ke t an d the va lua ti on of sha r es in 
genera l. In this chap t e r we the r e f or e r ev i ew the theory unde rlying 
the deci s ion us efulne ss ap proach t o ac counting with a vi ew to 
e stablishing the purpos e of accoun ting informa t ion as pe rceived by 
t he accounting prof ess ion. I n addi t ion we examine "ha t ,,'e like to 
catl the ."hi dden strengths" of accoun ting number s , and demonstrate 
how valuable such informat i on is as an input to t he f inancia l 
decision process. 
2. Obj ectives and Function of Fina ncia l St a t ements 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants' conventional view of the aim 
of financial reports, as expressed in Recommendation N15 in 1952, was 
that "The primary purpose of the annual accounts of a business is to 
present information to the proprietors, showing how their f unds have 
been utilised and profits derived from such use". This view was 
withdrawn in 1974 because it was felt that it was incomplete and 
unsympathetic to modern needs. In 1975 the Corporate 
Report(A.S.S.C., 1975) replaced this conventional view with the 
f ollowing: 
"The fundamental objective of corporate reports is to 
communicate economic measurements of and information about the 
sources and pe rformance of the reporting entity useful to those 
having reasonable rights to such information." 
This view has been reciprocated in the USA where in 1977 the 
Committee on Concepts and Standa rds for External Financial Reports 
produced a Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory 
Acceptance(A.A.A., 1977) in which they classifie d the conventional 
view of financial reporting as "Normative or Classical", and this 
r evis ed view as the "Deci s ion-Usefulness" approach. This r eport, 
however, suffers f rom the same major drawback of the Corporate Report 
in that although it is possible to obtain a concensus on what the 
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objectives of a financial report should be in an ideal world, there 
would appear to be no concensus on how to achieve these objectives 
and still maintain a comprehensive method of re p?rting (Peasne ll, 
1978). 
The Corporate Report is to be corone nded for specifying a more dynamic 
objective for accounting information, instead of the traditional 
.stewardship/rearview mirror approach it ha s ar gued for the need to 
unde rstand user needs and then to make the ne ces sary changes to 
financial reports .so that these needs can be satisfied. 
Nonetheless, whilst it is admirable to sugges t new objectives, if 
these are so abstract that it is not possible to de termine how they 
can be achieved, the net effect is to unde r mi ne current accepted 
values and thus leave the accounting function in mid-air. Before it 
is possible to meet the objectives of the Corporate Report it it 
necessary to understand how the various user groups use accounting 
information. If the objective is to produce accounts that provide 
any user, be he a shareholder, employee or creditor, with information 
that can be readily input into their particular decision making 
models, then it is essential to understand exactly the parameters of 
each particular model. Furthermore, if it were possible to define 
all "user models" then, and only then, could a revolutionary set of 
accounts be produced that satisfy all user needs (Revsine, 1972; 
Miller, 1972). Obviously this is unrealistic and therefore 
accountants must be content to produce accounts that go part of the 
way towards meeting this goal. 
In a report issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants(1976) 
presenting the views of thirteen academics on the Corporate Report, 
the wide spectrum of opinion and theory presented indicates that it 
is unlikely that any consensus on how to improve financial statements 
will be obtained in the near future. This would appear to stem from 
the myriad of different definitions of the economic value of an 
entity prevailing among economists, and the inability of traditional 
accounting procedures to meet the requirements of each theory. 
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3. Mea s uring Economic Value 
I mplied in the Corporate Re port view of the purpose of accounting 
informat ion is the nee d to co mmunica te economic measurement of an 
entity which i mplies that economic values a re required and can be 
r eadily obtained. Brealey(l976), who is not an account ant, in his 
paper "Recommenda tions Rega rding the Cont ent of Financial Reports" 
puts forward the opinion that financial accounts should be orientated 
towards providing the inves tor with the neces s a r y da ta to produce an 
assessment of the value of an investment in t erms of the discounted 
value of all future cash flows. He draws an analogy wi th capital 
budge ting using the premise tha t investing in a security is the same 
a s investing in any other asset. Brealey's r e commendations include 
replacing the current profit and lo ss account wi th a cash flow 
account and suggesting that the balance sheet should be divorced from 
any subjective evaluation by the accountant with all assets and 
liabilities valued at their marke t value, or, where no secondary 
market exists, at their present value to the firm. Further 
recommendations are that more emphasis should be placed on including 
in the annual report a wide range of for e cast and historical data. 
The se radical changes would mee t resistance from most accountants for 
they would require a radical change in accounting concepts and 
accepted principles. Brealey Fecognises this, but defends his 
position by arguing that if the accountant does not meet user needs 
(ie. his perception of these) and continues to impose arcane rules 
which have no economic logic then the standing of the profession is 
in danger. 
The basis of Brealey's proposal is that some attempt should be made 
to aid the investor in assessing his investment using economic 
concepts. This implies that accounting statements should be based 
upon present value principles. If the accounting profession were to 
implement this type of proposal it could be construed as directing 
users on how accounting information should be interpreted rather 
than simply changing presentation and contents in response to user 
need s . Besides the fundamental problem of whether or not this new 
approach to reporting would actually be more useful to the user, 
there still remains the unanswered question of whether accountants 
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could maintain their objectivity and neutral presentation wi th no 
bias towards or against any particular user group(Sprouse and 
Moonitz, 1962). 
It is one thing to change the valuation methods and accounting 
conventions to report historic events ｩｾ＠ a more suitable ma nne r to 
meet user needs, but when the accountant is faced with for ecasting 
future cash flows, or rather verifying managements' foreca s ts, the n 
he is then taking on the rath e r more complicated and ｵｮ ｾｶｩ｡｢ ｬ ･＠ role 
of interpreter and corpora te planner. Surely if management wish 
investors to have this type of information they should provide it 
independently of the auditor. Moreover, if he were involved and the 
forecasts prove to be wrong then it is plausible that it could be the 
accountant who would become the scapegoat of both management Rnd 
shareholder. 
Tricker(1976) approaches this problem from a different point nf vie w. 
He stresses that financial statements have a heavy stewardship 
function that should not be forgotten although he does recognise the ' 
need to meet changing enviromental needs. Moreover, he suggests that 
the wrong question is being posed, in that financial report s do not 
contain information, merely data descr i bing financial health, 
"Information results from the use of those data by a decis ion maker 
Data has a cost, information has a value". Thus information 
is a function of the user and is dependent upon his personal decision 
making process. Tricker further states "To understand information 
is to understand the user and his needs; often th ese cannot be 
predetermined. The job of the accountant should be to increase the 
information potential for the user". The conclusion from this point 
of view is that no matter how much data is produce d and regardless of 
the quality of that data, it is an impossible task to meet the 
decision takers flexible and ad hoc perceived needs for relevant 
information. 
This different view on the use of accounting data would at first seem 
to , be regressive in that it appears to be saying that accountants 
should avoid the problems of user needs and concentrate on the 
stewardship function. This line of thought is not however 
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r egress ive but progressive , in tha t it provide s a·s tructure upon 
which improvements can be Qade . If accountin g is de scribe d as an 
exercise in producing data bas ed on cons e rvat ism, consistency and 
convention then any change s to tha t system must be based upon actual 
utility and not simply "pe rce i ved" utility to the user. 
This problem of mee ting us e r need s is seen by Perrin(1976) as asking 
the accountant to produce mo re informa tion on the f uture of the 
business rather than the past, but even then this is unlikely to 
ｾ｡ｴｩｳｦｹ＠ the critics of accounting re por ts. Perrin be lieves tha t at 
this stage in accounting knowledge , where r e l a tivel y little r esearch 
has be en conducted, it is di ff icult to r econcile the objectives of 
accounting and the accounting r eport. I n concluding his paper he 
suggests that accounting research be "stepped up" and that in the 
meanwhile no attempt is made to "pronounce on the scope and aims of 
published financial reports as though the . current and hurried study 
(that is the Corporate Report) were or could be exhaustive, 
definitive or conclusive". 
The above discussion reveals a wide discrepancy be tween the views of 
academics on how to meet the objective of communicating economic 
measurement to the user. On the one hand there is the idealistic 
and revolutionary views of Brealey, and on the other the perhaps more. 
traditional or evolutionary views of Tricker. It would appear that 
perhaps the only way to produce some sort of concensus on how to 
improve accounting would be to understand user needs more fully, that 
is to try to provide the accountant with an empirical framework upon 
which changes to meet user needs can be based. In the final 
assessment the accountant is only a provider of neutral data which 
the user turns into decision useful information. If the Gccountant 
goes beyond this basic role then he could have a conflict of interest 
as different user groups will require different interpretations of 
the same set of figure s ego management and employees. 
changes are to be made it is essential that a 
Therefore if 
"set of criteria for accounting measurement and disclosure which 
ideally, could yield a universal form of financial report 
equally useful and neutral or non--discriminatory, as amongst the 
interests of several groups of users" 
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(quoted from Perrin) is established . 
Perhaps one clear example of how the accounting profession is 
introducing changes to meet enviromental demands is in the measures 
taken to r ef lect the i mpact of inflation on corporate health. Such 
has been the pressure to make changes, many years of debate including 
an enquiry by a Government Committee (Sandilands , 1975) have 
eventually produced an accounting standard on inflation accounting 
(SSAP 16). The theme of the catalogue of event s leading to this 
latest standard has been t he questioning of the usefulness of 
traditional historic accounts during periods of high inflation. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings of the ｮｾｷ＠ standard as 
promulgated does seem to be a little weak. There is some survey 
evidence from the United States by Chandra(1974), Estes(1968) and 
Brenner(1970) that suggests that financial analysts, who are the most 
sophisticated interpreters of financial reports, are in general 
satisfied with historic accounts. In fact Brenner concludes his 
study; liOn the basis of these results • • • current values are only 
desirable if they are presented as supplementary information to 
historic cost figures". 
Other studies, also in the United States, by Ro(1980), Beaver et 
al(1980) and Gheyara and Boatsman(1980) have produced empirical . 
evidence which suggests that there exists no evidence that 
replacement cost disclosures, as defined by ASR 190, provide· any new 
information that affects security price returns. In a review paper 
on the use of replacement cost disclosures in the U.S.A., Watts and 
Zimmerman(1980) conclude that 
"We think that because of the diversity of the procedures used 
and the virtual unaminity of the results, these papers represent 
a compelling case for the conclusion that there is no evidence 
that the S.E.C. ASR 190 disclosures produce any benefit for 
investors." 
It should be noted, however, that the studies cited above are U.S. 
based and therefore caution must be exercised in generalising to 
current cost accounting in the U.K. 
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The se studies may appear to suggest tha t current cost fi gures may add 
little to the overall utility of conventional historic cost accounts 
for decision making. Howeve r, accountants would argue that analysts 
are not really aware of how misleading historic cost accounts are and 
that there is an education problem. Furthermore , at the time of 
some of the earlier studies infla tion was relatively low and 
therefore the peceived benefits we re not fully ap precia ted ｢ ｾ＠
analysts. The conflict that this circula r argument indicates is 
that either the accountant do es not rea lly und ersta nd the analysts' 
needs or that the analyst does not fully appreciate the value of the 
figures presented to him. Chandra 's study l ends support to the 
theory that the preparers of accounting information do not value 
information for equity investment decisions the same way as security 
analysts do. Beaver(1979) suggests that this is not ｳｴｲｩ｣ ｾ ｬｹ＠ true 
in that analysts analyse accounting data based on the assumption that 
it is correct, ie. neutral and objective, and therefore because the 
investor will perceive inflation adjusted accounts to be more useful 
(because the accounting profession say so) then · inflation adjusted 
figures will become the acceptable means of assessment. What is 
worrying about this whole debate is the lack of empirical research 
supporting the proposed changes as being the best solution to a 
perceived problem. 
A study by Lee and Tweedie(1977) into the extent to which ordinary 
shareholders understand the information contained in an annual report 
suggested that most shareholders had problems in interpreting the 
information contained in the report, although it must be stressed 
that shareholders, as opposed to investment analysts, may not 
necessarily be the most sophisticated users of accounting 
information. Lee and Tweedie state that: 
IIClearly, the needs of the private shareholder, as recognised by 
the Corporate Report, are not being met if he is in the position 
of being unable to understand the information presented to him." 
They conclude that this ｣ｯｾｾｵｮｩ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ gap can be overcome by either 
educating the shareholder or changing the entire basis of 
presentation of financial information. Furthermore they suggest 
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that the problem of inflation accounting is not major for the 
shareholder who cannot even understand traditional accounting data. 
It is feasible that the re is scope to simplify accounting statements 
to suit this large body of shareholders. Neve rtheless, if they are 
expected to make financial decisions for themselves, then there is a 
limit as to how far simplification will he lp them in this task, 
especially if they have no financial training. Therefore, although 
Lee and Tweedie suggest methods to close the communication gap 
between the peparer and user of accounts, the answer would seem to 
lie in ensuring that shareholders have access to sound financial 
advice, after all with a legal problem a ｬ ｡ｾｾ･ ｲ＠ is consulted. 
We have so far indicated that accounting information in its current 
form is frequently perceived by many academics and practioners as 
being unable to meet user needs. To those outside the profession 
this continued dissatisfaction could easily be interpreted as meaning 
that financial statements are somewhat redundant. The answer to 
this problem lies largely in discovering how the expert user (whose 
needs subsume those of the less skilled user) uses financial 
statments and what additional information, if any, is really required 
for decision making. In this study we attempt to provide some 
empirical evidence on the underlying relationship between accounting 
information and relative share values and thus provide some insight 
into the actual needs of the investment analyst. However, before 
this can be achieved it is essential to recognise the potential 
utility of accounting information in its current form for decision 
making. In the following section we therefore concentrate on the 
inherent usefulness of financial statements. 
4. The Hidden Strength of Accounting Numbers 
The empirical evidence in this second area is continually growing 
and, in general, the results indicate that modified historic 
accounts, despite all their inherent faults, do contain a great 
amount of useful information providing they are interpreted in the 
correct manner. 
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The most usual purpose for examining accounting information is to 
evaluate the financial health and performance of an entity. 
However, accounting numbers by themselves are difficult to assimilate 
and awkward to compare. It is a fruitless exercise simply to 
compare the value of outstanding debt for two companies without 
taking into account some consideration of the relative size of these 
companies. Obviously a large company is likely to have more debt 
,than a small company, purely because it is larger, but this does not 
indicate that it is financially in a worse position. Thus the usual 
approach used to evaluate relative performance is to adjust the 
absolute numbers into financial ratios. Once the ratios are 
computed it is possible to compare 1) compa ny trends and projections 
of future performance (intra-company analysis) and 2) performance 
between firms on an industry relative basis (inter-company analysis). 
Weirich(1976) reports that this approach to analysing historic 
accounts has been used since the 1800's and has the benefit of being 
objective and quantifiable. One problem in making inter-company 
comparisons based on ratios is the need to have a yardstick against 
which it is possible to compare and evaluate performance. With the 
aim of providing analysts and management with the ability of make 
useful and meaningful comparisons several commercial organisations 
produce industry average ratios, (Dun and Bradstreet and 
Inter-Company Comparisons are examples). As a concept for analysing 
company reports, ratio analysis is well established but the 
properties of financial ratios and their informational content are 
still in the process of being developed (see Lev and Sunder, 1977; 
Johnson, 1979; Whittington, 1980a and Sudarsanam, 1981a for examples 
of the current research in this area). In recent years more 
attention has been given to this area with much emphasis placed on 
the predictive quality of financial ratios when used in the 
appropriate framework. By reviewing some of these empirical studies 
it is possible to form an opinion on the overall utility of 
accounting information. 
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5. Fi nancial Ra tios and thei r Descr iptive Ability 
}lany empirical studies have investiga ted the association be t wee n 
accounting numbers and the occurence of s everal different events and 
have led to the conclusion tha t financia l r a ti os have ce rtain 
predictive ability . In so fa r as the s e events are often determined 
by the financi a l health of the entity unde r examina tion, and that the 
financial health of that entity is r eflecte d in its f inancial ratios, 
these r e sults are not r eally surpri sing . However, the benef it of 
this type of approach is that it provide s a systematic unde rstanding 
. 
of how financial ratios interact with ex t e rna l events and thus gives 
the analyst an objective asses sment of the state of an entity under 
. 
examination. Unfortunately, it ha s bee n proved too often that when 
the analyst is left to his own intuition he t ends to make judgement 
errors (Slovic, 1969; Goldbe rg, 1968). In the following discussion 
we examine the relationship between accounting information and 
corporate bankruptcy, bond ratings, systematic risk and a number of 
other related areas. 
5.1 Corporate Bankruptcy 
Corporate bankruptcy has been a focal point in this area of the 
utility of accounting information since the early 1930's. Studies 
by Ramser and Foster(1931), Fitzpatrick(1932), Winakor and 
Smith(1935) and Merwin(1942) have all used a univariate ratio 
approach and all have substantiated the theory that failing companies 
have poorer ratios than successful companies and that the warning 
signs are there several years prior to actual failure. 
Unfortunately none of these studies tested their results on 
subsequent data and therefore it is not possible to aSSess the 
predictive ability of their models. One interesting point worth 
noting from these studies is that each study produced different 
ratios for discriminating be tween the failed and non-failed 
companies, thus implying that the warning signs are present in 
different facets of the company profile. 
The first main study to test the predictive ability of ratios was by 
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Beaver(1966) who computed thirty conventional ratios for 79 failed 
and 79 non-failed companies for a five yea r period. For each r a tio 
Beave r compared the mea ns of ea ch group f or each of the five years 
and tested for significant differences . He fou nd that there was a 
continued decline in the failed set over the five year pe r iod and 
that the differences between the menns on mAny ratlo8 of t h two 
groups were statistically significant. On subsequent Appli ca tion of 
his model to a larger data base of equal numbe rs of failed and 
non-failed companies he found that he was 90% accurat e in classifying 
companies correctly into their respective groups, although it is 
stressed that ex-post discrimina tion is not the same as prediction. 
However, be cause of the lack of consideration given to prior 
probabilities and the fitting of a cut-off , to mi ni mise his errors , as 
his discussant Neter(1966) points out, his claims of predicti ve 
ability are not supported for each ratio distribut ion. I n addition 
the study possesses various other methodological flaws (Ta f f ler, 1976 
for a full discussion). Consequently although Beave r made an 
important contribution to the literature in revealing the potential 
benefits from this type of research, his results cannot be accepted 
at their face value. 
ｔｾ･＠ next major'study in this area was by Altman(1968) who used a 
ｾｵｬｴｩｶ｡ｲｩ｡ｴ･＠ approach to analyse the differences between companies 
classified as either bankrupt or non-bankrupt. The obvious value of 
a multivariate approach is that it is able to analyse the full 
financial profile of a company contemporaneously and thus improve the 
accuracy of a derived model. Altman applied a two group linear 
discriminant analysis (LOA) approach to discriminate between two 
identifiable groups, failed and non-failed companies. His final 
model comprised five ratios which when tested was found to be able to 
claSsify correctly 96% of companies into their respective groups. 
Despite the accuracy of Altman's model, the component ratios are not 
altogether intuitively acceptable and there are several 
methodological flaws (Taftler, 1977; Joy and Tollef.son, 1975; 
Johnson, 1970). Nevertheless, this multivariate study was 
recognised as an important step forward in assessing the use of 
multivariate ratio analysis. 
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The above studie s were all conducted in the U.S.A. and therefore are 
not strictly appropriate for advocat ing the use of ra tio analysis in 
the U.K. for such a purpose a lthough i t is re as onable to believe that 
th e principle should still apply. In the U.K., Taffler(1976) 
produced a bankruptcy model using simila r me thodology to Altman's, 
although Taffler's H.D.A. model di ffers in nature from Altman's in 
that no stock market measures were include d in the ana lysis. Since 
the development of his original mode l Taffle r has developed a second 
model (see Taff ler, 1981a ) which is r eported to have unde r go ne a 
considerable amount of t es ting and gene ral ass e ssment in several 
practical applications. At present these r esults show that the 
model is 98% accurate in categorising all quot ed industrial firms 
that have failed since 1976 as failures at least one year prior to 
failure. Taffler's holistic approach to analysing accounting 
information has revealed that not only is it possible to determine if 
a company is at risk of failure or not, but it also provides a means 
of measuring the company's level of general economic performance over 
long time periods. 
Taffler's model is not the only H.D.A. model to be developed in the 
U.K. Spellman(1978), Fadel(1977) and Hason and Harris(1979) have 
developed models for analysing construction companies but subsequent 
performance of their models is not known. Marais(1979) also 
developed a general model which, although currently in use by 
DataStream International Ltd., suffers from severe methodological 
weaknesses (Taffler, 1981b). 
The above studies are relevant to this thesis as they provide 
empirical evidence on the utility of financial ratios for measuring 
corporate health and demonstrate that accounts in their present form 
do possess meaningful information provided the numbers contained 
the rein are analysed in the appropriate manner. In addition these 
studies demonstrate that multivariate models are likely to be an 
effective way of analysing a set of annual accounts, which after all 
are multivariate documents. (Studies by Pinches et al, 1975 and 
Taffler and Sudarsanum, 1980 : using Principal Component Analysis have 
empirically demonstrated this characteristic; see Chen and 
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Sh imerda(19 8 1) for a summa ry of this a r ea of r esea rch.) The 
multivariate ap proa ch has shown tha t the whole is worth mo r e than the 
sum of the parts. Howeve r, da t a for the prediction of ba nkruptcy is 
only a subset of the in f orma tion need s of t he investor and the refore 
it is necessary to briefly r evi ew other s tudie s that show furthe r 
evidence on the utilit y of accounting da ta in more ge ne ral decision 
areas. 
5.2 Und e rstanding Bond Ratings 
A good example of the utility of accounting information in another 
area which is not too far removed from th e equity investors purview 
is the evaluation of risk premiums on fixed interest loan stock 
(o f ten refe rred to as bonds). In t he U.S. A. Fi sher(1959) r e lated 
the risk premiums on such bonds to several accounting-based and 
market-based ratios, and found that his mod e l could explain 75% of 
the variation in the premium. Despite the apparent high explanatory 
power of his model no indication is given on its success in 
predicting future premiums. However his r e sults clearly suggests 
tha t accounting ratios do have an association with market orientated 
factors and that risk premiums are related to fundamental risk. 
Other research in this area has concentrated on the understanding and 
prediction of bond ratings which are used extensively by the U.S. 
investment community as a surrogate measure for the riskiness of 
bonds. These bond ratings are arrived at by the judgement of 
informed and sophisticated financial analysts. Researchers such as 
Horrigan(1966), Pinches et al(1973), Peavy(1980), West(1970,1973) and 
Kaplan and Urwitz(1979) have tried to model the bond rating process 
by relating the rating to the fundamental characteristics of the 
corporation. ｈｯｲｲｩｾ｡ｮＨＱＹＶＶＩ＠ for example developed a model based on 
about 200 bonds with unchanged ratings between 1959 and 1964, and 
attempted to predict the bond rating of newly issued bonds and 
changes in bond ratings for 1961 to 1964. His explanatory data 
consisted mainly of accounting ratios. The results of this study 
revealed that the model was able to explain- 65% of the variation in 
bond ratings and was able to classify correctly about 55% of the new 
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bond issues and changes in bond ratings. Pinches and Mingo(1973) 
found similar r esults using linea r discriminant analysis to study 
bond ratings. They analysed 132 bonds and used a holdout sample of 
48 bonds to test the ir model. It was found that thei r model was 
able to correctly classify 65% of thei r sample with none of the 
misclassifications in error by more tha n one category, and on the 
holdout sample 56% were correctly clas sif ied. 
Both the above studies and several others into bond ratings are 
discussed at length in a comprehe ns ive r eview by Kaplan and 
Urwitz(1979) who go on to r eport their own bond rating analyses. 
They found that a model based upon a subordination variable, total 
assets, one financial ratio and the common stock beta could correctly 
classify two thirds of the 67 new issues in their holdout sample. 
Furthermore by introducing two additional financial ratios they could 
improve the predictive ability to 69%. 
The overall conclusion to be reached from an examination of these 
bond rating studies is that "it appears that relatively simple 
functions on historical and publicly available data can be used as an 
excellent first approximation for the highly complex and subjective 
bond-rating process 1l (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979:233). The overall 
accuracy of the models developed to-date ranges from 60 to 80% and 
probably difficult to improve upon given that certain qualitative 
factors are omitted from the models and that there is a high 
probability of judgement error by the bond rating agencies(Goldberg 
1968). We conclude from these analyses that if it is assumed that 
bond ratings are indicators of economic performance, then the 
inference is that financial ratios are able to measure economic 
performance providing they are combined in the appropriate manner. 
is 
In the U.K. there have been few studies in this bond rating area and 
therefore it is not possible to be conclusive about the ability to 
replicate these findings. One reason for the low interest in this 
area in the U.K. market is due to the high trading costs incurred 
wh en buying bonds, about 4%, which makes switching very expensive. 
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5 .3 Accounting Numbers an n Share Price s 
Further evidence on the hidd en s trengths of ac counting numbers can be 
found in the lit era ture on syst ematic risk in the stock market. 
Systematic risk , or be ta, is defined as tha t par t of company risk 
which cannot be dive rsified away and meas ures the r esp onse of a 
company's share price to movements in the stock marke t as a whole. 
In r ecent years much emphasis ha s bee n placed on using be tas for 
measuring portfolio risk(for example the collection of papers in 
Lorie and Brealey, 1978). On the one hand th ey provide a means for 
measuring ex-post risk-return performance , and on the other a means 
for deriving conditional expectations of fut ure ri sk-return 
performance. However, one problem with using technical betas, that 
is be tas derived from a simple r eg r ess ion of historic share price 
data, is that although they are adequate f or measuring past 
performance, they do not necessarily provide good estimates of future 
betas. 
With the aim of trying to predict future betas more acurately 
research has been conducted into relating beta values to accounting 
numbers. The first study in this area was by Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes(1970) who examined the systematic risk of 307 firms and found 
that dividend payout, leverage, earnings variability and the 
covariability of earnings to the aggregate level of corporate 
earnings, were each separately highly correlated with beta. They 
also tested to find if the accounting data could be used for 
prediction purposes and provided evidence ｴｨ｡ｾ＠ their regression model 
was more accurate in forecasting future beta values than a naive 
forecast based on historic beta values alone. 
In a study by Gonedes(1973), however, it is reported that no 
empirical relationship could be found between market-based and 
accounting-based estimates of systematic risk. Gonedes in comparing 
his f indings with those or Beaver et al argues that Beaver's results 
could have been caused by spurious correlation and therefore cannot 
be accepted at their face value. However, Gonedes does qualify his 
argument by stating that this difference may be explained by the use 
of different me thodolgoies and data. 
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In a later paper by Beaver and Manegold(1975) which att empts to 
replicate Gonedes results it is r e ported that there appears to be "an 
enormous amount of estimation error in the accounting beta computed 
by Gonedes, due to a program error." Not only do Beaver and 
Manegold's results provide some evidence to dispute Gonedes negative 
results but also they claim to find a relationship between 
accounting-based and market-based betas. On a more positive note, 
Gonedes does report that "accounting income numbers , if ｾｰｰｲｯｰｲｩ｡ｴ･ｬｹ＠
transformed, do reflect a statistically significant amount of 
information impounded in market prices". A further study by 
Rosenberg and Marathe(1975) found that the variance of cash flow, 
variance of earnings, growth in earnings, market capitalisation, 
dividend yield and gearing all contributed to a model for forecasting 
short term betas. They found that the use of a " fu ndamental beta", 
a beta derived from accounting information, was more accurate in 
forecasting future betas than just using historic or technical be t as . 
The results of these studies, with the exception of Gonedes(1973), 
and others by Eskew(1979), Thompson(1976), Rosenberg and 
McKibben(1973) and Castagna and Matolcsy(1978) clearly show that 
accounting measures of risk are associated with market risk and 
suggest that fundamental betas are likely to provide better forecasts 
of future betas than technical betas. Despite the intuitive appeal 
of these findings, however, they only refer to the U.S.A. and 
Australian stock markets and at present there is no evidence of this 
nature from the U.K., although it would seem reasonable to expect 
similar results. 
The above discussion clearly demonstrates the wide use of accounting 
information in practically all aspects of finance and stock market 
performance. In a comprehensive review of the use of "statistical 
classification models in common stock analysis" Altman(1980) cites 
several other areas where accounting information has been found to 
possess strong explanatory power:-
1) Capital Structure Decisions. Studies in this area have 
investigated the characteristics of debt versus equity issuing firms 
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(Martin and Scott, 1974; Marsh, 1979), different aspects of the 
share repurchase decision (Norgaard and Norgaard, 1974) and the 
prediction of those firms likely to convert convertible debt ove r a 
short time horizon (Frank and Weygandt 1971). 
2) Common Stock Returns. The information cont ent of accounting 
numbers has been examined by Gonedes(1974) and Altman and 
Brenner(1981) who attempted to examine the relationship between 
accounting data and share price movements. 
3) Common Stock Price and Earnings Classification. The studies in 
this area have looked at the determinants of pr ice-earnings ratios 
(Walter, 1959; Shick and Verbrugge, 1975) ', the characteristics of 
firms with volatile share price movements (Klemkosky and Petty, 
1973) and the factors causing firms to have low or high earnings 
(Haslem and Longbrake 1971). 
4) Common Stock Investment Classification. With a similar objective 
to the bond rating studies discussed above, that is trying to 
understand the characteristics of a decision making process, studies 
have been conducted into the characteri'stics of firms in various 
investment categories ego growth, quality, speculati ve etc . (White, 
1975). 
Although Altman(1980) does express his concern that most of these 
studies have statistically based methodological problems and/or 
mediocre results, he does believe that these efforts are worthwhile 
in that "the state of the art has been advanced." Our overall 
conclusion from these studies, despite Altman's criticisms, and those 
studies discussed earlier is that accounting numbe rs are on a face 
value basis useful and that exploitation of this utility depends On 
interpreting this information set in the appropriate manner. 
5.4 The DescriptiyeAbility of Accounting Ratios 
One of the tests used above to measure the utility of accounting 
information, rather than its descriptive ability, has been the 
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ability to predict certain outcomes . Thus, it is implied that 
f inancial ratios possess predictive ability. This implica tion can 
be criticised on the ｳ｡ｾ･＠ ba sis tha t accounting information is 
criticised for its r ea r view mi rror approach. Greenball(1971) 
states that; 
"Since an accounting met hod is expressly designed to measure 
past and present occurrences, but not the f uture, it is 
incorrect to speak of the predictive abilit y of an accounting 
method or number." 
Taffler(1976:84) also comments on this aspec t when reviewing Altman's 
and Beaver's studies; 
"What he has done(Altman) on an ex-post basis .is to show 
that firms which have gone bankrupt diffe r from non-failed firms 
in terms of the ir financial r a tios. ••• In testing his 
secondary sample he is not predicting bankruptcy but simply 
saying that certain firms ressemble in terms of their financial 
characteristics firms which have already failed, more than those 
which have not and others conversely." 
In essence what is being proposed is that accounting numbers can only 
describe a particular state at one point in time. Prediction by 
definition requires an assumption to be made about the occurrence of 
a future event and not simply an evaluation of the past. This 
should not, however, be interpreted as denying the practical utility 
of such statistical models as those referred to above for although 
they merely describe a particular state, they are objective, and as 
the empirical evidences suggests, apparently able to provide some 
indication of the probabilities of future events occurring. 
This aspect of the descriptive ability of accounting numbers is 
worthy of further comment as it is one of the main assumptions made 
in this thesis. Whilst the above studies have demonstrated that 
fi nancial ratios appear to pocess the ability to reflect the economic 
attributes of the firm, several writers have pointed out the pitfalls 
of accepting this premise as being totally free from defects. 
Gonedes and Dopuch(1979) for example argue that 
"Some changes in the properties of individual firm's accounting 
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numbers Ulay ha ve been i nd uced by cha nges in their accounting 
t e chniques and not by changes in the relevant attributes of 
their decisions." 
In other words, observed dif fere nces in accounting numbers between 
firms may be due eithe r to the economic a ttributes of the various 
management decisions or to different accounting techniques. In the 
latter event any inference on the economic a ttributes of the firm 
concerned could be misleading , and consequently the use of accounting 
.numbers for their descriptive ability is undermined. 
The extent of this distortion i s not, howeve r, considered to be 
large. Nair(1979) for example, in a study into the effect of 
a lternative depreciation ｾｮ､＠ inventory techniques in the ranking of 
firms on their economic attributes, found tha t different accounting 
methods did not significantly distort his rankings. Nair concludes 
that the distortionary impact of accounting methods should not be 
exaggerated and that the basic economic attributes of the firm are 
unlikely to be swamped by the distortionary effects of accounting 
techniques •.. 
Sudarsanam(1981) in a review of the literature in this area, 
concludes that this issue cannot be "conclusively resolved with the 
available evidence" and that in research of this nature it is 
necessary to accept that there is likely to be a significant 
variation in accounting techniques between companies. The relevance 
of this conclusion to this thesis is that we must be a,."are of the 
potential impact that this lack of uniformity in accounting 
techniques may have on the models developed. It would, however, 
seem probable that the effect of different accounting policies ｯｾ＠
observed accounting numbers will be random in nature, and therefore 
any inferences drawn from a set of observed relationships would be 
valid. Consequently, providing these relationships are economically 
meaningfUL, the use of accounting numbers in the understanding of 
complex decision situations remains acceptable. 
Besides the issue of the predictive ability of the above studies 
there are several other minor criticisms of this type of research and 
31 
the conclusions draw from it. These are as follows: 
1) the models are restricted to accounting variables only and it is 
plausible that other measures, such as the quality of management, 
could improve their practical utility and accuracy. However, as 
accounting numbers reflect the net effect of mana ge. ment de .:ision5 
the impact of this additional information may be marginal. 
2) there is a lack of consensus in the results with different models 
having different ratios and weights which might imply to the 
unitiated that the models are sample specific (Che n and Shime rda, 
1981). However the underlying characteristics being measure d are 
probably the same (see Pinches et al 1975, and Johnson 1979) despite 
the apparent differences in the ratio sets. 
3) the life span of any such models are possibly limited as company 
characteristics are liable to change over time und er the i nfluence of 
the economic environment as well as the decisions of their own 
managements. Further inter-temporal analysis is there fo re required 
to measure the continued accuracy of the models. 
The criticisms cited above are not major enough to prevent further 
research in this area being justified. Providing the researcher is 
aware of the possible pitfalls then very useful research can be 
performed. We believe that there are potential benefi ts from 
adopting a multivariate (holistic) approach to the analysis of 
aggregate investor behaviour. Such an exercise we hope will provide 
some evidence on the utility of financial ratios in fundamental 
analysiS and aid in the task of developing an empirically base d framework 
which may then be useful when changes for improving th e data content of 
acc:6'urtts' ｾｲ･＠ ｢･ｩｾｧ Ｇ＠ 'cortsidered. We believe that the results-
presented and discussed in the latter half of this thesis demonstrate 
the practical utility of this approach by providing an insight into a 
number of fundamental and unresolved issues in the fin Rnce area. 
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6. Summary 
The above discussion has concentrated on the purpose of financial 
statements and the practical utility of accounting information. It 
was seen that accounting sta t ements in general do not meet the 
specified objectives of the Corporate Report(1975) and that this can 
be attributed to the following: . 
1) in order to satisfy the objective of making accounting reports 
meet user needs it is essential to understand how users use 
accounting data. Without this basic understanding of how us e rs 
process information any proposed ' changes to meet perceived user needs 
will only be useful by chance alone. Furthermore, if it can be 
assumed that different user groups have different needs, then it is 
necessary to have a basic understanding of how each group, or even 
each different individual, processes this type of information. 
2) there is little, consensus on how financial statements can mee t 
the objective relating to the communication of economic 
measurement. The reason for this is that there are many definitions 
of economic worth. 
3) it is difficult to see how the accountant can maintain his role as 
an unbiased and neutral commentator on the stewardship of management, 
and at the same' time adapt his concepts and principles to a more 
dynamic and forward looking type of reporting. Moreover, the 
reporting of forecast information could be fraught with problems. 
The answer to the problem of how the objectives set in the Corporate 
Report can be met, lies in the understanding of how users process 
accounting data. Once a decision making system has been defined it 
is then possible for the accounting profession to make changes to the 
data reported so that the decision making process can be enhanced. 
As the defining of the users' decision making process is fraught with 
problems when normative reasoning is employed, it would appear that 
the only real solution to the problem lies in empirical research 
building a foundation upon which changes can be made. 
The second issue examined in this chapter concerned the hidden 
strengths of accounting information. Despite the numerous 
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criticisms voiced on the inadequacy ｾｦ＠ accounting da t a , the empirical 
s tudie s discussed revea l tha t f inancial s t a tments, when ana lys ed in 
the app ropriate manner, poss ess a grea t amount of de scriptive power. 
Fur t he rmore, the accuracy of the mode ls created from this t ype of 
analys is allows us to conside r the ir asses sments as predi ctive . The 
ge ne r a l conclusion from the dis cuss ion is tha t there is a l arge body 
of useful data contained in annual accounting s t a t ements and to 
exp loit this data is large ly a ma tt e r of analysing it in t he 
appropriate manner. 
We conclude that the two dis tinc t i ssues r eviewed above both have 
similar implications f or this study . On the one ha nd it is 
suggested that to advance the frontier of accounting and finance 
knowledge it is necessary to conduct empi ri ca l research, and on the 
other, it seems reasonable to use ac counting information to do so. 
In the next chapter we continue development of our analytical 
framework by examining some of the implications that the human 
information processing literature has for the model building approach 
in the identification of the underlying relationships within a 
decision making process. 
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CHAPTER III 
UNDE RSTANDING THE INVESTOR 'S JUDGEMENTAL PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
Associated with the general di scont ent expressed by many academics in 
the ability of accounting information to mee t us e r needs, there has 
bepn a growing int eres t, although almost exclusively in the U.S. and 
Australia, in applying the large body of psychological literature on 
the human information processing syst em to the accounting and finance 
area. It is be lieved that in order to unde rstand the factors at 
work within any judgemental process it is es sential to have some idea 
of the characteristics and biases which affect man's assessment of 
those factors. 
In the accounting and finance area the theories on what factors 
(including accounting information) influence investors are well 
e stablished and can be found in most finance textbooks (Firth, 1975 
and Lorie and Brealey, 1978 are examples). However, despite much 
theory, there does not appear to be a coherent understanding of how 
the investor actually uses these factors in his decision making 
process. Slovic(1969) comments on this as follows; 
"All too often expert judgement (in this thesis the investor) is 
regarded as a mysterious, intuitive phenomenon, incapable of 
being described precisely". 
In this chapter we construct a conceptual framework for our 
subsequent analyses by discussing the implications of the 
psychological literature for the development of user models. This 
discussion will be split into t wo parts. In the first the problems 
of data expansion and cognitive complexity and their probable effect 
on the user will be examined. In the second part we review the 
literature on "paramorphic representations" of the decision making 
process. 'This includes an assessment of both the linear additive 
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a nd configura l approaches to mode lling human judgement. The aim of 
thi s chapter is to provide an insight into the na ture and complexi t y 
of a de ci sion making process and the most appropria t e wa y of 
analysing such a process. 
2 . The Policy of Data Expansion i n Financia l Re port s 
In the previous cha pt e r it was shown that in genera l accounting 
sta t ements in thei r current f orma t are conventionally conside r ed 
s uboptimal in tha t they do not effec t ively co mmunica t e al l 
information necessary to mee t perceived use r needs (A.S.S.A. 1975, 
A.A.A. 1977). It was argued that this perce ived deficiency in 
conventional accounting statements could only be overcome by seeking 
a be tter understa nding of how users of accounting information process 
this type of data and tha t this understanding can only be acheived by 
empir ical research. Whilst this line of reasoning is acceptable. to 
some academics (Tricker, 1976 and Perrin, 1976 are examples), there 
is a l a rge body of academics and practioners who feel that empirical 
r esearch will take too long to conduct and that radical changes in 
accounting are r equired immediately. Unfortunately, lack of faith 
in empiricism has only led to a mixed collection of ideas and 
theories; Revsine(1970) describes the "proponents of change as 
seemingly united only by their dissatisfaction with the extant 
reportings". 
As a result of this lack of consensus on how to improve financial 
statments there has been a general policy of data expansion which 
seems to be acceptable to most practitioners and academics and has 
even been ratified by the FASB(1976) in the U.S.A. as a means of 
meeting user needs. Revsine(1970) in his paper on data expansion 
and acounting information explains this behaviour as follows: 
" Expanding the range of data provided is viewed as a means of 
ove rcoming the limitations of contemporary reports without 
necessitating detailed knowledge of user models." 
In other words, because there is a lack of understanding about user 
needs and as there is no agreement on the appropriate conceptual 
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frame\wrk upon which to base any proposed changes, the accounting 
profession finds that a policy of da t a expansion, tha t is r e porting 
a ll data which is conceivabl y r e l evant, is ge ne r a lly acc eptable. 
The premise upon which this policy is based is that as there are "a 
vast multitude of (d ecision making ) models used in practice" 
(Greenball, 1971), it is impossible to meet and satisfy all user 
ne eds. Futhermore, if a policy of selective item r e porting is 
adopted then it ca n be a rgued tha t this only reduce s the utility of 
accounting information to some use r groups who may need the data 
which is not reported. 
One advocate of this policy of. unlimit ed data expansion is 
Keane(1977) who argues that if an item of da t a , or a particular 
framework for reporting, is pece ived to be i mportant by any us e r then 
it should be reported regardless of the cost. Keane even goes so 
far as to recommend that if there is more than one me thod of 
reporting a particular item, or set of items, then all such methods 
should be reported, as someone somewhere may believe that one method 
is more relevant for his particular decision making process than 
another. He concludes his paper by stating that "it is sufficient 
that a given item of financial data be useful, without being more 
us eful than other data, to warrant its inclusion in the corporate 
report". Whilst the Keane approach is not without its problems, the 
policy of data expansion has also been advocated by expert users who 
believe that additional data on certain items would help them make 
better decisions (see Casey(1980) for a review). 
2.1 The Costs of a Data Expansion Policy 
Data expansion may at first appear to be the best solution to the 
very difficult problem of satisfying user needs, but it is not 
without its costs. Firstly, there are the costs associated with 
data collection and communication, and although the marginal cost per 
data item may be low, all costs must be seen to be warranted and 
therefore the additional data must be peceived to be useful. If the 
Kea ne approach discussed above were adopted in a blind manner it is 
feasible that financial statements would become even more voluminous 
and expensive to produce than at present. Nevertheless, even if the 
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production costs were not prohibitive there is a far more important 
negative effect which could have a real cost to the user, this is the 
potential decline in the efficiency of processing information and an 
associated reduction in ability of make "optimum" decisions. This 
negative effect described as information overload in the psychological 
literature (Goldberg, 1968), has been found to be present in other 
decision making environments (Jacoby, 1974) and therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that it could apply to the interpretation of 
accounting information. If the accountant were to succeed in 
providing data that satisfied all us er needs but in so doing reduced 
the value of that data to the user due to the effect of information 
overload, then he has merely solved one problem at the expense of 
creating another. 
Moreover, if the accountant accepts the premise that it is not 
sufficient to supply information but that the information should be 
useful to the user, then he can no longer ignore the way in which 
that information is actually processed. In other words it is not 
enough to theorise what could be useful, emphasis must be placed on 
what is useful. Obviously, this requires empirical research to find 
out which items of data are actually used and in which way. 
Furthermore, such research should not be blind to the way in which 
humans process 1nformation and thus make decisions. 
3. Optimum Information Processing 
Over the last ten years a number of articles (eg. Revsine, 1970; 
Miller, 1972) have been written relating the human information 
processing theories of Schroder, Driver . and Streufert(1967) to the 
use of financial statements' by decision ｭ｡ｫ･ｲｳｾ＠ Schroder et al 
describes man as having "the ability to utilize alternative meanings 
of the same stimuli and to build up and use different patterns of 
interrelationships within the same set of meanings". They further 
suggest that man processes the stimuli by firstly ordering them along 
existing conceptual dimensions and then by combining and integrating 
these dimensions to make his decision. Obviously the number and 
complexity of the conceptual dimensions for any individual are 
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dependent upon his experience, education and creative thinking 
ability. 
Based upon this description of how man processes information Schroder 
e t al propose that man's ability to make effective decisions is 
dependent upon two aspects as f ollows:-
1) the conceptual ability of the decision maker, that is his ability 
to organise and combine the stimuli being processed into conceptual 
dimensions. 
2) the envirnomental complexi ty, that is the 'number of stimuli that 
have to be processed by the decision maker. 
This means that the ability of an individual to make the best 
decision is dependent upon his intelligence and experience and 
secondly the amount of information at his disposal. Schroder et al 
further state that for a given level of conceptual ability the 
decision maker will become more effective as the envirnomental 
stimuli increase from zero. In other words if we start with no 
information, we are able to make better decisions as the amount of 
information increases. However, there is a limit to the amount of 
stimuli that can be processed, after which decision quality declines . 
This theory suggests that there is an optimum level of envirnomental 
complexity, abdve which there is information overload. In other 
areas such as consumer preferences this theory has been ratified by a 
number of empirical studies Ｈｓ｣ｾｲｯ､･ｲ＠ et aI , 1969 and Jacoby, 1974 
are examples). In the accounting area studies by San Miguel(1976), 
Casey(1980) and Moriarity(1979) have, in general, found similar 
results to the studies in other areas and as such lend some support 
to the theory that it is potentially possible to ｳｷ｡ｾｰ＠ a decision 
maker by providing too much information. 
A further finding from the psychological literature, which has a 
bearing on the policy of data expansion, conce rns man's belief that 
he makes better decisions with more information. One illustrative 
study, that of Oskamp(1965), relating to the clinical assessment of a 
patients personality by 32 judges found that as the amount of 
information provided about the patients increased, the accuracy of 
- , 
their judgements remained the same, about 30%, but the'ir. confidence 
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in t hei r judgements increase d dr amatically and "thei r certainty about 
thei r decisions became entirely out of proportion to the actual 
correctnes s of these decisions ." Slovic(1972) in a paper on human 
judgement and inves tment decision making, sugges ts that these 
fi nd ings may partly exp l ain the tendency t o provide the investor ｾｩｴｨ＠
as much information as possible. Consequently, al though the 
investor may feel more confident in his decision making , it may be 
argued tha t he may well become l es s effective through the 
dysfunctional consequences of the information overload phenomenon. 
Further discussion on this aspect is given in Taff l e r(1981c), 
Snowball(1980) and Goldberg (19 68 ). 
Revsine(1970) uses the Schod e r et al mode l fo r dis cussing the trend 
of dat a expansion at the expense of the utility of financial 
statements to the user. Revsine argues that data expansion without 
consideration of the way in which humans proces s information is more 
regre ssive than progressive. He concludes by saying: 
"If as accounting theorists we choose to embrace the data 
expansion approach, then, given the enviromental complexities 
contraint we must decide what information is to be in the 
expanded report. Knowledge that a particular kind of data is 
relevant cannot serve as a sole criterion for admissibility 
since there are numerous kinds of potentially relevant 
information." 
Mi ller(1972) develops Revsine approach by stating that as there are 
many user groups with different levels of cognitive complexity, it is 
impossible to draw up accounts to meet all their needs in the optimal 
manner. The best solution argued by Miller to this problem is for 
the accountant to concentrate on meeting the needs of the most 
sophisticated user, namely the investment analyst. Although this 
approach reduces the utility of accounting statements to some users 
through superoptimality, it is seen to be preferable to reducing the 
quality of the investment analyst's decisions through lack of 
information. In a following paper Wil son(1973) comments that 
Hille r's assumption that the utility of accounting information to 
other user groups will be reduced through superoptimality is not 
proven and that there is evidence to indicate that regardless of the 
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levels of cognitive complexity of different decision makers their 
optimal information load may be very similar. As a result Wilson 
agrees with Miller that the accounting profession will make more 
progress by concentrating on the investment analyst to determine the 
needs of all user groups but, he stresses, for different reasons. 
Wilson goes onto conclude that while there may be some preliminary 
evidence which supports the relationships in the accounting area, 
"this evidence is tenuous at best". Jensen(1970) Ｈｱｵｯｾ ･､＠ by Wilson) 
warns us against readily accepting 
"empirical evidence obtained by behavioural experiments as a 
basis for establishing accounting policy. Not only is it 
difficult to extrapolate from such studies but often the studies 
themselves have conflicting ｲ･ｳｵｬｴｾＮＢ＠
There is however the recent study by Casey(1980) who argues f rom his 
results that potential information overload may well be a prohlem in 
accounting and not merely a perceived problem resulting from r e lating 
the psychological literature to accounting research. In hi s study 
Casey asked 122 bank loan officers to participate in a questionnaire 
study whereby they were required to predict which of ten real-life 
firms would declare bankruptcy. He split his sample into three and 
provided each group with a different quantity of information. The 
results showed\that too little information produced an inferior 
performance but that the medium and large quantites of information 
groups where indifferent on predictive ability. However, th e large 
q,uantity of information group took significantly longer in its their 
assessment than the medium group and therefore was less efficient in 
its decision making. Casey attributes th is inefficiency to the 
additional information needed to be processed and concludes that this 
is clear evidence of information overload. 
Whilst Casey's results do provide some evide nce to confirm that the 
Schroder et al(1967) theory on information load may have some 
relevance in accounting, they also reveal that although the group 
with the largest quantity of information took longer they were able 
to consistently classify two companies more accurately than the 
middle information group. Thus the conclusion reached by Casey on the 
applicability ,of information overload rheory in accounting must be 
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considered a little tenuous, although his results do indicate that 
further research in this area is important. 
A further study of interest was conducted by Moriarity(1979) who 
examined the ability of accounting students to classify firms as 
bankrupt or non-bankrupt based upon f our different levels of 
information load. The results revealed that the level of least 
information proved to be the optimum both in terms of ac curacy and 
time. Whilst any conclusions from this study must b -e.considered 
tenuous at best due to the unusual mehodology employed, Moriarity has 
indicated the potent ial problem of information overload that may 
exist in the accounting area. 
The conclusion that we arrive at from the above discus sion is that 
when considering the utility of accounting information it is 
･ｳｳ･ｮｴｾ｡ｬ＠ to be aware of the way in which information is processed. 
We have seen that the psychological literature suggests that 
information overload is potentially a problem when a policy of data 
expansion is blindly pursued. Currently the accounting profession 
is in an awkward position in that it does not know whether the 
current level of information supplied in accounts is suboptimal, 
optimal or superoptimal in satisfying user needs. Furthe rmore given 
the empirical evidence to date it is not possible even to conclude 
\ 
ｾｨ｡ｴ＠ information overload is a problem in accounting. Thus we are 
forced to return to the call for more empirical research. 
In this thesis we do not directly test the information load 
phenomenon in the same way as Casey(1980), but look at in from rather 
a different angle. In the first place by examining the association 
between accounting information and share prices we hope to gain an 
insight into which data items appear important to the marke t as a 
whole. From this insight and by assuming that the market model is 
the sum of all individual investor models, it may be possible to make 
inferences about the conceptual complexity of the investor's decision 
making process. Furthermore, it is also possible tentatively to 
suggest that the strength of the association between relative share 
valuations and different items of accounting information might shed 
some light on which items are likely to be important to the investor. 
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A policy of data expansion that does not significantly add to the 
informational content of these key items may at the very least not be 
very helpful in improving the utility of accounting information. 
A second indirect way in which the above discussion may have a 
bearing on this thesis concerns our expectations of the complexity of 
the resultant models in our analyses. It is argued above that there 
is a limit on the number of input items that can be effectively 
processed by the decision maker. If we consider the investment 
analyst's informational needs we find that they are ｶ･ｲｾ＠ numerous 
encompaDing both micro- and macro- economic factors which may 
influence the future performance of the company in question and thus 
current share prices. It would therefore seem that the analyst's 
task envirnoment is already complex, even before he starts his 
detailed assessment of each of these factors. As accounting 
informqtion is only one of these factors, albeit a priori an 
important one, it would seem not unreasonable to expect a complex 
relationship to exist between accounting information and share 
prices. Whilst at this stage we cannot be very precise as to the 
form of models developed in this thesis, it is likely that only a 
small set of measures will be found to be important. 
4. The "Paramorphic Representation" of the Investment Analyst. 
In our quest to establish a relationship between accounting 
information and relative share values we concentrate on attempting to 
understand the factors at work in the market as a whole rathe r than 
studying the idiosycratic decision making processes of a few 
investment analysts. Whilst we believe that analysing the market as 
a whole is likely to yield more useful results, we recognise that the 
decision process of the market is the sum of the individual decision 
processes of many expert analysts. Consequently we believe that it 
is reasonable to expect the market to possess similar characteristics 
to that of the individual as a decision maker and that to conduct 
meaningful research it is essential to adopt a methodology which has 
the ability to accommodate such characteristics. 
The task of the expert judge is to process information and make a 
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decision, and it is in his ability to interpret and integrate that 
his success resides. However, the way in which the expert us e s 
information in his decision making process is difficult to describe 
with any degree of precision. Slovic(1969) suggests that if the 
expert is asked to reason why he made a certain decision he will 
ei ther describe a long list of factors and rationalise these, . or, he 
will simply reply "because it looks like itl" Both answers indicate 
that although the expert does process information, he is unable to 
clearly define how he uses it to make a decision, that is his self 
insight is poor. 
There have been many studies into the way in which humans make 
decisions and, although these have mainly concentrated on the 
clinical psychology area (see Goldberg, 1968 for a review), they have 
implications for other research areas, such as ac counting and 
finance. Libby and Lewis(1977) and Wright(1980) review the existing 
psychological literature in accounting and try to evaluate the stat e 
of the art of the understanding of human information processing 
research in accounting. This area covers a wide spec trum of topics 
but we shall only concentrate on one part namely the "paramophic 
representaton" of the decision makin g process. 
Paramophic representation is a term used by Hoffman(1960) (quot ed 
\ 
from Dawes and Corrigan, 1974) which describes th e use of a linear 
model to represent expert judgement. Dawes(1971) explains this term 
more fully as follows:-
"The term was chosen because Hoffman did not mean to imply that 
the actual psychological process involved in the judgement was 
that of weighting various variables, but rather that this 
process could be simulated by such a weighting." 
In other words the judgement process is re garded as a complicated 
system with many varying interactions which th e refore cannot be 
replicated in an isomorphic manner by a formal model . Nevertheless, 
if the output of a simulation model corresponds to that of the judge, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the mod el ha s captured the 
judgement policy, albeit in a way that we ights and combines di ffe rent 
key variables. Models of this nature only approximate the behaviour 
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the decision maker, they do not imitate. It should be stressed ｴｨｾｴ＠
it is this concept of analysis which is us ed in this thesis for 
understanding the market's decision making processes not any other. 
4.1 The Linear Additive Approach 
The use of linear models to approximate the expert's decision making 
process has been examined by several researche rs. Goldberg(1970) 
reports on a comprehensive study whereby the judgements of clinical 
psychologists were simulated by a linear model. The results 
revealed that the model was able to outperform even the be st 
psychologist. Dawes(1971) investigated the us e of a linear model to 
vet applications for postgraduate education and found that 55% of th e 
applicants could be rejected without screening out any who would have 
in fact been admitted by the committee. Dawes concludes by 
suggesting that this method for screeening helps make decisions which 
are "less capricious and more valid than those by the declslon maker 
relying on his own intuition". Goldberg(1968) and Dawes and 
Corrigan(1974) provide further reviews of the mod e lling of th e expe rt 
judge and in each case the general conclusion is t hat the mod e l can 
outperform man. One further and perhaps worrying res ult from th es e 
studies is the lack of consensus in the decisions mad e by expe rts. 
\ 
Libby and Lewis(1977) comment: 
"The results of psychological research usin g th e ｬ ･ ｮｾ＠ mod e l 
approach (that is paramorphic representat i on) have gene rally 
indicated that many expert judges such as clinical 
psychologists, radiologists and stockbroker s make judgements 
that are consistent over time, but indica te little consensus 
among judges." 
Before considering the studies that are more rele vant to the use of 
this approach in accounting and finance it is important to examine 
briefly the reasons for these perhaps unexpected results. Why does a 
model outperform an individual trying to do th e same job? 
Dawes(1971) suggests the following reasons:-
1) a mathematical model is an abstraction of the process it models 
and hence, if the decision maker follows valid principle s, then thes e 
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will be abstracted by the model. 
2) the model is not affected by fatigue, headaches or boredom which 
are factors that could and do reduce the quality of an individuals 
decision making process. In statistical terms individuals suffer 
from random error and bias. 
A paramorphic representation of man is not affected by extraneous 
variables, and as long as these variables are not related 
systematically to the decision under examination, then a model will 
attach the appropriate weights to the key variables. 
In the area of accounting and finance, one study which is 
particularly relevant to this thesis is that of Wright(1977) who 
tested the linear predictability, conse'nsus and accuracy of student 
predictions of stock prices. He supplied each student with five 
items of information for 60 companies and asked them to predict the 
share ｰｲｾ｣･＠ movement. He then developed a linear model relating the 
information cues to the actual share price movements. The results 
revealed that the linear model performed better than the students, 
inter judge disagreement was high although the estimation ability of 
the students was significantly better than chance, and that there was 
cognitive bias to overestimate low priced shares. 
\ 
Wright was demonstrating the use of the Brunswick lens approach (see 
Libby, 1975) for assessing how 'man compares with a mathematLcal model 
and, although his results indicate that similar results to those 
found in the psychological literature could be found in accounting 
and finance, the use of students could potentially have reduced the 
value of the experiment. Several researchers have, however, 
investigated the extent of this problem of using students as 
surrogates and found that the performance of students and the expert 
judge to be very similar (Abdel-Khalik, 1974; Ashton and Kramer, 
1980). Consequently, although the use of students has been a common 
feature of the studies conducted in this area to test linear models 
(see Libby and Lewis, 1977 for a full review), the empirical evidence 
in the accounting and finance area does lend support to the theory 
that models may be able to outperform the expert's intuitlon". 
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4.2 The Configural Approach 
Despite the accuracy of linear models to simulate the expert's 
decision making process it is generally accepted that humans process 
information in a configural manner. 
"since clinicians generally describe their cognitive processes 
as complex ones involving the curvilinear, configural and 
sequential utilisation of cues, one might expect the linea r 
additive model would provide a rather poor representation of 
their judgement" Goldberg(1968). 
Whilst linear models have been able to isolate key decision 
variables, they have not so far been successful in describing the 
complex manner of the use of information in practice. This is 
mainly attributable to two restrictions, firstly the methodology used 
does , not permit interaction between variables to be revealed, and 
secondly, because experts cannot describe the interaction between 
variables, it is not possible to formally model such relationships 
into such a model. 
A study which revealed some empirical evidence on the configural 
nature of the investment manager's information processsing is by 
Clarkson(1966). Clarkson's study involved the development of a 
\ 
simulation model, as opposed to the statistically derived models 
discussed above, of one investment trust manager's investment 
evaluation process. The model developed was formulated by breaking 
down the decision process into separate analytical processes and thrn 
constructing simple decision rules for each of these processes. 
Clarkson then went on to compare the similarity between the 
portfolios derived from this model with the actual portfolio of the 
fund manager and found that there were few differences. Whilst 
Clarkson's study is of a fund manager and provides no statistical 
evidence on the strength of the association between accounting 
information and share prices per se, the success of his model in 
classifying companies indicates that he was able to capture the main 
characteristics of the decision making process, and further analysis 
of the decision rules adopted reveals that this process contains many 
configural relationships. Consequently one conclusion from this 
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study is that the investor's dec ision making process may be expected 
to be configural. 
In order to overcome the perceoived problems with linear models, 
several studies have used nonlinear or configural techniques to model 
man with the hope of producing a more informative and realistic 
representation of his decision making process . Goldberg(1968) 
reports on several studies which used ANOVA to search for interaction 
be tween variables in a particular complex decision making 
e nvironment. The results were found to be "dis hea rt ening" as 
configural relationships could only account for 3% of the total 
variance examined. 
The use of ANOVA as an analytical techn ique in cognitivive research 
in the area of accounting and finance is not uncommon and in general 
the results have agreed with those found in the psychological 
literature. (Libby and Lewis, 1977 provide a good review of this 
work.) There are, however, two studies that a r e of particular 
relevance to this thesis in that they investigate the way i n which 
investment analysts process information. 
The firs t of these studies is by Slovic( 1969) who applied th e ANOVA 
technique for describing the way in wh i ch stockbrokers employ 
\ 
information for evaluating stocks. Slavic commences his article by 
addressing the problem of linear additive mod els and s t ating that 
they 
"have not been successful in de sc r i bi ng the complex patterned or 
configural use of information, that is, the process whereby an 
item of information is interpreted dif fe r ent ly from one t i me to 
the next, depending on the nature of other available 
information. Since experts generally claim that they us e 
information configurally, it is important tha t t echni qu es used 
to describe judgement be sensitive to such processes ." 
Slovic's reasons for choosing stockbrokers as subjects were that 
their task is an important one, the decision is extremely complex 
with many information sources and there is evidence that fi na ncial 
analysts believe that relevant factors are interpreted in a 
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configural manner (Slovic quoted the Clarkson, 1962 study to 
substantiate this claim). The study involved selecting two 
stockbrokers and asking them to examine 11 dichotomous factors for 
128 companies in order to arrive at a rating of the likelihood that 
the market price would rise over the following six to twelve months. 
The analysis of the results revealed that the correlation between the 
experts was low and that they had quite distinct decision making 
models. This was unexpected as the second broker was selected by 
the first broker based upon his knowledge of the other's similar 
attitudes and training. 
Slovic attempted to measure the amount of interaction between the 
variables which at first appeared to be low. However, he pointed 
out that the method employed to measure interaction, which had be en 
used by the other ANOVA studies, did not provide a true measure of 
interaction, and he therefore ｲ･｣｡ｬｾｵｬ｡ｴ･､＠ the variance explained and 
conclude4 that interaction accounted for 36% of the variance of 
Broker A and 85% of Broker B. If one accepts Slovic's mathematics 
then clearly his stockbrokers decision model were interactive. 
A further interesting twist to this study was that Slovic asked the 
brokers to rate each of the 11 factors on how they perceived their 
relative importance. These weightings were then compared with the 
\ 
model weights and Slovic concluded that the brokers showed only a 
small insight into their own decision making process, thus suggesting 
that the perceived needs of users might possibly differ from their 
actual needs. Slovic ends his article by stating that these results 
"provide experimental evidence to support the commonly believed 
notion that judges use information configurally". 
The second study of importance is by Slovic, Fleissner and 
Bauman(1972) who conducted a similar study to the one discussed 
above. In this study 18 subjects took part, 13 stockbrokers and 5 
students, who were asked to rank the expected share price movement of 
64 stocks using eight dichotomous variables. The results revealed 
that a) there were substantial differences between individual uses of 
variables, b) the most heavily used variable was earnings yearly 
trend and c) brokers exhibited more disagreement in their use of 
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variables than did the students. As regards interaction they found 
that although some of the brokers revealed that their processing 
systems were highly configural, most of the systematic variance of 
their judgements could be accounted for by means of a linea r additive 
combination of factors. Slovic et al concluded their study by 
suggesting: 
"that techniques such as ANOVA and multiple regression have 
considerable promise as devices for describing and furthering 
our understanding of the use of information in investment 
decisions." 
Before leaving this study completely it is interesting to note that 
the subjects were also asked to rank information variables on 
perceived utility. Again a low correlation between actual and 
perceived utility was obtained, although 'it was found that the 
students seemed to have more idea on how they processed information 
than did , the brokers, possibly because they were attempting to apply 
theory they had been taught. 
The two ANOvA studies discussed above, and the Clarkson (1966) study, 
provide strong evidence that the investment analyst processes 
information in a configural manner. Moreover, when the analysts 
were asked to rationalise the interaction found to be present between 
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certain variables they were able to provide intuitively sound and 
economically reasonable explanations of their actions. Furthermore, 
despite the clear interactive nature of the way in which investment 
analysts process information, it was demonstrated that simple linear 
additive models were capable of , performing just as well as the more 
complicated configural models. Ashton(1979) demonstrates 
statistically why a linear formulation may provide a good fit to a 
non-linear configural task environment. 
The ANOVA technique has therefore been shown to be useful in 
revealing the interactive nature of investment analysis, but it is 
not without its limitations. Firstly, in the studies presented 
above only dichotomous variables were used, and therefore the 
experiments cannot be accepted as modelling the true decision making 
process. Secondly the ability of the technique to create a picture 
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of how the variables interact is severely res tr icted. The results 
have very simply shown that varia ble A in teracts with variable S, but 
because of the nature of the technique and the need for a large 
number of observations, it is not possible to meas ure whethe r 
variable C interacts with th e interaction of A and B. In othe r 
words, if it were found that t he earnings trend interacts wi th the 
support trend (a measure of how low the share price has fallen), as 
in Slovic(1969), then we would want to know how the ea rnings yield, 
for example, related to the original i nt e r action and in wha t 
circumstances did the interaction ｣ ｨ ｡ ｮ ｧｾ Ｎ＠ Only i n this-way is it 
possible to build up a full unde r stand ing on how the i nvestme nt 
analyst interrelates hi s conceptual dimensions when processing 
information. We must therefore conclude that, des pite provid i ng 
some insight into the interactive nature of decision making , the 
ANOVA type of study is very restric t ed . 
On the other hand linea r additive t ec hniques have i n seve ral s tud ies 
proved to be as good as, if not more accurate tha n, the configural 
approach for modelling judgements. Furthermore empirica l evid ence 
from the psychological literature and from Wright(1977), which was 
discussed above, suggests tha t linear additive techniques are more 
consistent in their evalua t ions than even the best judge. 
Nevertheless, the linea r add i t ive ap proach is not without its 
\ 
limitations. Firstly the resultant comb i na tion of va riables tell us 
very little about how the expert decision maker uses these variables 
i n his decision making process . Wh ils t no one would suggest that 
the model is not useful for bootstrapping, that is helping the 
decision maker make better decisions , i t is questiona ble whethe r it 
is ve ry informative about the way i nfo rma tion i s ac tually processed. 
Secondly, even if we accept the premise that these techniques 
highlight key decision variables, it is not pos s ible to make 
i nf e rences about their relative influence within the decision model. 
There is some evidence (see Dawes & Corrigan, 1974 a nd also Ashton, 
1976 for a review) that if the regression weight s a r e replaced with 
unit weights, the models are still able to outperfo rm the expert 
judge. If we accept that this empirical evidence is correct, then 
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we can only conclude that the regression variables are influential, 
but we are unable to qualify our statement as to which variables are 
more important than others. 
5. Other Characterists of the Human Information Processing System 
In concluding this discussion of the characteristics of the human 
information processing system, it is instructive to briefly examine 
some of the heuristic decision rules which we use in complex task 
situations. The empirical research into these heuristics reveals 
that they are likely to introduce systematic biases into the 
evaluation process and thus may cause errors in judgement. 
heuristics are as follows: 
Typical 
1) The Availability Bias. This heuristic relates to the bias 
caused by either recent experience or lack of experience. For 
example Taffler(1981c) suggests that it is feasible that a bank loan 
officer may be overcautious in his judgements if a customer has 
recently defaulted on a loan. 
2) Conservatism. This describes our difficulty in assimulating new 
information. Very often we tend to pay insufficient attention to 
new cues and find difficulty in reassessing our views. The reverse 
can also be true (ie. "non-conservatism") whereby we pay too much 
attention to new cues, heavily overemphasizing the importance of the 
newly received data and forgetting our prior knowledge. 
3) Illusory Correlation. Often we tend to interpret evidence in 
accordance with our previously held beliefs when in fact our beliefs 
are wrong. In other words we see what we want to see and build an 
illusion of correlation between the cause and the effect. 
4) Hindsight Bias. This heuristic describes our inability to go 
back in time and recollect our views on the probability of an event 
occurring. Once we become aware of an event taking place then we 
tend to believe that it was inevitable and that prior to the event we 
knew what would happen. 
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5) Illusion of Validity. Under certain conditions we can become 
more certain about our judgements even though the accuracy of our 
prediction remains the same or declines . This usually happ ens when 
dealing with large qualities of collinear data. 
6) Anchoring and Adjustment. In order to simultaneously make sense 
of a large number of pieces of information and synthesize these into 
an overall judgement, we often start with an initial view, that is 
the anchor, and then adjust in the light of the other data. 
Typically however we are unable . to adequately adjust oui judgements 
to reflect the implications of the other data. 
Taffler(1918c) and Wright(1980) provide a more detailed discussion of 
each of these heuristics and provide many references to empirical 
tests in both the psychological and accounting area. It is 
sufficient for our discussion to point out their existence and to be 
aware that judgement ･ｲｲｯｾ＠ caused by these biases are likely to be 
pr.esent in the investment analysts decision process. The impact of 
these various heuristics on our resultant models depends upon whe the r 
the bias is systematic or random. In the fir B t instance the bias is 
caused by a consistent treatment of particular data items by the 
market as a whole, and consequently will be reflected in relative 
share values. Whilst the impact of systematic bias, if present, 
will affect our models due to our use of the "black-box" approach, we 
are unable to recognise or quantify such biases. On the other hand, 
random bias caused by individual analysts treating particular data 
items in an .incon sistent manner is likely to have only a random 
effect on share prices and therefore is not expected to have any 
significant effect on our resultant models. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter in an attempt to lay a throretical framework for our 
subsequent analyses we discussed two aspects of the growing body of 
literature on human information processing, namely information 
overload and paramorphic representation. The purpose was to 
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emphasize that when investigating the manner in which accounting 
information is processed by the market it is essential that the 
methodology adopted is capable of accommodating the way in which 
humans process information. 
The first part of this chapter examined the issue of information 
overload and the resulting potential problems for the producers of 
accounting information. It was suggested that the adoption of a 
data expansion policy, without an understanding of user needs, will 
lead to less efficient processing by users. Although the concept of 
information overload is not ､ｩｲｾ｣ｴｬｹ＠ tested in this theiis, we 
believe that by developing a better understanding of the association 
between accounting information and relative share values it may be 
possible to make some general inferences about the complexity of the 
investor's decision making process and also tentatively suggest areas 
where a policy of data expansion might be more effective. In 
addition this examination of the problems of information processing 
led us to expect that our resultant models of th e i nvestor may 
consist of only a few variables. 
The second part of this chapter discussed the paramorphic 
rep'resentation of the judgement process and can be summarised as 
follows. Firstly, our investigation into the relationship between 
accounting infqrmation and relative share values ce ntres around 
trying to understand the factors at work within the decision making 
process of the market as a whole. Furthermore as the market's 
decision making process may be viewed as simply the sum of all the 
expert analysts decision making processes, we may expect the market 
to possess similar human characteristics in its judgement 
process. However, it was shown that the judgement process is all 
too often viewed as a mysterious phenomenon, and consequently an 
understanding of the typical characteristics of an investment analyst 
could not be obtained by simply asking a group of such experts to 
describe their decision making processes. The answer to this 
pr,oblem lies in understanding how humans process information and 
therefore reference was made to the psychological literature. 
The empirical evidence from both clinical psychology and the 
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accounting and finance areas revealed that linear additive models can 
successfully replicate the judgement of experts and furthermore that 
such models are in many ways more reliable than any single judge . 
However, such models are not presente d as being exact r e plicas of the 
decision making process, but are best described as providing a 
paramorphic representation of the expert's decision making process. 
However, despite the conclusive resulte from such research (see 
Goldberg,1976), this type of study has provid ed little insight into 
the characteristics of the human dec ision making process which is 
highly complex and involves ｩｮｴｾｲ｡｣ｴｩｯｮ Ｂ ｢･ｴｷ ･･ ｮ＠ various )nput cues. 
Nevertheless, other studies using a different analytical approach 
(ANOVA) have suggested that it is possible to uncover some configural 
relationships which may go unnoticed using the conventional linear 
additive analytical techniques. Whilst the conf igural models have 
provided some additional insight into the judgem nt process in 
question, they are unable to produce any significant improvement on 
the preditive accuracy of the linear additive "approach. 
Furthermore, their ability to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
decision making process is severly restricted due to their inability 
to examine the data in a holistic way. 
The above discussion also revealed several other interesting 
fi ndings. ｆｩｾｳｴｬｹＬ＠ it would appear that experts have a poor 
understanding of how they combine variables when making decisions, 
and secondly, there would appear to be little consensus in The 
judgement of expert judges. Also various heuristic decision rules 
are" likely to be used by the analyst in an attempt to r e duce the 
"cognitive strain" introduced by having to analyse a complex and 
relatively unstructured decision situation. Although the usual 
caveats apply about generalising from experimental evidence in one 
task domain to another and also from laboratory studies to complex 
and real decision environments there would appear to be no good 
reason why such biases are not an inherent characteristic of the 
cognitive "kit bag" of the investment analyst. 
In this study we adopt a methodological approach which attempts to 
overcome some of the deficiences in the studies referred to above. 
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In the f irst place we att empt to pick up the configural nature of the 
marke t's decision making process by employing a r ela tively new 
mult ivariate statistical t echnique called Au tomatic Int e raction 
Detector (AID) which produces a decision tree typ e model of the 
factors a t work within the market. This t echnique is able to 
combine the interactive exp l ana tory nature of the ANOVA approach with 
the multivariate mod e l building app r oach of the linea r additive 
t echniques. Consequently , we are not restricted to analysing 
､ｩ｣ｾＡｯｭｯｵｳ＠ variables as in the case of Slovic(1969) and Slovic et 
al(1972) and ca n apply the t echnique to l a r ge data bases of 
i nfo rmation. The end r esult should be a more exact and compl e t e 
model of the interactions and interrela tionships be tween ac counting 
information and relative share val ues . Second ly, by analysing the 
market as a whole rather than conduct ing a laboratory type analysis 
which is ｲ･ｳｴｲｩ｣ｴｾ､＠ to a limited number of subj ects and the 
researcher's own subjective r e cording processes , we believe that we 
have been able to reduce the impact of the inevitable biases 
resulting from the unconscious application of the many heuristics 
present in any analyst's decision making process. The impact of 
these heuristics on the market as a whole may be expected to be 
e ither random or specific. \{hilst we do not expect random bias to 
have any significant impact on our mod e ls we r ecognise that any 
specific biases present in the marekt as a whole, which is a result 
of a majority of analysts allowing the same heuristic to bias their 
decision making process in the same way, then this should be 
reflected in the structure of the resultant models but unfortunately 
it will not be explicitly detected. Overall, therefore, we believe 
that the models derived by the application of AID to a large data 
base may lead to more precise paramorphic representations of the 
decision making process at work within the market. 
Despite the potential benefits of the use of AID in understanding how 
the market processes information, it is important not to disregard 
the utility of the linear additive techniques completely. By making 
a comparison between the results derived from the application of AID 
with those from applicatfon of the more traditional analytical 
techniques it should be possible to establish whether or not the 
configural approach adds anything to the linear additive approach for 
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our particular purposes. This, we hope, will provide some empirical 
evidence on the suitability of such models for the description of the 
information processing process. In this thesis we therefore examine 
both the descriptive ability of each approach and from a statistical 
point of view, the explanatory power of each technique. 
In ·the next chapter we continue this inductive argumentative approach 
to building an analytical framework by examining the theory and 
extant work on the association between share prices and accounting 
information. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Accounting Information and Share Prices: A Conceptual Framework 
1. Introduction 
Our search for a relationship between accounting information and 
relative share prices is premised upon the not unreasonable 
assumption that both strong theoretical and empirical relationships 
exist. In this chapter we examine the issues underlying this 
assumption by reviewing in detail both relevant theories of share 
valuation and the extant empirical work to date. The resulting 
conceptual framework will aid us in the formulation of our models in 
terms of variable selection and methodology and also in the 
subsequent interpretation of the theoretical implications of our 
analyses. 
It is unquestionable that accounting information . is used in the 
process of evaluating shares. Most text books on finance discuss 
the importance of accounting information, and in practice financial 
statements are a major source of information to the analyst. 
Parker(1967), a senior partner in a New York stockbroking firm, in 
fact goes so far as to s tate that "the financial history and 
prospects of a corporation exp r essed in the figures extracted from 
standard accounting statements are the beginning and end of eve ry 
professional inves tment ana l ysis ". In this thesis, however, we 
stress that as accounting information is only a part of the total 
information set available to the investor, it is wrong to expect any 
relationship be tween share values and published accounting 
information to be absolute. 
There exists a large body of empirical research into the behaviour of 
the stock market, portfolio management and security analYSis (see 
Lorie & Brealey, 1978 for a book of r eadings) but unfortunately much 
of this work is devot e d to the way in which share prices behave with 
only a few studies concentrating on the way in which the share price 
fixing mechanism act'ual':'y wcrks. As our conce rn in this thesis is 
the understanding of this mechanism we shall only concentrate on 
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those studies that fall within our purview. In very broad t e rms 
studies into the relationship betwee n accounting variables and share 
prices can be classified into two groups. The first group contains 
those studies that have attempted to relate share price movements to 
accounting numbe rs. The purpose of these studies appears to be 1) 
to isolate the factors influential in dete rmining share prices and 2) 
to assess whether a particular item of information or event ha s 
economic value to the investor. The assumption made in mo st of 
these studies is that the stock market is efficient in processi ng 
information. Market efficiency has bee n defined by Fama(1970) as 
"A secui"ities market is efficient if security prices fully relect the 
information available". Whilst there are criticisms of this 
definition (see Beaver, 1979), for the purpose of this review these 
can be treated as semantic. By making the assumption of market 
efficiency it is possible to accept the premis e that if a particular 
item or event has informational content then share prices will react 
in sympathy. If, however, no share price movement is found then the 
conclusion drawn, methodological weaknesses aside is that the new 
information has no economic value. 
The second group of studies to be reviewed contains those studies 
which have concentrated on factors that determine share values as 
opposed to share price movements. This type of study attempts to 
model the decision making process of the investor in order to arrive 
at an appropriate share price/value. From the practioner's point of 
view such a model would be used for finding over- and under-valued 
shares, but from our point of view any relationships uncovered should 
provide insight into the market's decis ion making process and a means 
of empirically evaluating the validity of ce rtain theories of share 
valuation. 
The format of this chapter is as follows. Prior to reviewing the 
two groups of studies referred to above we present a brief outline of 
two opposing theories on share valuation. Whilst this brief 
discussion does not attempt to detail all the various arguments for 
and against each theory, as these will be examined later, it does 
provide a useful basis for comparing the results of the extant work. 
Following this we present our discussion. on the two groups of studies 
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relevant to this thesis. This discussion not only serves to bui ld a 
picture of the ･ｭｰｩｾｩ｣｡ｬ＠ evidence f or and against t he va rious 
theori es, but also sheds light on the typ es of rela tionship to expect 
in our models and the variables we should include in our model 
building process. Having presented this broad review of the extant 
work we then focus our attention on several important theoretical 
issues. These are the role of dividends and ea rnings in the share 
price fixing mechanism, the evaluation of financial risk and its 
impact on share prices and lastly, the utility of systematic r isk 
measures in the U.K. stock market. Within each of these subsections 
both theory and the empirical evidence are eva luated and a number 
hypotheses are formulated. 
2. Share Valuation Theory 
There are two opposing theories on the valuation of shares. The 
first is the traditional view taken by Williams(1938) which states 
that a share derives its value from the discount e d value of all 
f uture dividends. It is argued that investors in common stocks 
invest to r e ceive a be nefit a nd that this benefi t can only take the 
f orm of dividends. 
The opposing theory which was presen t ed in the famous paper by 
Modigliani and Miller(1961) supports the earnings orienta t ed approach 
to investment. The theory proposes tha t ea rnings are all tha t 
matter to the investor and tha t div idends are irrelevant for 
determining the economic va lue of a firm. Furthermore, it is argued 
that dividends are a mere residual and only affect future financing 
policies. The basis of this theory is that investors have an 
ownership right to a company's earnings whether they are distribut ed 
or not, and that if the investor wishes to receive an income from his 
investment he ca n r eadily sell the portion of his inves t ment tha t 
represents the capital growth caused by the r e tained earnings. 
The counter argument to thi s second ､ｯ｣ｴｲｩｾ･＠ is based on ma r ke t 
imperfections and unce rtainty. Unde r conditions of uncertaint y 
investors perceive dividends as a means of reducing their ove r a l l 
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downside risk. Furthermore, market impe rf ec tions of t en mea n that 
capital growth cannot be r e lied upon and the r e for e the selling of 
shares to realise cash income may not be practical. Thus we 
conclude that in reality the market may well be expected to react to 
both dividends and earnings. The above theories are not presented 
at length as they can be found in most textbooks on finance. 
However, they do provide us with a theoretical base for making 
inferences from the empirical research discussed be low. 
3. Share Price Movements and Accounting Informa tion 
The extent to which accounting numbers influence share prices has 
been the focus of attention for many studies. It is traditionally 
accepted that financial statements are used by invesors in share 
valuation and as ' such it is argued that changes in accounting numbers 
may change investor expectations and hence change share prices. By 
examining the association betwee n accounting numbers and changes in 
share prices it should be possible to gauge to some extent which are 
the important numbers in the share valuation process. Studies of 
this nature are the refore releva nt to this study in that they firstly 
provide some empirical evidence on the validity of severa l 
ｴｨｾｯｲ･ｴｩ｣｡ｬ＠ issues and s econdly indicate which variables are likely 
to be influential in t he share price fixing mechanism. The review 
that follows has been split according to t ype of methodology. The 
first is the univariat e app roa ch where the emphasis is placed on the 
impact of a specific event/accounting numbe r on share prices. The 
second type of me thodology ' is the multiva riate approach which adopts 
a more complex view of the way the ma rket' operates and attempts to 
explain share price movements in terms of a collection of variables. 
Both types of study are based on the principle that over a period of 
time there should be some sort of systematic correspondence between 
share price movements and ,accounting numbers. 
3.1 The Univariate Approach 
The aim of most univar ia te studies has bee n to establish whe ther or 
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not certain it ems of information or accounting me thods a r e of 
suf f icient economi c i mp ort a nce to ma ke the marke t as a ｷｾｯｬ ｣＠ ｾ ･ ｡ ｳ ｳ･ｳｳ＠
the value of a sha re. Host of thes e studies assume tha t the market 
is efficient, at least in the semi-strong form (Lorie & Hamilton, 
1975: p.7l), which means that 1) all publicly available information 
is impounded in share prices and 2) that share prices react 
instantaneously and unbiasedly to new information. Having made this 
assumption and by using Capital Asset Pricing ｾｬｯ､･ｬ＠ ba sed methodology 
it is possible to relate specific share price r eaction to the release 
of new information. Gonedes(l973) surruna rizes why this type of 
research is important for the suppliers of financial information. 
"The extent to which accounting numbers reflect information 
that is impounded in market prices serves as a means of 
empirically evaluating the information content of 
. 
accounting numbers. Observed market prices may be used as 
a standard for evaluation in this case because of the 
observed efficiency of marke t prices." 
Premised upon the above assumptions if it is ' found that there is an 
association between the release of new information and abnormal share 
price movements the n it is reasonable to conclude that the new 
information is of economic value to the investor. On the other 
hand, if no share pr i ce movement is found then either this suggests 
that the particula r it em of inf or mation is unimportant, and/or that 
the informa tion does not ｣ｯｮｴ ｾ ｩｮ＠ a ny thing new and merely confirms 
market expectations . 
One of the first studies to use the above methodology was by Ball and 
Brown(1968), who examined the impact of large differences between 
actual and expected earnings on share prices. They corrunenced ' their 
study by deriving a regression model ba sed upon estimates of the 
market's expected change in earnings. This expected change was then 
compared with the actual change and, depending on whethe r the 
difference was negative or positive , companies were either classified 
as producing unexpectedly good or unexpectedly bad ･｡ｲｮｩｮｧｳｾ＠
Ball and Brown then proceeded to create an Abnormal Performance Index 
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for each of these two groups of companies. This index repre sented 
"the value of one dollar investe d (in equa l amounts) in a ll 
securities at the end of month -12 (that is, 12 months prior to the 
month of the annual report) and held to the end of some arbitrary 
holding period after abstracting from market effects." When the 
performance of each portfolio was plotted using this index it was 
clearly shown that companies whose earnings were significantly higher 
than expected produced significantly above average returns and vice 
versa. These results led Ball and Brown to conclude that the market 
forecasts earnings quite well in that most share price movement takes 
place prior . to the preliminary results being released. Furthermore, 
only 10 to 15% of the total share price movement took place in the 
month of the announcement indicating that most of the information in 
the preliminary report had already been discounted. 
The Ball and Brown study clearly demonstrated the importance of 
earnings in the investment decision making process and that the 
market continually adjusts its forecasts of future earnings by 
assessing new information as it becomes available. Hhilst we can 
accept Ball and Brown's general conclusions in general it should be 
noted that certain caveats pertain. Firstly, the results are 
dependent upon the validity of the regression model used to derive 
the estimated earnings f igures. Secondly, there is an element of 
bias in the movement of the Abnormal Performance Index which 
accentuates the returns. (This is however noted by Ball and Brown.) 
Beaver(1968) also concentrated on earnings by monitoring both the 
volume of trading and the share price movements in the weeks 
surrounding the earnings announcement. In his study on 143 
companies over five years, he found that activity was on average 33% 
higher during this period than in other weeks and that share price 
movements were also greater. These results confirm the importance 
of earnings figures for investment decision making, and indicate that 
new information is discounted very quickly after the announcement. 
A discussant of the paper, Chambers(1974), states that these results 
merely confirm that the announcement of the annual accounts affects 
trading in the market, it does not specifically prove that earnings 
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per se are the cause fo r t he activity. 
A further study by Brown(1978 ) us ed residual analysis to monitor 
unusual share price movements for companies reporting a 20 percent 
change in earnings. Whilst his results confirmed the affect of 
earnings on share prices, they did cast doubt on the assumption that 
share prices instantaneously absorb new information. He found that 
abnormal share price movement s could be detected up to two months 
after the announcement of the new earnings numbe r. 
Other researchers have also found that earnings announcements ha ve a 
strong influence on share prices. Brown and Kennelly(1972) and 
Kiger(1972), using similar methodologies to Ball and Brown(1968) and 
Beaver(1968), found that quarterly earnings announcements contained 
useful information and tha t they led to a revision in share prices. 
Gonedes(1978) also adds further evidence on the influence of 
earnings. To summarise then we can conclude that the above 
empirical evidence suggests that earnings are rela ted to share prices 
and therefore are important to investors when making investment 
decisions. However, the re sults do not allow us to draw further 
conclusions r egarding whethe r ea rnings pe r se are the key to share 
values or whether they me r e l y cha nge investor expectations. 
The univariat e approach has not just been r est ricted to looking at 
the impact of ea r nings . In a recent s tudy be Aharony and 
Swa ry(19 80 ) the "informationa l content of divide nds" came under 
examination. This study invo lved the monitoring of share price 
cha nges fo r 149 c ompanies which report ed their dividends quarterly 
between 1963 and 1976. The sample was divided into three subsets: 
a) no change in dividend, b) increases in dividend, and c) decreases 
in dividend, and for each subset, t wo new groups were formed bas ed on 
whethe r the divide nd ,,,as announced bef ore or af t e r the earnings 
announcement. 
The r e turns on each of thes e subset s of cofupanies were the n monitored 
using the residual analysis approach for twenty days ｳｵｲｲｯｵｾ､ｩｮｧ＠ the 
announcement date. Aharony and Swary fo und tha t: 
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1) normal returns were gene rat ed for the no change subset and that 
these were not affected by the timing of the Announcement 
2) positive abnormal return s we re generated for the dividend 
increase subset and again the timing of the announcement telative to 
the earnings announcement had no significant effect 
3) lastly, negative abnormal returns we re ｧ･ｮ ｣ ｲｾｴ ･ ､＠ on the dividend 
decrease subset and again timing of the announcement hdd no effect . 
Aharony and Swary argue that these results confirm th't dividends 
have informational content and that the timing of the announcement 
relative to the earnings announcement has no ｳｩｧ ｮｩｦｩｾ｡ｮｴ＠ effect. 
They concluded from their results that "the quarterly dividend 
announcment contains useful information beyond that already provided 
by quarterly earnings numbers." In addition the authors tested to 
see if the influence of dividends decreas ed wh en the effects of 
earnings changes were taken into account. They found that changes 
in dividends still generated abnormal returns and thus ｰｲｯｶｩｾ､＠
further evidence to support their conclusion. Oth e r studies by 
Pettit(1972) and Laub(1976) have also found similar results. 
It would appear that the empirical evidence indicating that dividends 
possess informational content is strong. However, other studies by 
Gonedes(1978) and Watts(1973) on U.S. data and by Brown, Finn and 
Hancock(1977) and Ball, Brown, Finn and Officer(1979) on Aust ralian 
data provide conflicting results. Gonedes and Watts both concluded 
that there was very little information contained in the dividend 
announcement once the effect of earnings is controlled for. Brown 
et al, however, point to the existence of various methodological 
difficulties that they argue, might account for these conflicting 
results. They suggest that it is in fact very difficult to isolate 
the marginal informational content of either dividends or earnings 
and that it is only possible to conclude that there- is a relationship 
between the magnitude of the share price movement and the magnitude 
of both dividend and earnings changes. Ball et al also emphasize 
the methodological problems, and although their results are 
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consistent with the information content of dividends theory they go 
on to suggest that "the obse rved dividend effect is too large to be 
explained by the majo r hypotheses concerning ma rke t-wide preferences 
for or against dividends." 
The above studies which have a ttempted to assess the informational 
content of dividends provide conflicting results and therefore cannot 
be interpreted together as ei ther supporting or disputing the 
Modigliani and Miller(1961) theory on the valuation of shar s . This 
univariate CAPM based app roach has not, however, been limited to 
earnings and dividend studies and has also be en used for testing the 
impact of other events/data i tems on share prices . Firth(1978a) in 
the U.K. and Ball, Walke r and Whittred(1979) in Australia have both 
looked at the influence of audit quali fi cations on share prices. 
Both studies found that only certain types of qualified audit report 
contained significant information as reflected in share price 
movements and that investors react differently to various types of 
audit qualifica tion. Firth(1977b) has also investigated the impact 
of capitalisation issues on share prices. He found that the issues 
themselves have no impact on share prices which merely confirms 
rational behaviour in the market. Gonedes(L978) found that 
extraordinary items had no effect on share prices and therefore 
provides evidehce to suggest that such data is not important to 
investors. 
To summarise these univa riate studies based upon share price 
movements we can conclude that it has been empirically demonstrated 
that certain data items/events do have an influence on share prices 
and therefore can be considered to be of economic value to the 
investor. Nevertheless the methodological approach used can be 
criticised on the following grounds: 
1) the empirical evidence is conflicting for certain data items, the 
impact of dividends is an example. This means that it is difficult 
to substantiate or reject theory and this might suggest that the 
methodology may not be totally appropriate for this type of research. 
2) even when there is a consensus in the empirical evidence, the 
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researcher can only make crude generalisations about the impact of an 
event on the investment decision making process. 
3) although this approach does provide some insight into the 
relationship between accounting numbers and share price movement s , 
all too often the results merely confirm the obvious. Under such 
circumstances if events/data items were not found to be signific3nt 
then it would mean questioning the fundamentals of investment 
practice and infer irrational behaviour in the market. 
To conclude then, the univariate approach may be considered to be a 
very blunt tool for clarifying the impact of accounting numbe rs on 
share prices and as such has only provided us with limited insight 
into the factors that may be important in our model building . 
However, the multivariate approach may prove to be more us eful . 
3.2 The Multivariate Approach 
The second part of this discussion on empirical evidence into the 
association between share price movements and accounting information 
concentrates on multivariate studies. The advantages of this model 
building approach are that a) it can potentially provide a holistic 
model of the set of underlying relationships, b) the impact of more 
than one data item/event can be evaluated in the same model, and c) 
it produces a greater understanding of how variables inter-relate in 
a complex environment. Because of the advantage s of this 
multivariate approach to investment research and the general 
availability of the statistical techniques there have been numerous 
studies of this nature, especially in the U.S.A. However, in the 
review that follows we shall concentrate on those studies that are 
considered to be the most relevant to our purpose and rigorous in 
their approach. 
One of the first studies of this kind was by Benston(1967) who 
reports on an investigation into Ｇｾｨｩ｣ｨ＠ published accounting data are 
used by investors as reflected by changes in the market price." The 
model he proposed was that a change in sbare price was a function of 
dividends, earnings, market conditions and accounting numbers such as 
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sales and net income. He constructed numerous regression models 
relating share price movements in the months surrounding the 
publication of accounts to various independe nt variables. However, 
despite all his analysis he found very little, if any, r e lationship 
between share price changes and the independent variables and 
concludes, "thus, as measured in this study, the information 
contained in published accounting reports is a relatively small 
portion of the information used by investors." 
Nevertheless, for our purposes, Benston's results suggest tha t "past 
annual ratios are not used by investors" and that lagged variables 
are much weaker variables than contemporaneous variables. 
Furthermore, by assuming that his results indicate that accounting 
variables are unrelated to share price movements, he concludes that 
accounting data does not have any economic value to the investor. 
He further adds that it is irrelevant which concept for r eporting 
income is used, as all are irrelevant. 
Benston's results cannot however be taken at their face value for the 
methodology employed is suspect. Firstly in his regression models 
he does not take O into account market expectations and forecasts, and 
assumes that the market reacts to the latest year's report in the 
months surrounding publication of the accounts. The Ball and 
Brown(1968) study r efe rred to above indicates that this is not 
correct and tha t share prices are continually moving to take acount 
of new information affecting forecast figures. Furthermore, °if we 
accept the premise that investors are interested in future r e turns, 
it is not surprising that lagged models were not as important as the 
contemporaneous models. We must therefore conclude that the 
methodology used by Benston was not adequate for the purpose of 
revealing whether accounting numbers influence share price movements. 
A second study by O'Connor(1973) into the relationship between 
accounting data and share price changes us ed financial ratios as the 
independent variables. The reasons for this was that "there is 
considerable evidence that •••• inves tors use financial ratios in 
their analyses of published datu", and therefore it is reasonable "to 
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assume that financial ratios analysis might well be used fo r fo r mi ng 
expectations about future returns .11 
The study covered the period from 1950 to 1966, with financial r a tios 
computed for 127 companies being used as the explanatory variables. 
The dependent variables were the share price movements from the date 
of announcement of the accounts for holding periods of one, three and 
five years. O'Connor examined the relationship .between the 
independent and dependent variables on both univariate and 
multivariate bases. The univariate analysis revealed that ratios 
used singly were not effective in differentiating be tween high and 
low return stocks. With the multivariate analyses it was found that 
the models explained between .08 and .3 of the variance, which leads 
0' Connor to conclude that the IIexp1anatory variables have some 
ability to explain the variation in the explained variable. 1I 
Further work was performed to test the predictive ability of the 
models and it was found that they performed no better than a naive 
investment strategy. 
In his final summary of the study, O'Connor suggests that his results 
cast strong doubts on the utility of financial ratios to investors 
for predicting -future r e turns. Furthermore, he also states that the 
usefulness assertion implicit in the textbooks on ratio analysis is 
ques tionable. 
O'Connors conclus io ns are so contradictory to ｡ｾ｣･ｰｴ･､＠ theory ' on 
investment analysis that his me thodolo gy has to be examined more 
closely to subst a ntiate that his conclusions are valid. If we 
return to fundamentals we can see that O'Connor's approach has one 
major flaw. Investors are interested in future returns which 
presumably are a function of a company's future performance. Ifa 
company's performance improves, then stock returns are also expected 
to increase, and vice versa. Furthermore , if there is no change in 
a company's performan.ce, then future r e turns (share price movements) 
are likely to remain static. It is theref ore reasonable to suggest 
that investors are interested in changes in the level of historic 
performance ｾｮ､＠ expectations rather than simply the current level of 
performance. We therefore conclude tha t O'Connor should have 
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concentrated on changes in the ratio values rather than the absolute 
values themselves. 
If, however, we assume that O'Connor's methodology was incorrect then 
we must also explain why he was able to explain up to .3 of the 
variance over a five year period. The reason for this unexpected 
result could be attributed to the plausible theory that ｣ｯｭｰｾｮｩ･ｳ＠
with a high performance record are able to maintain thei r pe rformance 
over long time periods and therefore their share prices reflect 
this high growth rate by steadily increasing. On the other hand low 
performing companies are likely to ha ve equally poor share price 
movements. A more plausible explanation is that his statistical 
methodology resulted in both search and sample biases being present 
leading to an overfitting of his data. This suspicion may be 
confirmed by the lack of ex-ante predictive ability of his models. 
However, as O'Connor does not provide sufficient detail in his paper 
this question remains unan swered. 
The third and final study to be examined in this section is by 
Gonedes(1974). Again this study used u.s. data, and covered the 
period 1957 to 1967. The methodology adopted was unique and 
involved the use of multiple discriminant analysis. The first stage 
in the analysis was to classify the sample of companies into two 
ｾｵ｢ｳ･ｴｳ＠ based upon whether the cumulative average residual (that is 
the abnormal performance) of the share was positive or negative. 
Then by using estimated accounting ratios as discriminatory variables 
Gonedes derived a model to discriminate between the two groups of 
companies. Next his model was used to classify the sample of 
companies into their respective groups, that is positive or negati ve 
residuals. The returns from these new portfolios were then compared 
with the original portfolio to test if the model would have yielded 
abnormal returns. The results showed that a) the multivariate model 
did appear to have some discriminatory power but this was very weak 
and b) although some abnormal returns were generated they were very 
small. 
Gonedes concludes that "these results of our multivariate tests 
assign a high probability to the statement that the numbe rs do 
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jointly provide information pe rtinent to assessing equilibrium 
expected r e turns." Further analysis, however, revealed that th e 
ability to generate abnormal returns of the multivariate mode l over a 
un'ivariate mod e l based on earnings-per-share was minimal an d 
therefore the author goes on to state that "insofar as expecte d 
effects are concerned, our results seem to ascribe special importance 
to the information r eflected in the ea rnings-per-share variable, 
relative to the other variables examin -d." 
The results of this study again ,demon st rate the problems' of relating 
accounting numbers to share price movements. Al though the 
informational content of accounting in f ormation, especially 
earnings-per-share, was shown to be important to investors, the 
results provide very little information over and above that already 
provided by Ball and Brown(1968). Furthermore, the approach adopted 
can be ｾｲｩｴｩ｣ｩｳ･､＠ for its heavy reliance on the es timation procedures 
used to calculate the efect of share price movements and the 
estimated accounting numbers, (see Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974 for a 
full discusion on th is point). 
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the studies discussed 
above, and other studies of this type (eg. Rosenberg and HcKibben, 
1973; Nerlove , J968; Klemkosky and Petty, 1973). Firstly, the 
potential benefits of the multivariate approach in explaining share 
price movements over that of the univariate approach appear minimal. 
There is a general methodological problem in relating share price 
changes to accounting numbers without taking into account changes in 
those accounting numbe rs. Moreover, the empirical evidence has not 
provided any new insight into the characteristics of the share price 
fixing mechanism and as such is unable to provide us with a better 
understanding of how published accounting ｩｮｦｯｲｭ｡ｴｩｾ･ｦｦ･｣ｴｳ＠ share 
prices . Furthermore despite a priori reasons for conducting this 
type of research it might appear that the unpredictable nature of 
share price movements as suggested by Little(1962) may not lend 
itself to worthwhile research using this type of framework. In the 
next section we examine a more positive approach to understanding 
share price valuations. 
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4. Share Valuation Models 
The research to date into share valuation models has provided 
somewhat more positive results than those found above. Instead of 
trying to explain share price movements, the emphasis is more on 
explaining share prices or, in relative terms, share values. 
Although, much of this work has been orientated towards creating 
models for generating abnormal returns in the market, the 
constituents of themodels provide a means of testing the validity of 
several finance theories and may indicate variables which are likely 
to be important in our model building process. 
This type of empirical study is particularly relevant here because of. 
the related objectives and methodology of our research, although it 
is stressed that in this thesis we do not attempt to replicate any of 
the previous studies directly. In this section emphasis will 
therefore be placed on both the methodological issues and the 
contribution of the findings of these earlier studies to the theory 
of share valuation. 
The research into share valuation models is extensive and uses many 
different analytical approaches and variables. In the review that 
follows we shall concentrate on the main studies that are believed to 
be relevant to this ｴｨ･ｳｾｳＮ＠ For simplicity these studies have been 
split into two groups, the first contains those studies that use 
historical data only and the other contains those studies that were 
able to use forecast data. 
4.1 Historic Data Based Share Valuation Models 
One of the earliest studies was by Meader(1935) where the mean 1933 
share prices were regressed against five accounting numbers. This 
study was replicated by Meader(1940) and is reported to have revealed 
inconsistent results. The main problem with these studies was that 
the variables were not adjusted for size of company and therefore no 
useful conclusions would be expected to result. 
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In order to overcome this problem of scaling most researchers deflate 
the share price into a measure of relative valuation and the most 
commonly accepted way to achieve this is to use the price earnings 
(piE) ratio or its reciprocal the earnings yield. Another similar 
yar.dstick that has been used in this type of study is the dividend 
yield. Once the measure of relative valuation has been determined 
then it becomes a matter of trying to explain ｴｨｾ＠ reasons for the 
different valuations in terms of explanatory factors. 
, 
One of the first studies into the factors that influence relative 
share values was by Walter(1959) who used linear discriminant 
analysis to discriminate between companies with high and low earnings 
yields. The objective of the study was to "ascertain that linear 
combination of financial characteristics which best discriminates 
large industrial companies with low earnings per share to common 
stock price from those with high ratios." Two subsamples were 
selected from the largest 500 industrial companies in the U.S., one 
containing 50 companies with the highest earnings yields and the 
other containing 50 companies with the lowest earnings yields. The 
variables used in the discriminant analysis were: 
1) the average dividend payout from 1952 to 1955 
2) change in earnings before interest to the change in investment 
from 1952 to 1955 
3) average current ratio from 1952 to 1955 
4) the average interest cover from 1952 to 1955 
5) , the change in sales from 1952 to 1955 
6) the systematic ri'sk as measured by beta and computed over the 
previous twelve years 
From the analyses it was found that the most important variables were 
dividend payout and beta, with the remaining variables possessing 
very little explanat,ory power. When the model was applied to the 
original data it ｷ｡ｾ＠ ,found that it was able to correctly classify 87% 
of the companies into their original groups. Walter then proceeded 
to test the model by classifying a sample of sixty companies over the 
period 1948 to 1951. He fcund that the classification accuracy of 
the model fell to 80%, and that over time the inconsistencies between 
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the model and the actual earnings yield tended- to diminish. Walte r 
concluded his study by suggesting that his model had a large amount 
of intertemporal stability with the discriminant coefficients 
remaining "relatively invariant" and therefore "the approach offers 
possibilities for the discovery of under-or over-valued securities". 
However, the use of mUltiple discriminant analysis in this way has 
been heavily critcised by Eisenbeis(1977) who argues that certain 
major assumptions are violated. In particular Eisenbeis is critcal 
of the methodology used to form the discriminatory groups which is 
quite arbitrary. Altman(1981) is also critical and states that 
there is a problem in that the sample is unrepresentative of the 
population of stocks, that is a majority of stocks are not analysed, 
and that regression analysis is potentially more appropriate. Also 
as there is no evidence on the ability of his model to actually find 
over-valued and under-valued shares ｦｯｲｴｨ｣ｯｾｩｮｧＬ＠ Valter's conclusion 
appear to be possibly a little tenuous. However, these criticisms 
for our purposes are not sufficient to detract us from the strong 
underlying relationship found by the model. Perhaps a stonger 
criticism of Walter's work lies in the choice of using five year 
averages to compute the variables, which may have the effect of 
restricting the influence of secondary variables entering the model. 
In other words the use of averages could dilute the differences 
between the two groups of companies. 
From our point of view these results suggest that dividends might be 
an important discriminator between companies with high and low price 
earnings ratios which infers that dividends may influence the rate at 
which the investor discounts earnings as reflected in the price 
earnings ratio. 
Another study conducted around the same time as Walter's was by 
Gordon(1959) who tried empirically to prove that the price earnings 
ratio of a stock is independent of the dividend-payout ratio. On 
the basis of the results of his study Gordon concluded that dividends 
were the primary determinant of share values and this was attributed 
to 
" the financial consequences of retention by a company are 
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more uncertain than the financial consequences of dividends 
received. Since risk aversion characterises almost all 
investors, the higher ••• uncertainty attached to retained 
earnings ••• causes retained earnings to have less value than an 
equal number of dollars paid out in dividends." (Quoted from 
Lorie and Hamilton, 1975.) 
This study would appear on the surface to confirm the importance of 
dividends to the investor, but the conclusion reached by Gordon may 
not be strictly correct in practice due to the inherent assumption 
made about earnings when analysing price/earnings ratios as we shall 
see below. 
Benishay(1961) tested the hypothesis that the rate of return on 
corporate equities is a function of a) earnings trend, b) the trend 
in share price, c) the payout ratio, d) the expected. stability of 
future income streams, e) the expected share price stability, f) the 
market value of the firm and g) the debt-equity ratio. He conducted 
a regression analysis using the average values for the independent 
variables calculated over nine years and the weighted average of 
earnings over the previous nine years divided by the share price in 
the ninth year. The cross-sectional regression results revealed 
that the most important variables were size of company, as measured 
by the market value, and share price stability. That is the larger 
the company the higher its share value, and the less stable the share 
price the higher its relative share value (which is 
counter-intuitive). Stability of earnings was also found to 'be 
significant. The other variables, including the payout ratio, were 
found not to be important. At first we may be led to believe that 
these results infer that dividends are unimportant in determining 
share values. However, the use of nine year averages to compute the 
variables must have the effect of diluting any possible relationships 
that might exist between share prices and the independent variables. 
In fact Benishay's two most important variables demonstrate this by 
reflecting market trading features rather than corporate financial 
characteristics. In other words if a stock is actively traded in 
the market it is likely to have 1) a fairly volatile price relative 
to stocks which are rarely traded and consequently may possess very 
stable share prices for a long period and large sparodic movements 
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when trading does occur (this aspect is discussed at length in the 
following chapter), and 2) a large market capitalisation, with both 
of these characteristics likely to persist over the nine year period. 
The importance of this study lies in establishing empirically that 
the marketability of a share is an important factor in influencing 
share values. 
Another attempt to build a share valuation model was made by 
Martin(1971). In this study the emphasis was placed on the 
relevance of accounting information for making investment decisions. 
Regressions of the earnings yields in 1965 and 1967 were run against 
independent variables for the corresponding years. Further analysis 
was conducted using the independent variables lagged by one year. 
The general conclusion reached was that accounting information 
reported to shareholders through published financial statements 
constituted decision relevant data. More speC'ifically it was found 
that the historical earnings growth ratio, operating margin and book 
return on capital appeared to be the most important variables. The 
absence of the dividend payout ratio seems to support the earnings 
orientated approach to investment. 
A closer examination of Martin's methodology, however, reveals that 
no attempt was made to take out from his sample of 98 companies those 
companies with very low earnings and therefore very high price 
earnings ratios. Normally a high price earnings ratio can be 
interpreted as indicating that the company is re1atively highly 
valued. However, when earnings are very low the price earnings 
ratio becomes meaningless and impossible to interpret. Furthermore 
as the ratios for these companies are likely to be outliers in the 
price earnings ratio distribution they could easily corrupt the 
results. In fact a closer look at one of Martin's conclusions, that 
a high price earnings ratio is associated with a low return on 
capital, could be interpreted as confirming the potential corruption 
of his sample by the few meaningless observations in the sample. 
The final study we shall review that relates accounting information 
to price earnlngs ratios is by Shick and Verbrugge( 1975). In this 
study the authors use discriminant analysis in the same way as 
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Walter(1959), discussed above. Here attention was focussed upon the 
banks with high and low price earnings ratios and in total sixty six 
banks were analysed over a six year period. The authors found that 
their five variable model was quite effective in classifying 
companies into their respective groups but it would seem from the 
variables entering the model that the financial characteristics 
influencing price earnings ratios for banks were different from the 
industrial companies models we have reviewed so far. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the marketability of a share and 
the earnings growth rate were influential factors and that the 
absence of dividends from the model, methodological considerations 
apart(see Walter, 1959 discussion above) ,suggests that they may not 
be very important to investors in banks. 
So far the evidence presented above has concentrated on the price 
earnings ratio as the relative measure of 'market valuation. 
Although this ratio does appear to be generally accepted as the key 
to share valuation it does introduce a problem which possibly may not 
have been fully appreciated by the above researchers. In essence 
any study that searches for factors that lead to differences between 
relative price earnings ratios automatically assumes that earnings 
are the prime factor in determining share values. In other words 
the question being asked by these studies is that once earnings have 
been taken into account what are the other factors that influence 
share prices? This approach therefore implies that, ceteris 
paribus, the rate at which earnings are discounted by the market 
should be constant and consequently does not allow for differences in 
the quality of the earnings to be taken into account. 
This problem inherent in using the price earnings ratio was overcome 
in a study by Ryan(1974), who used the book value of the ordinary 
capital as the deflator instead of earnings believing that this would 
overcome "the possibility of spurious correlation arising from the 
presence of both high-priced and low-priced stocks in the sample." 
The analysis was conducted on 60 U.K. companies using 1970 data and 
produced the following model: 
Ploe = -22.7 + 15.9 D/oe + 9.9 (E-D)/Oe 
R =.717 
where P = Market Value 
D = Dividends 
E = Earnings 
oe = Ordinary Capital 
This model proposes that the dependent variable, which is a relative 
measure of how the stock market values the firm's equity, is a 
function both of the level of dividend paid and the amount of 
retained earnings. Ryan points out that although it would seem that 
dividends are more important than retained earnings in the regression 
model this could possibly be caused through a potential bias which 
"stems from the possibility that stocks, which, because of their 
relatively high risk, are capitalised at a lower rate than other 
stocks. Thus the lower capitalisation coefficient on retained 
earnings in the equation could well reflect the existence of a 
risk premium attached to such stocks, rather than a true 
preference for dividends as such." 
In an attempt to try to overcome this bias Ryan introduced into his 
analysis several other variables covering risk, profitability, size, 
growth and dividend cover. The effect of this was not to improve 
the importance of the retained earnings variables but to reduce it. 
It was found that sales growth had a positive relationship with share 
value. A more likely explanation for this apparent dominance of 
dividends stems from the misinterpretation of the regression 
equation. It should be remembered that it is the earnings figure 
before dividends that is believed to be the key to share valuation 
not retained earnings, according to Modigliani and Miller(1961) and 
Durand(1959), and that the empirical evidence of Ball and 
Brown(1968), Brown and Kennelly(1972) and Kiger(1972) demonstrates 
the fundamental importance of earnings and earnings expectations. 
As such it is not surprising that the dividend variable was picked up 
by the regression analysis. A careful look at table 1 in Ryan's 
study reveals that 87% of the companies in his sample paid out over 
50% of their earnings in dividends and therefore the regression 
analysis found the variable that was more heavily correlated to 
earnings. In fact if the ･ｱｵｾｴｩｯｮ＠ is transformed into a simpler 
form as follows it can be seen that earnings are more important than 
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dividends and that re tained ea rn i ngs ar e no longer in t he equation. 
p/oe -22.7 + 15.9 D/oe + 9.9 (E-D)/Oe 
-22.7 + 6. D/oe + 9.9 E/oe 
-22.7 + (60 + 9.9E)/OC 
Although this study does contain certain serious statistical and 
me t\lodologica l problems such as potent ial surioua co r r In t ton between 
the va riables due to the common de nominat and col1inearity it does 
r e veal the benefit that might pot ential l y be obtained through similar 
analysis using a different de pendent variable other than the price 
ea rnings ratio and a more robust me thodology . In addition to these 
criticisms Ryan can faulted in two oth e r ways . Firstly, in Ryan's 
reworking of his original model he does not deflate his va ri able by 
the book value of the equity. Because of this i t is not surp r isi ng 
he obtained very high R- square d values of .98 which clearly reflects 
the corruption caused by hete roscedast icity In t he data. 
Furthermore, it is diff i cult to attribute the strength of the 
dividend variable over that of the retained ea rnin gs variable to a 
risk premium on growth stocks which could only at the very most 
account for a small part of his total sample . 
The above studies and others such as Bower and Bower(1969) and 
Gordon(1962b) demonstrate that there ma y well be ｢･ｮ･ｦｩｾ＠ to be fo und 
by using this approach for explaining share values . Nevertheless we 
have also seen that fundamental problems reside in both the 
methodology and the statist ica l analyses. These can be summa rised 
as follows: 
1) the use of the price earnings ratio as the de pendent variable has 
the inherent disadvantage in assuming a constant discount rate fo r 
ea rnings and therefore it does not provi de an insight i nto whether 
the quality of earnings has an impact on relative value. 
2) very often studies have used the price earni ngs rat i o without 
t aking into consideration the potential difficulties caused by very 
low earnings, or at least no me ntion of this problem is made . The 
use of averages over several yea rs is presumably supposed to avo id 
such problems, but this presupposes that companies with very low 
ea rnings do eventually recover during the period under examination. 
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Although we cannot prove that such problems were present in the 
studies discussed, it does seem highly likely that the inclusion of 
low ea rnings companies into the data sample could introduce some sort 
of bias. 
3) most studies have adopted the use of variables computed by taking 
the mean of several years data, the purpose being to derive a 
"normal" variable value. The problem with this approach is that it 
will t end to average out the unusual annual observations which may 
have caused a t emporary change ｾｮ＠ price. For example ft is feasible 
that a company with high gearing in one year may be marked down by 
the marke t as a whole until the gearing has returne d to a more 
acceptable level. If we average out such observations we reduce the 
explanatory power of the mod el and thus the ability to uncover the 
subtleties of the secondary factors in the share price fixing 
mechani sm. Furthermore, the us e of averages also means averaging 
out the effects of economic cycles. It is feasible that in a 
depression low geared companies will stand at a premi um in the market 
but by averaging this effect will be severely reduced . 
4) the use of multiple reg ression or discriminant analysis ma y be 
criticised for the way in which . a linear additive model is imposed on 
the data. ｗｨｾｬｳｴ＠ these t echniques provide an adequate means of 
revealing the important variables in the share price fi xing 
mechanism, they may well tell us little about the way in which the 
variables interact with each othe r. 
Whilst there are problems in this area of research the results of the 
cross-sectional model building approach have proved to be more 
informative about the share price fixing mecha nism tha n the time 
series analyses. We would argue that by concentrating on the 
factors underlying share values , rather than share price changes, it 
is possible to become closer to replicat i ng the way in which the 
market operates in practice. After all traditional investment 
analysis, excluding such dubious techniques as chartism, is based 
upon relative share valuation assessments at one poi nt in time and 
not upon time series correlations. Furthermore by deriving a 
cross-sectional model of investor behaviour it is implicit that 
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changes in the constituent elements of such a model are likely to 
change share prices. Consequently, we see this type of approach as 
the most fruitful method for research and as such it forms the basis 
for the empirical analyses reported in subsequent chapters. In the 
share valuation models developed in this thesis we believe that we 
have been able to improve our methodology by overcoming most of the 
problems found with the previous studies. In the first place the 
models are not restricted to using the price earnings ratio as the 
sole measure of relative market valuation. By using both the price 
earnings ratio and the dependent variable employed by Ryan(1974) 
discussed above, which from now on will be called the valuation ratio 
(Marris,1967), we are able to 1) compare the benefits and 
disadvantages of both variables and 2) assess the influence of 
earnings and dividends separately. 
Secondly, in this thesis we do not use averages for either the 
dependent or independent variables and we restrict the cross 
sectional analysis to a period of one year. By adopting this 
approath we believe we will be able to model better the 
ｾｨ｡ｲ｡｣ｴ･ｲｩｳｴｩ｣ｳ＠ of the share price fixing mechanism. 
Finally, as we shall be applying a new technique for analysing the 
data that has the ability to reveal interaction between variables we 
hope to be able to form a more complete picture of the utility of 
accounting information to the investor. However, it would be wrong 
to ignore the traditional approaches of regression and discriminant 
analysis as they possess some benefits in certain areas over the 
interactive approach and therefore they are also used to analyse the 
data. The benefit from using several analytical techniques in this 
way is that it is possible to 1) establish that the key variables are 
not subject to statistical bias and 2) make comparisons between the 
techniques to establish which is the most suitable from a 
methodological point of view. 
Before leaving this 'section on valuation models using historic 
accounting information it is important ｾｯ＠ distil from the above 
studies the key factors that appear to be important to the investor 
in making his investment decision. These can be summarised as 
81 
follows: 
1) EARNINGS - Although most studies use the price earnings ratio as 
the dependent variable and therefore inhibit the use of this variable 
per se in the models formulated. it has been demonstrated above that 
they are nevertheless taking into account the effect of earnings via 
the use of surrogate measures. 
2) DIVIDENDS - The evidence on dividends is slightly conflicting with 
the studies by Walter(1959) and Gordon(1959) suggesting their 
importance and other studies by Benishay(1961) and Martin(1971) 
denying it. However, on balance the evidence does tend to tip 
towards the theory that dividends are an important part of the share 
price fixing process or at least the hypothesis is worthy of further 
empirical investigation. 
3) MARKET FACTORS - The marketability of shares as measured by asset 
size or market capitalisation(see Benishay, 1961 and Shick and 
Verbrugge, 1975), indicates that factors not related to the financial 
characteristics of a company but to general market interest may be 
important . to ｳｨｲｾｰＮ＠ valuati0n. 
4) EARNINGS GROWTH - Martin(1971) and Shick and Verbrugge(1975) found 
earnings growth to be an influencial variable although historic 
earnings ｶ｡ｲｩ｡｢ｩｬｾｴｹ＠ did not prove to be significant. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from these historic data based 
share valuation studies is that the above factors appear to be 
important in ､･ｴ｣ｾｩｮｩｮｧ＠ share prices although a more precise and 
informative model is required before it is possible to make 
inferences· about how the investor processes accounting information. 
It is interesting to note that despite the established theory on the 
use of various risk measures in the share valuation process, none 
were found to be significant explanatory variables in the above 
studies. As this is such an important omission and implies that 
risk per se is not important to investors we shall discuss this 
separately latter in this chapter. 
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4.2 Share Valuation Using Forecast Data 
This second section on share valuation models reviews the literature that 
has taken a more dynamic approach to the problem of understanding share 
values. The motivation behind these studies resides not so much in 
assessing but understanding the share valuatiqn process. Obviously, the 
main operational benefits of such an approach are that the models once 
constructed are able "to value hundreds of shares quite quickly and they 
are unbiased, objective and consistent" (Firth, 1977). 
The major difference between these studies and those previously discussed 
is that they use forecast data to develop their models. The reason for 
doing this is that as share prices can be defined as representing the 
discounted value of all future expectations, it is important to take into 
account these future expectations. Furthermore, it is not possible 
simply to relate accounting numbers to the previous year's share prices 
as this will only reflect actual outcomes rather than those expected at 
the share price date. 
One of the first and best known studies to adopt this methodology was by 
Whitbeck and Kisor(1963) who proposed that a company's "normal" price 
earnings ratio was a function of expected growth in earnings, the 
expected dividend payout ratio and the expected standard deviation of 
earnings about a trend line. The model was developed using the forecast 
' data obtained from a New York bank's trust department for 135 U.S. 
companies in June 1962. The rationale behind choosing these variables 
was that investors desire high levels of earnings growth, high dividends 
and low variability in earnings growth. 
Having created their model, the authors then proceeded to test the model 
for its ability to find over- and under-valued shares covering four 
different time periods. They used the principle that if a company's 
price earnings ratio was signi,ficantly different from its estimated price 
earnings ratio then this was a temporary phenomenon, and therefore the 
share price should move back into line in time. They claimed to have 
found that when a company's ratio differed by 15% from the estimated 
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ratio, then the over-valued companies under-performed and vice versa. 
However, the extent of this abnormal performance must be regarded as weak 
as it ranged from only 1% to 12% over the four, three monthly periods 
covered. Further work was performed by Malkiel and Craig(1970) to test 
on an ex-ante basis the predictive ability of the model, but again 
similar weak and unstable results were obtained. 
These findings show that some benefits from this approach may possibly be 
obtained but as such should not be over emphasized. Furthermore the 
evidence presented provides little insight into the strength of the 
regression model and avoids a full discussion on the details and 
stability of the portfolio returns. 
A second study is that of Ahlers(1966), whose model contained different 
variables, namely estimated earnings growth, current dividend yield and 
the variability of earnings. The model'was derived using a small sample 
of 24 companies issuing quarterly data from 1964. Ahlers claimed that 
with thi s model he was able to outperform the market by a substantial 
amount and that his success rate was higher than that of an analyst. 
However the . evidence supporting this· claim is not given, and therefore it 
is not possible to critically appraise the results for ourselves. 
Both the above studies suggest that benefits may be derived from using 
forecast models but, like most of the research in this area, they are 
based on U.S. data. One of the few British studies to be conducted was 
by Weaver and Hall(1967) who developed a model which was subsequently 
reported to be in active use by their employers, a firm of stockbrokers. 
Unlike the other studies discussed so far they developed a model to 
estimate the dividend yield on a share rather than the price earnings 
ratio. The explanatory variables employed were 1) the payout ratio, 2) 
the forecasted short term earnings growth, 3) the forecasted long term 
dividend growth, 4) earnings variability, and 5) the historic earnings 
growth rate. The authors found that they were able to explain 58.7% of 
the varlance in the dividend yield and that when used for investment the 
model managed to outperform a simple buy and hold policy. It is 
reported that this model is still in use, although it has undergone 
various changes. 
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Weaver and Hall can be criticised on two main points. The first is the 
selection of the dividend yield as the relative market valuation measure. 
By doing this they are automatically assuming that dividends are all that 
matter to investors which, as we have seen from the empirical work 
reviewed above, may not be correct. The second point really stems from 
the first. In the article the authors reveal that the dividend payout 
ratio was the most important explanatory variable ie: 
DIP a f( DIE) 
where D 3 Dividend 
P s Price 
E s Earnings 
From this it is easy to see that if the effect of dividends is taken from 
both sides of the equation, then the share price ,becomes a function of 
earnings and in these circumstances the model is prone to serious bias. 
Thus the authors have produced what must be considered to be an 
inappropriately formulated model for estimating share values. However. 
it could be argued that the value of enforcing a formal model for 
analysis on investment analysts is an important benefit from such a 
model. 
Nevertheless, the above studies, despite their methodological flaws, have 
at the very least not contradicted the notion that forecast data might be 
used effectively for investment purposes, although the potential benefits 
may appear to be small. The obvious disadvantage from this approach is 
that it requires a team of analysts to continually revise the forecasts. 
These studies do however emphasize the point that share prices are based 
on future expectations of growth in earnings and dividends. 
In this thesis we do not use forecast data for building share valuation 
models but instead we use a database based on historic information. The 
reasons for adopting this approach are as follows: 
1) the use of forecast data limits the number of variables in the 
analyses to those that are produced by the analysts. 
2) the number of companies included in the database has to be limited to 
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the number that can be feasibly analysed by the analysts. 
3) there is the possibility of imposing a judgement model on the data 
unless many analysts are employed and all agree on the various 
definitions of the variables. In practice this is not feasible. 
4) the use of historic data lends itself to unbiased analysis on a large 
scale. 
5) although share prices are based upon investor expectations, there has 
to be some point in time when expectations are compared with actual 
performance. We believe that it is generally accepted that the day of 
reconciliation is the date of publication of the accounts, that is when 
forecast accounting numbers can be compared with the actual. 
Furthermore, if we accept that the market is efficient, at least in the 
semi-strong form, we can argue that the share prices on the day of 
publication (or the day after allowing for the assimilation of the 
information) will have adjusted to this new information. If in addition 
we accept that the best estimate of future expectations on this day is 
provided by the latest actual results, or that future expectations may 
take time to be reassessed in light of this new information, then we 
argue that this particular date is the one point in time when historic 
information is best reflected in share prices. 
Benston(1981) in a review of relevant U.S. studies refers directly to 
this issue of which date should be compared with which prices. He 
concludes that averages computed over the latest three or five years and 
expected figures computed from the averages reported by other companies 
were not as useful for this type of research as the most recent annual 
figures. 
6) there is a major difference in the objective of this study and those 
that have employed forecast data. In this study we are trying to model 
the market's decision making process by using an exploratory type of 
methodology. In contrast the forecast data type of study simply imposes 
a normative model on the market and presupposes that this model is 
correct. The Weaver and Hall(1967) paper clearly demonstrates the 
drawbacks inherent in this approach in that the original variables and 
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even the structure of the model may need to be revised when the 
models appear to be inaccurate. 
5. The Influence of Earnings and Dividends 
Perhaps the most important issue in this area is that concerning the 
relative importance of dividends and earnings in the share price 
fixing mechanism. At the beginning of this chapter we briefly 
discussed the arguments supporting the two extreme points of view. 
On the one hand there is the Williams(1938) dividend orientated model 
and on the other the Modigliani and Miller(1961) dividend 
indifference theory supporting earnings. The empirical evidence 
above has not been able to clearly ratify either one of these extreme 
theories. On balance it would seem reasonable to suggest that 
earnings may be the key factor in determining share prices and that 
dividends, although important, are secondary. It is interesting to 
note that Benston(1981) in concluding his review paper on the use of 
accounting numbers by investors emphasizes the importance of earnings 
as follows: 
"Reported earnings provide, at the least, a crude historical (if 
not predictive) representation of the economic performance of 
companies, as measured by share prices." 
The empirical question that needs to be answered is, how much 
influence do dividends have in the share evaluation process and why 
do investors, if they do, perceive them as important? The first 
part of this question can only be answered by empirical research, but 
the second part has been well discussed in the literature. A full 
examination of the theories can be found in Van Horne(1977), Meyer et 
al(1970) and Lorie and Hamilton(1973). Briefly they suggest that: 
1) the level of dividends is an indication of management's future 
expectations, that is it contains information. A change in dividend 
"may alter investor's expectations about the future and effectively 
change the risk class of a share"(Meyer et al 1970,p35). This 
argument is recognised by Modigliani and Miller who suggest that 
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changes in dividends merely reflect future earnings expectations and 
therefore in their own right are not important. 
2) dividends may be viewed as reducing the uncertainty in equity 
investments. Every investor knows that capital gains are not as 
certain as dividends and cannot be relied upon to generate future 
income. Van Horne(1977:p271) refers to this as follows: "The 
critical question is whether the 'quality' of a dividend payout is 
greater than the 'quality' of the capital gain."? Again Modigliani 
and Miller have a reply in that they argue that there is no 
difference in quality. In the words of Van Horne this. theory is 
'tenuous' at best. 
Renwick(1969) discusses this aspect of the influence of dividends in 
terms of future growth prospects. He suggests ｴｨｾｴ＠ there is an 
inverse relationship between the size of dividends and the rate of 
growth of earnings and that there are two stable (normative) states 
within the stock market defined as follows: 
a) companies with relatively high growth potential pay 
relatively small dividends because of the opportunity cost of 
distributing funds which can be utilised effectively within the 
business. 
b) companies with relatively low growth potential pay relatively 
high dividends because of the need to compensate investors for the 
lack of ｦｵｴｵｲｾ＠ growth. 
From the point of view of this theory Renwick suggests that companies 
lying outside these two states are unstable as they are not 
optimising their asset value, that is their share price. In other 
words, companies with relatively low growth and low dividends, or 
vice versa, will not be optimising the personal utility of the 
company to the investor and will therefore eventually change policies 
to enter one of the stable states. This theory does not suggest 
that companies in either state will be equally valued as this depends 
on the utility of dividends versus the utility of rate of potential 
growth. Only when there are conditions of equilibrium and 
indifference between these two controll.ing factors will the value of 
companies in either state be equal. 
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3) there are transaction costs associated with selling stock as 
proposed by the Modigliani and Mille r theory and theref ore capital 
gains are not a perfect substitute for dividends. Howeve r as 
...... dividends can be subject to highe r tax rates than capital gains this 
reasoning does not necessarily hold true for all investors. 
4) the demand for dividends is not totally ｣ｯｮｴｲｯｬｬ･ｾ＠ by 
theoretically sound investment policies, and in certain circumstances 
they may be sought for their dividend value alone. It is not 
uncommon for a fund manager to guarantee that a specific. percentage 
of his fund be received in dividends which therefore must ha ve the 
effect of making some fund managers seek high yielding stocks for no 
other reason than to receive dividends.· If this preference for 
dividends is found to be on a sufficient scale to influence share 
values, then high yielding stocks will command a premium over low 
yielding stocks. If on the other hand there is an overall dislike 
of dividends by investors, possibly for tax reasons, then the reverse 
will be true. It is relevant to note that during the period covered 
by the analyses conducted in this thesis there were divide nd 
restraints imposed on the market and the effect of thi s may well have 
been to create a premium for high yielding stocks. 
The nature of ehis study is such that although we may be able to 
demonstrate the influence of dividends on market prices, we are 
unable to suggest which of the above theories is the best description 
of the cause of this phenomenon. However, the second theory that 
dividends reduce investor uncertainty, and the fourth theory 
concerning the impact of restrictive investment practices, would 
intuitively appear to be better explanations for the investors 
interest in dividends. 
From this discussion we propose the following hypotheses be tested 
using our derived descriptive model of the market's decision making 
process: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 - Earnings are the dominating factor in determining 
relative share values. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2 - Dividends are influencial in determining relative 
share values but take second place to earnings. 
6. Share Valuation and Investment Risk 
So far in this chapter very little has been said about the i nfluence 
of risk in the assessment of share values. The reason for this can 
be attributed to the lack of significance of such measu res in share 
ｶ｡ｬｾ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ models to date which may possibly infer that r isk is not 
perceived to be important be investors. However, most basic text 
books on investment usually advocate the need to evaluate both risk 
and return in any investment project, and therefore it would seem 
that some measure of risk should influence relative share values . 
One explanation for the absence of such a variable from the extant 
valuation models is that the methodology, which we have cr i tici sed 
above, may not be capable of detecting the influence of risk, either 
through reasons of mis-specification of the measure or the inability 
of the statistical techniques used to isolate its true affect. As 
there appears to be a gap between theory and empirical evidence it is 
necessary to look closer at the arguments for and against the use of 
risk in share valuation. Conventionally there are two types of 
investment ｲｩｳｾ＠ namely financial risk and systematic risk. 
6.1 Financial Risk 
The financial risk of a company, often referred to as fundamental 
risk, describes the internal gearing and is usually measured by the 
debt/equity ratio. Firth(1975) explains why gearing is important 
as follows, "Highly geared companies will have more volatile profits 
performance than similarly placed firms with little fixed interest 
borrowing and will be a mor,e risky investment." Based upon this 
argument it would seem reasonable to expect financial gearing to 
adversely affect share values as it changes the risk class of an 
ｩｮｾ･ｳｴｭ･ｮｴＮ＠ Modigliani and Miller(1958) support this line of 
argument but their theory is based on the net operating income model. 
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Their reasoning is that shares generating the same net operating 
income will have the same market valuations regardless of the 
financial structure and that the effect of arbitrage will cause 
highly geared companies to have ' lower share prices. In other words 
shareholders will adjust their capitalisation rate in line with 
changes in financial risk. 
The opposing line of thought is often referred to as the Net Income 
Valuation Model(Weston and Brigham; 1979) and suggests that earnings 
after interest are all that matters to the investor. Renwick(1969) 
reconciles the two theories by suggesting that gearing is only 
important when there is a risk of bankruptcy. He goes further to 
suggest that gearing can be beneficial to investors in certain 
circumstances and therefore should not be adversely interpreted all 
the time. The normative model Renwick proposes is that gearing and 
expected returns interact to form two stable states within the market 
as follows: 
a) companies with low expected returns should have low gearing. 
b) companies with high expected returns should have high gearing 
providing the probability of default remains low. 
Any other combination of these factors is an unstable state and does 
not maximise the investor's risk return profile. For example a low 
return company with high gearing has a high probability of default 
and therefore must be considered to be risky. In such circumstances 
it is argued that management should take action to either increase 
expected returns or reduce gearing to enable the company to reach a 
,stable state. On the other hand if a company has high expecte'd 
returns and low gearing then it is possible to increase shareholder 
profits by adopting a policy to fund expansion by debt rather than 
equity. Obviously, the only circumstances when the benefit from 
gearing is obtained is when the expected return is greater than the 
interest on debt. Under these conditions risk of default is nil, 
and the expected dispersion of future income is optimised. This 
relationship can be clearly shown with the use of a graph. Figure 
4.1 presents the relationship between the cost of capital and the 
traditional debt equity ratio. Under the Net Income Valuation model 
the cost of equity(Ke) and the cost of debt(Kd) remain constant' as 
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the level of gearing increases, until a point is reached, A, where 
the risk of bankruptcy is considered too great, whereupon both Ke and 
Kd increase. The impact on the average cost of capital(Ka) is a 
decline until point A and then a rise. The net effect of this 
decline in the average cost of capital is to increase the amount of 
income available for distribution to shareholders, and providing Ke 
remains constant the market value of the firm should increase. 
COST OF 
CAPITAL 
8 ' 
FIGURE 4.1 
The Net Income Valuation Model 
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO 
Under Renwick's normative model companies with returns greater than 
the cost of debt would maximize shareholders wealth at point A and 
for companies with low returns (that is less than the cost of debt) 
at point B ie. zero gearing. 
Renwick's argument suggests that risk as measured by the debt/equity 
ratio cannot be interpreted without reference· to overall 
profitability. As this line of thought is believed a priori to be 
the most likely model of investor preferences we propose that the 
following hypothesis be tested: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 - Financial risk, as measured by the debt/equity ratio, 
does not adversely affect share values unless the risk of default is 
high. 
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A second type of financial risk which in theory is very relevant to 
investors is the risk of bankruptcy. When bankruptcy does occur the 
effect is for the investor to lose his total investment in that 
particular stock. This type of risk is therefore probably as 
important, if not more so, than the risk caused by operational 
gearing discussed above. However, despite the serious effect 
bankruptcy can have on portfolio performance, it has to date been 
given only cursory attention in most finance texts which probably 
stems from the difficulty in determining whether or not a company is 
at risk of failure. Empirical work by Taffler(1981a) and 
Altman(1968) in the area of bankruptcy prediction has revealed that 
it is possible by the use of statistical models to accurately 
classify companies at risk of failure. 
It would be argued by many analysts that they are able to predict 
bankruptcy through traditional financial analysis and that such 
. 
models merely confirm their expectations. In order to test the 
ability of the market to determine bankruptcy several researchers 
have investigated the association between corporate failure, share 
price movements and market risk. In a recent study by Altman and 
Brenner(1981) the market's response to information about firms whose 
future is assessed to be extremely problematic by application of 
Altman's 1968 z-model, . that is firms that possess similar financial 
characteristics to those of previously failed companies, was 
monitored. The hypothesis tested by Altman and Brenner was that 
such information should not produce any abnormal returns because the 
information obtained by the use of the model should be digested 
before or upon the publication of the annual report. In contrast to 
this hypothesis it was found that deterioration in the firm's share 
price adjusted for market risk persists up to 12 months after the 
date of publication of the accounts. Because these results were 
considered "perplexing and contradictory to · much evidence concerning · 
market efficiency", Altman and Brenner subjected the data to more 
tests which proved inconclusive. So, although there may be some 
evidence to show that new information conveyed by Altman's z-model 
may not have been picked up immediately by investors further 
investigation is required to confirm Altman's and Brenner's 
preliminary results. One possible reason for these inconclusive 
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results could be due to the problems associated with using "failing 
companies" as opposed to actul bankruptcies. 
Aharony, Jones and Swary(1980) used a different methodology to test 
the impact of impending bankruptcy on share prices. In this study 
the share price movements of 45 bankrupt and 65 continuing companies 
were compared over a period of 390 weeks prior to failure. From a 
cross-sectional analysis of the weekly returns it was found that, 
although the systematic risk for each portfolio was not significantly 
different, the variance of returns was significantly different. The 
authors suggest that this implies that this difference is caused by 
firm specific factors rather than market factors. The time series 
analysis further revealed that there was a significant negative 
cumulative return for the bankrupt portfolio which started 
approximately four years prior to bankruptcy and which becomes 
increasingly negative as bankruptcy approaches. 
Aharony et al conclude that investors were adjusting continuously for 
the declining solvency positions of these firms over about a four 
year period, and that even near the point of bankruptcy "the market 
did not fully expect that these firms would soon file bankruptcy." 
Finally, a study by Arbel, Kolodny and Lakonishok(1977) attempted to 
test the impact of default risk by monitoring the returns of 
portfolios with different financial risk. They reported that in 
general there were no abnormal returns generated by high risk 
portfolios. However, their methodology can be severely criticised 
for using bond ratings as a means of defining the degree of financial 
risk as this implies that bond ratings are accurate predictors of the 
risk of failure, which was not empirically demonstrated in the study 
and therefore questionable. 
Our overall conclusion from the empirical evidence is that whilst 
investors have a fundamental interest in knowing the risk of 
bankruptcy present in their portfolios, it appears that they may not 
be able to recognise the signs with a sufficient degree of accuracy. 
This conclusion is rather controversial for it implies inefficiency 
within the market. As such we propose that the following hypothesis 
･ｸｰｲ･ｾｳ･､＠ in conventional form is tested: 
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HYPOTHESIS 4 - Financial risk, as defined by the risk of bankruptcy, 
adversely affects share values when the risk of default is high. 
6.2 Systematic Risk 
The other risk measure which theoretically should be used in 
investment appraisal is beta. Beta is a measure of systematic risk 
which is that element of investment risk that cannot be reduced by 
simple diversification, and represents the risk relative to the 
market as a whole (Franks and Broyles, 1979). As some companies are 
more susceptable to changes in the economy and therefore the market, 
they will possess higher risk or betas. If we also assume that 
investors are risk adverse and require an additional expected .return 
for incurring additional risk then this leads to the conclusion that 
the greater the risk, the greater the expected return to compensate 
for the risk. Thus, if all other things are equal, companies with 
greater systematic risk should be valued less than companies with 
less risk. This simple theory on systematic risk is well documented 
in several text books (Lorie and Hamilton, 1973, Firth, 1975, Franks 
and Broyles, 1979 for example) and therefore we do not examine the 
theory in more detail. The empirical evidence to support the theory 
is plentiful in the U.S.A.(see Foster, 1978 for a review). However 
the same cannot be said for the U.K. where the empirical work has 
been far less voluminous. One of the early studies is by Briscoe, 
Samuels and Smyth(1969) who examined the risk-return performance of 
14 unit trusts from 1953 to 1963 with a view to substantiating the 
applicability of the capital asset pricing model in the U.K. The 
results revealed that "the risk aversion hypothesis which holds for 
United States mutual funds must be rejected for British unit trusts." 
The authors add that "The British investor does not appear to 
differentiate between unit trusts on the grounds of risk." 
A later study by Moles and Taylor(1977) reported that unit trusts in 
general gave a return of 1%.above a simple buy and hold policy. In 
this study the returns of 86 unit trusts over the period 1966 to 1975 
were examined. Moles and Taylor found that 
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1) there was no relationship between "beta" and the risk c1;lss 
attributed to each unit trust. 
2) the beta for the period 1966 to 1970 was not a good guide for the 
beta of the subsequent period. 
3) beta gave a poor showing, appearing totally unstructured and 
apparently completely random in its behaviour. 
Besides stating that these results should be interpreted as mea ni ng 
that the CAPM is not applicable in the ' U.K. stock market , Moles and 
Taylor conclude that 
"One must be wary of a blind application of modern inves tment 
techniques without a proper analysis of their validity." 
However, in a review paper on the U.K. stock market Henfrey, Albre cht 
and Richards(1977) dispute this claim by Moles and Taylor and make 
strong criticisms of their methodology. In summary, whilst we 
recognise that there may be some empirica l evidence inconsi s t nt with 
the view that systematic risk has utility in the U,K., we propos e 
the following hypnothsis! 
HYPOTHESIS 5 -ISystematic risk as measured by be ta is inverse ly 
related to share values, the higher the risk the lower the re lative 
share value. 
7. The Focus of this Study 
The above survey of the literature into the factors influencing share 
values has revealed very mixed and sometimes conflictt ng results. 
In the first place we saw that the empirical studt s relating 
accounting numbers to share price movements on a univariate basis 
were only, at best, able to contribute broad generalisations about 
how a limited set of factors influenced share prices. Fur t hermore, 
all too often these generalisations merely confirmed relationships 
which are all too obvious to those involved with share valuation. 
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In order to investigate whether the limitations of the univariate 
approach could be overcome we examined some of the multivariate time 
series studies. Despite the potential benefits from this approach 
it was found that the methodology was fraught with problems and the 
resulting models provide little insight into how share prices react 
to accounting information. These negative results were unexpected 
in light of the strong theoretical grounds for relating accounting 
information to share price changes and may well indicate that either 
the analytical techniques or the methodology employed may not be 
appropriate for uncovering the true relationships. 
The second class of study examined concerned the development of share 
valuation models. By using a cross-sectional approach several 
researchers have attempted to explain share valuations using 
financial characteristics. These studies were generally more 
helpful in relating accounting information to relative share values 
but unfortunately there was little consensus in the variables forming 
the resultant models which could possibly be attributed to the 
different methodologies employed. Several cross-sectional studies 
that used forecast data to explain relative share values were also 
discussed. Unfortunately for our purposes here the methodologies 
employed imposed valuation models on the data and consequently were 
unhelpful in providing new insights into the factors at work within 
the share price fixing mechanism. 
The conclusion drawn from this review is that further research needs 
to be conducted into understanding the relationship between 
accounting information and share prices. We suggest on the evidence 
presented above that the cross-sectional approach using share 
valuation models based on historic accounting information is likely 
to be more fruitful than the time series approach. We further 
suggest that part of the reason of the inconclusive results has been 
the restrictive methodology employed which has in general 1) 
concentrated on analysing the price earnings ratio, 2) employed 
linear additive techniques for analysing configural relationships, 
and 3) diluted the resultant models by the use of normalised ratio 
values. In this study we attempt to overcome these problems 'as 
follows: in the first place we do not restrict ourselves to the 
.' 
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price earnings ratio but also work with an alte rn a tive meas ure thn t 
overcomes certain of the problems inherent in the use of pr ice 
･ｾｲｮｩｮｧｳ＠ ratios and is arguably more theore tically de f ens ihl y , name Ly 
the valuation ratio. Secondly, we ove rcome th e problems of t he 
linear additive approach by adopting a new anal yt l eal techn i.q \l € 
called Automatic Interaction Detector which ha s t he ability to S Ar ch 
for and reveal any configural relationships prese nt i n t he datR (th e 
importance of this was discussed in chapte r 3). Lastly we avoid th e 
problems of normalised data by using dat a comput ed f r om th e latest 
available information. 
In order to crystalise the relationships we may expec t to fl nd in our 
share valuation models, we then examined both t he theo ry and 
empirical evideonce on se veral finance issues . This .l d to t he 
formulation of five norma tive hypotheses on th e roles of eRr nlngs , 
dividends, financial risk, bankruptcy risk and sys t ematic risk in he 
share price fixing mechanism. It is unfortuna t r t ha t t hese 
hypotheses cannot be tested against more of th e exta n t work , and thL s 
only emphasizes the large ga p be tween the theory and prA ct ice of 
finance. We thus hope that this thesis will ha ve po ent inl va lU0 
from a methodological vantage point and also i n so doln g may prov lde 
a contribution towards enhancing our unde rsta ndin g of c rt a Ln 
important issues in the thoery of finance • 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DATA AND RELATED ISSUES 
1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the data that was used in the building of the 
models which are presented in the following chapt e rs. The dat a 
consisted primarily of financial ratios which can be split into two 
groups. The first contains the dependent variables based upon 
market values and the second group ｣ｯｮｴ｡ｩｾｳ＠ the inde pe ndent variables 
computed from the annual accounts of the companies in the data ba se. 
In this chapter we report on the following: 
1) the criteria upon which the companies were selec t ed 
2) an examination of the variables included in the analyses, both 
independent and de penden t 
3) the definitions of t he ratio elements and the adjustments made to 
the accounting dat a 
4) the tests performed on ea ch ratio distribut i on in orde r to 
ascertain the ex t e nt of non-normality and where necessary t he 
adjustments made to make the data more amenable to statistica l 
analysis 
5) an examination of the dimensionality of the inde pendent variables 
by using the multivariate technique of factor analysis. The pupose 
being to identify the differen t financial characteristics measured by 
each ratio. 
2. The Criteria f or Select i ng Compani es 
The accounting data ｵｳｾ､＠ i n these studies were ex tra ct ed fr om the 
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EXSTAT computer t ape , which contains the balance sheet and profit and 
loss account items for over 2,000 companies including app r oxima t ely 
1,200 U.K. quoted industrial compani es, approxima t e ly ｴ ｨｾ＠ l a r ges t 70% 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Consequently the first 
criteria for inclusion in the data base was that the company had to 
be on the tape. Although, this restricted the sample size, it was 
felt that the results would not be adversely affected. The r eason 
for a subset of quoted companies only bei ng ava ilabe on the t a pe is 
ｴｨ｡ｾ＠ the tape was compiled with similar coverage to that of the Extel 
Analysts Card Service which only covers those companies that are 
thought to be of interest to the financial community. The quot e d 
companies not on the tape are in gene ral small and r a rely traded. 
It is resonable to assume that had these companies been included in 
the analyses then the error term in the data might have been 
potentially greater as their share prices are unlikely to have fully 
reflected the market's true perception of their value due to l a ck of 
trading. 
2.1 The Industries 
The data included only manufacturing companies or companies that were 
predominantly manufacturing. Specifica lly the following industries 
were excluded f ro m the data ba se: 
1) retail and rental 
2) distribution and transport, ' including warehousing and 
stockholding 
3) importers and exporters (trade rs) 
4) service industries ego launderies , financtal services, etc. 
5) hotels and leisure activiites 
6) property developers 
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7) financial trusts and investment companies 
A full list of the industries included in the data base is given in 
appendix D. (The industry definitions are those given by the 
Institute of Actuaries.) Screening for manufacturing companies in 
the leisure and miscellaneous industry classes was also undertaken 
with the result that thirteen additional companies were found and 
included in the data base. From the EXSTAT tape as at 1st 
September,1977 a sample of 689 companies was initially obtained. 
This is slightly less than we expected but, unfortunately, companies 
with financial year ends in May, June and July had not yet reported 
their latest accounts and therefore did not meet our time period 
constraint. A further detailed check was then made using the Extel 
Card Service to ensure that every company in the sample was; 
i) predominantly manufacturing, that is more than 50% of its 
turnover was from this activity. 
ii) not a subsidiary. 
iii) not in liquidation. 
iv) quoted on the U.K. Stock Market with a share price readily 
available. 
After vetting and checking that the da : a on the EXSTAT tape was free 
from errors the final sample ｣ｯｮｳｩｳｴ･ｾ＠ of 547 companies. Of the 142 
companies excluded 19 were found to be ･ｩｴｨ･ｾ＠ in liquidation or had 
their listing suspended, seven . had errors in their data and 3 were 
subsidiaries. The remaining 113 ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｮｩ･ｾ＠ were found not to be 
predominantly manufacturing. It was thought that this final sample 
was a homogeneous group of manufacturing companies and large enough 
to enable thorough analyses to be undertaken. A full list of 
companies is presented in appendix K. 
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2.2 Time Period 
The time period covered by the analyses is from 1st August, 1976 to 
31st July, 1977. Companies reporting their annual accounts during 
this period were included in the data base. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
shbw the histogram of the financial year ends and the date the 
accounts were published. It can be seen that the vast majority of ' 
companies published their annual accounts in the period April to July 
1977 • 
3. The Selection of Variables 
The variables employed in this study can broadly be described as 
"financial ratios", and for convenience we shall split them into two 
groups, namely the dependent and the independent variables. The 
dependent variable group contained only two ratios, both of which 
were computed using share prices and for the purpose of this study 
represent two measures of relative stock market valuation. The 
second group, which contained the independent or explanatory 
variables, was used to explain the variance of the dependent 
variables. This second group differed from the first in that all 
the variables were derived from data extracted from published 
accounts and thus can be described as "externally stable variables" 
as opposed to the "market based valuations" of the first group. In 
essence the difference between the two groups was that the dependent 
variables were based upon values determined by investor preferences 
whilst the explanatory variables were based upon "objective" historic 
data. 
4. The Dependent Variables 
One of the initial problems in this study was to decide upon a method 
for measuring relative share values. In the previous chapter it was 
pointed out that Meader(l935) conducted a 'study using "share prices 
as the dependent variables" but because of the influence of company 
size the results were considered invalid. To overcome this problem, 
most subsequent studies have used a measure of relative share 
valuation usually the price earnings ratio. In this thesis we 
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comply with this traditional approach by adopting the earnings yield 
(the reciprocal of the price earnings ratio) as a dependent variable. 
However, this variable has been criticized by many, as we shall see, 
and therefore it was considered appropriate to adopt another measure 
of relative share valuation, the valuation ratio. By analysing 
these variables in parallel arid comparing the results it was thought 
that a more complete picture of the rationale behiftd the share price 
fixing mechanism might be found. 
4.1 "The Earnings Yield 
The earnings yield or its reciprocal the price earnings ratio has 
been used extensively in the empirical studies into share valuation. 
In the previous chapter studies by Walter(1959), Gordon(1959), 
ｂ･ｮｩｾｨ｡ｹＨＱＹＶＱＩＬ＠ Martin(1971) and Shick and Verbrugge(1975) were 
discussed at length and, although the results in" general were poor, 
the authors were consistent in their use of this relative share price 
measure as the dependent variable. Other major studies that have 
concentrated on the characteristics of this ratio over time are 
Beaver and Morse(1978), Basu(1978) and Basu0977). However, as. all 
of these studies focus upon the Capital Asset Pricing Model, it is 
not considered appropriate to discuss them at length, especially in a 
thesis which does not have a spes:ial emphasis towards testing the 
C.A.P.M. For our purposes it is sufficient to demonstrate the 
academic interest in this measure of share valuation. 
Most financial analysts would appear to use the earnings yield, or 
its reciprocal the price earnings ratio, to relate forecasted 
earnings to share prices and to help decide a share is over- or 
under-valued"(see Firth, 1977a for a detailed discussion). Quite 
simply the earnings yield is the earnings per share expressed as a 
percentage of the share price and is analagous to return on capital. 
Larcier(1977) suggests that the concept of the price earnings ratio 
is similar to that of the "payback" method used by industrial finance 
managers. The definition of earnings often varies from analyst to 
analyst but in this study we have used the "Net (Actual) Earnings" 
definition which has been recommended by the Institute of Chartered 
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Accountants. This definition of earnings only takes into account 
the ACT (recoverable and . non-recoverable) on dividends actually paid 
by the company. The ratio is calculated: 
Earnings Per Share 
Earnings Yield 
Price Per Share 
This ratio can be best interpretated if Table 5.1 is considered. 
TABLE 5.1 
A ComEarison of two Earnings Yield Ratios 
ComE any EPS Share Price Earnings Yield 
A 21p 200p 10.5% 
B 21p lOOp 21.0% 
From this table we can see that although company A has the same 
earnings per share as company B, company A has a higher price and 
therefore a lower yield. This can be interpreted as meaning that 
investors value the earnings of A ｭｾｲ･＠ than they do B. There are 
several possible reasons for this. It could be that A: 
1) has greater growth potential than B, and the market is therefore 
expecting a higher return in the future. 
2) has' temporary depressed earnings and the market expects a return 
to a higher more normal yield in the current year. 
3) has a less volatile earnings record than B and is therefore 
thought to be less risky than B. 
4) has a greater net asset per share than B and therefore offers 
more asset cover to the investor. 
5) has a more marketable stock than B. 
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6) has a lower debt/equity ratio or is less likely to fail than B 
and therefore can be described as possessing iess fundamental risk 
The major problem when using this ratio is that its interpretation is 
extremely difficult especially at the lower end of the distribution. 
A company with normal profits, but considered to have high upside 
potential, will have a low yield caused by a high share price. 
However, a company with little or no profits will also have a low 
yield as there is a limit as to how far the market is willing to let 
the share price fall. Obviously the value of the underlying assets 
will prohibit , share prices falling to zero. 
In order to avoid the problems with companies generating low returns 
and therefore not possessing meaningful earnings yields, it was 
decided to exclude these companies from the earnings yield analyses. 
The rule of thumb adopted for this purpose was that if a company was 
generating a return on capital of less than 5% and had an earnings 
yield value of less than 7%, then it was excluded from the database. 
It should be noted that of all the 43 companies with yields less than 
7%, only 2 were not associated with a very low return on capital. 
The end result was a reduced , sample of 506 companies. 
It has been ' suggested by Whitbeck and Kisor(1963), that in order to 
aid interpretation of the ratio, earnings should be normalised. 
This, it is argued would overcome the problem of temporary high or 
low earnings in the current year. Normalising would take the form 
of averaging several years earnings figures in order to produce a 
normal earnings figure. Although there is substantial agreement 
. that this type of adjustment is necessary, there is little agreement 
on the best way to do it(Lorie and Hamilton 1975:133). The 
implication of this type of adjustment is that earnings have a 
cyclical nature. However this is not supported by the findings of 
Little and Rayner (1966) who tested earnings growth for secular 
trends, cyclical changes and seasonal variations only to find no 
significant relationship between succesive earnings figures. 
In this study we make no attempt to normalise earnings for several 
reasons. The first and the most important is that the use of 
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normalised or averaged variables has the effect of diluting any cause 
and effect relationships that. may be present between the dependent 
and independent variables. For example, it is conceivable and in 
fact probable that temporary changes in a company's financial 
characteristics might cause a temporary change in its share price. 
However, by using normalised or averaged variables it is plausible 
that this cause and effect relationship may easily be lost in the 
resultant model's error term. The second reason is that during the 
two year period prior to 1976 the U.K. economy was in a recession and 
suffering from high inflation. As a result company profits were 
substantially reduced and therefore any attempt to normalise might 
introduce a general downward bias. Finally, we would argue that one 
of the strengths of this thesis lies in relating the latest historic 
accounting data to share prices on the day after the 4ay that the 
accounting data was released to the public. If one accepts the 
premise that share prices reflect future expectations then at this 
one point in time · the historic earnings yield is likely to be the 
closest to the expected yield. Obviously as time progresses from 
this date revised earnings forecasts will be calculated but these 
will probably take time to be fully reflected in the share price(for 
. evidence to support this argument see Brown, 1978 and Latane and 
Jones, 1977). Our conclusion is that any attempt to normalise 
earnings is likely to weaken rather than strengthen the relationship 
between relative share values and historic accounting data. 
A further area of controversy surrounding the use of the earnings 
yield as a yardstick for share valuation lies in the definition of 
"earnings". Several critics (eg. Sibley, 1979 and Larcier, 1977) 
have used the basic reasoning contained in SSAP 16 on inflation 
accounting to argue that the "earnings" number is not a "true 
measure" of a company's income and therefore any ratio that uses this 
misleading figure is invalid. Furthermore, other critics such as 
Brealey(1976) and Lawson(1980) argue that cash flows are all that 
matter and therefore earnings are not an appropriate number for share 
valuation. However evidence from a study by Govindarajan(1980) 
reveals that investment analysts view earnings information to be more 
useful than cash flow information. Consequently, whilst it would be 
true to say that these criticisms have a growing body of support at 
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the present time, as yet no replacement scheme has been introduced 
and accepted by the market as an acceptable substitute for the 
traditional method of calculation. Thus, although we recognise that 
the earnings yield is not a perfect measure for share valuation, 
there is no generally acceptable substitute, and therefore because it 
is so widely used in its current form it is considered to be a 
relevant measure for use as a dependent variable. (It is interesting 
to note that a study by Moore, 1980 revealed that from a 
macro-economic point of view there was little difference between 
inflation adjusted and unadjusted earnings figures.) 
4.2 The Valuation Ratio 
The valuation ratio measures the relationship between the stock 
market's valuation of a company's ordinary share capital and the book 
value of its underlying equity assets. The ratio has been used in 
several empirical studies ego Singh and Whittington(1968), 
Ryan(1974), Kamath(1980) and Moore(1980) and is often referred to in 
the more academic finance literature (eg. Marris ｾ Ｎ＠ 1967). In 
practice the ratio is usually only referred to in take-over or 
liquidation situations. It is calculated as follows: 
Book Value of Equity 
Valuation Ratio -
Market Value of Equity 
In pure economic theory terms if the book value of equity were the 
same as the economic value of the assets, and given certain 
theoretical assumptions, then it is postulated that this ratio would 
always be equal to one. Nevertheless, theory does not hold in 
practice and rarely will the ratio equal one. The higher the ratio, 
the less the market values the earning power/risk profile of the 
assets. The lower the ratio the more the investor is willing to pay 
for the assets, which should mean a higher risk adjusted earnings 
potential. Table 5.2 shows the calculation of this ratio for two 
companies with the same Net Assets per share. It can be seen that 
the market has a higher regard for the assets of A than it does for B. 
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Table 5.2 
A Comparison of Two Valua tion Rat i os 
Company 
A 
B 
Net Assets 
Per Share 
SOp 
50p 
lOOp 
50p 
Valuation 
ｾ＠
.5 
LOO 
The ratio is far easier to interpret than the earnings yield as it 
does not suffer from temporary variations in the numerator. The 
numerator of the valuation ratio, the book value of equity, is 
relatively stable although it can be criticised for problems 
associated with asset valuation. However, the current trend is for 
companies to regularly revalue their assets and therefore this 
problem may be possibly more apparent than real. In any case, faute 
de mieux, in the absense of any more accurate valuation information 
we are forced to use the published book value figures. Also our 
prime interest was in the relationship between published accounting 
information and relative share valuations. 
A further point of interest is that this ratio is free from the 
criticisms voiced about the definition of the earnings figure used in 
the calculation of the earnings yield. Thus a further attribute of 
the valuation ratio is that it measures the economic value of the 
assets as perceived by investors and therefore does not implicitly 
assume traditional accounting profit measures to be correct for 
measuring economic income. 
The valuation ratio is not used regulary by analysts or referred to 
by the press except in takeover situations but as we have seen in the 
previous chapter it has been used quite effectively by Ryan(1974) for 
share valuation. In conclusion, despite its problems, we believe 
that this ratio provides a valid alternative measure of share 
valuation. 
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A final point worth clarifying is that the share prices collected for 
the calculation of the two dependent variables were the middle prices 
taken from the Stock Exchange Daily Official List on the day after 
publication of the accounts. It is interesting td note that only a 
few companies had no deals marked on this day which suggests that 
their share prices were likely to be reflecting the market feeling on 
the basis of latest accounting information available. Any prices 
found to be "ex div" on this day were adjusted by adding to the price 
the net value of the dividend to be paid. This was considered 
important due to the possible impact of the dividend restraint 
policies in force at this time. The F.T. 500 All Share index was 
also collected for the same dates and subsequently all the share 
prices were adjusted for "any movements in the index. This was 
undertaken as it was believed that when using a six month time 
period, prices could be influenced by various market fluctuations. 
The adjustment made was as follows: 
Share Price X Average Index 
Revised Price ｾ＠
Index at Date of Publication 
During the period examined the movement of the market ranged from 
139.4 to 223.0, the average was 197.8. No attempt was made to 
adjust the prices for any industry specific movements as the majority 
of the share prices collected related to a short time period (3-4 
months), and because of the difficulties of classifying companies 
into a relevant index. 
, 5. The Independent Variables 
The independent (explanatory) variables used in this study are mainly 
financial ratios that can be computed using the "EXSTAT" database. 
One problem faced in this study was that of selecting the accounting 
ratios. The objective adopted was to obtain a set of ratios that 
had the greatest likelihood of including most of the measures that 
might be expected to be useful to investors and investment analysts. 
In general terms the selection criteria were: 
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1) the popularity of the ratios as cited in the financial statement 
analysis literature 
2) the previous success of the ratios in earlier studies 
3) the occurrence of the ratios in the information services supplied 
to the investment community 
The initial source of ratios was from Taffler's(1976) thesis which 
contains a thorough review of the literature in this area. In 
addition to producing a list of 80 conventional financial ratios, 
Taffler also evaluated the use of 71 four year trend measures and 
found that they had "no coherent form ••• with large numbers of 
outliers, however the ratios were transformed, and thus they were 
dropped from the analysis"(pI45). It was therefore decided to 
exclude similar trend measures except for two. These were growth in 
"Net Capital Employed" and the change in "Profit before Interest and 
Tax" over the latest year. The author is of the opinion that more 
complicated trend measures are not frequently used in practice and 
would therefore not have much, if any, influence on share prices. 
The Benston (1967) study which was ､ｩｾ｣ｵｳｳ･､＠ at lenght in chapter 4 
provides some. empirical evidence to support this line of thought. 
Taffler's list of 80 ｲ｡ｴｩｯｾ＠ was thoroughly reviewed with the result 
that 29 ratios were considered to ·be redundant. Other ratios which 
were considered to be of potential utility were found in Weaver and 
Hall(1967), Firth(1977a), Van Horne(1977), the Extel Analysts' 
Service and in the many articles reviewed in the previous chapter. 
These new ratios were added to the set to give a total of 85 
financial ratios which included the two trend measures referred to 
above • . 
In addition to the above set of ratios five other variables were 
included, namely z-score, beta, a measure of the market liquidity and 
two size measures. The z-score is the result obtained when 
Taffler's(1977) discriminant function is applied to four ratios. 
Essentially it is a measure of solvency, with the lower the z-score 
the less the solvency. However, recent empirical research (Taffler, 
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1981a) has found tha t not only doe s the mod e l prov i de a mea ns to 
distinguish between ba nkrupt and non-bankrupt companies , i t al s o 
provides a measure o f ove rall economic pe rformance and because of 
this it was thought tha t i t might be use ful. 
The be ta and the marke t l i quidity measures we r e ki nd ly provided to 
the author by the London Business School. The be t as. we r e ca lcula t e d 
over the three year per i od from January 1975 to December 1977 usi ng 
monthly observations. The market liquid i ty f actor was based on the 
numbe r of deals marked during this three yea r pe r i od. A f ive poi nt 
scale was used, one indicating the most liqui d, i ncreas ing to fi ve 
where trading was infre quent. Whilst it is r ecognised t ha t the 
period over which these two measure s we r e ca lcula t e d ove rla p the 
period of this study it i snot conside re d important f or t wo r eas on s . 
Firstly, it can be seen from figure 5. 2 that the overla p is only one 
month, ie. December 1976 a nd only aff ect s a f ew compa ni e s . 
Secondly, even if the ove rlap probl em was more accute evi dence f r om 
Marsh and Dimson(1980) suggests . that be t a s ar e r e l a t i ve ly sta ble ove r 
time and therefore it is unl ikeiy any s i gnif icant bias is pres ent. 
A full list of the inde pendent and dependent varia ble s i s given i n 
a ppehdix A, with an i ndex to the abbre via tion s used i n append i x B. 
It is not the author's int ent i on to r eview these ratio s i nd ividually 
a t this point 1n th i s thesis as many will be seen to be re dund ant . 
Nevertheless, the ra tios tha t a re found to possess s igni fica nt 
explanatory powers will be discussed in l a t e r cha pte r s . 
6. The Ratio Definitions and Accounting Da t a Adjus tments 
In the previous section the ratio s utilised i n the analyses wer e 
discussed and reference was made to app end i ce s A and B whe r e a full 
list of the ratios and their definit i ons can be f ound. Whil s t 
deciding on the ratios it was a lso necessa ry to standardize the 
definitions of the elements that const i tut e the ra tios. We shall in 
this section briefly discuss the necessa ry adjustments made to the 
ac·counting data on the EXSTAT tape. Bas ed on the authors past 
experience in analysing sets of accounts, i t was decided that these 
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adjustments were necessary in order to avoid "window dressing" and 
certain other accounting misrepresentations. Possibly in certain 
cases the adjustments made may have been overcautious, but it was 
felt that when analysing a data base of 547 companies it was far 
better to be conservative. Briefly the adjustments were as follows: 
(i) the bank overdraft and cash figures were offset against each 
other. 
(ii) quoted investments were included at their market value at the 
balance sheet . date instead of book value. The excess (or short 
fall) over book value was added to (or subtracted from) the 
shareholders' equity. 
(iii) intangible assets were excluded from the balance sheet, the 
value being deducted from the shareholders' equity. 
(iv) the deferred tax account was included as part of the 
shareholders' equity. 
(v) corporation tax payable was classified as a current 
liability. 
(vi) a quarter of the long term bank loans and H.P. loans 
outstanding were included in the current liabilities and called 
medium term finance. The reason for this unusual adjustment is that 
most bank loans and all H.P. loans are repayable by instalment and it 
was felt that the amounts repaid during the eighteen months after the 
balance sheet date were not long term loans but medium term and 
therefore should be treated as a current liability. 
(vii) Government grants received were classified as long term debt 
rather than shareholders' equity. It is believed that this is a 
more valid treatment as the grant is not classed as equity until it 
has flowed through the profit and loss account. 
(viii) Value Added was calculated by adding together employees' 
wages, earnings before interest and tax, and depreciation, less any 
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other income. This definition does not exactly reconcj Le with t he 
normal textbook definition but it is the best that could be obtai ne d 
from the limited information on the EXSTAT tape . One fu rt he r 
problem with this measure is that many companie s do not rpport th a lr 
overseas employees' remune ration. It is be lieved, howe ve r, that the 
effect of this omission on the calculated measure may not be too 
great as most of the companies analysed were pre dominan tly U.K. 
manufacturing. 
The above adjustments constitute the major changes m;)d e. to t he EXSTflT 
accounting data. In addition "the ratios we re construct d in su ch a 
way that like was always compared with Hke, this pre vent s the UR e of 
some meaningless return on capital ratios oft e n se e n in the 
literature ego net income to total assets. Only one ratlo of thLR 
nature was included, that being profit bef ore tax to net capltal 
employed, and the reason for this is that many i nvestment analysts 
quote this measure as a good indicator of return on capital. Some 
"of the obvious pitfalls inherent in published accounts Ruch as off 
balance sheet financing and under valuation of the fixed As sets of 
course will have remained after the above adjustment s bill as no 
figures are available on these factors, no adjustment cOl1ld he m:ld p 
to accommodate them. A full explanation of th ratio e lement s l s 
contained in appendix B and a set of the standardised accounts are 
\ presented in appendix C. 
7. The Ratio Distributions and Transformations 
It is necessa ry when using the multivariate statistical techniqu es 
employed in this thesis to have a knowledge of the distributions of 
each of the indpendent and dependent variables. In th e P;)st the r e 
has been a tendency in this area of research to avoid this particular 
issue and all too often it has been assumed that the data ls 
approximately normally distributed. The reason for this common 
assumption is that the alternative would be to employ nonparame trlc 
statistics which, although in theory are statistically more valia, do not 
provide the same degree of predictive accuracy (s e Chen & Shimerda, 
1979 and Lev & Sunder, 1977). In this study all of the fin;)ncial 
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ratio distributions ha ve bee n examine d for normality, sk ew and 
relative flatness, and whe r e necessa ry transfo rmat ions have bee n mane 
to improve the shape oE the ratio dis tribut ions . 
A similar exercise was performed by Dea kin(1976) who e xamined t he 
distributions of 11 ratios for 19 years using a population oE 1.114 
companies. From this da ta base, Deakin found that only one of the 
eleven r a tios examined appeared to be normally distributed, although 
he found that transforming the data improved normality . The se 
r esults do not, however, prohibit the use of ratios i n this a r a of 
r e search, a point which Deakin refers to i n th e co nclusi.on of his 
a rticl e : 
"Finally, one ca n conclude that while probability stat ement s 
from models based on financial accounting ra t ios may be su b ject 
to question be cause of the distr i butions of the data ｴ ｨ ･ ｭ ｳ ･ ｬｶ ･ ｾ Ｎ＠
a us e r could be better off with a ball park estimate t han no 
estimate at all. Thus the ultimat e test of the value of such n 
mod el lies not in its adherence to certai n data assumptions, hut 
rather i n its adherence to its us efulness in de cis i on making ." 
In the U.K., a study by Bougen and Drury(1980) examined t he 
statistical prJperties of the seven ratio distribut i ons compllt d f rom 
700 companies. By using the chi-square t es t they fo und tha t the 
distributions were non-normal and that this characteristic pe rsist ed 
in an analysis of industries containing thirty or more compani e s . 
They conclude their study as follows: 
"The overall impression therefore, is tha t the U. K. empiri ca l 
evidence for the distribution of financial ratios seems t o 
indicate non-normality caused by varying degrees of sk ewnpss and 
the existence of extreme outliers. The ｲ ･ｳｵｬｴｾ＠ adhere to most 
overseas findings and provide an empiri cal framework for f urth e r 
U.K. research." 
The importance of the above results to this st ud is that they 
empha size the need to understand the und e rlying ｣ ｨ ｒ ｲｒ ｣ｴｲｲ ｬ ｳｴｩ ｾ ｳ＠ of 
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the ratio distributions. This unde rstanding was obtained by 
calculating the following statistics for each of the 91 continuous 
variables in our data base :-
(i) Chi-Square Test for departure from normality. 
(ii) Skewness. This statistic takes a value of zero when the 
distribution is symmetrical, a positive value indicates that cas e s 
cluster more to the left of the mean with the extreme values to the 
right and vice versa for a negative value indicates clustering to the 
right. 
(iii) Kurtosis. This is a measure of the relative peakedness of a 
distribution. The greater the value above zero the more peaked, the 
lower the value below zero the flatter the distribution. 
(For an expanded explanation of each of the above tests see Clarke 
and Schkade, 1974). 
In addition to the above tests observations outside 3.1 standard 
deviations from the mean were brought into 3.0 standard deviations. 
This principle was employed to reduce the extreme values in the data, 
which were usually caus ed by some anomaly in the raw data and have a 
disproportionate effect on the distribution of a variable. This 
type of adjustment is discussed at length by Lev and Sunde r(1977) who 
refer to it as "Winsorization", named after Charles P. Winsor. They 
argue that winsoriza'tion makes the data more amenable to statistical 
analysis than the more usual method of trimming the outliers. It 
was found that in general the number of outliers on this basis was 
low, usually less than 1% per ratio. 
The above statistics were calculated for each ratio using both the 
raw ratio and each of the following transformations: 
(i) The Reciprocal 
(ii) The Natural 10g 
(iii) The Square Root 
(iv) The Square Root of the Reciprocal 
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Winsorisation took place after each transforma tion but prior to the 
calcula tion of the statistics. 
The results of the computer program used to compute the 
transformations and tests are shown in appendix E. These r esults 
were used to select the best transformation for each ratio based on 
the following rules of thumb: 
(i) the lowest chi-square value, or 
(ii) if chi-square values similar, the least skewed, or 
(iii) if chi-square values and skew values similar, the l eas t number 
of outliers (column A on appendix E), or, 
(iv) ｩｦｾｬｬ＠ the above measures produce similar results, the lowest 
kurtosis value. 
The final transformations used are presented in appendix A together 
with the mean, standard deviation and number of outliers for each 
ratio. The log transformation was used on 42 of the ratios with the 
reciprocal, square root and square root of the reciprocal 
transformations be ing used on 3, 20 and 6 ratios respectively. The 
remaining 20 ratios were found to give the best distributions when 
left untransformed. The high proportion of ratios using the log 
transformation indicates a sk8wness in the distributions which is to 
be expected from this type of data. A summary of the results 
obtained from the use of the three t ests is shown in table 5.3. The 
chi-square results tended to agree with Deakin's, in that a majority 
of the ratios had distributions significantly different from the 
theoretical normal distribution. (In fact ｾｮｬｹ＠ 32% of the ratios 
had normal distributions at the 5% level of significance.) However, 
ｴｨｾｳ･＠ results are vastly better than those of Deakin(1976) although 
the bringing in of the outliers could account for this improvement. 
From the chi-square tests it is also possible to detect those ratios 
that have unusual distributions. A list of these r a tios is given in 
table 5.4 and will be discuss ed below. 
117 
..... 
ｾ＠
:00 
StM1ARY OF THE DISTRIBUl'ICN TEST RESULTS AFI'ER TRANSFOR.MATICN AND wmSORIZATICN 
Level of 
Significance 
>5% 
.-
<5% > 1% 
<1% 
'IDl'AL 
CHI-sqJARE 
No. of % of 
Ratios Total 
--
28 31.8 
l3 14.3 
50 54.9 
91 100.0 
TEST 
SKEWlliSS 
Positive 
No. % 
27 29.7 
9 9.9 
16 17.6 
52 57.1 
KURIOSIS 
Negative Total Positive 
No. % No % No. % 
26 28.5 53 5A.2 16 17.8 
4 4.4 13 14.3 26 28.9 
9 9.9 25 27.5 38 42 •. 2 
39 42.9 91 100.0 80 88.9 
Table 5.3 
ｎｾ｡ｴｩｶ･＠ Total 
No. % No • . % 
16 17 .8 
1 1.0 27 29.9 
10 11.1 48 53.3 
11 12.1 91 100.0 
---
The resul.t s of the othe r two dist ribution tests were far more 
positive . The ske\.;ness res ld.t s jndicated that 73 % of t he ratloG 
were not significantly skewed at the 1% l e ve l and wha t skew ｴｨ･ｲ ｾ＠ wos 
tended to be pos itive (to the right). Thes e re s ults provided 
evidence that, although the da t a may no t be normf.llly dis tributed, it 
was after transforma tion in general symmetric. The ｫｵｲｴｯｾｬｳ＠ ｴ ･ｾｴ＠
revealed tha t at the 1% leve l of s ignificance 53.3% of the ra ttos had 
distributions that were either exce ptionall y peaked or flat . In 
general the distributions were peaked (89%) or "leptokurtic" ｲ｡ｴｬＧ ｾ ｲ＠
than flat or "pl a tykurtic", indica ting a high concentra t i on of valueb 
around the mean. 
TABLE 5.4 
ｾ｟･＠ R3tio Dist...: ibutions with Oli-Square ValLEs > 100 
No Ratio Cl1i- Skew- Kurtosis TransfolJl'ation 
Square ress 
28 ｃｆＧＯｾａ＠
46 IEBT/QA 
53 LEBT/llWJ 
54 IEBT/ICE 
57 CCE/INV 
459.20 1.05 4.44 
152. Tl -0.08 -0.21 
133.18 0.34 0.25 
169.29 0.54 -0.05 
221.41 1.05 
73 EDIV/OSNI 112.46 0.46 
77 ｄｅｂｔｾ＠ 149.95 0.58 
78 rEBT/CA 120.34 0.83 
85 PRCFrr GROWTH 126.75 0.19 
1.28 
0.75 
-0.02 
0.48 
2.04 
NCNE 
SQ\RE ROJr 
SQJARE RCXJI' 
NCl\TE 
NCNE 
NCNE 
Lex:; 
Table 5.4 lists the ratios that had chi-square values greater than 
100, a lin::i.t thought to be large enough to i,1dicate a n unu sual 
distri.bution. The histograms of these nine ratios were visually 
examined in order to determine the reason for their high chi-square 
values. Five of the ratios were meas'-Iring the level of debt and the 
histograms revealed that the distributions were heavily skewed due to 
geMf lug i nc reased . Ea ch of the ｩｾ ｬｵｲ＠ ｲ ｩＡｭ ［ ｾＺｩ｟ｮｩ ｮｧ＠ ra tios was tound ::0 
have exceptionally hi gh peaks ｩｮ､ｩ｣｡ｴｩｮ ｾ＠ a na rro"" distribution with a 
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high cow.:entra tio n of: observat.ions ,round t.he 'mean. These ratios 
I,ould be "lues tioned if th ey ｾ｜Ｇ｣ｲ･＠ to ent e r any of the Illode 1s , ho JCvc r , 
if they proved to b0. signifj ca nt \o,li th no close sub s ti.tut e th e n t.he y 
｜ Ｌ ｾｯ｜ｬｬ､＠ ha ve to be accepted as impul:tant explanatory ftlctot" s. 
8. Th0. Dimensionality of the . Inde pende nt Variables 
It wIll be noted from our ､ ｩｾ｣ｵｳｳｩ ｯｮ＠ above tha t our ind e pende nt 
variable set is quite large consist ing of 90 diffe re nt meas ures . 
The reas on for this l a r ge numher is tha t ma ny previous researche rs 
and fi nancia l ana'.ysts have t e nded to deri"e their own measure .' fo r 
analysis often claiming their particular dcfinitiod to be more val id 
thall other similar meHsures. Obvious ly one of th e major drawbacks 
when analysing a 131 ge databdse of this nature is t ha t ma!'y ratios 
will be meas uring the same unde rlyin g financial character ist ic ) 
albe it in slightly different ways. The hi gh '_orrelation ｢ ･ｴ ｾ Ｎ［ｲ･･ ｮ＠
variables infers that ｴｨ ｊｾ･＠ is a considerable amo un t of redundancy in 
the ratio ;:;e t choser.. ｾｯｲＮＡＧｩＡＡ｣ｭＨｬＹＶｓＩ＠ refers to thi s problem ab 
follows: 
"The pres ence of collinea rity Is both a bless:i. ng and a curse f or 
financial ratio ｡ｮｾｬｹ ｳ ｩｳＮ＠ It mE!ans that or..ly a small nUJTJbe r of 
financial ratios are needed to capture most of the information 
ratlos can provi de, but iL means that this small numbe r {uust be 
selected very ｣ ｡ ｬＮ ﾷ ･ｾｵｬｬｹＮ Ｂ＠
The possible impact of collinea rity on the models deve loped in this 
thes i s is two fold. Firstly, both in the application of regress ion 
｡ｮ｡ｬｾ Ｍ ｳｩｳ＠ and automatic intera ction detect i on high corre lation be tween 
variables can have se rious implica tions on the stability and 
statistical significance of the resultant models (see Koutsoyiani s , 
1977 and Songuist and Mo rgan, 1963). Secondly there is the probl em 
of interpretation of the ｲ ･ｾｾ ｵｬｴｳ＠ which is made difficult if thel:e are 
a number of highly correla ted va riables present in a model. For our 
purposes of cla r ifying the r.e l at ionshi ps a t work within the sha r e 
price ｦｪｾｩｮ ｧ＠ ｣｣ｾｨ｣ｮｴ［Ｚ［ｭＬ＠ ｾ｡ｳ･＠ of int e rp retRtion is cO lside red to be au 
important and ne cessary characteristic of any derived model. 
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I n oz:de r to overcome t1:u prob l c ms ca:..;s ca by co1.1ineur ｶ Ｎｊｲｩ｡ ｨ ｬ｜ ｾ ｳ＠ ':1 
p ri ncipa l comp one nt a nalysi s ( PCA) I,'a s Ｈ ｾｭ ｰ ｊ ｟ ｯｹＬＭＺ ､＠ to a i cl i n the 
i d e nU_f icati on of tlte b2. s1 c dim8Lls i. on s of the da t a based on t hc j r 
ｩｮｴ ･ ｣｣ｯｲｲ ･ ｬ ｡ ｴｩｯ ｮ ｾＮ＠ The be ne f it f rom us in g th is ap pr o<l c h to e xplo r e 
th e da t a i s tha t Iole a re able to unc ov p r the ma in d Lme ns i ons of 
infor ma tion be in g me a s u re d by t.he r a tios in the da t a b11 S0. . 
Shime rda(1 98 1) discus s this a s f o l lows: 
ｃｉｉｅ Ｚｾ ｮ＠ a nd 
"Onc o f the funct i ons per[ol"l:::tc d by p eA i s to gro up va r i a bles 
into a few factors tha t r e l:a l n 11 maximum infor ma ti on contai ned 
in the orighal va ria hle 'c t . This tool is a useful s tep fo r. 
subseque nt analys i s. The us e of PCA , a long I, ith o tr.e r 
statistica l me thods t pro chle _s a more po\Ye rful and has i c 
ana lysis. II 
The procedure adopted by ｴｨｾ＠ '" stuuy \'Tas to fi t 3t:ly es t a bli s h a [; ,= L of 
orthogonal f a ctors from ｴｾ･＠ ､ ｾ ｴ｡＠ us ing PCA. ( Se e Ha r ma n, 1976, 
Child, 1969 or ｒｕｾＧ［Ｑ ｾ ｬＮ＠ 197(1 for further de t a ils of PCA.) The 
ｴ･｣ｨｮｩｱｵ ｾ＠ works by ｾ ｸ ｡ ｬｵｩＮｬ ﾷ ［ ＬＬ ｾ＠ the da ta for uncorr e la te d g roups of 
variables \Vhich po&..;e :- s high int e rna l homogene ity and hi gh ex terna l 
heterogeneity. The results of th is varimax-relat e d orLh ogonal peA 
are shown in appendix ｾＮｬ＠ whe re it ca n be obse rved that e leven 
factors we re found to be ;resent. These factors can br oadly be 
reified as measuring profitability, f inancial gearin g , working 
capital structure ｾ＠ st-,or': -term liquidity , ass e t turllOVCl.' , de bt 
position, value ｡､､･ｾＬ＠ s i z e , debtors position, divid <.> nd p-3. yOl1t an d 
overdraft dependence. Howeve r, if these fa ctors ar "2 ca r e f ully 
examine d some of the ratio grouping s are not inluit i vely a ppealing . 
For Instance the sepa r ation of th e de bt-bas e d ratios fr om the othe r 
gearing ｲｾｴｩｯｳ＠ does no t see m t.o be justified on a priori g rounds . 
Furthermore , several ratios app ea r to be loaded quite highly on two 
or more factors, ego AQA/Pj)OE, S/ TCE , leaving us in a sligh t dil e mma 
as to what they are measuring . Ne verthele ss this type of r e sult is 
to be exp ected as it is unr e asona ble to assume orthogonal 
relationships i n natural da ta (Ca tt e ll,1978,p224 ). At this fir s t 
stag e of the an c.t ly"js <l rnode l hrri 13 itr.ply bee n i mpose d on t he da ta 
rather than the natural dimens ions be i ng eSUlblishe d '3mpiricaLly, 
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Tabl e 5. 5 
08 L I QUE ROT ATE D P R I I'; C I PA L CO'1PONENTS LOlIDINGS MATRIX 
Ratio 
FF/AvrA 
FF/AVICE 
EBIT/AvrA 
EBIT/AVICE 
PBT/AvrA 
PBT/AVI'NW 
PET/AVICE 
PET/AVNCE 
TNI/ S 
WI/AvrA 
NI/ AVNW 
W I/AVICE 
WI /AVNCE 
CF/AVfCE 
CF/AVNCE 
OSCF/AVOSE 
EDIV/OSFI 
TNI /AV'I'Ntv 
CL/CR 
FA/I'A 
W:/I'NH 
W:;1\TCE 
CA/TA 
INV/ CL 
Va r i a n ce Exp la ine d_ 
Rat i o 
CA/ S 
S/A\iTA 
QA/CL 
viC/INV 
INV/CA 
QA-CL/pOOE 
O.A/I'A 122 
P:::-incip3 1 Corru:x;nent No . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
. 81 
.82 
. 82 
. 83 
.76 
. 88 
.79 
. 84 
.74 
.86 Profitability 
.99 
. 90 
. 94 
. 82 
.84 
. 86 
. 76 
. 99 
. 84 Overdraft dependence 
- .78 
. 91 
. 90 
.84 
.74 
Horking Capital Structur e 
2 9 . 6 1. 2 1 3 .1 . 
Princioa l Corroonent No. 
4 5 6 
.75} 
- . 83 Asset Turnover 
. 84 
.72 
7 8 9 10 
Short-Ter.m LiquiQit y Suf fic iency 
.84 
.173 
Ratio 
VA/S 
VA/AvrA. 
VA/AVICE 
VA/AVNCE 
VA/ER 
TA/ER 
[cl)t/QA 
!)::>....bt/TNW 
[cl)t/'ICE 
D2bt/'I'A 
Debt/CA 
TL/TNW 
TA/TNW 
Log TA 
Log NCE 
Mkt Liq 
Beta 
EOIV/OSEl 
EDIV/OSNI 
DR/CA 
Daysdrs 
CL/'I'A 
CL/TNW 
Va ri ance 
Exp lain ed 
NarES: 
Table 5. 5 continued 
ｐｙＮＧｩｮ｣ ＵＮｄＮ ｾ＠ 1. COJT1IX)nPJlt No. 
4 
6 . 9 
5 6 
.77 
.94 
.84 
.84 
.76 
. 99 
7 8 
Value Added 
.83 
.96 
9 10 11 
. 97 Gearing (Long Term) 
1.00 
.91 
.61 
-.61 
-.60 
Size 
-.75LDividend 
｟ＮＸｾ ｰ｡ｹｯｵｴ＠
. 92llJeCtors 
. 7:J Dependence 
ＮＵｾＬＮＮＮ＠ . , ..earl11Q 
. 49 (Short-term) 
8 .1 3.1 17.3 2.5 1. 5 2.1 5 .4 
1. Only the highest loadLDgs are shown. 
2. For an expansion of ｌｾ･＠ ratio descriptions see appendix B 
3. Delta = O. 
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The second stage of the analysis involves removing the rigidity 
imposed by the orthogonality condition with a view to possibly 
identifying the under lying natural clusters more cl ea rly. This type 
of analysis is called an oblique rotation. The bes t results from 
this rotation were found when delta = 0, and the fact or patt ern and 
structure matrices are shown in appendices G.2 and G.3. Table 5.5 
gives a summary of the ratios with the highest pattern loading on 
each factor. We can observe that , although t he numbe r of factors is 
the same as in the orthogonal analysis and the broad ､ ･ｾ｣ｲｩ ｰｴｩｯｮ＠ of 
each is generally unchanged, the factors appc:!ar to be easier to 
interpret and consequently more acceptable. For instance we can See 
ｴｨｾｴ＠ the debt position and gearing factors have been altered to form 
two new factors namely long-term gearing and short-term gearing. A 
further interesting observation is the constituents of the size 
factor namely two size measures, market liquidity and beta . It 
would appear that companies that are large have a high amount of 
trading and a higher level of systematic risk. Howe ver, at this 
stage it would be wrong to try and draw any inferences from these 
loadings. From a statistical point of view these ele ven factors 
were able to explain 90.8% of the variation in our data base. The 
amount explained by each factor is shown in table 5.5 and ranges from 
29.6 for the profitability factor to 1.2 for the overdraft dependence 
factor. 
In table 5.6 a comparison of these resuits is made with the results 
of four other recent studies that have ' employed factor analytic 
techniques, namely Sudarsanam(1981a), Taffler (1977), Pinches et 
al(1975) and Johnson(1979). At first sight, examination of these 
results appears to suggest that the results are as diverse as the 
ratios themselves. Different factors ca n be found i n different 
studies. However, a more detailed revi ew reveals that these factors 
vary in name only. Chen and Shimerda(1981) comment: 
"To a great extent, the diversity of factors re ported in the 
literature can be attributed to the difference in variables 
included in the P.C.A." 
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A CQI1PARISON OF ROCENT FACIDR ａＮＮｾｙｔｉｃ＠ STUDIES USING FINAOCIAL RATIOS Table 5.6 
This Stu9Y Sudarsanam Pinches et .al Taffler Johnson 
(198la ) (1975) (1977) (1979) 
I. Profitability Profitability Return on Profitability Return on InvesbTent. 
Investrrent 
2. Overdraft B Cash Position Creditors Cash Position 
Dependence Position 
3. oorking Capital Short-term Assets B Working Capital Inventory Intensiveness 
Structure Intensity Position 
4. ·Asset Turnover Asset Turnover Capital Turnover Activity Capital Intensiveness 
,-
Inventory 
...... 
Turnover 
N 
V1 
5. Short-term Structural Short-term Current Asset Receivables Intensiveness 
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity ｂｲ･｡ｫ､ｾ＠
Sufficiency 
6. Value Added Labour Intensity A Value Added A 
7. Long-term Gearing Long-term Financial Leverage Financial Financial Leverage 
Solvency Leverage 
8. Size Size A A A 
9. Dividend Payout Dividend Payout A A A 
10. Debtor Dependence B Receivables Turnover B Receivables Intensiveness 
II. Short-term Gearjng Short-term Solvency Short-tenn Liquidity Financial B 
Leverage 
....... /Continued 
.... 
:...) 
'" 
Table 5. G continued 
Tnis Study f)udqrs'->l1am ?i.i"1ches et a 1 . Taffler 
(198Jo·) . (1975) (19 77) 
No. of Factors 11 11 7 7 
No. of Ratio.s. 89 87 48 80 
No. of Companies 547 570 221 92 
% of Variance 
Explained 
COtmtry 
lUrES: 
90.8% 87% 92% 93.5% 
U.K. U. K. U.S.A. U.K. 
A = Ratios on tl1is cliJre.nsior:. not included ill the study 
B = DiIrP.....nsion not identified by study although ratios rE.?rese..l1ting 
it were included. 
Jcru"1so:1 
(1979 ) 
8 
61 
30G 
81% 
U. ｓ Ｎｬｾ＠ • 
We would further add tha t this dive rsity might also be pa r tly 
attributable to different sample sizes, diffe rent met hodology and 
differences in the economic and fi nancial envirome nt s, f or example , 
between the U.K. and U.S.A. studies. Despite thes e differences, 
however, it can be seen that our financial dimensions display the 
same underlying characteristics as both of the U.S.A. studies 
(Pinches et al, 1975; Johnson, 1979) although in both cases we have 
more factors. As we might expect the closest agreement is observed 
between our study and the two U.K. studies (Sudarsanam , 1981a ; 
Taffler, 1977). Although there are some inconsistences in the 
table, we would conclude that the underlying financial 
characteristics in this type of data base are fairly stable and that 
our results may not be sample sensitive. 
The implications of this analysis for this study are firstly that the 
peA results have clearly demonstrated the considerable redundancy in 
the use of ratios in traditional financial analysis. It would seem 
that our 89 measures could be reduced to a set of 11 carefully 
selected variables without the loss of a significant amount of 
information. Secondly, we can use these results as an obj ective 
means of combining several ra tios in an ｡ｮ｡ｬｹｴｾ｣｡ｬ＠ model . The 
principle employed in subsequent cha pters will be to allow only those 
ratios loaded on separa te fa ctors to enter any of the -models derived. 
In this way not only do we minimise the possible problems of 
multicollinearity, a lthough careful monitoring of intercor r e l a tion is 
still necessary. but also it should make interpretation of the models 
easier f or we can now r e l a te ea ch variable to a distinct fina ncial 
characteristic and unde rstand better what it is measuring. 
9. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has des cribed the data employed in the model building 
processes presented in the following chapters. In broad t erms this 
data consists of accounting ratios and measures of rela tive share 
valuation for 547 manufacturing ｣ｯｭｰｾｮｩ･ｳ＠ computed as a t the date of 
publication of the annual report during the period 1st August,1976 to 
31st July, 1977. 
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Two measure s of relative stock valuat i on we r e employed, namely the 
earnings yie ld and the valuati on r a t io . It was po int e d out tha t t he 
earnings yield is a common yardstick for share va luat i on a nd ha s bee n 
used in several previous empirical studies. However, it is by no 
means perfect as there are problems of interpre tation of ve ry low 
yields and there is mounting criticism of its de pendence upon 
accounting based earnings as opposed to "true ea rnings". In view of 
this it was considered appropriate to use a second meas ure of 
relative share value, namely the valuation rat i o, which a lthough 
rarely employed in the market has been employed in one or t wo 
empirical studies to date. This second ratio quite simply measure s 
the extent to which the market values company assets. In othe r 
words it is perceived as a measure of the earning powe r of the 
underlying assets and therefore should r e fl ect the inhe r e nt qua l i ty 
of the company's mana gement. 
The independent or explanatory variables were decided upon aft e r a 
detailed r eview of the standard text books on investment ana lysi s , 
the extant literature and the information se rvices used by investment 
analysts. The final set of variables cons i sted of 83 financi a l 
ratios computed from the annual accounts, a measure of ma rke t 
liquidity, beta, z-score , two growth variables and two si ze measures. 
In the author's op i nion this list is likely to include most of the. 
relevant financia l measure s that could be conce ived to be useful to 
the investor in his decision making processes. 
Before the empirica l ana ly ses could begin it was ne cessa ry to gain an 
insight into the underlying cha r acte ristics of the da t a and whe r e 
necessary make adjustments so that it would be more amenable to 
statistical analysis. In the first instance the variable 
distributions were transformed, whe r e necessary, to improve normality 
and any extreme observations were brought into 3.0 standa rd 
deviations. The second stage involved the use of princ ipa l 
component analysis to identify the unde rlying patterns in the da t a 
based on its intercorre lations. The end r e sult was a se t of el even 
factors that when taken togethe r expla ined almost all the va ria t i on 
in the original data . The purpose of the peA was to provide a means 
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of objectively assessing the underlying financial dime nsion being 
ｭｾ｡ｳｵｲ･､＠ by each variable and thus providing a means for ens ur i ng a 
ｮｯｮＭｴ｡ｵｾｬｯｧｩ｣｡ｬ＠ and parsimonious combination of variah l e s in our 
resultant models. The principle employed was that only variables 
loaded on sepa rate factors could be combined i n one mod e l. 
In the next chapter we analyse this data using two linear addItive 
techniques with a view to providing our first insight i nto the 
ma rket's decision making process. 
129 
CHAPTER VI 
AN INTIAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARKET'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
The research presented in this thesis is essentially an examination of 
the decision making processes at work within the market's share price 
fixing mechanism. Historically there have been two types of approach 
to this area of research. The first type of approach is to monitor 
in detail the way in which investment analysts process information 
(Slovic et aI, 1972; Clarkson, 1966) and then to analyse these 
descriptive records to build a picture of the decision making process. 
Unfortunately this approach has the major drawbacks of firstly being 
dependent upon the researcher's ability to monitor the detail of the 
'decision making process and secondly, the ability to obtain a large 
enough sample of analysts to enable rigorous statistical analysis to 
be conducted. As a result the empirical evidence from this type of 
study has been very inconclusive and has provided little insight into 
the judgement process (see chapter III). 
The second type of approach is to treat the investor's decision making 
process as a 'black box' about which very little is known other than 
the input cues and the output ie. the decisions made. By analysing 
the input to and the output from this 'black box' for correlations it 
is possible to form a model of the decision making process from which 
inferences can be made as to how the judge values and utilises the 
input cues. It is stressed that this type of model is not an actual 
representation of how the information is used by the user but merely a 
'paramorphic' representation (see chapters III and IV). 
It is this paramorphic approach to understanding the value of 
accounting information to the investor which forms the basis of this 
thesis. In terms of the model presented above, the market's decision 
making process forms the contents of the 'black box', the input cues 
are the financial ratios computed from the annual accounts and the 
outputs from the black box are share prices which reflect the value 
placed on shares as a result of the market's judgemental process. It 
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is important to emphasise that by adopting this paramorphic approach 
we are analysing the market as a. whole and not simply analysing the 
idiosyncratic models of a few investment analysts. Figure 6.1 shows 
this relationship in pictorial form and clearly indicates .that any 
model of the market is a concensus of all investors or at least an 
average of their competing views on share values. From this type of 
model we should be able to make inferences about the characteristics 
of the decision making process in question and thus attempt to verify 
the validity of certain share valuation theories. As a by-product of 
this analysis, we should also be able to make inferences about the 
utility of accounting numbers to investors. 
In this chapter we present our initial investigation into the market's 
decision making process which involves employing two traditional 
analytical techniques to build linear additive models of the 
relationship between accounting information and relative share values. 
This preliminary investigation should provide us with an insight into 
the likely variables used by the market and thus aid us in the next 
stage of our analysis where we attempt to build a more realistic model 
of the market's information processing system, " Moreover, the 
relationships found in these linear models will also serve as a means 
of testing our five hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. 
More specifically this chapter takes the following format: 
1) a review of the broad issues under examination in this thesis 
2) the empirical results from both the earnings yield and the 
valuation ratio analyses including a detailed discussion of the 
theoretical implications 
3) a comparison of the regression results using the two measures of 
relative share value 
4) a summary of the main points and the conclusions to be drawn from 
the analyses 
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2. A Restatement of the Main Issues 
As 'stated above the approach adopted by this thesis is to represent 
paramorphically the market's share valuation process by analysing the 
relationship between accounting information and share prices. More 
specifically our areas of interest are 
1) the validity of traditional share valuation theories in the U.K. 
Stock Market 
2) the complexity of the investor's decision making process and 
3) the degree of association between accounting information and share 
values, and hence the value of accounting numbers to the investor. 
So far several major points have been made. Firstly in Chapter II it 
was established that accounting information is able to form the basis 
for decision making (see Tarfler, 1976, Pinches et aI, 1973 inter 
alia) despite the criticisms voiced in the Corporate Report (1976), 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee ｾＹＷＵＩ＠ and Sandilands (1975). 
In addition it was considered necessary to review the literature on 
the way humans process information (Chapter III) and from this we 
concluded that the decision making process is likely to be configural 
and therefore any investigation into 'how humans (and as such the 
market in ｡ｧｧｲｾｧ｡ｴ･Ｉ＠ make decisions should be able to reveal such 
relationships. Furthermore, our examination of the problems of 
information overload led us to expect the number or variables used by 
investors to be few and their interrelationships to be relatively 
simple. 
In Chapter IV the discussion on the extant literature revealed that 
the empirical evidence reported to date was unable to provide a clear 
\ 
picture of the underlying nature of the market's decision making 
process. The results, in broad terms, proved to be so conflicting 
that even generalisations on how the market values accounting 
information could be questioned. Our conclusions from this review of 
the extant work were that earnings, dividends, tradeabllity and 
earnings growth seemed to influence investors but unfortunately no 
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further insight as to how these factors influence share prices or how 
they interact with each other was forthcoming. By contrasting the 
results of this review with the various theories of share valuation, 
it became apparent that there appears to have been littl e empirical 
testing of different theories. As a result five hypotheses on the 
role of earnings, dividends, financial gearing, default risk and 
systematic risk were proposed for subsequent testing. 
One reason postulated by this thesis for the lack of consensus in the 
results of the empirical work to date is that the analytical tools 
employed were not appropriate for the task at hand. In addition 
fundamental flaws in the research designs in many instances called 
into question the value of the results reported. It is argued in 
this thesis that the use of techniques with linear additive 
alogorithms is incorrect as they are unable to allow for the 
configural way in which variables are combined by the decision maker. 
Goldberg(1968) and Slovic(1969) argue that if we are to obtain a 
greater knowledge of a particular decision making process then it is 
necessary to employ an analytical technique that reveals interaction 
between decision variables. Thus it would seem plausible that linear 
additive techniques may not be totally appropriate for the 
cross-sectional analysis proposed in this thesis. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the linear additive 
approach to building models of the expert judge has proved to be very 
successful in several studies (see Chapter III for discussion; Dawes, 
1971, -Libby, 1975 are just two examples). Moreover these models of 
man have been seen to be able to out-perform the decision maker by 
making consistent and more accurate decisions. So, not only can 
these models replicate man, they also appear to be better processors 
of information. It is argued that the reason for this phenomenon is 
due to the model not suffering from fatigue, headaches, off days etc, 
all of which impede man's decision making performance (see Libby and 
LeWis, 1977 for a detailed discussion). 
It therefore appears that there are two diametrically opposed lines of 
thought. On the one hand the linear additive approach is criticised 
for its inability to adequately describe the way in which variables 
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are combined in the decision making process and to a certain extent 
this is attributed to be one reason for the lack of consensus in the 
empirical evidence on share valuation. On the other hand it ha s been 
shown that in certain circumstances the linear additive technique is 
very accurate in replicating man's decisions and therefore, if this is 
the case, then one must conclude that the variables making up t he 
model are fundamental to the decison process under examination. The 
balance of consideration between ｷｨ･ｴｨｾｲ＠ the linear additive approach 
is appropriate or not for this type of research is very fin e and the 
empirical evidence to date provides no clear indication as to which 
way constructive analysis should be conducted. 
The overall ｰｾ｣ｴｵｲ･＠ that emerges from this discussion is that the lack 
of consensus in the extant work can be attributed partly to the use of 
possibly inappropriate analytical techniques ｾｮ､＠ partly to 
/ 
methodological issues. In this study we have placed great emphasis 
on ensuring that the methodology is appropriate and in understanding 
the underlying characteristics of the data to be analysed . Howeve r, 
as the appropriate analytical technique is not clear we have employed 
a number of alternative approaches, all of which have various 
disadvantages and benefits. Consequently, we would hope that the 
models we derive of the decision making process using accounting data 
are defensible. 
" \ In the following part of this chapter the results obtained from the 
first stage of a two stage analytical process are presented. This 
first stage concentrates on the linear additive approach to building 
share valuation models, and is split into two parts, the first 
covering the earnings yield analyses and the second the valuation 
ratio analyses. Within each of these the results obtained from using 
two analytical techniques namely Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) 
and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) are presented. In addition 
the implications of these models for tradltioml theories ｡ｲｾ＠ ･ｾ｡ｭｩｮ･､＠
in some" detail. From this analysis it may be possible to gain an 
inSight into the following: 
1) the extent to which the linear additive approach is able to help 
us understand the way in which variables are utilised in the market's 
judgement process 
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2) the key variables that are likely to be important i n t he second 
stage of analysis presented in the following chap te r and 
3) the strength of the relationship between account i ng number s and 
relative share values and thus the value of accou nting information t o 
investors 
3. The Earnings Yield Analyses 
In Chapter IV where the extant ｾｯｲｫ＠ on share va luation theory was 
reviewed at length, it was revealed that mos t of the empir ical studies 
into share valuation models have concentrated on trying to explain t he 
variation in the earnings yield. It was also s hown that these 
studies usually employed multiple regression as the analytical tool 
(see Bower & Bower, 1969, Gordon, 1959, Whitbeck and Kisor, 1963, 
Martin, 1971 and Benishay, 1961), although multiple discriminant 
analysis was used by Walter(1959) and Schick and Verbrugge (1975)}. In 
this section it is not considered necessary to examine the results of 
ｴｨ･ｳｾ＠ previous studies again in detail, it is sufficient to simply 
restate our general conclusion that these studies provide no clear 
picture of how the share price fixing mechanism operates and often 
propose conflicting theories on share valuation. 
In this study both multiple regression and discriminant analysis wer e 
, 
used to analyse the underlying relationships between accounti ng 
information and relative share values. The results of t hese analyses 
are presented below in two subsections, each containing a general 
discussion of the principles employed and the resultant mod els 
obtained. Following the presentation of the models a di scussion on 
hhe theoretical implications proposed by the underlying r elati onships 
in the models is provided. It is emphasized, however, before the 
analyses are considered in detail, that the multiple regress ion 
approach is the more appropriate of the two analytical techniques due 
to the inherent problems in using linear discriminant analysis on our 
data (Altman,1981; Eisenbeis,1977). 
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3.1 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Several studies in the finance area, discussed in chapter IV, have 
employed multiple regression analysis. The technique attempts to 
explain the variation in the dependent variable, in this case the 
earnings yield, in terms of the independent or explanatory variables 
and takes the following form: 
+ •••• 
where y = the dependent variable 
(bi) = the regression coefficients 
(xi) = the independent variables 
It can be ｳｾ･ｮ＠ that with MRA ｾｨ･＠ purpose is to try to explain the 
variation in the dependent variable, in terms of a linear function of 
a set of independent variables. Providing certain statistical 
assumptions are adhered to and given the model is correctly 
formulated, then it is usual to find that only a proportion of this 
variation can be explained by the model. The remaining unexplained 
variation is often referred to as the error term. Obviously, the 
objective of this type of analysis is to maximise the variance 
explained which automatically reduces the error term. - This brief 
introduction is probably sufficient to introduce the reader to the 
utility of MRA. A more detailed explanation of the principles, 
assumptions and significant tests employed in this study is presented 
in appendix F. 
The earnings yield model derived from applying stepwise MRA to the 
data from the sample of 506 companies, that is the reduced set of 
companies containing only those companies with meaningful yields (see 
chapter V), is as follows: 
Log -(EY) = 2.99 - 1.41 x DIV!NI + 0.36 x 1!NCE 
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The model proposes that the earnings yield is primarily dependent upon 
two factors, namely the dividend payout ratio and the size of the 
company. This suggests that given two companies with the same 
earnings per share, the company with the higher payout ratio will have 
the higher share price. Secondly, it would appear that investors 
value large companies relatively more than small companies, thus the 
bigger the company the higher its relative share price. 
Before the relationship proposed by the model is discussed, it is 
important to put the model into perspective by reviewing the 
statistics of the model and in Table 6.1 the main statistics obtained 
from the stepwise MRA ｾｲ･＠ presented. Perhaps the most important 
figure is the "adjusted R-squared" which represents the amount of 
variance explained by the model. For this model it is only .263, 
leaving the majority of the variance unexplained. 
This , low amount of variance explained , indicates that the model is weak 
and infers either that some ' stronger , explanatory variables have been 
omitted from the model, that the regression algorithm is unable to 
decompose the data for interaction effects or that the model is 
incorrectly formulated. In the first case it seems unlikely that any 
significant financial variables have been excluded from the data base, 
although it is realised that we are only considering a subset of the 
total information available to the investment analyst. If the other 
factors could be quantified it is plausible that items such , as ' 
forecast earnings and dividends would be more influential, but, as we 
have stressed before, by using share prices as at the date of 
pUblication of the annual accounts we have ettempted to ameliorate 
this problem. It is interesting to note that Weaver and Hall(1967) 
were able to explain 58% of the variance in the dividend yield 
although there were some statistical problems with their model, such 
as spurious correlation. Other authors in this area seem reluctant 
to disclose the amount of variance explained ego Gordon(1959) and 
Ahlers(1966), which could suggest a low R-squared. In the second 
case it does seem plausible that the variance unexplained could be due 
to numerous factors interacting and affecting share prices in 
different ways, and therefore it could be suggested that the 
unexplained variance is unexplainable using a global type of analysis 
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"M:DEL CHARACTERISTICS" 
Step No. 
1 
2 
Independent 
Variable 
DIV/NI 
NCE 
CCNsmNr 
F-Value for model 
Adjusted R2 
Multiple R 
Std deviation of residuals 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 'mBLE 
Source 
Regression 
Residual 
rorAL 
THE EARNINGS YIELD MULTIPLE REGRESSIOO M:DEL 
B Std Error 
of B 
-1.41 .1106 
0.36 .0691 
2.99 .0357 
= 91.53 
= 0.263 
= 0.516 
= 0.297 
D.F 
2 
503 
505 
Beta 
Coefficient 
-.487 
.201 
F 
Value 
162.5 
27.7 
7055.0 
Sum of Squares 
16.2123 
44.5442 
60.7565 
Table 6.1 
R2 
0.226 
0.266 
"VARIABLE CHARACI'ERISTICS 
F to 
Enter 
--
147.5 
27.8 
Correlation 
With Derendent 
Variable 
-.441 
.156 
ｾ｡ｮ＠ Smn of Squares 
8.106 
0.088 
8.194 
like MRA bn the earning yield distribution. It is of interest to 
observe from a scattergram of the earni ngs yield and the regr ession 
residual (see Appendix J) that there is some heteroscedasticity 
present, especially at the lower end of the earnings yield 
distribution. Although we used a reduced sample to avoid companies 
with meaningless earnings yields, this may imply that there could well 
be other companies which possess distorted earnings yields in the 
distribution but to a lesser extent than the rejected group. From a 
statistical point of view the presence of heteroscedasticity has the 
effect of reducing the accuracy of any predictions based on the model 
and invalidates certain significant tests (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). 
Table 6.1 also provides the "beta coefficients" (sometimes called the 
standard partial correlation coefficients) which indicate the 
respective influence of each variable in the moael. It can be seen 
that the beta coefficients are .48 and .20 for nrV/NI and NeE 
respectively, thus ipdicating that the dividend payout ratio is 
approximately 2.5 times more influential than the size measure. The 
overriding importance of dividend payout is ratified by its F-ratio 
and its higher correlation with the dependent variable • 
From a statistical point of view the model is statistically 
significant In all respects at the 99.9% ievel of confidence. 
Furthermore the correlation between the two independent variables is 
very low, about 0.09, which is not surprising as each of the two 
variables measures a distinct financial characteristic as determined 
by the prinCipal component analysis of chapter V, viz: dividend 
payout and marketability. This low correlation indicates that 
problems of multicollinearity are unlikely to be present in this 
model. 
One criticism of the model could be that the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the major independent variable, namely dividend 
payout, is caused by spurious correlation. The basis for this 
criticism is that both variables contain a ｣ｯｾｾｯｮ＠ factor, namely 
earnings, and therefore the model may be picking up a relations hip not 
caused by a systematic link between the earnings yield and the payout 
ratio. Whilst we accept that there is a small possibility that this 
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argument is correct, evidence from Sudarsanam(1 98 1b) and Kuh and 
Meyer(1955) suggests that the relationship is unlike ly to be spuri ous . 
In fact Sudasanam argues that if the existence of common 
denominators/numerators has any effect, it is to reduce the 
correlation coefficient between the two ratios. 
From a theoretical point of view this evidence suggests that the rate 
at which earnings are discounted by the market 1s determined by the 
size of the dividends paid from those earnings and the size of the 
company. In the case of the influence of dividend s these results 
would appear to be contrary to the established Modigliani and 
Miller( 1961) theory on the irrel"evance of dividends in sfJare 
valuation. We saw in Chapter IV that this type of result had been 
obtained by other researchers (Aharony and Swary, 1980, Pettit, 1972 
and Laub, 1976 and Gordon, 1959 are examples) and the r easons proposed 
to explain this effect revolve around the established arguments 
against the ｍｯｾｪ Ｌ Ｘ Ｑ ｩ ｡ｬｬｩ＠ and Miller theories, namely the informational 
content of dividends, the clientele effect, the reduction in 
uncertainty, and transaction and taxation costs. Whilst we cannot 
provide empirical evidence to support these arguments we can try to 
build a picture of the likely reasons for this relations hip appeari ng 
to hold. However, as a further set of analyses was conducted it 
would be premature to attempt explanations at this particular stage . 
As for the influence of size on relative share values, this ca n be 
\ 
interpreted in two ways. The first is that investors may perceive 
that large companies possess less downside risk and therefore are 
willing to pay a premium for this type of security. This type of 
reasoning may possibly be explained by investors assuming that large 
companies have more stable earnings or even that there is less risk of 
bankruptcy due to the underlying size of the company. 
Whittington(1971) provides some evidence to support this line of 
thought. The second interpretation of the size variable is that it 
represents a surrogate measure for ｭ｡ｾｫ･ｴ｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹＬ＠ that is the amount 
of market interest in the share. If the principal component analysis 
presented in Chapter V is referred to, it will be seen that the size 
variables are loaded on the same factor as market liquidity and thus 
we conclude that size is measuring the same und erlying characteristic. 
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Consequently our interpretation of the relationship posed by the model 
is that the higher the market interest in a share the higher the 
relative share value. Thi s relationship can be readily explained i n 
terms of dealing prefe rences. If the market for a share is large and 
active, then it is easy to deal in large quantiti es with fairly stable 
share prices, whereas if t he market is very thin it is more difficult 
to match buyers and sellers and as a result the share prices of low 
market interest stocks are likely to demand some sort of ri s k premium 
as compensation. This type of influence was also found by 
Benishay(1961) and Shick and Verbrugge(1975). 
3.2 The Linear Di sc riminant ａｾ ｡ ｬｹ ｳｩｳ＠
A second approach to examining the factors that influence relative 
share values which has been used by other researche r s in this a r el 
ego Walter(1959) and Shick and Verbrugge (1975), is linear di scrimina nt 
analysis (LDA from now on). LDA differs from MRA in thAt it looks at 
the problem from a s lightly different angle and makes different 
assumptions about the underlying nature of the data ana lysed. 
LDA is a technique which is able to analyse the different 
characteristics of two or more groups and creates a mod el based on 
those characteristics that best ､ｩｦｦ･ｲ･ｾｴｩ｡ｴ･＠ between the groups in 
question. ｔｨｾ＠ end result from using the technique is a model that 
transforms a set of characteristics into a single variable, normally 
called a z-score. Once the z-score for an observation has been 
computed then it is compared with a predetermined z-score cutoff value 
and depending on whether the computed z-score is greater or less than 
this cutoff value , the observation is then categorised as' belonging to 
a particular group. This technique has been widely employed, 
although in the finance area most of the work has concentrated ' on 
discriminating between fa i l ed and healthy Ｇ ｣ｯｭｰ ｾ ｮｩ･ｳ＠ ego Taffler(1976), 
Altman(1968), Deakin(1972) and Edminster(1972). (For a full review 
of these and the other topics for which LDA has been used see Foster, 
1978). ａｾ＠ introduction to the technique and t he tests employed in 
the analyses are provided in Appendix H. 
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In this ｾｴｵ､ｹ＠ LDA has been used to discriminate between high and low 
valued companies on the basis of their financial ratios. The purpose 
was to find a linear combination of financial characteristics which 
best discriminated between the high and low valued companies and thus 
indicate the salient features ,used ' in the share valuation of extreme 
cases. The major difference between this approach and MRA is that 
LDA focuses on the differences between the extreme valuations rather 
than explaining the variance of the whole distribution. . From a 
statistical point of view LDA bvercome$ the problems of assuming 
homoscedasticity and normality in the distribution of the error term 
(Taffler, 1976). 
The way in which LDA is used in this thesis has, however, been 
criticised by Eisenbeis(1977) and more recently Altman(1981). Both 
critics dislike the use of a segmented continuous variable as the 
criteria for forming the groups to be analysed, which after all is 
based upon .the whim of the researcher. . They would argue that we are 
violating one of the principles of LDA by not investigating discrete 
and identifiable groups. As' the views of these critics cannot be 
dismissed lightly, we present a detailed examination of their 
arguments and our counter-arguments for the use of LDA in this ｴｨ･ｾｩｾ＠
in appendix H. - In broad terms their main criticism concerns the 
subsequent use of such a model which under normal circumstances would 
be for reclassifying cases into one group or the other with the aim of 
predicting a certain event. In defence, however, we would argue that 
the use of LDA in this thesis is to aid clarification of the 
influences present within the dependent variable distributions and 
that the differences between the extremes provides some insight into 
the factors as work. We do not attempt to predict in any way 
whatsoever. Al'tmail(1981) would seemingly sympathise with our 
approach as he states 
"This would be fine (that is the use of LDA as we advocate) if 
the analYSis stopped simply with a study of the original sample 
and did not ascribe to predictive elements." 
We therefore stress the point that our use of LDA is simply to gain 
further inSight into the factors at work in the share price fixing 
mechansim. 
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The methodology adopted in this study is the same as that employed by 
Walter(1959). Two groups of companies were formed, one ｣ｯｮｾ｡ｩｮｩｮｧ＠
sixty companies with the highest earnings yields and the other 
containing sixty companies with the lowest earnings yields. The 
following model was created from the data: 
z = -1.28 + g.05 x DIV/NI - 1.15 x Market Liquidity 
The model indicates that the two main variables that distinguish high 
and low earnings yield companies are dividend payout and market 
liquidity which in this analysis was simply a ' 0,1 variable with 0 = 
highly traded and' 1 = infrequent trading. (The detailed statistics 
relati ng to this model are contained in appendix H.) · The most 
important features are as follows: 
1) the payout ratio contributed 87.5% to explaining the difference 
between the groups whereas market liquidity contributed only 12.5% 
(based on Mosteller and Wallace, 1963). 
2) the misclassification matrix showed that 79.2% of the original' 
observations were correctly reclassified, this ｾｯｭｰ｡ｲ･ｳ＠ to the 50% 
expected by chance alone. 
3) the Lachenbruch holdout test revealed no bias to be present in the 
model. 
These results indicate that dividend payout is clearly more 
influential than market liquidity, which is a similar finding to the 
MRA. Furthermore the overall accuracy of the model is quIte weak, 
the 79.2% is considered to be low especially when the arbitrary manner 
by which the groups were formed is taken into account, . indicating that 
the model is not that effective in discriminating between the two 
groups. This percentage compares unfavourably with the 87% found in 
the Walter study. 
One final statistic which provides a measure of how well this ｭｯｾ･ｬ＠
explains the variance of the earnings yield distribution is the 
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Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (Yeomans,1968:302). In this 
instance the coefficient squared was .253, which is not very different 
from the R-squared of .26 found in the regression analysis. (Further 
tests and analysis are presented in appendix H.) 
The interpretation of this model is very similar to the MRA model with 
dividend payout appearing to be the key factor that influences the 
ｲｾｴ･＠ at which earnings are discounted by the market. ·· Again the 
higher the payout the higher the relative share value. 
The second variable in the model, market Ｑｩｱｵｩ､ｩ ｾ ｹＬ＠ is different from 
the second variable in the MRA model, namely size. " However, the 
principal compOnent analysis presented in .chapter V revealed that 
these variables are measuring the same underlying characteristic 
namely tradeabi1ity. Again the more tradeable a share, apparently on 
the evidence of the model, the higher its relative share price. 
4. Theoretical Implications of the Earnings Yield Models 
Before we consider the results obtained from the analyses conducted on 
the valuation ratio it is essential to evaluate the theoretical 
implications of the earnings yield analyses and to contrast these 
findings with the five hypotheses proposed in chapter IV. At · the 
outset of this evaluation it is stressed that any conclusions or 
inferences made in the .following discussion must be considered as 
broad generalisations that need to be replicated in other time periods 
on dlf}erent data.' It is also relevant to note that a policy of 
dividend restraint was in force at the time of these analyses and that 
this may have caused ·some · sort of bias in the results. - These results 
are therefore by no means definitive due to the limitations of drawing 
conclusions from one research study and even if this were possible, 
the low amount of variance explained indicates the ｾｯ､･ｬｳ＠ are weak and 
therefore infers the relationships established are also weak. 
However despite these strong reservations the results are 
statistically significant and therefore it is essential to examine 
their implications. We shall now ｣ｯｮｾｩ､･ｲ＠ each of these in turn. 
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4.1 Dividend Payout and the Value of the Firm 
If we make the assumption that two companies are the same in every 
respect, except that one has a higher payout than the other, then our 
results infer ·that the higher payout company will have a relatively 
higher share value. If we then translate the payout ratio into the 
benefit to the shareholder, the inference is that shareholders prefer 
high dividends and are willing to pay more to receive them. -
As previously stated this result does not agree with the MM theory on 
the irrelevance of dividends, nor does it agree with the results of 
several empirical stUdies which tend to confirm the Modigliani and 
Miller(1961) theory (eg. Gonedes, 1978; Benishay, 1961; Martin, 1971; 
Pettit, 1972). Nevertheless, this type of result was found by 
Walter(1959), Gordon(1959), ｒｹ｡ｮＨＱＹＷｾＩＬ＠ Aharony and Swary(1980), 
Pettit (1976) and Laub(1976) (all of which are discussed in Chapter 
IV) and therefore there appears to be some ' support for these results. 
The arguments in favour of the theory that dividends influence share 
prices revolve around trying to invalidate the main assumptions of the 
established MM theory. Most of these arguments are discussed at 
length in the finance text books (eg. Van Horne, 1977 and Franks and 
Broyles, 1979, and Richards, 1976 who presents an excellent review on 
the evidence with respect to the U.K. stockmarket) and therefore we 
shall concentrate only on those aspects which seem to have a bearing 
on our results. Obviously in a study of this nature it is not 
possible to be definitive about the reasons behind this type of 
investor behaviour. 
results. 
We may only postulate a case that explains our 
One of the major causes for confusion to the investment practioner in 
understanding the MM theory is that dividend announcements are often 
associated with movements in share prices and therefore it is easy to 
see how he could be led to believe that diVidends influence share 
prices. ' However, this reaction is explained by MM who argue that the 
change in dividends conveys information to the investor about future 
earnings and thus the share price movement is not caused by the 
dividend per se but from the informational content reflecting a change 
in management policy. The time series stUdies into this theory (see 
146 
chapter IV) suggest that dividends are influential but as Ball et 
al(1979) point out it is very difficult to isolate the marginal 
informational content of dividends from a change in dividends per see 
In a study by Black and Scholes(1975) this issue was investigated only 
to find that the return on a stock was not related to dividend yield. 
This therefore implies that it is not possible to tell the effect a 
change in dividend policy will have on a corporation's stock price. 
However, the informational content argument revolves around relating 
share price movements with dividend changes, that is time series 
analysis, and cannot be applied in the same way to the share valuation 
model type of research which is cross-sectional. If dividends enter 
a share valuation model, as they have above, this should be 
interpreted as meaning that the level of dividend per se influences 
share prices rather than any change in dividend policy. As the 
theory of the informational content of dividends implies a dynamic 
model of dividends which cannot be tested by ,cross-sectional analysis 
we can neither 'reject or accept any such hypothesis on the basis of 
our model cross-sectional formulation. 
A second line of argument ,against the pure MM theory is that dividends 
help reduce the uncertainty attached to equity investment and 
therefore investors are not indifferent 'between dividends and capital 
gains. They prefer dividends. Gordon(1962a) who strongly supports 
this line of argument, contends that "uncertainty on the part of 
investors increases at an increasing rate with the distance in the 
future of prospective returns." If it is 'assumed that investors are 
risk adverse then the discount rate used on future earnings will rise 
with the length of time in the future. Gordon continues this line of 
thought by suggesting that investors prefer an early resolution of 
uncertainty and are therefore willing to pay a higher price for the 
stock that offers the greater current dividend, all other things held 
equal. ' Our results are consistent with Gordon's arguments. - It is 
interesting to note that at the time ' of this study inflation in the 
U.K. was particularly high 2nd t herefore t his crgument of uncertainty 
was reinforcec still further. 
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Several arguments have been made against Gordon's dividend orientated 
theory (eg. Van Horne, 1977:270). The first is that investors can 
manufacture Ｂｨｯｭ･ｾｭ｡､･＠ dividends" by selling a part of their 
investment to realise the capital gain, if they so desire. If these 
"home-made dividends" are a perfect substitute for cash dividends then 
Gordon's theory would not seem to hold. However, we would argue that 
the selling of capital is not a perfect substitute for cash dividends. 
Firstly there are transaction costs involved and therefore selling of 
stock could be a more expensive alternative, although this may be 
compensated by a lower tax rate. Secondly, and probably more 
important, investors perceive selling capital as unsatisfactory 
especially as there is no certainty that share prices will rise in the 
future and therefore they may ｾ･ｲ｣･ｩｶ･＠ the selling of stock-as 
consuming capital rather than generating income. ' Furthermore ' such 
trading activity would cause short term fluctuations in the market 
price. 
In a review of the literature on dividend policy Richards(1976) puts 
forward two further arguments against Gordon's conclusions on the 
influence of dividends. Firstly Richards argues that Gordon's 
results are spurious and caused by companies with tempOrary reduced 
earnings maintaining the same ' dividends and thus "low earnings would 
cause both a high level of payout and a high price-earnings ratio and 
this would not be evidence of a causal relationship." This criticism 
does appear to be tenuous and whilst we cannot defend Gordon's 
methodology .due to its lack of published detail, we can defend the 
same type of result produced by this study. For Richard's statment 
to be valid the number of companies .with ·that particular phenomenon 
would need to represent a high percentage and in our sample of 506 
companies this was not the case. Furthermore, as our analysis 
specifically excluded the very high earnings yield companies with low 
returns on capital, which could have been caused by temporarily 
depressed earnings, this bias, if it exists in a statistical sense, 
could only be, at most, very weak. 
A second and even more tenuous argument put. forward by Richards is 
that gearing could also produce bias. He proposes that highly geared 
companies adopt a conservative dividend policy and vice versa. Thus 
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a highly geared company would have a low market rating to reflect its 
high risk and as a result a low payout ratio becomes associated with 
low relative market valuation. This argument implies that dividend 
policy is a surrogate meAsure for tinancial risk and again, although 
we cannot defend Gordon's study, the results of this study clearly 
suggest that Richard's theory of bias is unfounded. In the first 
place had gearing been the main cause for the difference in earnings 
yields then this measure would have entered the regression ｭｯｾ･ｬ＠ prior 
to dividends. Secondly, if this bias postulated by ｾｩ｣ｨ｡ｲ､ｳ＠ were 
present the correlation between dividena payout and gearing would be 
expected to be quite higH. In this study the correlation coefficient 
between these two variables . is ｾＮＰＳｾＬ＠ suggesting no relationship 
whatsoever exists. If we assume ' that this low correlation could have 
been found by Gordon, and without any evidence to the contrary this 
assumption is not too unreasonable, although perhaps simplistic as we 
are assuming that the UK enviroment is Ｇ ｳｩｭｩｬ｡ｾ＠ to that of the USA, it 
appears that Richard's arguments are based on weak hypothetical 
reasoning. 
Evidence from Lewellan et al(1976) who conducted a study into the 
investment strategies and behaviour among individual investors in the 
USA, suggests that an average 41% of investors' portfolios are 
allocated to securities designed primarily to produce dividend income. 
This in itself does not confirm the theory that dividends reduce 
\ 
uncertainty, but further analysis of their results suggest that those 
investors with experience in the market and who are not termed as 
speculators, allocate a greater proportion of their portfolio to 
dividend income stocks. If we accept the premise that experience 
provides the best basis for forming an optimum risk/return investment 
policy then this preference for dividends could be interpreted as a 
means of reducing uncertainty. Furthermore, the evidence revealed 
that even the speculators had a policy of investing at least 20% of 
their portfolio in dividend securities. In conclusion the theory 
that dividends reduce uncertainty would seem perfectly acceptable and 
given a dividend restraint policy in force at the time of this study, 
this bias, if present, is likely to be accentuated. 
Van Horne(1977) postulates several other theories on why dividends can 
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be seen to influence share prices. One such theory is the 
"clientele" effect whereby certain investors may prefer dividends and, 
others may prefer capital gains. In the Richards(1976) article an 
example is presented showing how low marginal tax payers would be 
attracted to high payout firms and high marginal tax payers would be 
attracted to low payout firms. Thus the quality of a dividend 
payment versus 'the quality of a capital gain varies from one investor 
to the next and is dependent upon their individual tax position. Any 
imbalance between the frequency distribution of investor preferences 
for either capital gains or dividends and the existence of those 
preferences in the market will lead to a situation whereby dividends 
influence share prices. 
Nevertheless, supporters of the MH theory argue that in a perfect 
market no systematic preference for dividends will be found, providing 
the two distributions are equal. In such circumstances each 
corporation will attract a certain type of clientele preferring a 
particular payout and therefore dividends per se would not affect 
share values in any way other than the eventual reduction in the 
terminal value of the company. - Van Horne suggests that, at best, 
this theory is tenuous and that such a policy of specialisation could 
lead to poor diversification and thus investors would suffer in other 
ways. 
Even if we accept Van Horne's argument that the distribution of 
investor ｰｲ･ｦｾｲ･ｮ｣･ｳ＠ does not equal the market distribution, in order 
to apply this argument in support of our finding it is neoessary to 
demonstrate that there is a preference for dividends over capital 
gains. If, for example, the clientele effect was such that the 
majority of investors preferred capital gains then companies paying a 
dividend would stand at a discount in the market. - As ' our evidence 
suggests that dividends stand at a premium we must ask why there is 
this imbalance in the UK Stock Market. - In other words what are the 
possible causes for a preferenoe for dividends? 
In his article Richards(1976) pOints out that if the main body of 
investors making up the market has ' a marginal tax rate lower than ＵｾＥ＠
then high payout stocks would be preferred and vice versa. One 
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problem that immediately arises ie hO\l to estimate the marginal r a te 
of tax for all investors in the market and not simply the pension 
funds or certain individuals. Richards ｳｵ ｧ ｧ･ｳｴｾ＠ that it is 
approximately 50% and therefore proposes that the effect of taxation 
on' share prices is approximately neutral. Brealey(1975) and the 
Royal ｃｯ ｾ ｾｩｳｳｩｯｮ＠ on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1975) 
support this argument and therefore it cannot be used for reinforce 
Out' results. 
A further feature of the UK stockmarket that may explain this 
preference for dividends is the legal requirement for many investment 
ｾｵｮ､ｳＬ＠ which account for over 70% of the ownership of equity (source 
Franks and BrJyles, 1979) to have a minimum cash income in the form of 
dividends. The extent of this requirement is unknown although it is 
often referred to in the ｴｾｸｴ＠ books on the technical side of fund 
management. Obviously, the presence of this systema tic bias towards 
dividends will cause high dividend pAyout companies to stand at a 
premium. In ｡､ｾｩｴｩｯｮ＠ if there are other investors who seek dividends 
ｾｾ＠ a form of regular income; such as pensioners, then these too will 
tend to create ｭｯｾ･＠ of an imbalance. The study of Lewelan et 
al(1976) referred to above provides some " evidence to support this 
latter argument. They found that investors over 55 years of age 
allocated a very high percentage of their portfolio to illcome ' stocks 
which was interpreted as indicating that these investors required a 
regular income ' stream. In recent years, and during the period 
･ｾ｡ｭｩｮ･､＠ by this thesis, the influence of dividend ｾ･ｳｴｲ｡ｩｮｴ＠ in the UK 
ｳｴｯ｣ｫｭ｡ｾｫ･ｴ＠ may well have accentuated the clientele effect and ｣｡ｵｳｾ､＠
investors to seek high payout companies more than under normal 
circumstances. 
In conclusion it would seem that the r esults of the earnings yield 
models are theoretically defensible. On the one hand there is a 
strong case for accepting ｴｾ｡ｴ＠ dividends provide a means for reducing 
uncertainty and that a £.1 paid out is valued more than a 1: 1 retained. 
Furthermore the argument that investors can generate "home-made 
dividends" by selling stock is in practice an inconvenient and 
expensive way of realising an income. On the other hand, there is 
·the olientele effect theory which proposes that ｾ＠ majority of 
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investors seek dividends for a number of diverse rea sons, some of 
which may not be justifiable from an efficient use of funds point of 
view, and thus cause an imbalance in the market in favour of high 
dividend payout companies. 
The above analysis provides a basis for arguing that dividends are 
influential in the UK stock market. However, in any study of this 
nature it is important to corroborate results with those of other 
etudiee. One euch etudy that provides evidence on the inrluence of 
dividends in the UK stock market is by MooreC1g80) who investigated 
the valuation of earnings and dividends over the period 1961 to 1977. 
He found that although earning; had been maintained a ft e r adjusting 
for inflation, share values haq fallen over the 16 year period. He 
suggests that if the MM theory is applied, then eQujties are 
undervalued by 50%, and this large discount can only be ｾｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴ･､＠ to 
greater uncertainty attached to inflation, which Moore proposes is 
unrealistic. Further investigation by Moore revealed that dividends 
had not kept up with inflation which in part 'was attributed to 
dividend restraint policies, and this lead him to the conclusion that 
this was the primary reason for equities failing to maj ntain their 
real values. 
The Moore study therefore provides further evidence to support our 
finding that dividends are influential in determin i ng relative share 
values at ｬ･｡ｳｾ＠ over the time period covered by our study. From this 
we conclude that management can influence share prices by ｰｾｹｩｮｧ＠ a 
higher dividend. . However it is stressed that 1n t he mod els presented 
above a linear relationship between the rate at wh ich earnings are 
discounted by the market and dividend payout is assumed which in 
practice is unrealistic and contrary to established theory. This 
point will be discussed at length later in this chapter and in the 
following chapter. 
4.2 Marketability and the Value of the Firm 
The Earnings Yield model presented above suggests that the rate at 
which earnings are discounted is a function of dividend yield and 
152 
marketability. This second factor, marketability, apparently has a 
far less important role to play in the share price fixing mechanism, 
but according to our models a significant one. In our two different 
models it entered 1n the form of the size variable as measured by NCE 
and via the market liquidity measure, which was derived from the 
average number of deals marked in a month over a three year period. 
From the results of the principal component analYSis it was possible 
to deduce that both variables were measuring the same underlying 
characteristic, namely marketability. 
The , tentative inference to be drawn from our results is .that the more 
marketable a share the lower its earnings yield which means, ceteris 
paribus, that the share price is higher. The logic behind this 
ｲ･ｬｾｴｩｯｮｳｨｩｰ＠ Is really quite simple. The less the market interest in 
a share, which may generally be caused through insufficient tradesbl 
stock in the market, the lower the demand for the share and hence the 
lower the relative share price. Problems with low market interest 
stocks range from having a wide spread between the buying and selling 
price of the stock and the inability to trade relatively small amounts 
of stock without moving the price appreciably. Benishay(1961) also 
found this relationship to be strong and postulates that the more 
marketable a share that is the easier it is to trade, the greater the 
demand. Benishay goes on to argue that size (which was his measure 
of marketability) may be used as a surrogate for risk and as such the 
\ 
market prefers large to small (more risky) companies. However, he 
does not provide any underlying empirical support for this line of 
reasoning. Evidence from Whittington(1911) and Samuels and 
Smyth(1968) indicates that although average profitability is 
independent of ･ｯｾｰ｡ｮｹ＠ size "the inter-firm dispersion of 
profitability was greater among smaller firms" and "the variability of 
profitability over time was also greater among small companies" 
(Whittington, 1971:12). Consequently there is a strong argument for 
supporting Benishay's line of thought in the UK Stock Market. As we 
did not include a measure of past variability of earnings in our 
database for reasons given in chapter V we are unable to make a direct 
comparison between size and this measure of risk. However, included 
in our database was beta, which is argued to be a function of the 
variability in earnings (Rosenberg and McKibben, 1913; Beaver et 
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a1,1970;' Castagna and Matolcsy,1978) and therefore an indirect link 
can be assessed. It was found that beta had a correlation 
coefficient of -.37 with the size variable (note the size 
transformation was the square root of the reciprocal) and wa s found to 
be loaded on the same factor in the PCA. At first sight it would 
seem that size and risk are related. However, the relations hip 
proposed in this study was that the larger the company, the greater 
its systematic risk, which is contrary to a priori expectations. In 
chapter VIII we examine possible reasons for this relationship but at 
this stage it is sufficient to suggest that size, at least in this 
study, appears to be a measure of tradeability and is not a surrogate 
measure of risk. 
The model presented above provides clear evidence that marketability 
is of importance to investors and according to this study is an 
attribute of share valuation. Yet marketability,as such, is rarely 
referred to in the literature on share valuation which is rather 
surprising given the marked impact it has in the UK Stock Market. 
Where research has been conducted in this area it is normally 
concerned with beta analysis and improving beta estimates 
(Dimson,1979; Oldfield & Rogalski,1980j Fisher,1966). Williams(1938) 
does address this issue of marketability but dismisses it as not being 
part of "the meaning of investment value" and this is a plausible 
reason why it is not given much weight in share valuation theory. 
Williams presents the argument that marketability should be divorced 
from the concept of investment value. Whilst he accepts risk to be 
important, he disregards marketability on the grounds that it is 
confUSing and difficult to interpret: "for instance, an investment 
can be both cheap and liquid, not that it is cheap because it is 
liquid and so much to other factors". The distinction Williams makes 
is that investment value is determined by future dividends and is not 
a function of saleability. In other words an investment is purchased 
for an income stream and not for resale in the short term. 
In this thesis we do not agree with William's rejection of this factor 
from the concept of security valuation. From the investor's point of 
view, if marketability is ignored it is feasible that he would expect 
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a greater return over a particular time period than was actually 
forthcoming. If a share price is known to be depressed due to the 
inability of investors to deal in large quantities in the stock then 
it is unlikely that this discount is going to change over the short 
and probably the long term. Consequently, future return s have to be 
adjusted for the continuity of this ｭ｡ｾｫ･ｴ＠ characteristic. If one 
takes into account future earnings variability then why not also 
" 
assess the likely capitalisation rate of the earnings which is a 
function of marketability. If we accept the William's logic on 
intrinsic value he would say a share was cheap and 'illiquid, but under 
our definition this could mean that the share is not che.ap once 
liquidity is taken into account; 
Our line of reasoning is that given the earnings yield for a given 
company we could apply the regression model using simply the payout 
ratio alone and conclude that thii ｣ｯｾｰ｡ｮｹ＠ was over or und er-valued. 
So far Williams would probably agree with us. But apparently in our 
analysis a better estimate of share value is achieved by including 
marketability in the model. Essentially we have quantifi ed the 
impact of marketability whereas Williams could not. Possibly this 
inability to quantify the effect inhibited Williams from including it 
in his model. 
In conclusion, it may be said that marketability should be permitted 
to enter into t he meaning of the term investment value. On the one 
hand it is a factor that ｩｮｦｬｵ･ｮ｣ｾｴｨ･＠ market's valuation of a sha r e 
and secondly it may be argued that it is likely to influence the 
future share price as well and therefore expected returns. 
ｾＮＳ＠ Summary of the Earnings Yield Analyses 
The main conclusions to be drawn from the analyses can be summari sed 
as follows: 
1) the primary factor influencing relative earnings yield s is 
dividend payout. Plausible reasons put forward to explain this 
systematic bias were a) that dividends may be perceived as reducing 
155 
uncertainty and b) the clientele effect created by institutions and 
other investors seeking dividends for legal or tax rea sons, which may 
have been accentuated to some extent by the dividend restraint policy 
in force at the time of this study. 
2) the secondary factor in influencing share values in terms of 
relative earnings yields is marketability which is a surrogate measure 
for market interest (tradeability); the less the market interest the 
less the relative value. 
3) the overall explanatory power of the models are weak and therefore 
the relationships proposed above are merely generalisations on how two 
factors appeared to affect share prices in the market during the 
period examined. 
Having established a plausible theoretical framework it is possib le to 
apply our preliminary results to consider the five hypothese s proposed 
in ｣ｨ｡ｰｴｾｲ＠ IV. The first hypothesis concerning earnings was not 
tested as it was automatically assumed by adopting the earnings yield 
as the dependent variable. Essentially the above analyses accepted 
that earnings dominate share valuations and the question posed was 
"what are the other factors that determine the rate at which the 
market discounts earnings?" The second hypothesis which proposes 
that dividends influence share values, but are secondary to earnings, 
\ 
was supported by the influence of the payout ratio in the models. 
The third hypothesis stating that financial gearing does not affect 
relative share values was not rejected ,by our results in that it did 
not prove to be a significant explanatory variable. However, to 
conclude through its absence that this hypothesis is correct would be 
quite wrong. We can only say that our results provide no evidence to 
contradict this hypothesis. The remaining hypotheses concerning the 
roles of bankruptcy risk and systematic risk in the market were also 
unsupported by our results. The absence of both Z-score and beta 
from the models is not consistent with our hypotheses but again we 
stress their absence should not be interpreted as rejecting these 
hypotheses, merely that it is non-confirmatory. 
l5 6 
For our purposes these results are dissappointing in that they present 
a very simplistic and weak model of the market 's decision making 
process. There are several plausible reasons for these poor results. 
It could be argued that there are several non-financial variables s uch 
as growth potential and management quality which if included in the 
analysis may have improved the model's explanatory power. However, 
whilst we recognise that our database contained only a subset of the 
total information available to investor' s , the extent to which these 
other factors influence share values over and above financially 
determined measures might be arguable, 
Perhaps a more suitable explanation may be that the mod el has been 
defined incorrectly, that is by using MRA to analyse the variance in 
the earnings yield may not be a valid methodology. Firstly, it is 
possible that linear additive techniques are unable to search and 
explore interaction between variables and therefore incapable of 
coping with the complexities of the decision making process. 
ｓ･｣ｯｮ､ｬｹｾ＠ despite the numerous studies that have used the earnings 
yield as the dependent variable, it may be that thi s measu re is not a 
sufficiently sensitive surrogate for measuring relative share values 
and therefore is not amenable to this type of analysis. For instance 
it may be argued that our model basically proposes that the rate at 
which earnings are discounted by the matekt is a function of the 
dividend payout ratio ego E/P = f(D/E). If then the impact of 
\ 
earnings per se is taken from both sides of the model the result is 
that share prices become ' mainly a function of dividends. However, 
this conclusion would be quite wrong as it proposed that earnings have 
n? impact on share values, which is contrary to findings in the 
previous chapter and therefore requires further examination. 
Nevertheless, as we do not, at present, have any evidence to support 
these possible explanations, we must conclude that our analysis so 
far has taught us very little about the market's judgement process. 
Furthermore any inference we might make on the basis of these results 
for traditional share valuation theory must be considered to be very 
tentative and broad generalisations and no more. It remains to be 
seen whether the valuation ratio analyses are more informative. 
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5. The Valuation Ratio Analyses 
In this section the results of the valuation ratio analyses ar e 
presented. ａｾ＠ we stated in the previous chapte r thi s r a tio is used 
only rarely by investment analysts, and as a re s ult has not r eceived 
the same amount of attention in the extant literatur e as t he ea rn i ngs 
yield. The only study known to the author that has used th e 
valuation ratio for building share valuation mod el s i s by Ryan(' 974) 
but as we pointed out in chapter IV his methodology is s us pect and 
therefore provides no yardstick against which we can compa r e the 
results of our analyses. 
This section follows the same format of that of t he ea rn i ngs yield 
analyses. Firstly, the results from applying the MRA and LDA 
techniques will be presented. This will then be fo llowed by a 
discussion on the theoretical implications and finally a s umma r y of 
the conclusions to be drawn from the analyses will be presented. 
5.' The Multiple Regression Analysis 
Before the model is presented it is important to res t a t e wha t the 
valuation ratio is measuring and what we are trying t o explai n. The 
valuation ratio is a measure of how the market values t he asse t s of a 
\ 
company and the question we are asking is "What are the key financial 
characteristics that determine whether a company's assets a r e va lued 
highly or lowly by the stock market?" In other word s th is is a 
measure of the earning power of the assets which reflec ts di r ectly the 
ability of management to utilize the assets under thei r control . 
The model created by understandi ng MRA on the full da t a base of 547 
companies is as follows: 
Log "(VR) = ＭＱＮｾＲ＠ ＭＱＮｾＶ＠ x Log(PBT/AVTNW) 
ｾＰＮＵＸ＠ x Log(Profit Growth) 
-0.37 x DIV/NI 
+0.09 x Market Liquidity 
-0.06 x Log(TL/TNW) 
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where VR = Valuation Ratio 
PBT/AVTNW = Return on Net Worth 
DIV/NI = Dividend Payout Ratio and 
TL/TNW = Financial Gearing Ratio 
The model proposes that the valuation ratio is primarily dependent 
upon five faotors, namely the return on capital, profit growth, the 
dividend payout ratio, market liquidity and finanoia l gearing. 
Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients indicate that the higher 
the return on capital, dividend payout and financial gearing, the 
lower the profit growth and ｴｨｾ＠ greater the market liquidity, then the 
lower the valuation ratio (ie. the higher the relative share price ). 
Before examining the implications of these results in more detail it 
is essential to put the model into perspective by reviewing the 
statistios presented in table 6.2. The amount of varianoe explained 
by the model is 53% of the total variance in the valuation ratio (the 
adjusted R-squared is .53). Although a direct comparison between 
this model and the earnings yield model cannot be made due to the 
different dependent variables the higher level of variance explained 
represents a considerable improvement on the earnings yield model 
(this aspect is discussed at length later). Whilst, a variance 
explained of 53% does not signify a powerful model, it is generally 
\ 
considered respectable and indicates that the most influential 
variables in the model can be interpretated as more than just broad 
generalisations. It is of interest to note that the scattergram of 
the valuation ratio with the regression residuals (see appendix J) 
reveals little heteroscedastic tendencies as was the case with the 
earnings yield model. 
The relative importance of each variable is also shown in table 6.2 by 
the beta coefficients. Clearly the return on net worth variable can 
be seen to be the most influential, over four times the next most , 
important variable, profit growth. A' further indication of the 
importance of this return on capital measure is that alone it is able 
to explain .469 of the variance, compared with .534 for the whole 
model. The remaining four variables are considered to be fairly weak 
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THE VAULATION RATIO MULTIPLE REGRESSION MJDEL Table 6. 2 
"lvUDEL CHARACI'ERISTICS" "VARIANCE CHARACI'ERISTICS" 
Step Indepe.l'1dent B R2 
Correlation 
Std Error Beta F F to Wi th Depend""nt 
No. Variable of B Coefficient Value Enter Variable 
1 PBT/AVl'NW - 1.46 0 .062 - 0 .749 0. 469 566 .9 482.3 -.685 
2 Profit Gth 0.58 0 . 101 0.181 0. 504 32.8 38. 6 -.057 
3 Drv/NI -0.37 0.094 -0.119 0.517 16.0 14.6 -.034 
4 Market Liq 0 .09 0.030 0.096 0.528 10.5 12.5 .184 
5 ｔｌ Ｏｔｨｾｶ＠ -0.06 0.025 -0.079 0.534 7.3 7 .3 -.094 
F Value for model = 124.4 
...... 
Adjusted R2 = 0.530 
(J'\ 
0 
Multiple R = 0 . 731 
Std deviation of residuals = 0.325 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source D. F. Sum of Squares. ｾｩ･｡ｮ＠ Sum of Squares 
Regression 5 65 . 811 13 . 162 
Residual 541 57.250 0 . 105 
'lUI'AL 546 123 .061 13 . 267 
. " 
adding only a further .065 to the unadjusted R-squared of the whole 
model. Also shown on this table are the correlations between each of 
the independent variables and the dependent variable, and these 
provide further evidence on the high influence of the r eturn capital 
variable and the relatively low impact of each of the other variables . 
With a five variable model the scope for multicollinearity is 
increased substantially. Once again by allowing only one variable 
per faotor to enter the model it was possible to ｫ･･ｾ＠ this probl m to 
a minimum. Table 6.3 presents a correlation matrix for all the 
independent variables and it can be seen than the highest correlation 
coefficient is between return on net worth and profit growth at ＮＳｾＮ＠
This value is well below the accepted r.ule of .60 and below the 
overall explanatory power of the model (ie. Klein's rule) and 
therefore it is reasonable to assume that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in this model. Again, as with the earnings yield mod el , some 
critics may suggest that the common factor of net worth in the 
dependent variable and in the most powerful independent variable, 
return on capital, is a cause for concern. However, as we stated 
before, this is likely to be more a perceived problem than an actual 
problem in practice. The empirical evidence of Sudarsanam(1980b) 
clearly demonstrates that any potential ' spurious correlation of this 
nature is not likely to lead to major bias. 
TABLE 6.3 
\ 
Correlation Matrix of the Valuation Ratio 
Model's Independent Variables 
PROFIT GROWTH ＮＳｾＰ＠
EDIV/NI .120 -.162 
MKT LIQ. 
-.102 .002 -.019 
TL/TNW ＭＮＰＲｾ＠ .023 -.081 - .105 
PBT PROFIT EDIV MKT • 
TNW GROWTH NI LIQ. 
The rationale proposed by this model is that the relative value of the 
valuation ratio is affected in the following ways:-
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1) the greater a company's return on capital the more investors value 
the company's assets (ie. the lower the valuation ratio). This means 
that the primary factor within our data that would appear to determine 
the market's valuation of a company's assets is the earning power of 
those assets, and obviously the higher the earning power the higher 
the relative share price. 
2) a low profit growth is associated with a high share value 
inferring that investors prefer low historic growth rates. A 
plausible reason for this is that high growth companies possibly 
possess more downside risk due to the difficulty of maintaining a high 
growth rate. · On the other hand, low growth companies may be 
considered mote stable and thus able to maintain their current growth 
rate or at least maintain their current earning power. It seems 
quite reasonable that once an investor has taken into account the 
earning power of the assets, he then considers the stability of the 
return. 
3) ceteris paribus, the higher the dividend payout ratio the lower 
the valuation ratio which infers that a company is valued relatively 
more if it distributes a higher proportion of its earnings. This type 
of relationship was also found In the earnings yield model. 
4) \ the higher the frequency of trading in a share, the higher the 
relative share valuation. 
earnings yield model. 
Again this relationship was found in the 
5) the final and least influential variable in the model is TL/TNW 
which is a financial gearing measure. The model suggests that the 
greater the gearing then the higher the relative share price. This 
implies that investors have a preference for gearing, after taking all 
the other main factors into account, and does appear to be rather an 
unusual relationship as it infers that investors have a preference for 
risk. 
The implications of these relationships proposed by the model will be 
discussed at length after the LDA has been reviewed. Before leaving 
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the MRA we can conclude that the ｭｯｾ･ｬ＠ has a r easonable explanatory 
power and that the five variables are all s t a t ist i cally s i gni f icant at 
the 99.9% level of confidence (see appendix F for a de t ailed 
discussion of these tests). 
5.2 The Linear Discriminant An'alysis 
The technique of linear discriminant analysis (LDA) was applied to the 
valuation ratio data 1n much the same way as with the earni ngs yie ld 
analysis. In this analysis the sixty top and sixty bottom companies 
in the valuation ratio distribution formed the two groups . 
produced was as follows: 
z = 0.62 + Log PBT/AVTNW-
The mod el 
The model indicates that the best discriminator be tween companies wi th 
high and low valuation ratios is the r eturn on ne t worth. The 
statistics relating to this model are presented in append ix H, wh e r e 
it can be seen that this one variable model was able to class ify 
correctly 95% of companies back into their original groups . Th js 
high success rate suggests a very accurate ex post classi f ication 
model even though it is based on one variable. 
It i s ｩ ｾ ｴ･ｲ･ｳｴｬｮｧ＠ to note that this ｯｮｾ＠ variable , r e turn on ne t worth, 
was the only significant variable to emerge from the 90 i nd epend ent 
variables in the analysis. If this ｭｯｾ･ｬ＠ is compared wi t h t he f i ve 
variable MRA model then the implication is that the r el a t i onshi ps 
between the four variables missing from the LDA model and t he 
valuation ratio may not apply across th e whole distribut i on of 
valuation ratios. In other words we must be careful i n maki ng 
normative statements about dividend policy, earnings growth etc., as 
we are unable to define more specifically the complexi t y of the 
underlying interaction between these variables. One fina l s t at i st ic 
worth mentioning is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
(squared) between the model when applied to the whole database and t he 
valua t ion ratio which was .47. This is very similar to the variance 
explained by the return on capital measure in the regression model. 
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6. The Theoretical Implications of the Valuation Ratio Models 
As the results of the LDA added very little additional insight, if 
any, we shall concentrate only on the theoretical implications of the 
five variables entering the regtession model. At the outset of this 
evaluation it is stressed that the arguments that follow are normative 
as it is only possible to make some general and tentative inferences 
about the market's decision making process on the basis of our 
resul ts. The main benefi t :from LDA was to show t h8 t the 
- -- . - - \ 
ｲ ･ ｬ ｾ ｴｩｯｮ ｾ ｨｬｰｳ＠ found in the ｲ･ｧｲｾｳｳｩｯｮ＠ model were possibly not 
consistent across all companies which emphasises the need to be 
careful in interpreting the results. The purpose behind the 
valuation ratio analyses was to establish the factors that influence 
whether a company's assets have a high or a low value in the stock 
market and to aid us in our model development. The MRA model 
revealed that return on capital was the primary factor, and that 
earnings growth, dividend payout, market liquidity and financial 
gearing were secondary contributing only a further 7% to the variance 
explained. We shall now consider each of these in turn. 
6.1 Return on Capital and the Value of the Firm 
The relationship proposed by the ｭｯｾ･ｬＬ＠ that a company's assets are 
valued more the higher the return on those assets, is hardly 
surprising. Quite clearly this implies that the primary factor in 
determining a share value is the earnings that accrue to that share. 
This is a result that has been found by other researchers using 
different methodologies ego Ball and Brown(1968), Kamath(1980). 
Although there is little controversy in this finding, unlike the 
influence of dividends on share values, there are two important 
theoretical issues that need to be considered. The first concerns 
the implications of these results for the applicability of the 
Modigliani and Miller(1958) theory based on the net operating income 
approach to investment in the UK Stock Market, and the second is the 
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matter of the appropriate accounting number for measuring income. 
The MM theory on the Net Operat i ng Income mod el f or sha r e valuation 
postulates tha t earn i ngs before inte r est and tax is th e correct 
accounting number for valuing a firm. This theo r y i s pre ented at 
l engt h i n ｭ ｾ ｮ ｹ＠ fi nance ｴ ･ｸ ｴ Ｇ ｢ｯｮｫ ｾ＠ (eg . Van Horne , 1977, or Wes ton & 
Brigham, 1979) and therefore it is inappropriate t o present the de t ail 
of the MM reasoning here. The main conclus ion of the MM a r gument is 
that the rate at which earnings after interest a r e capitalised i n t he 
market is proportional with the rate a t which f i na nc ia l 
gearing increases. They argue that, in an effic ient ma rket , i f t wo 
compa nies only differ in the way in wh i ch they a r e financed and have 
different market values, then investors would sell the overvalued 
firm's shares and buy the undervalued firm' s shar es . Fur t hermor e , i f 
these differences persist it would be possible f or investors to "gea r 
up" and increase their financial returns without increasing t hei r 
financial risk. 
In contrast to the MM theory there is the Net Income model of sha r 
valuation (see Durand, 1959 for an extended discussion) wh i ch Rr gues 
that the cost of debt and cost of equity are i ndependent of t he 
capital structure, but because the weighted aver age cost of capital 
declines with the increased use of gearing, the value of t he f i rm 
(equity plus debt) rises. There are obviously l i mits to t he extent 
\ 
,that debt can be increased without affecting the capi t alisation r a t e 
of earnings ego when the risk of bankruptcy becomes high, but f or t he 
purpose of this analysis we shall ignore this as our empi rical r esults 
do not allow us to make inferences on this more s pecifi c issue . 
The results from our analyses reveal that a variable based on profit 
before tax was apparently more powerful than any of the other r e turn 
on capital variables based on earnings before interest and tax, ca sh 
flow, or trading profit. This result may infer that th e Net Income 
Model of share valuation, which is based on an after in teres t ' profit 
figure, could be a better model of reality than the MM model. By the 
way the above analyses were conducted whereby the t echnique was 
allowed to find the most significant explanatory variable, if the MM 
model was a more realistic representation of the market, then a ratio 
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., , 
based on earnings before interest and tax would have been expected to 
enter the model. However, it is stressed that as t hese r atios are 
highly correlated any conclusions drawn from this variable preference 
are very tentative. 
It is feasible, however, that a combination of a re turn on capital 
ratio based on profit before tax and a gearing ratio would have a 
compensatory influence in the regression model and thus may provide 
some support for the MM theory. However, despite gearing entering at 
t 'he fifth step in the MRA the sign of the coefficient is in the wrong 
direction for us to draw any conclusions along these lines of thought. 
The second theoretical issue that our results have some bearing upon 
is the most appropriate accounting number for assessing the "true 
income" of a firm. It has been argued by several academics (Lawson, 
1980 and Brealey, 1976 are examples) that the measurement of corporate 
profitability should be based on cash flow rather than the traditional 
accounting profit presented in the annual accounts.' ｆｵｲｴｨ･ｲｭｯｾ･Ｌ＠
criticism has been made that this traditional profit figure is 
incorrect because it does not show the effects of inflation ( see 
Sibley, 1979 and Lacier, 1977). 
Whilst We cannot comment on the use of inflation adjusted profit 
figures versus unadjusted numbers as no inflation adjusted measures 
\ 
were included in the data set, we may draw some tentative conclusions 
on the cash flow line of thought. Based on the same logic as that 
for discussion of the MM theory above, it could be argued that if cash 
flow was perceived by investors to be a better measure for evaluating 
performance then a variable based upon this number would have been 
seen to be mote powerful than a profit before tax number . We cannot 
conclude that cash flow is inferior to traditional accounting numbers 
for measuring performance, but we can suggest that at the time of 
these analyses the market as a whole appeared to prefer the use of 
traditional accounting numbers. This possibly infers that there is a 
need to educate analysts and investors on the benefits of cash flow 
based assessments (a conclusion that is conveyed by Lawson, 1980 and 
Govindarajan, 1980 but by using different methodologies). Once again 
we need to stress that the cash flow variables are highly correlated 
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with the profit before tax variables and therefore conclusions on 
investor preferences are tentative. 
6.2 Profit Growth and the Value of the Firm 
The relationship proposed by the regression model is that lower profit . 
growth is associated with higher share values which infers that 
investors prefer a low historic growth rate. At first this appears 
to be irrational as one might expect growth over one year to be 
continued and therefore high growth companies would stand at a premium 
over low growth companies. 
Evidence from Singh and Whittington(1968:136-9) provides some support 
for this unexpected relationship. They argue that investors should 
not expect the earnings per share of the average company to grow at a 
steady rate over successive periods. This type of conclusion is 
consistent with the results of Little and Rayner(1966) who found that 
growth followed a random pattern. 
In Whittington's(1971) book on the prediction of profitability it is 
reported that there was a tendency for returns to regress "towards the 
mean at a constant proportionate rate". If a company has a higher 
than average rate of return then it may be expected to tend to fall 
\ 
more into line over time and vice versa. The author further 
concludes 
"that we should not expect any strong systematic tendency for 
relative growth of earnings per share to be a persistent 
characteristic of an individual firm. This does not mean 
'growth' stocks do not exist; it merely means that they are 
atypical and that a general rule of 'growth breeds growth' would 
not be a successful means of picking out those companies which 
will achieve a high future growth of earnings per share." 
Thus, although at first the inverse relationship between profit growth 
and relative share valuation appears counter intuitive, the extant 
work provides some support for this finding. The empirical evidence 
suggests that growth trends do not.tend to continue in general and on 
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average there is a tendency to regress towards the average. If we 
assume that investors are aware of this, it is plausible that 
companies with high growth rates stand at a discount due to the 
problems of maintaining the high growth levels, on the other hand, low 
growth companies could be considered more stable and thus more able to 
maintain current earnings or change their earnings growth i n line with 
the average rate of growth. However, due to the age of the 
supporting evidence and the lack of further confirmatory evidence we 
emphasise the need for caution in the interpretation of this variable. 
6.3 Dividend Payout and the Value of the Firm 
The model proposes a similar relationship to that found in the 
earnings yield model as a higher dividend payout is associated with a 
relatively higher share price. As we have discussed this 
relationship at length already in this chapter we shall not repeat the 
detail ｯｾ＠ the underlying logic implied. It is sufficient to say that 
it is believed that this phenomemon is a result of the investor trying 
to reduce his uncertainty in equity investment decisions and the 
clientele effect. 
6.4 Marketability and the Value of the Firm 
The variable ｭ｡ｾｫ･ｴ＠ liquidity was also found in the earnings yi eld 
analyses and again the inference to be drawn from the sign of the 
regression coefficient is that the more marketable a stock, the higher 
the relative share price. The arguments supporting this relationship 
are the same as those presented in the earnings yield analysis and 
revolve around the ease with which investors can deal in stocks. 
Obviously the more difficult or awkward to deal, the lower the share 
price. 
6.5 Gearing and the Value of the F ir'm 
The final variable that entered the valuation ratio regression model 
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was TL/TNW, a measure of financial gearing. The model implies that 
the greater the gearing the lower the ｶｾ ｬｵ｡ｴｩ ｯｮ＠ ratio, that is the 
higher the relative share price. This infers that i nvestors have a 
preference for gearing. 
This reasoning is directly opposed to the Mod igliani and Miller(1958) 
theory where it is argued that gearing has an adver se impact on s hare 
prices. Furthermore Firth(1975) argues that companies which are 
highly geared will have more volatile profits performance t han simila r 
firms with little fixed interest borrowing , a nd will constitute more 
risky investments. The counter arguments on gea ring (see Durand, 
1958 and Renwick, 1968) are that providing t he risk of default is low 
ｴｨｾｮ＠ gearing is an effective way of increasing the return on the 
shareholders' investment. The difference between the two lines of 
thought lies in the issue of whether investor cha nge their rating of 
a company in line with the amount of gearing. 
Our results would at fir st sight tentativealy lend s upport for the net 
income "model of share valuation in that we could justi f y the 
investor's preference for gearing in terms of additional return. 
However, a closer look at the model reveal s that the first and most 
influential variable to enter the model is r eturn on capital based on 
a profit after interest figure. Thi s might indicate that the 
influence of gearing in generating additional returns to the 
\ 
shareholder may have already been taken into account and therefore 
other reasons for this relationship might usefully be explored . 
In a recent study by Drury and Bougen(1980) the level of gearing in UK 
companies in 1977 was investigated in terms of profitability, 
industry, size and sales enviroment. This study provides some very 
interesting findings such as that the level of gearing (measured by 
the debt/equity ratio) was not significantly associated with a 
company's sales enviroment and industry norms. On a more positive 
note it was found that in general highly profitable companies had low 
ｧ･｡ｲｾｮｧ＠ and vice versa. Furthermore it appears that small firms are 
likely to have less gearing than large firms with ｾＶＥ＠ of the smaller 
companies compared with 15% of the larger companies operating witH 
gearing of less than 20%. However, 20% of the smaller companies 
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compared with 25% of t he la r ger comapnies ope r a t ed on high gea r i ng 
ratios. 
Whilst there are s ome pr oblems in r elating t he r esults of Drury a nd 
Bougen to this study in t hat t hey used t he debt/equ ity r a t i o and i n 
our model we us ed TL/TNW, (a l t hough bo th a r e measuring t he same 
characteristic, see chapte r V), th eir f i nd i ngs may sugges t a plaus ible 
explanation for the appare nt pref er ence f or gea ring proposed by our 
model might be that gearing is ac ting in some way as a su rrogate f or 
size. However, the correla tion be tween size and gea r i ng is ve r y 
small and therefore this l i ne of argument is a t bes t tenuous . 
Thus although the variable TL/NW would appear to convey additiona] 
information we may conclude that we a re unable to i nterpre t t he 
relationship in an economica lly meani ngfu l way . As such we have 
problems in interpreting wh a t t his variable i s conveyi ng about how t he 
investor processes informat i on. 
6.6 Summary of the Valuation Ra tio Analyses 
The main tentative conclus i ons to be drawn from t he analyse can ｨｾ＠
summarised as follows: 
\ ) the primary factor in determin i ng r e l a t i ve va luation r Atios in 
return on capital and this clearly support s the th eory that ea rn i ngs 
are the primary determinant of relati ve sha r e values . 
2) earnings growth is inversely rela ted to r ela t i ve share valuation. 
This finding may possibly be partially expla ined by t he ove r 811 
expectation of growth rates regressing toward s an aver age . 
3) as was seen in the earnings yield analyses di vi dend payout 
influences the relative valuation ratio. Thi s i nfe r s t ha t investors 
have a preference for dividends which is caused by a systematic bi a s 
in the market. 
4) the degree of market interest also has a bearing on r ela ti ve share 
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values; the grea ter the marketability the higher the r e lative sha r e 
price. 
5) the effect of financial gearing could not be intuitively explai ned 
with any degree of conviction. 
If these results a r e now compared with the f i ve hypotheses set up i n 
chapter IV we find that both hypoth eses 1 a nd 2 a r e s upported. The 
models clearly show t ha t ea rnings are the pr i mary fin ancial 
determinant of r elative share values as measured by thp val uation 
ratio and that dividends are influential, although seconda ry to 
earnings. 
The third hypothesis which states that f1na ncja ri o k dop no t 
influence share values unless risk of default high ha been 
ratified to a ｾｩｭｩｴ･､＠ extent. The mod el dor . Ghow that financiAl 
risk has a small amount of influence bu t as we hAVP stre ｾ･ｲｬ＠ t hp 
underlying rationale for the relationship propo ed ｪｾ＠ not st rong . 
Thus although we cannot conclude that these r esl Jt upport th js 
hypotheSis, we can state that we have no t found any . tron p- evid ncp. to 
reject it. 
ｔｨｾ＠ remaining hypotheses concerning default anrl ｾ ｹｳｴ･ ｭ ｡ｴｩ｣＠ ri sk Are 
however unsupported as neithe r z-score nor beta ente r ed any of hp 
models. Consequently we suggest that our r esul ts a r e not Ｇ ｯ ｮ ｾｩｾ ｴ･ｮｴ＠
with the theories that default ri sk as measured Iy ｾＭｳ｣ｯ ｲｰ＠ or 
systematic risk as measured by beta a r e of major i mportanc p to 
investors. Again we stress that the abse nce of any positiv rp ul t 
is not to be interpreted as rejecting t he hypotheses . 
These results clearly show a more complex picture of the i nvestor' s 
decision making process than was found with th e earn i ngs yield 
analYSis and therefore provide a more complete picture About the 
market's decision making process. 
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7. The Link between the Valuation Ratio and the Earnings Yield Models 
One surprising result from the analyses was that the earnings yield 
model only explained 26% of the variance, whereas the valuation ratio 
explained 53%. Prior to conducting these analyses it was expected 
that the earnings yield, which is a ratio constantly used by 
investment analysts, would be easier to explain than the rarely used 
valuation ratio. One plausible reason for this phenomenon might have 
been the influence of companies with meaningless earnings yields 
oorrupting the model, but 8S oare was taken to exolude this type of 
oompany we must look elsewhere for the explanation. 
As both independent variables are a function of share price and an 
adcounting ｮｵｭ｢ｾｲＬ＠ namely ･｡ｲｮｩｾｧｳ＠ and net assets, the explanation for 
the difference in the two models must lie in the way these accounting 
numbers interact with share values. A way of examining the 
difference between the two models is to compare the effect a change jn 
each of these accounting figures has on share prices. In fi gure 6. ? 
the earnings yield and valuation ratio regression models are plotted 
on a graph which allows a direct comparison of the two mod els to be 
made. The x axis is the share price in pence and the y axise s are 
earnings per share for the earnings yield model and return on capital 
for the valuation ratio model. From this graph it is possible to see 
the impact a change in earnings, or profitability, has on the s hare 
price. 
\ The solid black line represents the earnings yield mod el . This line 
is computed by using the constant term in the regression mod el , that 
is the discount rate for earnings is 19.88% when all other things are 
held constant. This straight line clearly demonstrates the 
assumption made when analysing the earnings yield using MRA of a 
linear relationship between earnings and share price. Moreover , it 
clearly shows the major drawback with the earnings yield approach in 
that when earnings are zero, the share price is also expected to be 
zero, suggesting that the company is worthless (although in reality 
this could not happen). A point worth noting is that when the 
earnings yield regression model was computed, companies producing a 
low return on capital were excluded from the analyses and therefore 
the extrapolation of this line to zero is not strictly correct. 
However, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining the point 
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where the level of low earnings produces a meaningless earnings yield 
it is not possible to know where to stop this line. · To illustrate 
the impact dividends have on the rate at which earnings are discounted 
(ie. the earnings yield) a second earnings yield regression line has 
been drawn (long dashes) on the graph. This line is computed using 
the average dividend yield for all companies and clearly shows that 
dividend payout has a marked effect in increasing the sha re price for 
a given level of earnings. 
In order to permit a direct comparison between the valuation ratio and 
the earnings yield, the earnings scale used as the Y axis in the above 
discussion directly relates to the second Y axis measuring return on 
capital (PBT/AVTNW). By using the average relationship between 
profit before tax and net income, which is the basis for computing 
earnings per share, the average tax charge was computed to be 25.2%. 
With this figure it was possible to convert the return on capital, 
based on an asset backing of 50p, into an approximate earnings per 
share figure. For example if a compnay had a ratio of PBT/AVTNW of 
20.0% based on an assetbacking of 50p that is equivalent to a PBT of 
, 
10p per share. Given the averagae tax charge Is 25.2% of PBT, the 
earnings per share are 7.48p. The end result s is that when both 
models are plotted on the graph they can be interpreted as being 
approximately on the same scale, although by the nature of the various 
assumptions made rather crude. 
The line of asterisks shows the effect different rates of return have 
upon share prices. This line has been computed using the valuation 
ratio regression model and assuming a net asset backing of 50p per 
share. The other factor taken into account is the mean profit 
growth, all other variables in the model have been omitted. The 
reason for including profit growth in this way is to provide a f a r 
more useful comparison to be made between the models. (Th e short 
dashed line shows the result when this factor is ignored.) The 
interesting aspect about this line is that it is slightly curved and 
that when the earnings are zero the share price is approximately 18p. 
Thus this graph clearly demonstrates that companies are far from 
worthless at this low return on capital level and suggests that the 
investors take into account the asset value of the share wh en 
174 
assessing relative share values. It should be noted that even with 
the valuation ratio, companies with zero profits are at a ve ry large 
discount compared with their asset backing . I n t his ｴｮｾｴ｡ ｮ｣ ･＠ the 
share price represents only 36% of the book value of the Rssets . 
Also shown on the graph is the impact of dividend payout in the 
valuation ratio regression model. In contrast to the ea rnings yield 
model the impact on share price is relatively small. The reason for 
this can probably be attributed to the instability of the earn i ngs 
yield model due to the low variance explained. 
From the above discussion it is implied that there is a link between 
the earnings yield and valuation ratio regression mod els . 
Whittington(1971) in a discussion on how investors should value 
investments proposes that when choosing between two compAnie th ese 
two measures should be compared. Whilst he also propo es two simpl 
rules for investors he presents the relationship that the rate of 
return on capital is equal to the valuation ratio divided by the 
price/earnings ratio:-
PIA 
E/A : 
PIE 
where E = earnings 
A = assets 
P = Share Price 
\ This equation indicates that the link between the earnings yield and 
the valuation ratio is return on capital. The graph of t he 
regression models clearly demonstrates this point and reveals that it 
is particularly relevant in the area where earnings become very low. 
In conclusion the above discussion reveals that the reason for the 
earnings yield model explaining less variance ' than the valuation ratio 
model is due to its inability to accommodate the problems associated 
with low returns on capital. The valuation ratio, on the other hand, 
starts a step further down the valuation hierarchy and adjusts the 
share value by the quality of the earnings entering the model, the 
quality being assessed by the return on capital variable. This 
difference between the models can also be expressed in terms of the 
regression residuals. As earnings are the prime determinant of 
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relative sha re values , at leas t according to our va luation r atio 
results, by using the earnings yield as a depe nd ent va r iable we a r e 
trying to explain a residual of a previous process and consequently 
the variance explained will be l ess. Because of th is i t i s di ff ic ul t 
to be conclusive about the additiona l exp lanatory power of t he 
valuation ratio model, but we would suggest t ha t t hese r esul t s 
indicate that the valuation ratio is a be tter de pend ent va r iable f or 
this type of analysis simply because it t akes i n t o accoun t the effec t 
profitability has on share values and does no t simp l y concent r a t e on 
examining the residuals. 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
Having discussed at length the theoretical i mplications of t h 
earnings yi eld and valuation ratio model s , and t he r e l a t ions hi ps ｴｨｾｴ＠
exist between these two dependent variables, i t is i mporta nt t o ､ ｲ ｾｷ＠
together the main points and to assess the ove r a l l abil i t y of ｴ ｨｾ＠ e 
analyses to aid us in our search for an und er s t and i ng of t he ｭ ｾｲｫ｀＠ Ｌ ｾ＠
judgement process and its use of financial informat ion. 
In the first set of analyses conducted on the earn i ngs yield l , ｷ｡ｾ＠
found that both dividend payout ratio and ma rke t ahjli ty had ｾ ｮ＠
influence on share prices. The discussion that fol lowed provided us 
with the general conclusions that investors pref er di vi dend s and t hat , 
the more the market interest in a stock, the highe r i t s r elative ｳ ｨ ｾ ｲ ･＠
value. 
The second ｾ･ｴ＠ of analyses conducted on the valuation r a t io ｰｲ ｯｶｾ､＠ ｾ＠
be mote complex with five statistically significant va r iables ente r i ng 
the regression model. The most dominant explana tory va riahJe ｷｾｾ＠
return on capital, this was followed by profit growt h, di vi den j 
payout, market liquidity and financial gea ring in ord er of 
contribution to the model. The discussion on th ese va r iablp. 
revealed that at least for the time period cover ed by th is study 
investors had a preference for earnings, low growth In prof i t s , higher 
dividend payouts and more marketable shares. The f i fth f actor , 
financial gearing, could not be interpreted in a meaningful way . 
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The overall conclusion to be drawn from these analyses is that 
although inferences about the association between accounting numb er s 
and relative share valuations may be attempted, it is ve ry difficult 
to be more specific. Consequently, it appear s that these linear 
additive models provide us with only vague gene r alisations about the 
share price fixing mechanism. We have seen that all of ou r arguments 
for supporting the relationships proposed by the mod el s a r e normative 
and, although interesting from a theoretical point of view, a r e very 
limited in clarifying the conditions unde r which certa i n va riables are 
more important than others. For exampl e t he valuation r a tio 
regression model proposes that a high div i dend payout is preferred at 
all levels of return on capital, but th e r e are strong arguments for 
suggesting that when the return on capital is ei th er ve ry high or very 
low investors may not prefer divid end s (see Lintne r, 1962 ). 
The problems from using linear additive techniques have been ､ｩ ｳ ｾｵ ｮＮ･ ､＠
at length in the cognitive psychological literature. Shanteau ｾｮ､＠
Phelps(1977) specifically note that the use of multiple r egr essjon ａｾ＠
a normative model is different in emphasis from the desc r i ptiv 
applications of the technique. In this study the descriptive 
application of multiple regression has bee n concerned with summarlzi np-
the market's (that is the sum of all analysts ) decision policy in ｾ＠
linear equation. The output from thi s has heen a mod el composed of 
\ 
only those characteristics that made significant and unique 
contributions to predicting the overall judgement. However, i t is 
important to carefully examine exactly what has been achieved. 
Shanteau and Phelps(1977) comment on th is topic as follows : 
"A frequent mistake, however, had been to assume that the judges 
use only these few characteristics. Instead, thes e 
characteristics are the only ones need ed to describe the judges 
decision ••• Thus multiple regress ion analysis may seriously 
underestimate the number of characteris tics actually used by the 
judge." 
Consequently, it is to be recognised that the model and the underlying 
judgement process are not the same, the models merely "paramorphic 
represent" the judge (Hoffman, 1960). Shanteau and Phelps(1977) add 
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that: 
"Unfortunately, this distinction is frequ ently overlooked by many 
users of descript ive models who believe that they havp somehow 
also described the process. Too often, a close ｣ｯｲｲ･ｳｰｯｮ､ｾｮ｣･＠
between the predictions of a mod el and of a judge is taken to 
mean that the judge must somehow share the ba sic properties of 
the model." 
This point is furth er empha sized by Dawes and Corrigan(197 ll) who ｨｾｶ･＠
shown that there is little loss in predictive ability when the weights 
in such models are changed from statistically optimal values to random 
values. Thus, although we can conclude that in many ｩｮｳｴｾ ｮ ｣･＠ the 
linear additive models of the judgement process can be v ry accu r at 
in their predictive ability (see Dawes, 1971; Goldber g, 1968 ; Lewi. 
1975), it is inappropriate to conclude that such mod els ar e an 
accurate description of the judgement process. If we apply this lj ne 
of reasoning to the results reported so far in this thesi , it is 
apparent that we must be careful in interpreting the mod els as 
accurate descriptions of the investor's decision making proce s . 
Consequently, we can conclude that our normative models only provide 
broad generalisations and are therefore unable to provid e descriptive 
evidence concerning actual usage of financial information. 
Slovic(1969) also recognises this problem and suggests a possible 
cause as ｦｯｬｬｯｷｾＺ＠
"While their techniques (referring ·to previous studies w:; ing 
linear additive techniques) have been quite successful in 
describing how individual items of information are weighted anrl 
combined by a judge, they have not been successful in descrj Ｇ Ｑ ｾ＠
complex patterned or configural use of information, t hat ｴｾＬ＠ thp 
process whereby an item of information is i nterpreted differently 
from one time to the next, depending on the na tu re of oth r 
available information. Since experts generally cJ a tm that thpy 
use information configurally, it is important that techni.qlJes 
used to describe judgement be sensitive to such processes". 
Slovic further proposes that the ANOVA technique is more approprjate 
for quantitative description of both configura I and nonconfigural use 
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of information in judgement. Slovic concludes ｨ ｩｾ＠ analytical s tudy 
into stockbroker decision processes by stating "it is now clear that 
substantial configural processing of information doe s occur a nd can 
readily be detec ted by the ANOYA technique." Other s tudi es i n this 
area (see Libby and Lewis, 1977 for a detailed r eview ) have also 
reached this conclusion in different areas and therefore the ANOYA 
methodology might appear to be a useful approach for describing the 
configural manner in which information is processed . 
In summary if we accept the premi se that the way i n which i nformation 
is processed by the decision maker is configural by na ture, then it 
would seem essential in a study ｾｦ＠ this kind to adopt a methodology 
that can reveal configurally interactions existi ng between ｶ ｡ ｲｩ ｡｢ｾｬ･ｳ Ｎ＠
Thus we conclude that although the traditional linea r additive 
techniques have revealed some interesting ｲ･ｬ ｡ｴｪｯ ｮ ｳｨｩｰｾＬ＠ they are 
unlikely to be able to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
investor's decision making process. It 1s one thj ng to a rgue in 
broad terms that earnings, dividends, market interest, etc . i nfluence 
share values but quite another to be more specific about hnw th se 
variables interact with each other. A brief i nt rview of any 
investment analyst would confirm that these ｢ｲｯｾ､＠ ｧ･ｮ･ｲｾＩｩ＠ ations do 
not provide a valid description of hi s evaluat ion process. 
In order to overcome this deficiency in linear additive techniques a 
\ 
second type of analytical technique based on the ANOVA principle ha s 
been employed. This second set of analyses will be r eport ed in the 
following chapter where the technique of Automatic Interaction 
Detector will be presented. By adopting this approach we not only 
hope to develop a more real istic model, hopefully providing supe r ior 
insight into market processes, but also there is the potential added 
benefit of "cross-methodological validation of the resea rch results" 
(Libby & LeWis, 1977). ThiS ' provides a wider hody of knowledge of 
the underlying relationships and thus should lead to more relevant 
findings. This line of thought is also recommend ed by Shanteau and 
Phelps(1977) who argue for greater flexibility by researchers. The 
authors argue for the adoption of analytical techniques which are most 
suitable for the investigation, rather than the investigator, and this 
may mean the use of several techniques depending on the problem under 
consideration, with each contributing something to the study. 
Essentially in this study we have followed this line of thought. 
1. Introduction 
CHAPTER VIr 
A CONFIGURAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING 
RELATIVE SHARE VALUES 
In this thesis it has been argued that when investigating any decision 
making process it is necessary to take into account the complex way in 
which humans process information. In the previous chapter the 
results obtained from using the more common linear additive analytical 
techniques were presented and although we were able to make several 
generalisations about the market 's decision making process, i n general 
the interpretations we were able to ｭ｡ ｾ＠ were relatively restricted. 
Our results clearly emphasized the importance of using analytical 
techniques capable of providing a more detail ed in s ight into the 
investor's decision making process. 
In this chapter we try to overcome the deficiencies r evealed in the 
previous chapter by replicating the analysis using a technique capable 
of uncovering the configural way in which variables are combined 
\ 
within the market's judgement process. This statistical t echnique 
termed Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) has not been used be fore 
in this area of -research. Because it possesses certain analytical 
advantages for our purposes over the ｭｯｾ･＠ traditional techniques, we 
hope the analyses that follow will lead to the development of a more 
realistic and informative model of how investors value accounting 
information. 
This second stage of the analysis proceeds with a discus sion of t he 
AID technique which includes a brief analysis of its benefits and 
limitations, a description of the AID algorithm, an examination of the 
potential pitfalls in its use and suggestions made by the literaturp 
to overcome these, and finally the controlling criteria used in ｴｨｾ＠
subsequent analyses are presented. The following two sections 
present the results obtained with both the earnings yield and the 
valuation ratio as dependent variables. Within both of these 
sections the discussion is split into three subsections ｣ｯｶ･ｲｩｮｾ＠ the 
lOA 
statistical interpretation, a gene ral description, and the 
implications for theory of the derived AID models. The chapter is 
concluded with a general summary of the AID results and an examination 
of how these results help us to meet the objectives of this thesis. 
2. The AID Technique 
Despite the AID technique being a relatively new analytical tool, it 
has been employed in a wide vari ety of research areas such ｡ｾ＠ market 
research (Assael,1970; Newman, 1973), education (Orr,1972), population 
analyses (Ross and Bang,1976), and a study into the British Fishing 
Industry (Heald,1972). However, in the author's knowledge, ｴｨｩｾ＠ ｩ ｾ＠
the first study to use AID in the building of share valuation mod els . 
In fact, the only other study that has used AID in the financ e area is 
by Lewellen, Lease and Schiarbaum(1976) which investigated the v riOllS 
patterns of investment strategy and behaviour among 1,000 ｩｮ､ｩｶｩ､ｬＱ ｾ ｬ＠
investors. Although this study did reveal some interesting findings . 
the methodology employed and objectives were so different from the 
issues under examination in this thesis, that we believe further 
discussion of this study here is not warranted. , 
The main reason for the increasing popularity of ｴｨ ｾ＠ AID approach in 
the social sciences is its ability to Axplore and reveal certain 
relationships, intercorrelations ｾｮ､＠ interactions between variables, 
which the more traditional analytical techniques may not be able to 
uncover. The AID algorithm was developed by Sonquist and 
Morgan(1963) and has been made widely available by the publication of 
a book by Sonquist and Morgan(1964) containing a description of the 
technique, its benefits and pitfalls, and an AID computer program. 
The version of AID employed by the author wa s produced by the London 
School of Economics (1972) and entitled AID 1. 
AID does have some similarities to stepwise regression in that it 
attempts to explain the dependent variable in terms of explanatory or 
predictor variables. However, it differs from regression in that it 
makes no assumptions concerning linearity or additivity of the 
contributions made by the explanatory variables (Sonquist and Morgan, 
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1963). Essentially, AID operates by successively searching among the 
independent variables for the best binary split which maximises the 
variance explained in the dependent variable. At each stage in the 
analysis the independent variable selected will split the data set 
being analysed into two parts, one part being defined by a subset of 
the independent variable's categories and the remaining categories 
defining the other part. This process is continued until no more 
splits are possible without violating the various control criteria. 
The end result is a tree structure as presented in figures 7.4 ｾｮ､＠ 7.5 
where it can be seen that each new branch is formed a result of a 
binary split. The AID technique is based upon "one way analysis of 
variance" (ANOVA) with splits being determined by the variable that 
minimises the "residual sum of squares" of the dependent variable in 
the reSUltant two groups. This is equivalent to maximising the 
"between subgroup sum of squares" in ANOVA terminology. A more 
extensive description of the algorithm is given in Appendix I. 
A clearer picture of the AID analytical process can be obtained if 
Stage 1 in figure 7.1 is referred to. Essentially, there is one 
dependent variable represented by vector Y and several independent 
variables represented by vector's Xl to Xn. Each independent 
variable's observations are ranked and then split into subgroups (or 
categories), SG1 to SGn, (in figure 7.1 we have used five). The AID 
technique proceeds by trying to find the best dic .0tomonous split on 
any dependent variable that is able to explain the most variance in 
the independent variable. If we consider figure 7.1 the technique 
would commence on variable Xl, and proceed by examining the splits 
determined by subgroup 1 and subgroups 2 to 5, then it . would examine 
the splits determined by subgroups 1 and 2, and subgroups 3 to 5 and 
so on. This process continues until all possible splits on all 
variables have been examined and the one split that explains the most 
variance is selected as the basis for splitting the sample into two 
subsamples. The process is then repeated on the two subsamples 
formed (shown on ｦｩｧｵｾ･＠ 7.1 as stage 2). Again new subsamples will be 
formed and the process is continued until certain statistical criteria 
are not met. 
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FIGURE 7.1 
Th e ma i n beneflt fro .. ) twing lIID, a s sV!. t ed abo· e , L' tha t it lukes no 
as s umpt ions concerning linearity or addi tivity in th e ildopenden t or 
expiana t ory var iables. The l"eiiSOt1 foT' this i s t h ' t ｾ ｡｣ｨ＠ stage or tile 
anal ysis is evaluated i ndepend ent l y f r om the p evious stages , with 
each new par ent gr oup bei ng analysed a ." a dis t i nc t s e t of da t a . From 
t hi' pr ocess a ser ies of deci s ion rul es based upon t he ord er of the 
splits :i.s pr oduced and t his provides a bas i c for unders t anding th e 
variance in the dependent variable. Al though this type of ｡ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹｳ ｩｾ＠
lIill r eveal cert a i n i nter actions between val'iables "lh1ch may be hidden 
in a lflultiple !'egr esssion analys is, it i s no t i nf . . l1 i bl e as ccrta :1.n 
interactions ｾ｡ ｹ＠ s till go unde t ected Ｈｾ ｯｮｱ ｵ ｬｳ ｴ＠ & ｍｯｲ ｧ｡ ｮＬＱＹＶｾＩＬ＠
A furthe r benefit of AID is its ability to analys e comp lica t ed 
ca tegorical variables. In ot:1er studies pace , age , t ype of educa tion 
etc. a r'e typical categorj.cal var i a l11es tha t have been used 
success f ul ly. I n thi s study only two va r iables of thi s kind wer e 
ｾｮ｣ｬｵ､ ･ ､ Ｌ＠ namely ｭ｡ｾｫ･ｴ＠ liquidi t y and indus trial activi ty. Al t hough 
the mal"ket liquidity variable \olas included in our previous ana lyses , 
it wa;:, !' educed from its five point scal e to a two poin t (0,1) s cale 1.0 
make it. more ame nable to the techniques employed. \-Ii th AID 1 t ,,'aR 
possible to leave this variable in its origina l five ca t egory state . 
The second variable of this type, indus tria l ｡ ｣ ｴｩｾｩｌｹ Ｌ＠ ｣ｯｭｰｲｩ ｾ･ ､＠ tte 
four broad Stock Exchange industry clas s i f ications i e. Capi t al Goods, 
Light Engineering, Heavy Engineering and mi scellaneous . Thi3 
variabla is treated by AID as a non-ordina l and cons equently does not 
assume any sort of r anking between the four industries. 
Nevepthe less, AID is not without its limitations and several 
sugges t ions to avoid certain pitfalls ha ve been put forHard by 
Doyle(1973), Songuist & Morgan(19 63), Ali et al(1975) and Ecob(1978). 
The suggestions relevant to thi s study are as follows: 
(1) The number of cases should be large, at least 200. The earlier 
work by Sonqulst and Horgan(1963) r ecommended a minimum of 1,000 cases 
but a r ec:ent. study by Ecob(19 78 ) s tab:::":;; tha t ｾｬｉｬ ｡ ｬｬ ･ ｴ Ｇ＠ ｾ｡ ｭｰｬ ･ｳ＠ can be 
used effectively providing the controlling cut-off criteria are 
adjust ed accordingly, For ｾ ｲｮ｡ ｬｬ＠ ｾ ｡ｭｰｬ｣ｇ Ｎ＠ below 200, Doyle (1 973 ) 
suggests tha t multiple ｲ･ｧ Ａ Ｇ ･ｳ ｾｩｯｮ＠ ie fa:, mor' c ｰ ｯｷ ｣ｬｾｦｵｬ＠ ::w an 
( l i) Intet'cCf'r'01;:l L.i. cn hcblCCll ｰｲﾷ｣ｾＮｩ｣ Ｍ ﾷｏ ＺＺＢ＠ vi.lriabl<?S m lS i: ), ::!2 l -c fu l ly 
monitored t o 'vo i d Ｓｰｬｲ ｩＰ ｾｳ＠ r esult3. 
selccte: to spLit 3 pa r ent gr oup , thel1! if any oth el' pr'cd:i.ct(l r· 
ven 'iable t.> &1'E: cOi' r e l a tcd wit.h val":i ab l e .' , they b ,come I e .']..., l i kely to 
be sel ected t o split any of the subsequent groups . It i s fe s ibl 
that had a second variable B, which has a lmos t as much di .criwina tory 
power as variable A, been selected for the fir st ｾ ｰｬｩｴ＠ ｩｮ ｾ ｴ･ ｡ ､＠ of A, 
then the resultant AID model dePl.ved may have ｢Ｈ ｾ･ ｮ＠ apprecla bly 
dHfer'ent . In order to avoj d this problem the data ITILl S t b'..: exa mj ne( 
fo r high intercorra ' a Uon s and competItion between va l'labh: '3 for' 
splits and nume rous analyses must be "ndertaken excluding f. 8rtuin 
variables. (It was at thi::; point that t he f actor ｡ｮ ｡ ｬｹｳｾ Ｎ ｳ＠ )'e fer' r ed 
to in chapter V Has employed to select ｵｮ｣ＨＩｲｬ ｾ ｅＧ Ｑ Ｓ＠ te ri vadi?b] e s . ) 
(iii) The continuous ｰｲ ･､ｩ｣ｴｯｲ Ｏｩｮｾ ･ｰ･ｮ ､･ｮｴ＠ variables have to be 
r anked and recoded into subgroups (see figure 7.1). Eact ｾ ｵ｢ｦｩ ｲｯｵｰ＠
should contain approximately the same number of ｯ ｢ｳ･ｲｶ｡ｾ ｩｯｮ ･＠ nnd 
differ-ent analyses have to be conducteu . " 0 deter:;r'_ne Ｚｨｾ＠ 'Jpt:imum 
number of ｓ ｕ｢ ｧ ｬ ｾ ｏｕｰｓＮ＠ In this study ｭＺ Ｚｮ･ ｾｾｯｵｳ＠ ｡ｮｩＧｾ＠ ySbd ( . --; this n .. ｾｴｵｲＮ Ｇ･＠
were tmdertaken and it was found that the most usd't:l model s vlere 
obtained from using 12 sutsroups, that is approximately 45 
observations per subgroup per ｶ｡ｲｩ｡｢ｬｾＮ＠
(iv) The dependent variable should not be heavily skewed as this may 
cause spurious results. In chapter 5 it was ｲｰｰｯｲｴ･ｾ＠ how each r a tio 
distribution was exami.n!::'d for Bkewness and, where t';C) cessClry, 
transformed to improve normality and syrometr'y. Tho distl'ibut:i.ons of 
the dependent variables, t.he c8.r nJngs y:i.eld and the log of thb 
valua tion ratio, are sh own in figU, es 7.2 and 7.3 respeetively . 
In addItion to ｴｨ･ ｾ･＠ suggestions Doylc('i973) rt?corr.mends that the 
resultant AID tree pattern ｾｨｯｵｬ､＠ be ｴ･ ｳｴ･ｾ＠ for stabili ty 8S follows: 
(a) the original data set should be split into two subsamplcs , one 
subsample to be used for the ､｣ｶ ･ ｬｯｰ ｭ･ ｮｾ＠ of the mode ' and the second 
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for validating and testing the model's stability. Whil st this 
approach is feasible with very large samples, in this study the sampl e 
size was not large enough to permit this type of testing. In s tead 
the stability of the resultant models derived from the whole sampl e 
were tested by splitting the sample into two subsamples and then 
analysing these subsamples. The analyses were then compared with 
each other and with the analyses on the total sample leading to a 
useful insight into the underlying stability of the relations hips in 
the model. Obviously this approach is not as efficient as using two 
separate large samples but it does provid e a use ful and meaningful 
substitute stability test. 
(b) several analyses using differing partitioning contraints have to 
be performed to establish stable final groups. 
(c) the key factor causing the first split in the tree should be 
removed and the analysis repeated to see how the tree is affected. 
In his paper Doyle(1973) adds that AID should be used as part of a 
comprehensive analysis and if used should be preceded by a f actor 
analysis to isolate the important characteristics in the data. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the relationsh ips revealed hould be 
used to provide a basis for deriving a more definitive model using 
mul tiple regression. In this study a,l1 of Doyles suggestion hflve 
been followed where possible except the last.. The reasons for this 
\ 
,is that 1) this study is concerned with understanding the user's 
decision making process and not predicting share prices and 2) it was 
not possible to manipulate the relationships r evealed by the analyses 
in the way Doyle suggests to form new variables for regression 
analysis. 
3. The Controlling Criteria 
The tree structure obtained from an AID analysis depends heavily upon 
the termination rules used to stop further splitting of the parent 
groups. It 1s necessary to ensure that each split is statistically 
important to the analysiS and not just caused by chance or sampling 
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error. The rules adopted by this study are those recommend ed by 
Sonquist & Knott(1976) and Ecob(1978). They were as follows: 
(a) the minimum number of observations in a final group was set to 
35, below which the groups were considered too small for t his type of 
analysis. 
(b) the maximum number of final groups was 30 (in practice this was 
found to be redundant). 
(c) the criterion for splitting a group was that the resultant child 
groups must reduce the total sum of squares by at least .01 2 (as 
suggested by Ecob(1978) when the predictors have 8 to 12 subgroups at 
95% level of confidence). This is called the "split reducibility 
criterion". 
(d) before a group could be split, it had to contain at least .013 of 
the total sum of squares. 
(e) the t-value to test if the difference between the means of the 
two new child groups was significant was 2.0 
In practice the most important rule for determining a split wa the 
split reducibility criterion. The reason for this is that the 
program will continue to split large groups possibly several times, 
producing child groups which although intuitively appealing are not 
statistically significant. Sonquist & Morgan(1964) sugge t a cut-off 
of .006 but as Ecob(1978) points out this level is only useful with 
either samples larger than 1,000 cases or with small samples with only 
two subgroups per variable. By using Ecob's higher cut-off level the 
probability of splits occuring which are important (in the sense they 
reduce the unexplained variation by a large amount), but not 
statistically significant, has been minimised. 
4. Interpretation of the AID Tree Pattern 
Prior to reporting the results of the earnings yield and valuation 
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ratio analyses a brief summary of the characteristics and i mpl I cations 
of certain AID tree patterns is given. The purpose of thi s summary 
is to clarify certain basic interpretations that will, be mad e durIng 
the subsequent analyses. 
When analysing an AID tree pattern there are three main features to be 
examined. In broad terms these are, the shape of the tree, the 
characteristics of the final unsplit groups and the competition 
between variables to split the parent g'roups. , All of these factors 
influence the overall interpretation of the AID model. 
The shape of the tree can either be described as a "trunk-twig" or a 
"trunk-branch" structure. A "trunk-twig" structure is found when 
small terminal groups split off ,from a main branch. An example of 
this is given in figure 7.7 where groups ｾＬ＠ 6, 8 are the small 
terminal groups (or twigs) with the main trunk connecting groups 1, 2, 
5, 7 and 9. This particular trunk has one "alternative advantage" 
(or top terminating) group 6 and two "alternative disadvantage" (or 
bottom terminating) groups ｾ＠ and 8. The reason for this type of tree 
pattern is that each of the small terminal groups possesses a 
particular characteristic which distinguishes it from the main body of 
cases forming the trunk. Obviously these characteristics can be 
either advantageous or disadvantageous, depending on the direction of 
the split. For example in figure 7.7 where group 6 is formed, all 
companies in that group have the advantage of having a total asset 
- \ 
value above £109m, which has caused a low earnings yield, ie. a 
higher-share price. 
A "trunk-branch" structure is where the splits from the parent groups 
to child groups are symmetrical, at least for the first four major 
splits. The lower trunk in figure 7.6 shows an example of a 
trunk-branch tree pattern. Very often with this type of structure 
some of the early groups remain unsplit and, if this is so, they 
usually possess large amounts of unexplained variation. It i s , 
therefore, important to try to understand why this type of terminal 
group cannot be explained. 
A further property of a tree is its symmetry or nonsymmetry in terms 
190 
ｾ ＬＮ＠ .. 
of the variables used in the splits on various trunks. 
Sonquist(1964:112) explain this property: 
Morgan and 
"Nonsymmetry implies interaction, ie. effects of combinations of 
factors. If a variable is used on one of the trunks, and if it 
shows no actual or potential utility in reducing predictive error 
in another trunk, then there is clear evidence of an interaction 
effect between that variable and those used in the preceeding 
splits." 
This aspect of interaction is ｭｯｾｴ＠ important and worthy of further 
explanation. Interaction between variables in its simplest form is 
where a variable has the effect of influencing a decision in one way 
given one set of circumstances, and in a completely different way, 
given a different set of circumstances. For instance, it is 
plausible that an investment analyst may prefer to see a very high 
turnover of fixed assets for a distribution/warehousing type of 
company, whereas an equally high turnover of fixed assets in a 
manufacturing concern may be considered unhealthy, possibly a sign of 
overtrading. In this hypothetical example there is what we have 
termed "perfect interaction" whereby the influence of one variable on 
the decision maker is completely reversed and is solely dependent upon 
the industrial classification of the company under examination. In 
practice, however, perfect interaction is rare and is unlikely to be 
found in a study of this nature. Nevertheless, there are other forms 
\ 
of interaction between variables which are less obvious and yet 
clearly demonstrate the configural nature of the human decision making 
process. For example, it is possible that the variable may influence 
the decision maker in a similar direction given two different sets of 
circumstances but the impact of the variable in each case is Quite 
different. For instance, a high fixed asset turnover ratio may be 
found to be undesirable when analysing either a distribution or a 
manufacturing company but the overall impact on the assessment of the 
distribution company may be considerably more than on the 
manufacturing company. In this case there is interaction between 
fixed asset turnover and type of company but is in a less discrete 
form than above. 
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A second type of interaction which was r eferred to above in a 
reference to Sonquist and Morgan(1964) is nonsymmetry. This form of 
interaction is where a variable is found to be important given one set 
of circumstances but is missing from a second set. For example it 
may be found that fixed asset turnover is important in assessing a 
diBtribution company but insignificant in the assessment of a 
manufacturing company. This clearly reveals that different variables 
only have an influence given a specified set of circumstances and 
although this indicates interaction it is not perfect as per our 
definition above. In order to aid the clarity of the discussion that 
follows these less obvious forms of interaction will be referred to as 
"imperfect interactions". 
A further important feature of an AID tree is the utility of variables 
in the model which is reflected by the amount" of the unexplained 
variance they can explain. Obviously, the more a variable is able to 
contribute to explaining the variation in the dependent variable, the 
more influence it will have in the overall model. However, in 
addition to this, it is important to monitor the competition between 
each variable for splits. Often two variables will be found to 
explain similar large amounts of the variance, but only one can be 
chosen for the split. If competition is present and if the defeated 
variable does not enter at a subsequent split, then it is necessa ry to 
rerun the analysis excluding the victorious variable in order to 
establish whether a better tree structure could be found using the 
\ 
vanquished measure. 
Finally, each of the unsplit groups should be inspected for the reason 
why the splitting has stopped. It is possible to distinguish three 
main types of final group, small groups, explained groups and 
unexplained groups. A "small group is one containing too few cases to 
warrant an attempt to split. An explained group is one over the 
minimum size but which has too little variation to warrant an attempt 
to split. An "unexplainable group is one which possesses enough cases 
and variation to warrant a split but no variable in the analysis is 
able to make a useful contribution to reducing that variation. 
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5. The Earnings Yield Analysis 
The earnings yield under examination in this thesis represents the 
investors' valuation of a company's earnings as at the day after 
publication of the accounts. A high yield, that is high earnings 
relative to the share price, indicates that investors require more 
earnings per pound of investment and implies that this type of share 
possesses more risk than a lower yielding share. However, this rule 
of thumb is not always applicable and on certain occasions it would be 
wrong to use it, ego when a company is generating a loss or a very low 
profit (see chapter 5). 
In the previous chapter the results of the multiple regression and 
discriminant analysis revealed the following factors to be important 
in determining the relative earnings yield: 
(1) Dividend Payout 
(2) Market Interest 
However, the explanatory power of the derived models was rather weak 
with the discriminant model classifying only 79.2% of the cases 
correctly and the regression model explaining only 26.3% of the 
variance. With the AID technique we will try to improve- upon the 
accuracy of the traditional models and also try to reveal certain 
previously unidentified interactions between variables. 
In this section the AID results presented are the final models 
considered to be the most informative, complete and stable. These 
final models have been decided upon after concluding numerous analyses 
with varying control criteria and differing combinations of variables. 
In addition, tests for stability were performed on the SUb-samples of 
the total sample. The results obtained from these tests are not, 
however, presented here because the trees produced merely confirmed 
the major splits . in the tree derived from the total sample. 
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Th e ､ Ｑ ［Ｓｾ ｵ ｾＡＩＺｌｮｮ＠ 0)) til e f;;)!'nJ.i1gs ｹ Ｎｩ ･ｾ＠ d nnc:lyse:3 that 1.'0 ] 0\ i8 ｃｏ ｉｈｬ Ｉ ＼ＺＡ ＡＱｃ ｾｓ＠
\-lith a deta i l e d rC'd 8H of t he statistical IJ. Spccts of t hf; tIm fI.ID 
Ti loJ el s ｬｨ ｾ ｲＧ ｩ ｶ ･ ｣ＺｩＮＬ＠ nam;)ly ear'nlngs yie l d AID ti 'ee pdtte r!'J r,l ( 1) and (2 ) . 
This i s t hen f o ll o ':lCd vrith a ge n .ra l de 'cription and a dL:5c uw"' ion Oi l 
the theor etical ｩｭ ｾｬ ｩ ｣ Ｘｴ ｩ ｯｮ ｳ＠ of t he model s with particu l a r attention 
given to t he underly ing e COnOiTI i 0 10gi c of eacb s plit . The !"'elJla :!.ni n g 
part of ｴｬ ､Ｎ Ｚ ｾ＠ chapter pr esents t he valuation l'atto analy ses and 1s .in a 
s i mU a r forma t. 
5.1 THE S.T ATIST ICJl.L I NTEHPflET AT ION 
Earnings Yi eld AID Tr ee Pa ttern (1) 
The AID ｾｲ･ ･＠ pa tte r n produced from ar analysis of t he whole sample of 
547 companies is shol-ll1 in figure 7 ＮｬｾＮ＠ This tree structut' hows hO\v 
the analysis progressed from group 1 on the ｬ･ｦｾ＠ to .ach of the s ix 
final groups (2, 11, 10, 9, 8, 6) on the right. Als o : hnwn in the 
figt< .'c a:-e the folloHing statis tics for each group. 
(i) the ratio and the cut-off value us · d 1n '.;l1e pl -evJ Ol.ln split to 
fOl' m the group 
(il) the mean of the dependent variable 
(iii) the number of cases in the group 
(iv) the total sum of squares of the group, eg o the variance 
(v) the standard deviation of the dependent variable ｦｾｾ＠ tha t 
group. 
(note itcms elv) and (v) are based on a normalised scale and cannot be 
directly compared with item (ii». 
The earnings yield pattern shown in figure 7.4 possesses two di s tinct 
characteristics. The first is the isolated "twig" s t ruc ture created 
when g!'oup 1 is spl! t into groups 2 and 3 by thIJ re t ur'n on capital 
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CompeU nrr 
.. _----
Va r i.,§;blc.:1 
NONE 
NONE 
QA/CL 
r,JONE 
NONE 
In addition, table 7.1 shows the t-values for testing the di f ference 
between the child group means (all of which are statistically 
significant) and the competing variables for each split. In all 
cases, except for group 4, there were no other variables competing for 
the splits. However in the case of Group 4 the competition, although 
strong, was not important as the competing variable, QA/CL, was able 
to contribute to the model at the subsequent split of group 7. This 
subsequent involvement of the competing variable signifies that the 
two ratios are measuring different characteristics with the dividend 
payout ratio being the more influential. 
Final Earnirgs 
GrOl.p 
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The next stage in the statistical analysis is to examine the 
characteristics of the final unsplit groups and in table 7.2 a summary 
of these characteristics is given. The table reveals that all of the 
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final groups contained enough unexplained variation to warrant further 
statistically valid splits, but in each case other factors prevent ed 
these splits from taking place. In the case of group 2, there were 
not enough companies in the parent 'group to form two new child groups. 
As for all of the other groups no further splits took place because 
there were no statistically significant variables available in the 
data set. This implies one of two things. The first is that the 
database is not comprehensive and that other variables, if included, 
could have explained more of the variation. The second, and in the 
author's opinion more likely, is that the model has been f ormulated 
incorrectly in that the earnings yield is not the most appropriate 
measure of relative share value because of the assumptions made about 
the relationship between earnings and share prices. Consequently the 
unexplained variation is unexplainable using this dependent va riable . 
One further observation to be made from table 7.2 is the large 
difference between the mean of group 2 and the means of all the other 
groups. In order to appreciate the extent of this dif ference the AID 
tree presented in figure 7.4 has been redrawn to scale using the mean 
values of each group as the location for each split, and this is shown 
in figure 7.6. This diagramatic AID Tree reveals the extent of the 
isolation of group 2 caused by the 6plit using the return on capital 
ratio. The reason for this well-defined split is due to the AID 
ｴｾ｣ｨｮｩｱｵ･＠ identifying ,a group of companies which possess very low 
earnings yields caused by very low returns on capital, that is below 
6%. 
This anomaly in the earnings yield distribution was expected and was 
discussed ｾｴ＠ length in chapters 5 and 6. It is interesting that the . 
AID technique was able to isolate this group of companies which 
possess low return on capital and a low earnings yield. Although it 
is not possible to derive an exact rule for determining the point 
below which the return on capital becomes influential (due to the 
arbitary way in which the subgroups are formed), this split clearly 
reveals a case of "imperfect interaction" between the earnings yield 
and the return on capital ratio. 
Despite the overall statistical significance and the extreme nature of 
this interesing split, it does, unfortunately have a restricting 
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effect on the whole model. The reason for this is due to the nature 
of the companies in group 2 (that is, low returns on capital). The 
earnings yields of these companies are not intuitively meaningful and 
therefore not amenable to this type of exploratory analysis. The net 
effect of including this group of 41 companies in the analysis is to 
increase the total variance to be explained by 46%, which leads to a 
reduction in the statistical significance of late splits in the tree 
thus shortening the length of the major trunks. As this group of 
companies can be said to be inhibiting the resultant model, the 
analyses were rerun using the reduced sample used in the multiple 
regression and discriminant analyses. This second set of analyses is 
called the earnings yield AID pattern (2). 
Earnings AID Tree Pattern (2) 
Reducing the sample size from 547 to 505 companies by excluding those 
companies with meaningless earnings yields produced the AID pattern 
tree shown in figure 7.5. 
This new tree has been lengthened by two additional splits, with one 
occurring on the upper trunk and the other occurring on the lower 
trunk. A further change to the tree has occurred in the lower branch 
of the lower trunk, where the short-term liquidity split that occurred 
in AID tree pattern (1) has been preceded by a size factor split. 
This indicates that with a smaller total variance the size factor was 
able to explain marginally more variation than the short-term ' 
liquidity factor. 
The statistics relating to this tree are presented in tables 7.3 and 
7.4. Table 7.3 reveals that this new model only explains 26.36% of 
the total variance, which is substantially less than the previous 
model (42.81%). However, when the effect of the additional variance 
caused by the low return on capital companies is taken into account 
then the new model can be seen to leave less variance unexplained than 
the first model (2,754,877 v's 3,122,566). 
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TABLE 7.3 
THE EARNINGS YIELD AID TREE PATTERN(2) FEATURES 
Split Splitting Variation Total t ComEeting 
GrouE Variable EXElained % of Value Variables 
No. (BSSi) Variance 
EXElained 
1 Drv/NI 622,85.3 16.65 10.02 NONE 
2 DIV/NI 95,634 2.56 3.59 SIZE 
5 TOTAL 95,203 2.54 3.92 QA/CL 
ASSETS 
7 QA/CL 63,257 1.69 3.10 NONE 
3 DIVNI 60,186 1.62 3.98 NONE 
10 MARKET 48,815 1.30 3.41 NONE 
LIQUIDITY 
TOTAL VARIATION 
EXPLAINED ' 985,948 26.36 
-----
TOTAL VARIATION(TSS) = 3,740,825 
As ' expected the dividend payout ratio is the most influencial ratio in 
the tree, accounting for 20.83% of the variance, with si'ze, short-term 
liquidity and market liquidity accounting for a further 2.54, 1.69 and 
1.30% respectively. Table 7.3 also shows that on two ｳｰｾｩｴｳＬ＠ groups 
2 and 5, competition between variables was present. However, this 
competition is not important as in each case the competing variable 
enters the model at a subsequent split. 
The finaf group characteristics shown in table 7.4 are far more 
informative than those presented for the AID tree pattern (1). For 
four of the seven final groups the reason for stopping was because 
they did not contain enough cases to form two new child groups, each 
containing 35 companies. 
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TABLE 7.4 
EARNINGS YIELD AID TREE PATTERN(2) 
FINAL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
Final Earnirgs ｾＮ＠ of trexpl.ainerl Starrlard IEaoon for 
Grotp Yield Conp3nies Variation r.eviatim Split Stowirg 
-!:b. ｾ＠ ('lSSi) 
11 13.24 125 391,813 55.99 ro significant 
explanatory 
variable 
12 13.99 43 99,422 4S.00 txx> few ｣ｾｳ＠
6 15.27 36 84,434 4S.43 .. " .. 
13 17.41 44 257,226 76.46 " " .. 
9 lS.10 102 423,107 64.41 00 significant 
explanatory 
variables 
8 20.80 85 791,520 96.50 " " " 
4 21.75 70 707,353 100.52 too few cases 
This indicates that the possibilities for further variation 
explanation along these branches had been fully exhausted. However, 
the remaining three terminal groups all possessed enough variation and 
cases to warrant further splitting but no significant variable could 
be found in the data base. Again, based on the arguments presented 
above, in the author's opinion this remaining variance is 
unexplainable by this type of analysis. The table also shows that 
the means of the groups have become more evenly split and the standard 
deviations have been slightly reduced. The overall impression being 
a reduction in the unexplained variance and an improved AID model. 
Finally, before we consider the theoretical implications of this 
model, these results need to be compared with those found in the 
previous chapter. The variance explained by the AID of 26.4% is very 
close to the variance explained in the multiple regression analysis of 
26.3%. - Thus we can conclude that although the algorithms of these 
two techniques are different, the underlying analytical power is very 
similar indicating that interactive analytical techniques may have 
little to offer 1n terms of explaining the ｵｮ､･ｾｬｹｩｮｧ＠ variance. 
However, with AID some ｩｮｦｯｲｭ｡ｾｯｮ＠ is lost through the use of 
categorical variables, as opposed to multiple regression's continuous 
variables and therefore suggests that AID has performed slightly 
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better than the linear additive analysis. it remains to be seen 
whether this interactive model can provide a better insight into the 
factors at work within the market's judgement process. 
6. A Descriptive and Theoretical Overview of the AID Model 
From the above statistical review of the AID tree patterns it is 
reasonable to conclude that the AID technique has produced a 
statistically sound model of certain of the factors that influence 
earnings yields, although it should be remembered that the overall 
explanatory power is rather weak. Nevertheless, despite the 
statistical s!gnificance of the splits, it is necessary to establish 
that the relationships proposed are intuitively acceptable. In this 
section, therefore each split in the model is described in detail with 
particular emphasis on any interactive relationships .present and this 
is followed by a discussion of the broad theoretical implications 
suggested by the model. 
6.1 AUeneral Description 
• Conceptually, the AID tree pattern represents a series of alternative 
routes that eventually lead to a theoretical earnings yield, the route 
followed being dependent upon certain financial ratio values. Each 
of these routes in the model will now be examined in turn commencing 
with group 1 and working along each of the three major trunks to the 
terminal ｧｲｯｵｰｾＮ＠
Trunk 1:- The Low Return on Capital Companies 
The first split in the model, as discussed earlier, is the most 
distinctive of the whole tree with group 2 forming an isolated group 
of 44 companies all of which possess a return on capital of less than 
ＶｾＰＥＮ＠ The extent of the isolation of this trunk is shown 
diagramatically in figure 7.6. The model implies that ｣ｯｭｰｾｮｩ･ｳ＠ with 
a return on capital of less than 6.0% (ie. TNI/TNW) are likely to 
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possess very low earnings yields. Under normal circumstances this 
would be interpreted as meaning that investors have a preference for 
this type of share as the price is high relative to the earnings. 
However, the reason for the low yield is that there is a limit as to 
how far a share price will fall in relation to its earnings. There 
comes a point when, despite low earnings, the price stops falling due 
to other factors. Possibly, this point is a certain percentage of 
the net asset · per share value, below which a takeover situation could 
become likely, or perhaps if the latest year's results are only 
temporary curtailed then it may be related to a value based upon 
normal or expected earnings. Whatever the cause for the stop in the 
fall of the share price the earnings yield based upon historic 
earnings for this particular group of companies cannot be interpreted 
in a meaningful way. This point was clearly demonstrated in the 
chapter 5. 
In view of this, and for the statistical reasons stated in the 
previous section, the AID analysis was rerun without this · low return 
on capital group. The results of this second run are shown 
diagramatically in figure 7.7 this tree commencing from group 3 of the 
first tree. 
Trunk 2:- The Low Yielding Companies 
The second AID Tree commences at the new group 1 which can be loosely 
defined as all companies in the sample generating a return on capital 
of more than 6.0% and therefore possessing earnings yields that, a 
priori, allow valid interpretation. By using this new sample it is 
now possible to uncover more of the factors that influence whether or 
not a share has a relatively low or high earnings yield. 
Group 1 contains 505 companies with an overall mean of 17.25% and 
splits to form two distinct groups, groups 3 and 2 with the respective 
mean values of 1ij.29% and 19.ij3%, group 3 marking the start of the low 
yielding trunk and group 2 marking the start of the high yielding 
trunk. This reasonably well balanced split was caused by the 
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dividend payout ratio, DIV/NI, with companies paying more than 23.3% 
of their earnings in dividends forming group 3 and those paying less 
forming group 2. The rationale behind this ｾｰｬｩｴ＠ is that investors 
prefer a high dividend payout ratio for a given level of earnings and 
that in order to secure the extra dividends they are willing to pay a 
higher price. Thus companies with high payout ratios have low 
earnings yields (group 3) and companies with low payout ratios have 
high earnings yields (group ｾＩＮ＠
The low ｹｾ･ｬ､＠ trunk continues with a split on group 3, forming two new 
child groups, groups 10 and 11, which have the respective mean 
earnings yields of 15.71% and ＱＳＮＲｾＥＮ＠ Again the cause of the split 
was the dividend payout ratiO, with all companies having a payout 
ratio above 29.6% forming the low yield group, group 11, and all those 
with payout ratios between 29.65% and 23.3% (split on group 1) forming 
the higher yielding group, group 10. 
Group 11, the lowest yielding group in the tree, is a terminal group 
despite containing enough observations and variance to warrant a 
further split. This implies that companies with large payout ratios 
command low earnings yields (ie. a relatively higher share price 
relative to earnings) and that none of the other financial ratios 
included in the analysis have a strong enough influence globally to 
arfect the share prices of high dividend payout companies. 
Group 10, the group containing companies with payout ratios between 
23.3% and 29.6%, is not a terminal group and the low yield trunk 
continues with a split caused by the market liquidity factor. The 
two new child groups, groups 12 and 13, have distinctly different mean 
values of ＱＷＮｾＱＥ＠ and 13.99% respectively. This split indicates that 
companies which are highly traded (those in group 13) have a lower 
earnings yield than companies that are rarely traded and suggests that 
if a share is highly marketable then it is likely to have a higher 
share price relative to earnings than a rarely traded share. - Thus, 
despite a particular share having a dividend yield between 23.3% and 
29.6% its relative earnings yield relies very heavily on the degree of 
active trading in the market. 
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Both groups 12 and 13 are terminal as they do not possess the minimum 
number of companies required to make further splits, and it is 
therefore reasonable to conclude the this particular branch is "fully 
explained". 
Trunk 3:- The High Yielding Companies 
The lower trunk in figure 7.6 can be broadly described as containing 
all companies with a high earnings yield. This trunk commences ｦｲｾｭ＠
group 1, the total sample, and after the initial dividend payout split 
discussed above continues to group 2. Group 2 contains 294 companies 
with a dividend payout ratio of less than 23.3% and marks the 
beginning of several trunk-twig splits. The first of these is on 
group 2 and forms two child groups, groups 4· and 5, with the 
respective mean earnings yields of 21.75% and 18.68%. Once again the 
factor causing the split was the dividend payout ratio with group 4 
containing 70 companies all having a payout ratio below 11.8% and 
group 5 containg 224 companies all having payout ratios between 11.8% 
and 23.3% (ie. ·split on group 1). The rationale for this split is 
similar to that for all the other splits using the dividend payout 
ratio. 
Group 4 is the first of the twigs in this trunk-twig structure and is 
of the disadvantageous type. The disadvantage being a payout ratio 
of less than 11.8%. It is also the highest yielding group in the 
tree which is obviously a result of having a very low dividend payout 
ratio. However, the standard deviation of the dependent variable in 
this group is considerably higher than for any of the other terminal 
groups, and therefore it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. 
The implication is that there may be other factors which influence the 
share prices of low dividend payout companies but that these factors 
are diverse and consequently not strong enough in their own right to 
be detected by AID. 
The high earnings yield trunk continues with a split on group 5, the 
group containing 224 companies all with payout ratios between 23.3% 
and 11.8%. The cause of the split forming the two new child groups, 
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groups 6 and 7, is the size measure total assets: group 6 containing 
37 large companies (ie. total assets above £109m) and group 7 
containing 187 small companies (ie. total assets less than £ 109m). 
From the diagramatic AID tree shown in figure 7.6 it can be seen that 
there is a marked difference between the group means. 
mean values of groups 6 and 7 were 15.27% and 19.34%. 
The respective 
Companies in group 6, the twig group, possess the advantageous 
characteristic of being large. This suggests that the size of 
company has a considerable impact on relative earnings yields with 
large companies commanding higher share prices relative to earnings 
than small companies. However, it is important not to forget that 
this group has a relatively low payout ratio of between 11.8% and 
23.3%, and therefore it is reasonable to summise that despite a low 
dividend yield a company's share price may still be relatively high if 
it is a large company. 
The next and finai split on this high yielding trunk is on group 7 
which contains 187 small companies, all with a dividend payout ratio 
between 11.8% and 23.3%. The cause of the split is the acid test 
ratio, QA/CL. · All companies possessing a ratio above .82 form group 
9, the larger of the two child groups. This group represents the 
more liquid companies and thus has a lower mean earnings yield of 
18.1% than group 8 with 20.8%. Group 8 is the twig of this 
particular split ·and all 85 companies in this group possess the 
disadvantage of having a low short term liquidity cover. ·· This split 
indicates that investors who invest in companies with a payout ratio 
between 11.8 and 23.3% and with a total asset value of less than £109m 
prefer to invest in companies which have a good short term liquidty 
cover. 
6.2 The Theoretical Implications 
The above discussion has indicated that there are five different 
variables present in the Earnings Yield AID Tree, namely return on 
capital, dividend payout, market liquidity, size and the acid test. 
, -. 
In the discussion that follows we shall review each of these variables 
in turn with the view to forming an overall picture of how these 
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factors 'are combined in the investors decision making process. 
However, it is stressed that this model was only able to explain ＲＶＮｾＥ＠
of the total variance and consequently"the following discussion should 
not be interpreted as definitive. 
1) Return on Capital and the Value of the Firm 
The split controlled by this variable clearly demonstrated the anomaly 
in the earnings yield distribution caused by a very low return on 
capital. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that investors do not 
simply view earnings as the sole determinant for assessing share 
values without due regard for the underlying quality of the earnings. 
The AID model _proposes that the pOint -at which the underlying value of 
the assets becomes more dominant than the earnings themselves is when 
the return on capital is less than 6%. However, a rigid cutoff pOint 
is totally unrealistic and it is probabaly true to say that investors 
have a tendency to rely more on the asset values as earnings decline. 
ｎ･ｶ･ｲｴｨ･ｬｾｳｳＬ＠ we cannot determine a more sophisticated rule from the 
AID analysis presented so far. 
2) Dividend Payout and the Value of the Firm 
If AID tree pattern (2) is- examined it will be seen that dividend 
payout controls the first three splits and as such is the most 
dominant ratio in the Diodel. This symmetry in the structure of the 
tree suggests that the impact of diviQends is consistent throughout 
the data, in that the higher the dividend payout ratio the higher the 
relative earnings yield. In other words, if earnings are held 
constant, the higher the dividend paid the higher the relative share 
price. 
This systematic preference for dividends is the same -as -that found in 
the linear additive analyses presented in the previous chapter. Our 
inferences as to the cause of this preference remain the same, that is 
it is believed that dividends may be preferred by investors because 1) 
they reduce uncertainty and 2) there could be some clientele effect 
possibly accentuated in our data by the dividend restraint policies in 
force at the time. 
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3) Market Liquidity, Size and the Value of the Firm 
Market liquidity and size may be conveniently grouped together as they 
represent the same underlying factor namely market interest. In the 
previous chapter it was seen that both of these variables seemed to 
play an influential role in affecting share prices in much the same 
way as that proposed by the AID model. In general terms this 
indicates that the higher the relative market interest the higher the 
relative share price. Again, our explanation for this type of result 
is the same as proposed in the previous chapter, that is, not 
surprisingly, there would appear to be a systematic preference for 
stocks which are more marketable. 
Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the relationship 
proposed by the AID tree is the marked impact that market interest has 
on share prices. If figure 7.7 is examined it will be seen that the 
split using the size measure of total assets forms two groups with 
very different relative share values. The effect of this phenomenon 
in share price terms is that a large company with a low payout may be 
valued more than 28% higher than a similar small company (see table 
7.5 for calculation). Furthermore, if the split controlled by the 
market liquidity factor is considered there is again a 25% difference 
between the share price of a low and high traded company. 
TABLE 7.5 
The Impact of Size and Market Interest on Share Prices 
Group Controlling Variable Earnings Yield % Share Price % Change in 
ｾＮ＠ Share Price 
6 Size 109m 15.27 65.5 27.9 
7 . Size 109m 19.34 51.2 
12 High Market Liquidity 13.99 71.5 24.6 
13 Low Market Liquidity 17.41 57.4 
• based on earnings of 10p per share ego for group 6 the mean earnings 
yield is 15.27% (see figure 7.5), and therefore the expected share 
price is 65.5p (10p/.1527). 
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The AID tree pattern shown in figure 7.7 clearly demonstrates how 
important this factor of market interest is in determining share 
values in the U.K. Stock Market, at least for the period cove red by 
this study. The impact is so great that high dividend payout 
companies with low market interest (group 13) are valued less than the 
low payout companies with high market interest (group 6). (Note the 
cross-over of the connecting lines between the groups). Agai n, 
unlike Williams(1938), we would argue that market interest is an 
important aspect of share valuation. 
A final point of interest is that marketability only appears to be 
significant in the middle range of dividend payout ratios (i e . greater 
than .118 but less than 0.296). Despite both the extreme groups in 
the tree possessing enough companies to warrant further splits, no 
other variable proved to be statistically ｳｩｧｮｩｦｩ｣｡ｮｴｾ＠ This 
therefore provides us with a slight refinement to our original model 
in that it would appear that companies' with either very high or low 
dividend payout ratios are either set at a very high premium or at a 
large discount and that marketability is not so important. A 
possible reason for this may be that at the extremes the dividend 
policy adopted determines the market interest factor, ie the clientele 
effect, although a thorough examination of these two groups of 
companies revealed no tendency toward high or low market trading. 
Thus our refined conclusion is limited to suggesting that market 
\ 
'interest is of prime importance for an average payout type of company 
but that at the extremes it would appear to be far less significant; 
This behaviour is consistent with the hypothesis thatthe investor's 
decision making process could suffer from an anchoring and adjustment 
bias (see ｗｲｩｧｨｾ Ｇ ＱＹＸＰ＠ when it comes to assessing outliers. It is 
stressed however that this suggestion is only tentative as this type 
of behaviour needs to be tested further before any stronger 
conclusions can be made. 
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3) Short-Term Liquidity 
This final variable, often referred to as the 'acid test' is the least 
significant in the whole tree and therefore any conclusions drawn must 
be considered tentative. As pointed out above the relationship 
proposed is that if a company has a good short term liquidity position 
then it .. is valued more than a company with a bad short term position. 
Unfortunately, the model only permits us to argue this point when we 
are considering companies with dividend payout ratios between .118 and 
.233 and with total assets of less than £109m. · It is plausible that 
if the sample size had been larger, then this type of relationship may 
have been found elsewhere in the tree. 
This preference for greater short-term liquidity is understandable and 
supports traditional ratio analysis theories which advocate that a 
company' is healthier the greater its ability to cover its short-term 
liabilities with short-term assets. What is perhaps more surprising 
is that this variable entered the model prior to the more traditional 
risk measures such as financial gearing and beta. The inference is 
that investors see more. use in short-term liquidity ratios than in 
other risk ratios. Obviously this argument is counter-intuitive for 
it is perhaps unrealistic to expect investors to react in such a way 
as to contradict traditional theories on and the practice of 
fundamental analysis. Possibly one explanation for the impact of 
this short-term liquidity ratio is that it may be a surrogate measure 
for "over-trading" which often is used to describe a company that is 
trying to expand sales rapidly witnout the necessary finance and 
consequently causes short-term liquidity problems. It may be 
reasonable to suggest that investors place a great amount· of emphasis 
on over-trading, which is difficult to define in terms of one ratio, 
and therefore this measure of short-term liquidity could possibly be 
the best substitute in the data base. However, as we have no 
evidence to support this line of argument it is difficult to be more 
definite about the reason for the influence of this variable, in 
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preference to other risk variables, in the tree and therefore this 
conclusion is very tentative. 
Finally, in this section on the theoretical implications of earnings 
yield AID models it is important to relate these results to the five 
hypotheses proposed in chapter IV. The first hypothesis which 
postulates that earnings are the primarily determinant of share prices 
has been sub.sumed by analysing the earnings yield as the dependent 
variable. However, the AID model has added a further dimension to 
this hypothesis in that although earnings are important they should 
not be viewed in isolation of the size of the asset backing per share. 
When a company generates a low return on capital, earnings no longer 
remain the prime determinant of the share price. The second 
hypothesis relating to dividends has been ratified in that the AID 
model clearly provides some empirical evidence to support the theory 
that dividends have a positive influence on relative share values 
although we stress that these results are restricted to one time 
period when dividend restraint policies were in force. 
The third hypothesis concerning the impact of financial risk as 
measured by the debt/equity ratio on share prices has not been 
rejected in that no measure of gearing entered into the model. 
However, the absence of a relationship from a model cannot be taken as 
evidence to SUbstantiate a hypothesis and therefore we are unable to 
be conclusive about the validity of the hypothesis. 
The remaining two hypotheses concerning default risk and systematic 
risk have not been ratified by our model as neither z-score nor beta 
was seen to be influential in determining share values. Again we 
stress our results do not in anyway provide evidence to reject the se 
hypotheses. 
7. THE VALUATION RATIO ANALYSIS 
The valuation ratio measures the relationship between the book value 
of equity assets and the stock market valuation of those assets. The 
higher the ratio value the less the markets' regard for the assets and 
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vice versa. In the previous chapter the results of the multiple 
regression and disciminant analyses showed that the following factors 
had an influence in determining relative valuation ratios: 
(1) Return on Equity 
(2) Dividend Payout 
(3) Profit Growth 
(4) Market Liquidity 
(5) Gearing 
In this section the results using the AID technique will be presented. 
Firstly the statistical aspects of the model will be discussed and 
this will be followed by an examination of the theoretical 
implications of each split. 
7.1 The Statistical Interpretation 
The Valuation Ratio AID Tree Pattern is presented in figure 7.8. It 
shows how the analysis progressed Trom Group 1, the total sample, to 
each of the ten terminal groups, together with all the relevant 
statistics for each group. This tree has a distinct trunk-branch 
structure depicted by the symmetry of the splits and signifies that 
the model is able to consistently analyse the data into well-balanced 
child groups indicating a reasonably homogeneous sample. 
The statistics relating to each of the splits are shown in table 7.6. 
It can be seen that the variable explaining a majority of the variance 
(39.7ij%) and responsible for three of the nine splits is TNI/TNW, a 
return on capital measure. The next most important variable is the 
dividend payout ratio, DIV/NI, which again accounts for three of the 
nine splits but only 10.57% of the variance. The other variables in 
the model viz QA/CL, a short term liquidity measure, total assets, a 
measure of size, and market liquidity, explain 2.10%, ·'.02% and '.02% 
215 
. ｾＮＮ＠ -. -..... 
N 
.-
0'\ 
2 
TNI/TNW<0.169 
N = 269 
x = 1. 604 
TSS=1,810,194 
S.D.= 82.03 
6 RETURN 7 
THE VALUATION RATIO 
A. I. D. TREE 
1 
Total Sample 
N = 547 
x V.R.=1.252 
TSS=5,371,729 
S.D. = 99.10 
RETURN ON 
CAPITAL 
4 
NI/TNW<0.118 ON CAPITAL TNI/TNW>0.118 NI/TNW<0.248 
= 178 = 131 N = 138 
x V.R.=1.861 x = 1.396 
TSS = 813,397 TSS =739,795 
S.D. = 78.80 SD = 73.22 
17 
Total Assets 
< £13.7 
N = 43 
x V.R.=1.914 
TSS =233,997 
SIZE 
14 
DIV/NI(O.232 
N = 69 
X V. R. =1. 666 
TSS =377,408 
SD = 73.96 
16 
Total Assets 
>- £13.7 
N = 51 
x V.R.=1.522 
TSS =176,534 
15 
DIV/NI>0.232 
N = 69 
x V.R.=1.165 
TSS =183,179 
SO = 51. 52 
V. R. = 1.120 
SS = 961,329 
D = 73.49 
21 
Low Mkt.Liq 
N = 52 
x V.R.= 1.10 
TSS =214,762 
SD = 64.27 
Figure -7 . 8 
Explains 50.1% of the Variance 
3 
TNI/TNW>0.169 
N = 278 
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x V.R.=0.929 x V.R.=0.668 
TSS = 315,496 TSS =394,876 
SD = 82.82 SD = 85.51 
20 
Liq 
of the variance respectively. The total model explained 50.4% of the 
variance in the valuation ratio. 
TABLE 7.6 
THE VALUATION RATIO AID TREE PATTERN FEATURES 
Split Splitting Variation % of t ComEetins 
ｾ＠ Variable EXElained Total Value Variables 
No. (BSSi) Variation 
'--
1 TNIITNW 1,409,968 26.25 13.93 NONE 
3 TNI/TNW 366,966 6.83 7.53 NONE 
2 TNIITNW 257,000 4.78 6.65 DIV/NI 
4 DIV/NI 140,266 2.61 5.48 NONE 
5 QA/CL 112,899 2.10 3.95 NONE 
7 DIV/NI 179,208 3.34 
, 
6.59 NONE 
6 DIV/NI 131,817 2.45 4.99 NONE 
15 TOTAL 54,349 *1.02 3.49 BETA 
ASSETS 
9 MARKET 54,967 *1.02 4.08 PROFIT 
LIQUIDITY GROWTH AND 
DAYS DEBTORS 
TOTAL VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 2,707,440 50.40 
TOTAL VARIATION(TSS) = 5,371,729 
* indicates split not significant at the 95% level. 
The t-values shown on table 7.6 for the first 7 splits are all 
statistically significant indicating that · the resultant ' child groups 
are significantly different from each other. However, the last two 
splits namely the splits caused by the total assets and market 
liquidity variables, are only just not statistically significant on 
the split reducibility criterion. Nevertheless, they have been 
included in the model for the following reasons: 
(i) they are acceptable from both an economic and behavioural point 
of view 
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(ii) they split two potentially terminal groups which both contain 
high amounts of unexplained variance 
(iii) the four child groups formed are all terminal due to possessing 
too few cases to allow further splitting and therefore these branchee 
can be said to be fully explained given the sample size 
Table 7.6 also shows that there were other variables competing for 
control for three of the nine splits. The first sign of competition 
was found in the split of group 2 where the dividend payout ratio was 
competing with the return on capital ratio for control of the split. 
However, this competition was not considered to be important ｡ｾ＠ the 
losing variable, the dividend payout ratio, was able to contribute to 
the model by controlling both of the splits on group 2's child groups • 
• The other competing variables, 'namely beta on group- 15 and profit 
growth and days debtors on group 9, were all competing on the 
insignificant splits referred to above and therefore were not 
considered further. 
In Table 7.7 the final group characteristics for each of the ten 
terminal groups are presented. It can be seen that for all the 
groups except for group 8, the reason for the splits stopping was that 
they did not contain sufficient cases to form two new child groups. 
As a result the AID technique has been able to classify all the 
observations in these branches into the smallest possible, terminal 
groups and thus has "fully analysed" the sample. However, it must be 
stressed that each of these groups contains enough variance to warrant 
further splitting and it was only the sample size that restricted the 
tree length. 
The remaining group, group 8, contains 83 companies and possesses 
enough variation to warrant a split but could not be split further as 
,there were no statistically significant variables in the data base. 
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TABLE 7.7 
YALUATION RATIO AID TREE PATTERN 
FINAL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
Final Valuation N:>. of lhexplairro Starrlard IEason for 
GrOlp Fatiq canpmies Variation Deviation Split stofPin3 
lb. M?an ('ISS i) 
10 0.668 54 315,496 82.82 too few cases 
20 0.870 43 92,685 46.43 too few cases 
11 0.766 46 394,876 85.51 too few ｣ｾｳ＠
21 1.100 52 2l4,762 64.27 too few cases 
15 1.165 69 183,179 51.52 too few cases 
8 1.292 83 458,648 74.34 ro sigiuficant 
explaratory 
variable 
14 1.666 69 377 ,408 73.96 too few cases 
16 1.522 51 176,534 58.83 too few ｣ｾｳ＠
17 1.914 43 233,997 73.77 too few cases 
12 2.375 37 2l6,698 76.53 too few cases 
One further observation from table 7.7 is that unlike the earnings 
yield A1D tree the differences between the group means and standard 
deviations are not large. The means of each of the groups have been 
drawn diagramatically in figure 7.9 where it can be seen that the 
terminal groups are evenly spread along the valuation ratio scale. 
From the above it is reasonable to conclude that the AID tree 
represents a statistically valid set of relationships between 
accounting information and relative share values as measured by the 
. . 
valuation ratio. Despite possessing the two slightly insignificant 
splits the overall model explains 50.4% of the variance. 
Nevertheless, it is not enough for the model to be statistically 
Significant, it must also be intuitively meaningful and acceptable 
from a theoretical point of view. 
B.A Descriptive and Theoretical Overview of the Valuation Ratio Model 
A prerequisite of any model derived from statistical analysis is that 
all of the cause and effect relationships uncovered must be 
219 
VALUATION RATIO A.I. D. TREE Pi\TTERN Figure Ｗｾ＠
SHm'HNG DIFFERENCES I N GROUP MEAN S 
0.60 ] [ 0 . 60 
O . SO S .T.LIQUIDITY High O. SO 
QA/CL( O. 766 Trading 
10 20 
1.00 j ｾ ａｐｉｔａｌ＠ l 1.00 Low 
rading 
0 SDIV/NI>0.2 32 
21 ｾ＠
H 1. 20 1. 20 ｾ＠ 1 ｾ＠8 
t5 H 
H 1. 40 1. 40 8 § Tota l Asset. ｾ＠ｾ＠ ｾＳ Ｎ Ｗｭ＠OIVINI < 0.232 16 H 1. 60 'fNI!TNW ON 1. 60 0 
<0.169 
-.............. 
ｾ ＭＩＭＭＭＮＮＮＮ ＾Ｎｊ ＮｬＮＧＭＧｲＺＮＮ＠
1.SO ..J LJ.L.V/l.'II-L ｾａｳｳ･ｴｳ＠ L 1. SO 
'> 0 . 232 < £13 . 7m 
7 
2.00 ] t 2 . 00 
2.20 2 . 20 
DIVIN I 
l2.40 N 
2.40 J 
ｾ＠ 0 . 232 
N 
0 13 
theoretically cogent. In order to verify that the valuation ratio 
AID model possesses this quality it is necessary to examine each spl i t 
in terms of a priori economic logic. In this s ection, therefore , we 
begin with a general description of the splits in the tree commencing 
with the first split in tree (group i in figure 7.9) and then continue 
with a review of both the two major trunks formed from th i s first 
split. Following this, the theoretical implications of the tree will 
be discussed in detail. 
8.1 The General Description 
Split 1: The Start of the Tree 
The first split in the tree, shown in figure 7.9, takes place on the 
total sample group, group 1, and creates two well balanced child 
groups, groups 2 and 3, containing 269 and 278 companies respectively. 
The variable upon which the split is based is the return on capital 
ratio, TNI/TNW, with group 3 containing all companies with a return 
greater than 16.9% and group 2 containing all companies with less . 
Group 3, the high return group, possesses a lower mean valuation ratio 
than group 2 (0.98 and 1.604 respectively). The relationship that 
the AID technique has revealed, not surprisingly, is that a higher 
return on capital is associated with a ｬｯｾ＠ valuation ratio and vice 
versa. This very simple and logical relationship is also found at 
two subsequent splits in the tree and in total explains 38% of the 
total valuation ratio variance . 
Trunk 1: The High Valued Companie s 
Trunk 1, the upper half of the AID tree shown in figure 7.9 can be 
broadly described as containing the companies whose assets are valued 
highly by the market and thus have low valuation ratios. 
This trunk commences at group 1 and progresses to group 3 which 
contains all companies with a return on capital greater than 16.9%. 
At group 3 the trunk splits forming two child groups, groups 4 and 5, 
each containing 178 and 100 companies respectively. The cause of the 
split once again is the return on ｣｡ｾｩｴ｡ｬ＠ ratio with companies 
221 
generating returns greater than 24.8% forming group 5 and those 
generating less forming group 4. As expected group 5, the high 
return group, possesses the lower mean valuation ratio. 
The upper branch of this trunk continues with group 5, the high return 
group being split by the short-term liquidity measure, QA/CL, creating 
two terminal child groups namely groups 10 and 11. Group 11, the 
group with greater short-term liquidity cover (above 0.766) has the 
lowest mean valuation ratio (0.67) in the whole tree and can be 
described as containing the highest valued companies. The conclusion 
to be drawn from this set of relationships is that given a choice 
between two companies, both producing high returns (greater than 
24.8%) investors prefer companies with greater short-term liquidity 
cover than companies with less. 
This result, although theoretically acceptable, is unexpected as it 
does not follow the pattern found in the other branches of the tree 
where the dividend payout ratio is the controlling variable. 
However, it can be seen from table 7.6 that there were no other 
competing variables for this split and therefore this appears to 
suggest that short term liquidity cover was exerting a stronger 
influence in the share price fixing mechanism in the sample of 
companies and for the ｴｩｭ･ｾｦｲ ｡ ｭ･＠ considered than the dividend payout 
ratio when the companies under consideration were generating very high 
returns. This inter action between return on capital, liquidity, 
dividend payout and share values is discussed at length later. 
Having considered the upper branch of trunk 1 it is necessary to 
analyse the lower branch which starts at group 4, a group conta ining 
178 companies all generating a return on capital between 16.9% and 
24.8%. This group is split into two well balanced child groups, 
groups 8 and 9, based upon the dividend payout ratio. Group 8 
containtng 83 companies, all with a dividend payout ratio of less than 
18.8% and group 9 containing 95 companies all with payout ratios above 
18.8%. This split is very similar to those found in the earnings 
yield AID tree where companies possessing high payout ratios command 
higher relative share prices. Group 9, the high payout group, 
possessed a lower mean valuation ratio than group 8. The underlying 
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logic of the tree so far would appear to be that investors use 
earnings to determine a relative share price range and ｴｨｾｮ＠ adjust 
accordingly depending on the level of dividend payout. 
The tree continues with group 9, the high payout group, being split by 
the market liquidity measure. The two new groups formed are groups 
20 and 21, with group 20, the highly traded 'group possessing a mean 
valuation ratio of .87 and group 21, the rarely traded group, a mean 
of 1.10. Again a similar relationship was seen in the earnings yield 
AID tree where the more a share was traded the higher its relative 
share value. It is stressed, however, that this split is not 
statistically significant and therefore cannot be interpreted in quite 
the same light as the previous splits. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note ' that group 20 has a lower mean value than group 
10, the group with a return on capital greater than 24.8% and short 
term liquidity cover of less than 0.766. Again this suggests that 
the underlying relationships which determine relative share prices are 
dependent upon a combination of many different factors which 
simplistic share price models are unlikely to be able to account for. 
Trunk 2: The Low Valued Companies 
Trunk 2, the lower of the two main trunks shown in the tree in figure 
7.9 contains the companies with relatively lowly valued assets. As 
discussed earlier this trunk commences from group 1 and progresses to 
group 2, a group that contains 269 companies all with a return on 
capital of less than 16.9%. 
The trunk continues with group 2 being split into two well balanced 
child groups, groups 6 and 7, each containing 131 and 138 companies 
respectively. The variable controlling the split is again the ratio 
TNI/TNW, with group 6 forming the higher return on capital group (ie. 
"-
between 11.8% and 16.9%) and group 7 forming the lower return group 
(ie. ｾＱＱＮＸＥＩＮ＠ The underlying logic of this split is the same as that 
for groups 1 and 3. 
The next split to be considered is on group 7, the ｧｲｾｵｰ＠ generating a 
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return between 11.8% and 16.9%. At this split two new terminal child 
groups are formed based upon the dividend payout ratio. These new 
groups ｡ｲｾ＠ group 15, a group containing all companies with a payout 
ratio above 23.2%, and group 14, a group containing all those with 
less. Again the underlying logic of this split is the same as the 
previous split on group 4, the higher the dividend payout the higher 
the relative share price. It is interesting to note that the 
valuation ratio mean of group 15 (1.165) is less than the mean of 
group 8 (1.292) causing the two branches to cross (see figure 7.9). 
This suggests that although the earning power of the assets is the 
primary factor that determines share prices, a high payout ratio, and 
thus a high dividend, can sway the balance to such an extent that a 
.company ｧ･ｮ･ｾ｡ｴｩｮｧ＠ a low return on average could have a relatively 
higher share price than a high return company with a low dividend 
payout. 
The final branch on trunk 2 to be reviewed is the one commencing from 
group 6. Group 6, the group containing companies with a very low 
return on capital, is split into two child groups, groups 12 and 13, 
based again upon the dividend payout ratio. Of those companies in 
group 6, group 12 contains those companies with a payout ratio greater 
than 23.2% and group 13 contains those below 23.2%. The rationale 
behind this split ｩｾ＠ the same as for all the other splits using the 
dividend payout ratio ie. the higher the payout ratio the lower the 
valuation ratio and thus the higher the relative share price. 
This trunk is concluded with a split on group 12 caused by a size 
measure, total assets. Companies with total assets worth more than 
t13.7m form group 16 and those worth less make up group 17. This 
split would suggest that large companies are relatively more highly 
valued than small companies which again is a relationship seen in the 
earnings yield AID analysis. 
8.2 The Theoretical Implications of the Valuation Model 
The above description of the valuation ratio AID model reveals an AID 
tree pattern somewhat more complex than that of the earnings yield 
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model, possessing nine as opposed to six major splits. Furthermore, 
despite both models containing the same number of variables, namely 
return on capital, dividend payout, short-term liquidity, market 
liquidity and size, the valuation ratio model was able to explain 
nearly twice as much variance as the earnings yield model. ' Although 
this additional explanatory power was to be expected given the results 
of the previous chapter, it would appear at first sight that this 
model does potentially provide a more complete picture of the 
investor's decision making process. In the discussion that follows 
each of the main characteristics in the tree will be examined in turn, 
the most significant first. 
Return on Capital and the Value of the Firm 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the valuation ratio AID model 
is that the value placed on a company's assets by the market is 
primarily determined by the earning power of those assets. This 
result is exactly the same as that found in the multiple regression 
analysis with the underlying rationale being that investors are 
primarily interested in earnings per se. However, the multiple 
regression model revealed a slightly more complex relationship between 
return on capital and the 'valuation ratio. It was shown' in figure 
6.2 that the relationship was nonlinear and that when the return on 
capital was low, the rate at which the earnings were discounted into 
the share price started to decrease. It remains to be seen whether 
this relationship is present within the valuation ratio AID model and 
whether we can be more precise as to the exact form the relationship 
takes. 
In order to examine this issue more closely the Valuation Ratio AID 
tree as presented in figure 7.9 has been redrawn in terms of share 
prices based on a net -asset -backing of 100p per share (see figure 
7.10). This has been achieved by converting each of the mean 
valuation ratios for each group into an equivalent share price. (One 
of the benefits of using AID is that the algorithm is based on finding 
groups that have statistically different means and consequently this 
allows us to examine the relative positions of each group using the 
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group means). For example, the mean valuation ratio for group 1 in 
figure 7.9 is 1.252 and was converted to a share price of 79.9p as 
folows:-
Net Assets 
Valuation Ratio = = 1.252 
Share Price 
assuming the net assets of 100p then: share price = 100/1.252 = 79.9p 
In addition to this conversion to a scale based on share prices, it is 
also possible to convert some of the explanatory variables i nto the 
same scale and thus provide an easier set of relationships to explain. 
For example, consider group 5 of the orig i nal AID tree which has a 
mean valuation ratio of 0.779 and a mean return on net worth of 31.0%. 
If we assume an asset backing of 100p it is possible to determine the 
earnings per share necessary to create that share valuat ion as 
follows:-
TNI Earnings Per Share 
= = 31% 
TNW Net Assets Per Share 
if we assume Net Assets per Share = 100p then Earnings Per Share = 
31.0p 
Thus, by computing the mean return on net worth for each of the groups 
resulting from a split on the return on capital va riabl e , it is 
possible to relate changes in earnings per share for a company with a 
net asset ·backing of 100p per share to changes in share prices. By 
examining figure 7.10 it can be seen that if the company had earnings 
per share of only 5.8p then its share price is likely to be 54p, 
whereas if the earnings per share are 31p then the equivalent share 
price is 128p. 
227 
In order to examine the relationship between earnings and share pr ices 
in more detail we shall conc entrate on the four f ocal points in the 
revised tree marked A to D. These four points mark the end of the 
influence of the return on capital variable and t herefore i nd ica tA a 
major shift in emphasis by investors from earnings to other variables. 
TABLE 7.8 
The Relationship between the Earnings Yield and Return on Capital 
Point EPS Share Price Earnings Yield % Return on Capital % 
A 31 128 24.2 31 
B 20 89 22.5 20 
c 15 72 20.8 15 
D 5.8 54 10.7 5.8 
By using the figures at points A to D in figure 7.10 it is possible to 
compare the rate at which earnings are discounted into share prices 
(ie. the earnings yie ld) with the rate of return on capital Ｈ ｾ ･･＠ table 
7.8). Figure 7.11 shows a graph of these four points where it can be 
seen that the rela tionship is far from linear. Between points A, B 
and C the discount r ate is reasonably constant although there is a 
slight upward slope . This slight incline indicates that although ｾｨ･＠
share price of a company generating a high return on capital will be 
greater than a less profitable company, the relationship between 
earnings per share and share price does not remain constant. In 
other words the marginal benefit of additional earnings per share 
reduces as the return on capital generating those returns increases. 
A plausible explanation of this phenomenon is that investors may 
perceive there to be greater downside risk attached to earnings that 
are generated via a relatively high return on capital and vice versa. 
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At the other end of the gr'aph, at point D-, the rate at which earnings 
are discounted is very low in comparison. It would appear at first 
that companies generating a low return on capital are highly valued . 
However, it will be recalled from our discussions on the earnings 
yield model that low return on capital companies have meaningless 
earnings yields and therefore it is reasonable to suggest that at this 
point the low discount rate is a function of the high asset backing 
preventing the share price from collapsing completely. In the 
example given in figure 7.10 the share price of a company with 
earnings of 5.8p on lOOp worth of assets is 54p. That is the assets 
stand at the large discount of 46%. It is worth noting that very 
often press comment refers to asset-backing when discussing low return 
on capital/failing companies. 
In summary the above analysis has revealed that there appears to be a 
distinct relationship between that rate at which investor's discount 
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earnings and the underlying rate of return on capital that generated 
those earnings. This relationship takes the form whereby the cost of 
equity (eg. the discount rate on earnings) increases dramatically as 
the rate of return on capital increases from a very low level up until 
approxima t.ely 10 to 12%. The cause of this dramatic rise may be due 
to a transfer of interest by investors from a heavy reliance upon 
asset -backing to earnings per see At around point C the slope of the 
line becomes less steep and the rise in the cost of equity which is 
associated with a rise in return on capital is less dramatic. It 
could be argued that at point C the line would be expected to be at 
least horizontal which would infer an average cost of equity was used 
for all companies with respectable returns or perhaps the line may 
have a slight downward slope due to investors valuing the earnings of 
high return companies more than low return companies. However, the 
slight upward slope infers that once the underlying rate of return 
reaches an acceptable level investors are prepared to place more 
weight on the earnings of the slightly less than average return on 
, 
capital companies and vice versa. A plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that investors perceive there to be a tendency for rates 
of return to regress towards the mean. If this is true then it could 
be argued that the high return on capital companies are considered 
more of a risk due to higher downside risk and that the low return on 
capital companies are considered to be less of a risk due to the 
possibilities of i mproving the rate of return on capital. 
To some extent this theory is supported by Whittington(1971) who 
investigated the behaviour of profitability of U.K. companies from 
1948 to 1960. Although Whittington does argue that past performance 
1s the best pred1tor of future performance, his results revealed that 
when profitability was different from the average, it tended to return 
to the average over time ie. "below-average profitability tends to be 
cured, and above-average profitability tends to disappear." The 
author makes the following conclusion: 
"The tendency is always for above-average past performance 
to be associated with future profitability which is above 
average, but not so far above average as was past profitability." 
Thus, although Whittington's conclusions are based on a time period up 
to seventeen years prior to this ｳｴｵ､ｹｾ＠ it would appear that there may 
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be some empirical evidence to support this attitude of investors 
towards differing rates of return on capital. However, it is 
stressed that this explanation is only .tentative and requires further 
empirical work. 
If the established theories are considered (see Van Horne, 1977 or 
Weston and Brigham, 1979 for a discussion of these) then it will be 
found that changes in the cost of equity are theorised to be 
associated with changes in risk, normally measured by financial 
gearing. However, to the author's knowledge, there is no extant work 
which actually refers to the level of return on capital influencing 
relative share valuations. It is 'of course possible that the 
analysis has picked up a surrogate measure of risk which is hidden in 
the return on capital variable and therefore our interpretation is 
misleading. Nevertheless, this does seem unlikely and therefore our 
overriding conclusion from this section is that more empirical 
analysis is required into the inter-temporal stability of this 
relationship and the underlying factors that cause changes in 
profitability. 
The Dividend Payout Ratio 
The dividend payout ratio is the second most important variable in the 
Valuation Ratio AID Tree and proposes the relationship certeris 
paribus that the higher the dividend payout, the higher the relative 
share price. This relationship between dividends and share prices 
has been found in our previous analyses and is explained in terms of 
the reduction in uncertainty and the clientele effect. Once again 
the empirical evidence would not lend any support for the traditional 
Modigliani and Miller(1961) theory on the irrelevance of dividends. 
As this type of influence by dividends on share prices was found in 
the linear additive analyses, we have to ask whether the AID analysis 
has been able to contribute anything new to our understanding of the 
value of dividends to the investor. The answer to this question lies 
in a more detailed analysis of the valuation ratio AID tree pattern, 
but even at first sight it would appear that the dividend payout ratio 
is secondary to earnings in determining share prices and also that it 
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may not have a consistent influence throughout the AID tree (note the 
split on group 5). 
If figure 7.9 is again referred to, it will be seen that the dividend 
payout ratio controls three of the four secondary splits. It is 
interesting to observe that when the return on capital is greater than 
24.8% the dividend payout ratio becomes unimportant which at first 
glance seems illogical. Nevertheless this "imperfect interaction" 
between return on capital, dividend payout, short-term liquidity and 
share values can easily be explained. 
Dividends have so far been viewed as a means of reducing uncertainty 
and for providing the investor with the opportunity for controlling 
the reinvestment of his income. However, it is reasonable to expect 
that under certain circumstances this normative theory does not hold 
true and that other factors come into play. In this model it would 
appear that when a company's return on capital is very high, then and 
only then, do investors no longer have a strong desire for dividends. 
The most obvious reason for this is that if a high return can be 
maintained on all funds invested then it is in the investor's interest 
to allow the firm to reinvest his dividends and to achieve a high 
return in the future. A counter argument to this theory is that this 
action by investors may not reduce the uncertainty involved in equity 
investment as there is always a chance of the high return not · being 
maintained. However, it should be remembered that the cost of equity 
\ 
of this high return on capital group of companies is more than for the 
other groups (see our discussion above) and therefore as the earnings 
of these companies are valued at a lower rate than companies with 
lower rates of return on capital, there is to some extent 
already a built in hedge against uncertainty in the form of the 
possibility of a drop in earnings. Furthermore, we are not arguing 
that these companies do not pay dividends, we are simply suggesting 
that there is not a strong systematic preference by investors for 
dividends when the return on capital is exceptionally high. (It is 
interesting to note that in the valuation ratio discriminant · analysis 
model the dividend payout ratio was not found to be significant in 
discriminating between high and low value companies. The reason for 
this is made very clear by the AID tree.) 
232 
If we now look elsewhere for some corroboration of these resUlts it 
will be found that there are very few studies that address this issue 
specifically. Renwick(1969) proposes a normative theory that 
dividends are related to investment opportunities. He argues that 
there are two extreme stable states, one where the future growth in 
earnings is low and the dividend payout is high and the second where 
the future growth rate in earnings is high and the dividend payout is 
low. The theory underlying each ,of these states is that the dividend 
policy adopted reflects the opportunity cost of the retained income. 
If we asssume that high rates of return are good predictors of future 
rates of return, and there is some evidence by Whittington(1971) to 
'partly support this view, then we can easily adopt Renwick's model 
expressed in terms of expected utility of retained funds and dividend 
policy. With this slight change to Renwick's model our results can 
be seen to fit within an existing normative theoretical framework of 
investor preferences. Amore detailed discussion on the relevance of 
dividends to investors is given by Walter(1967) and Lintner(1962) but 
they contribute little additional ｵｮ､･ｲｳｴ｡ｮｩｮｾＮ＠
In addition to the above imperfect interaction the AID tree also 
reveals a further interesting set of relationships between the 
dividend payout ratio, return on capital and the valuation ratio. A 
brief examination of' the AID tree pattern leads one to the simple 
conclusion that the higher the payout ratio for a given level of 
return on capital, excluding the high return companies, the higher the 
relative share price. However, with AID we can ask whether the 
influence of the dividend payout ratio ｩｾ＠ constant or whether at 
different levels of return on capital its influence varies. 
In order to make our examination of this pOint easier to understand we 
refer back to the valuation ratio AID tree which is expressed in penoe 
per share (figure 7.10). In this tree the effect of the dividend 
controlled splits on groups B, C and D has been drawn, together with 
the mean dividend per share for each of the resultant -child groups. 
These dividends per share have been oomputed as follows. When group 
B was split it was found that the two child groups had mean dividend 
payout ratios of .255 and .141. These payout ratios were then 
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converted into dividends per share by using the mean earnings per 
share of the parent group thus: 
dividends 
Example: Dividend payout ratio = = .255 
earnings 
therefore if earnings = 20p then Dividend per share in pence = .255 x 
20p = 5.1p. 
This at first may seem a crude type of adjustment but it should be 
remembered that the AID technique has established that the group means 
are statistically different and therefore this type of analysis can be 
defended although working with group centroids alone ignores the 
distribution of observations in each group. 
Having established a set of relationships between earnings; share 
prices and dividends per share it 1s possible to examine how much 
influence a change in dividends has upon the share price given a 
certain level of earnings. In table 7.9 for each of the points A' to 
D in figure 7.10 the impact of a change in share price in pence, for 
the given change in dividends per share is shown. 
TABLE 7.9 
Computation of the Incremental Dividend Yield 
...... 
, 
Point Seconda£! Factor Difference in ,Difference in Inore- , Return , on 
I , mental % Share Price Dividends Capital 
,-- -- ._ .. . _-- . Yield 
I 42 31 A Acid. Test 
B Dividend per Share- I 211 2.30 9.58 20 
C Dividend per Share ! -26 2.25 8.65 15 
D Dividend per Share 17 3.55 20.88 5.8 
For example if we consider the two terminal groups stemming from point 
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c, it can be seen that the share price of the lower group is 60p and 
the dividend is ｾＮＵＵｰＬ＠ whereas the upper group has a share price of 
86p and a dividend of 4.8p. Thus it may be argued that given two 
companies with the same earnings per share (15p) then a difference of 
2.25p in dividend is associated with a 26p difference in share price. 
In other words a 1p difference in dividend may cause a 11.55p 
difference in share price, or in percentage terms investors discount 
the additional dividends at a rate of 8.65% (ie. 1p/11.55p). This 
discount is shown in table 7.9 as the "incremental yield", and 
represents the value placed on dividends at each of the four focal 
points. The lower this yield, ceteris paribus, the more i nfluential 
90es a change in dividend have on share prices. Obviously the 
reverse in also true, the higher the incremental yield, the less 
influence a change in dividends appears to have on the share price. 
In the above table, point A is shown to have an incremental yield of 
infinity which is due to the dividend payout ratio not influencing 
share values when the return on capital is on average 31%. This 
value of infinity is probably unrealistic but our discussion above on 
this split suggests that dividends are of little importance to 
investors at this point and therefore we must conclude that a change 
in dividend policy when the return on capital is high may at best have 
only . a marginal impact on sQare prices. 
The four pOints A "to D have been drawn on a graph (figure 7.12) which 
compares how the incremental dividend yield changes with different 
levels of return on capital. The "inverted U" shape reveals that the 
impact of dividends on share prices changes dramatically with the 
level of the return on capital. At' point D where the return on 
capital is very low the incremental yield is high, which infers that a 
relatively large change in the dividend payout ratio has only a small 
impact on share prices. A plausible explanation for this is that 
investors perceive these companies to be unhealthy due to ,the very low 
return on capital and therefore any increase in dividends may be 
viewed as a drain on cash resources which could possibly have a 
further weakening affect. Given this type of situation, investors 
would probably prefer to see an increase in earnings per share rather 
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than in dividends. It is stressed, however, that a change In 
dividends does have some influence and therefore investors do not 
disregard dividends completely. 
FIGURE 1.'2 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INFLUENCE OF DIVIDENDS ON 
Incremental 
Yield 
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At the second two points on the graph, Band C, the incremental yield 
has fallen to around 9% which suggests that the influence of dividends 
is quite high at this cost of capital range. A tp change in dividend 
is likely to produce an ttp change in share price. This possibly 
infers that investors place dividends at a premium when examining 
companies that have "normal earning. " capaci ty. 
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The final point on the graph to be examined is point A. As we have 
already discussed above this point is not controlled by t he dividend 
payout ratio but by the short-term liquidity measure and ther efore the 
implication is that investors no longer have a strong ｰｲ･ｦ･ｲ･ｮ ｾ･＠ for 
dividends when the return on capital is high. ｏｵｾ＠ interpretation of 
this relationship is that the incremental dividend y,ield for this 
group is infinity. Obviously in reality this is probably not the 
case but given the underlying logic of the tree it would be reasonable 
to assume that the incremental yield on high return on capital 
companies is very high, although it is not quant i fiable from the tree, 
and therefore the inverted U shape of the graph is realistic. The 
most logical explanation for this phenomenon is that investors no 
longer remain interested in dividends when the potential return on 
capital is high simply because of the opportunity cost attached to the 
distribution of profits. In other words when the potential returns 
on reinvested funds are greater than the opportunities for investment 
of the after tax income elsewhere, rational investors would prefer to 
have their funds reinvested. 
The implications of the graph presented in figure 7.12 may be 
summarised as follows:-
1) when return on capital is low the impact of a change in dividend 
policy is also low 
2) when the return on capital is about average the impact of 
dividends is at its peak 
3) when the return on capital is high investors appear to be 
indifferent towards dividends 
The underlying theory for this set of relationships may be explained 
in terms of the inherent risk involved with low return on capital 
companies, the desire to reduce uncertainty when investing in the 
average company and finally the opportunity cost of reinvestment of 
dividends. Unfortunately there are no effipirical studies to the 
author's knowledge that have uncovered a similar detailed relationship 
and consequently, we can only appeal to the general theories of 
dividend utility propounded by Lintner(1962), Walter(1967) and 
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Renwick(1969) referred to above to explain or justify our findings. 
In conclusion, then, our results would appear to suggest that 
dividends may be important in determining share values and that the 
extent of their influence is dependent upon the underlying rate of 
return on capital. However, it should be noted that -this study 
covers a period when a government policy of dividend restraint was in 
force and therefore our results may reflect a temporary accentuated 
preference for dividends. Obviously, further work is required to 
establish the inter-temporal stability of the relationship and until 
this additional evidence is forthcoming these results must be 
considered tentative although very interesting. 
Short-Term Liquidity 
Short-term liquidity controls only one split in the valuation ratio 
AID tree, that is on the group containing the very high return on 
capital companies. It can be seen from figure 7.10 that the greater 
the short-term liquidity cover the higher the relative share price. 
In other words investors prefer companies to be liquid in the 
short-term ie. have more quick assets relative to current assets. 
Whilst we can explain the underlying rationale of the split, it is 
difficult to understand why it should appear in the tree at this 
point. If the acid test ratio were measuring financial risk then we 
would expect the more traditional, and probably more commonly used, 
debt/equity ratio to be more influential, consequently a more suitable 
explanation needs to be found. Earlier in this chapter a similar 
type of relationship was uncovered in the earnings yield AID tree and 
it was argued then that this ratio is possibly a surrogate measure 
for ｯｶ･ｲｴｲ｡､ｩｮｧｾ＠ This line of reasoning would still apply here. 
However, as there is no other evidence to support this hypothesis we 
have to be very careful in drawing any strong conclusions from these 
results. 
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Market Interest 
The remaining two splits to be considered in the valuation ratio AID 
tree are controlled by the market liquidity and size variables. The 
influence of these variables has already been discussed at length in 
the earnings yield analyses, where it was argued that they are both 
measuring the same underlying factor namely market interest. Quite 
simply the relationship proposed by the model is that the greater the 
market interest the higher the relative share value . Although these 
splits are only just statistically insigni ficant, they are i ntuitively 
valid and seem to provide some additional ins i ght into the factors 
that influence share values. 
Finally, in this section on the theoretical implications of the 
valuation ratio AID tree pattern it is essential to relate these 
results to our five hypotheses proposed in chapter IV. The first 
-hypothesis concerning the importance of earnings is clearly in 
agreement with these results. The dominance of the return on capital 
measure in the tree and the high amount of variance explained provides 
empirical evidence in support of this first hypothesis. In addition, 
however, our results indicate that the relationship between earnings 
and share prices is far more complex than it would at first appear. 
The second hypothesis which states that dividends are also important 
in determining share values but are secondary to earnings is also 
supported. The dividend payout ratio was found to be the next most 
important variable to earnings in explaining the variance of the 
valuation ratio. Nevertheless, the relationship is not simple with 
interaction between the payout ratio and return on capital influencing 
the way in which share prices react to changes in dividend policy. 
As far as the influence of financial risk on share prices is 
concerned, the third hypothesis, our results have not picked up any 
systematic relationship between gearing and share values. Whilst 
this does not provide support for the hypothesis, it is not possible 
to be more definite as the absence of a variable from a model cannot 
be taken as confirmatory evidence. 
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Both the remaining ｾｹｰｯｴｨ･ｳ･ｳ＠ a re again not supported, but as we have 
stated before the absence of z-score or beta from the models is not 
sufficient to reject the hypotheses. 
9 . Summary and Conclusions 
The reason for using the AID technique for building a share valuation 
model was that the methodology has the ability to explore and reveal 
con figural relationships present in a data base . Consequently, it 
was believed that a more comprehensive picture of how the market 
processes accounting information might be revealed . However, as the 
technique had not been used in this way before, it remained to be seen 
whether these potential benefits would actually materialise. 
The powerful analytical ability of the AID technique was immediately 
apparent in the earnings yield analysis where it was able to isolate 
those companies that possessed meaningless earnings yields due to 
generating a very low return on capital. Subsequent analysis 
excluding this type of company revealed that the dividend payout 
ratio, market interest and short-term liquidity were all influential 
factors in determining a share's relative value. These results 
broadly agreed with the results from the traditional linear additive 
analyses presented in the previous chapter. Unfortunately the AID 
technique was unable to improve on the low amount of variance 
explained (only 26%) and therefore further detailed interpretation 
the tree was severely restricted. The general conclusion reached 
this stage of the analysis was that AID was unable to offer any 
substantial benefits over and above the linear additive techniques 
terms of explanatory power, but that it was capable of providing a 
more informed picture of the way in which the variables interacted 
with one another. 
of 
at 
in 
The set of AID analyses performed on the valuation ratio proved to be 
far more informative. Whilst the variance explained was marginally 
less than in the linear additive analyses, the valuation ratio AID 
model was able to reveal a far more complex and helpful picture of the 
ｾｲｫ･ｴＧｳ＠ judgement process. The increased complexity of this model 
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when analysed in detail revealed some very interesting interactions 
between variables and sha r e values. For example it was found that 
both earnings and dividend s had a distinct influence on share prices 
and that the extent of t his i nfluence could be related to the 
underlying rate of return on capital. Obviously more empirical work 
is required in this area t o add substance to thes e findings, but at 
least an initial foundation has been laid for further research. The 
other variables found to be important in this model were short-term 
liquidity and market liquidity, both of which r eflect acceptable 
rational behaviour by investors. 
In conclusion we have to ask what bearing do these results have on the 
overall objectives of this thesis which were outlined in chapter I. 
Firstly, it is apparent that there appears to be a strong relationship 
between accounting information and share prices. Despit e the rare 
use of the valuation ratio in practice, our results suggest that over 
50% of the variation in this measure of relative share valuation can 
be explained in terms of accounting numbers. If one accepts that 
there is a large degree of "noise" in the share ma rket which cannot be 
analysed by any statistical model and only financial measures were 
present as variables, the explanatory power of the mod el 1s perfectly 
acceptable. 
Furthermore, if we accept that there is a strong relationship between 
share prices and accounting information we automatically assume that 
accounting information is of value to the investor. By adopting the 
\ 
methodology of building models that paramorphically represent the 
judgement deciSion, it is implied that any causal r elations hip between 
the input and the output of the "black box" 1s a direct result of 
human analysis. Thus it may be suggested that the i mportant 
accounting numbers are those that constitute the key ratios in the 
share valuation models. If we accepi the valuation ratio AID tree 
model as the most useful model developed so far, then it could be 
argued that all the investor requires is an abridged balance sheet, 
profit and loss account and some insight into market interest. 
In chapter III when the characteristics of the human information 
system were discussed at length, it was suggested that due to the 
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a 
inherent complexity of the investor's decision making process the 
number of variables likely to be influential would be few. 
Furthermore, it was also argued that policies of data expansion could 
be harmful without recognition of user needs. The paramorphic 
representation of the market presented in this chapter would support 
these claims. 
The second objective of this thesis is to assess the configural nature 
of the market as a whole. It was argued that as the investor's 
decision making process is likely to be complex wi. th variables . 
interacting with each other, we could expect any model to possess 
similar characteristics. Lintner(1962) in concluding his paper on 
the theory of share valuation emphasizes this point as follows:-
"We have found that in general theoretical models, 
non-linearities, complex interactions, and inequalities leading 
to marked preferences abound. It remains a question of fact 
whether models which ignore important facts • • • and which 
substitute linear for non-linear functions and straight-jacket 
variable and interacting parts into constant sums, can encompass 
. 
practical reality to an acceptable approximation." 
The results from the valuation ratio AID analyses do, however, clearly 
demonstrate the advantage from analysing the data using a technique 
that was capable of exploring and disclosing this complex nature of 
the market's judgement process. These analyses revealed that 
although the number of input cues that we could identify from our 
database may be small, there is a very complex set of interactions 
between them. Thus we would conclude from the results presented in 
this chapter and for the period covered by our analyses that the 
investor's decision making process is complicated and possesses the 
inherent configural characteristics of the way humans generally 
process information. 
The third and last objective of this thesis is to assess the validity 
of traditional share valuation theories in the U.K. stock market. In 
broad terms the major theoretical issues under examination fall into 
three categories. 
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The first essential issue is whether equity values, ceteris paribus, 
are influenced by earnings or dividends. One group of authors wh om 
we shall call the "pure earnings" theorists, assert that div i dends a re 
irrelevant to investors and that share values are depend ent upon 
earnings alone. This group of authors includes Durand(1952), 
Kuh(1960) and perhaps most notably Modigliani and Miller(1961 ) . 
Opposing the pure earnings theory is another group of notable authors 
namely, Walter(1956), Renwick(1969), Gordon(1959) and Williams(1938) 
whom we shall call the "pure dividend" theorists. This second group, 
which Durand also joined in two later papers (Durand, 1957; 1959), 
view dividends as being the sale determinant of share values and that 
earnings are irrelevant. As the detail of these opposing theories 
has been presented in chapter IV, it is not necessary to restate them 
here. It is sufficient to simply restate our general conclusion that 
neither theory's appears to be totally correct in its own right. 
The results from the AID analyses clearly demonstrated that reality 
seems to encompass both theories with both earnings and dividends 
influencing share values. However, the ｾ｡ｹ＠ in which these varia bles 
interact with each other was found to be very complicated and 
therefore there would appear to be scope for restructuring these 
extreme theories to take into account a more realistic model of share 
valuation. Obviously the results of this study alone are not 
sufficient to establish any new theory, but at least by indicating 
certain possible avenues for fruitful research we have laid a 
foundation for future development. In conclusion we would argue that 
neither the pure earnings nor the pure dividend theories are correct 
and that a practica l investment theory lies inbetween these extreme 
vi ews. 
The second theoretical issue of importance is that concerning the 
impact of fundamental risk. Once again there are two opposing 
theories. One theory is based on the Net Operating Income (NOI) 
model as advocated by Modigliani and Miller(1958) and proposes that 
the total value of a company is independent of the financial gearing. 
It is argued that as the rate of gearing increases, so does the cost 
of equity to compensate for the additional risk incurred. The 
OPPOSing theory". <;tdvocated by Durand( 1959) and Solomon( 1955) is that 
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financial gearing is i mpor tant and that providing t he cost of equity 
is less than the cost of debt it is possible to inc r ease the value of 
a company by replacing equity with debt. Once agai n we do not i nt end 
to resta te the detail of t hese theories as t hey were di scussed at 
l ength in Chapter IV. The results from our analyses would at f i r s t 
sight appear to be in favour of the net i ncome valuation mode l i n t hat 
the key explanatory var iable i n the mod el is based on profit afte r 
i n te rest figure. It is conceiveable that had th e NOI model been a 
more appropriate model of r eality then the key explanatory va r iable 
would have been based on ea rn i ngs before i nterest and tax . However, 
this i nterpretation of our results i n f avour of one t heory or the 
other presupposes that ce rtai n assumptions about our analyses and t he 
measuremen t of fundamental risk by the debt/equity ratio a r e valid. 
For instance it assumes that i nve s tors do not vi ew this rati o as 
having a significant influenc e on sha r e values and t hat there is a 
meaningful difference in th e two prof i t measures . Because , t hese 
assumptions are difficul t to accept without any supporting empirical 
evidence and the importance placed upon the debt/equ ity ratjo i n t he 
finance texts we believe that this issue is worthy of further analysis 
and is examined in the following chapter. 
Finally, the remaini ng two finance issues that are consider ed 
important concern the rol e of default risk and systematic risk i n the 
market. Whilst we have found that neithe r z-scor e nor beta appear to 
be influential in the model s developed above, established theory would 
argue that both types of r isk are of prime i mportance in assessing 
\ 
relative share values. Thus there would ｡ ｰｰ ･ｾ ｲ＠ to be a weakness in 
the link between theory and pract i ce of i nvestment, or at least 
between theory and the results of this study . With the aim of trying 
to reconcile theory and practice, we discuss at length the rol e of 
risk in the market in the following chapter . 
In conclusion, the above AID analyses have provided an informative and 
interesting picture of the investor' s decision maki ng process. In 
general terms it has been shown that earn i ngs , dividends, market 
interest and short-term liquidity have an i nflue nce on sha r e values . 
Moreover, these results have provided a new i nsJght i nto the 
interaction between accounting variables and share values and forms a 
foundation for further research in thi s a r ea . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
The Util ity of Risk to the Investor 
1. Introduction 
It is argued in traditiona l finance theory that "rational" investors 
are risk adverse and consequently the assessment of ri s k is an 
essential part of the investment decision maki ng process. As this 
argument is of fundamental importance to investment analysis, it would 
seem, a priori, that risk in on e form or another should be present i n 
any relative share valuation mod el . It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that no risk variable has entered any of the model s 
presented so far in this thesis. An i nference t hat may be ma de from 
this result is that risk per se is unimpor tant to i nvestor s . 
However, this suggestion is clea rly prematu re as the issue of risk ｨ ｾ ｳ＠
not, as yet; been examined in sufficient detail. 
In this chapter, therefore, we address the role of risk in the 
investor's decision maki nR process more closely and consider the 
plausible reason for its absence from our share valuation mod Is. 
We begin by defining what is meant by i nvestment r isk and by exami ni ng 
our methodology to see whether it was app r opriate for capturing t he 
impact of risk on share values. Following this we critically 
appraise the utility of three different types of risk measures to the 
investors namely beta, the debt-equity ratio and z-scor e . 
2. Investment Risk 
The risk incurred by investors in the equity market 1s dete rmined by 
the variability of the values in their por tfolios . Klemkosky and 
Petty(1973) argue that the determinants of this variability can be 
categorized into three parts namely the market factor, t he industry 
factor and the firm specific factor. Evidence from King(1966) and 
Blume(1971) indicates that the market and i ndustry factors account for 
about 30% and 12% respectively of the total variance i n share prices 
in the US and that "well over 50% of the va riance is attributable to 
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factors unique to the firm". At f irst it would appear that analys ts 
should concentrate their efforts on analysing this thi r d f actor r athe r 
than the first two. Portfolio theory however sugges ts thi s would be 
wrong as diversification can reduce the impact of firm specific r isk 
in a portfolio to an insignificant level (Foster, 1978: 242). 
Essentially the benefits of diversification stem from assuming the 
returns from each security are independent of the r etu rns from other 
securities and the causes of variability are random. Thus ｡ｾ＠
portfolio size increases, variability in the portfolio's return 
decreases. Based upon this premise portfol io theory a r gues that the 
variability caused by market factors is the only aspect of risk which 
needs assessment. In other words, within the framework of mod ern 
finance, investment risk is unidemensional. 
In contrast, however, we have seen from our r eview of th e literature 
in chapter IV that certain share valuation theories show investment 
risk to be depicted by several f i rm-d etermined measures such as 
financial leverage, size and the probabili ty of bankruptcy as measured 
by ,a z-score. There would therefore appear to be two se perate views 
on risk and asset pricing. Gooding(1978), (d iscussed below in more 
detail) for example argues that although there are s ome "connecting 
links" between these two views i n that firm pecific factors may be 
directly related to the firm's beta, it would appear that i nvestment 
risk is a multidimensional concept. 
In the next two sections we shall consider these aspects in more 
detail but before hand it is necessary to establish whether our 
methodology was appropriate for testing the impact of risk on the 
investor's decision making process. Ri sk is defined as being a 
function of future share price variability, the higher the variability 
the higher the risk. If we assume investors behave in a rational way 
then, ceteris paribus, we would expect risk to be an important 
parameter in the investor's decision making process . Consequently 
high risk stocks would be expected to have lower r elative share 
values. 
A simple extension of this basic theory on investor ｰｲ ･ ｦ･ｲ･ｮ｣ ｾ＠ is to 
include the models of the investment decision making process provided 
246 
by this thesis. If we accept r isk as i mportant to t he i nvestor t hen 
we must ask "how does he i ncorpor ate it withi n hi s app r aisal sys t em?" 
Our results suggest that earn i ngs , di vi dends and market i nte r est ar e 
the three primary factor s for de t e rm i ning r ela t i ve share values . I n 
other words we have es t abl ished a set of cr i t er ia against wh ich 
relat ive share va lues can be derived. Havi ng established t his basic 
reiationship, i t i s r eas onable to expec t t he next stage i n t he 
analyses to be an adju s tment to sha r e values to allow fo r r isk and 
therefore, a priori, a ri sk va r iable wou l d be expec t ed to ente r t he 
model. 
Contrary to th i s expecta tion, our r esults r evealed t hat r isk was 
unable to contribute to explaini ng any of t he va r ia nce i n r el ative 
share values. Thi s sugges t s tha t either our methodology was 
incorrect and that our mod el of th e i nves t or is incorrectly s peci f ied 
in some way or tha t r isk pe r se is not a signi f ica nt dete rmi nant of 
share values. Bearing i n mi nd t he t heore t ical i mpo r"tance of r isk t o 
investors and the vast amoun t of emp i r ical r esea r ch conducted i nto its 
utility, admittedly a maj or ity of it stemmi ng fr om the U. S.A., t he 
first alternative seems t he more probable . Howe ver. the r igour of 
the analyses and the ample oppor t unity given to the nu mer ous r isk 
variables to be included i n anyone of the six model s prov i des a basis 
for strong counter arguments . I n the f i r s t plAce although it is 
conceivable that risk ha s al r eady been accoun ted f or i n on e of three 
\ 
primary explanatory f ac t ors , th is in i t self i nfe r s an association 
between the variabil i t y of r e turn s and one of t hese factors , a nd 
whilst this line of argument is plausible , it te nd s to s uggest that 
investors use ill defined and vague mea s ures for as s ｾｾｩ ｮ ｧ＠ r isk. 
Secondly, it may be suggested t hat our data base di d not i nclude a n 
appropriate surrogate measure of inves tment r isk . I n de f ence of t his 
thesis this suggest i on appear s to be unfound ed , as . th e ､｡ｴｾ ｨ ｡ｳ･＠
included all risk meas ures thought to be impor ta nt afte r conduc ting a 
thorough review of the extant literature . Fi nal l y, it Ｑｾ＠ r asible 
that the statistical t echniques employed wer e unable t o r eveal t he 
influence of risk due to t he i nab i lity of the algor ithms to analyse 
the data in the appropriate manner. Again th is line of ｡ｲｾｵ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ＠ is 
weak as it is unlikely that the relat i onsh i p betwee n r isk and sha r e 
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value is too complex to be revealed by one of the three analytical 
techniques employed. 
In view of the above arguments it is suggested that the more 
acceptable reason for risk not entering a model is that risk per se 
was not a significant determinant of share values for our data sample 
and at the time of analyses. This suggestion however needs to be 
carefully examined due to the implications for both the theory and 
practice of finance and investor behaviour. In order to simplify 
this discussion the two main sources of risk, namely systematic and 
specific, shall be considered separately. 
3. Systematic Risk 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to establish the utility 
of accounting information to the investor. In view of this it would 
appear that the inclusion of systematic risk as measured by beta, is 
unwarranted as it is unconnected with accounting information and 
therefore does not fit neatly within this objective. However, beta 
possesses two attributes that make it very important to this type of 
study. In the first place it is a variable that is theoretically 
perceived as being very important to every fund manager who wishes to 
optimise his risk/return profile and its ommision would therefore 
severely undermine any of our resultant models. Secondly, it is a 
risk measure that can be drived objectively from historic share price 
data. 
The absence of systematic risk from our models needs to be reviewed 
from two aspects. The first concerns whether investors view ｢･ｴｾ＠ as 
a useful measure in the U.K. stock market and secondly, whether the 
beta measure used in this thesis is specified incorrectly. It is 
stressed that the discussion that follows only examines the 
theoretical reasons for the insignificance of beta and does not 
provide any further empirical evidence to support these theories. 
Furthermore, this discussion is based on the premise that as 
systematic risk, as measured ｾｹ＠ beta, had no impact in our share 
valuation models, it is therefore unimportant to investors in the U.K. 
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questioned. 
However, as stated above, thi s premise may be 
3.1 The Perceived Utility of Beta to U.K. Investors 
The perceived utility of beta to U.K. investors might appear to be 
called into question by our results. Do U.K. investors peceive the 
variability of returns as measured by beta important and if not, do 
they accept the theory that efficient diversification r ed uces specific 
risk to an insignificant level? A crude but interesting way of 
assessing the utility of betas to investors is to examine the demand 
for "beta services" by the investment community. ' Beta ervice 
organisations are not as successful in the U.K. as they are i n the 
U.S.A. and whilst this type of organisation is r elatively new in the 
U.K. they are in general not very successful, which may be attributed 
to the lack of demand (see LBS(1979». Plausible r easons for this 
lack of demand may be as follows: 
1) the inability of pension fund managers to see a pract ical use for 
a beta based investment strategy. 
2) the average investor in the U.K. perceives specific ri sk as the 
main cause for variation in his portfolio. 
3) there is a strong belief that the market is ineffici nt and that 
it is possible to beat the market with good fundamental analysis . 
Acceptance of the underlying theory for using beta is essential for 
beta to be a significant variable in determining share values . 
the London Business School's Risk Management Service Handbook this 
aspect is covered in depth and suggests that fund managers s hould only 
be concerned with forecasting trends in sectors and in the market as a 
whole, and then changing their portfolio beta in line with these 
forecasts. Ostensibly, beta based portfolio management accepts 
efficient market theory in the semi-strong form and argues that 
fundamental analysis is to a large extent a waste of energy and time. 
Although the underlying theory for these arguments in favour of beta 
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based portfolio management is sound, it does ass ume stock ｭ ｾ ｲｫ ･ｴ＠
efficiency which to some fund managers i s difficult to acce pt . 
Consequently there i s an apparent paradox between mod e rn por t f ol io 
theory and believed inefficiences 1n the marke t; th e l a tt er view 
being the basis for the former. 
The second possible reason for the lack of inter est in beta is tha t 
speoific risk i8 peroeived to be more important tha n r isk. 
The cause of this phenomenon could be th eore tically acce ptAbl 
very large proportion of trading was conducted by ｩｮｶ ･ｳｴｯ ｲ ｾ＠ wi th 
poorly diversified portfolios. Bierman(1974) uses th e Ncw York 1965 
census of share owners which revealed the average inves t or owns t hree 
of four different stocks to support thi s line of argument. lI ow ver, 
the use of this theory to explain the in s i gnificance of b t a 1n th e 
U.K. stock market is weak because the smal l i nvestor accou ntA for only 
a small percentage of the total equity i nves tment. Th e maj r i t y of 
trading is conducted by City Institutions who in theory ｾ ｨ ｯｵ ｬ､＠ ｭ ｡ ｮｾ ｧ･＠
efficient portfolios. (See Ward and Saund e r (1977) for f ur t he r 
discussion on this issue.) 
Finally, the traditional training of fund manag r s and i nvr);1\.mp n 
analysts has always concentrated on spec i f i c r i k due to Lhr lnh pr nt 
belief that it is possible to find good long t erm i nv ｾｴ ｭ Ｂｮ＠ , with 
thorough fundamental research. The end r esult of th is hehavi ou r i 
in theory an "efficient market" where i' t i argued tha t ｾ ｨ ＺＺＱ ｲ ｰ＠ pr ices 
reflect all available informa tion and therefore at t empt , t ( I mpr '1Vf' 
port 'f olio performance by more fundamenta l r es ea rch will not he 
rewarded (Treynor,1976). Despite th e s trong t heoret ical 
justification for an efficient market to pe r sis t, i f ｩ ｮｶ ･ｾｴ Ｌ ｯ ｲ ｳ＠ do not 
accept the implications in practice the i r effort s will, ti ll be 
orientated towards the assessment of specific r isk r a th r r t hnn 
systematic risk. Consequently the as s ump tion that mnrkr 
efficiency will cause beta based investment s trategies to bp op t i mAl, 
may not be justified as this presuppos es t h t share prices r r lec t 
systematic risk rather than specific ri s k. Whi l st Wp expr ｾｾ＠ caution 
in expressing this line of thought, it could be a r guerl that i nvestor 
behaviour may not be consistent with CAPM theory, which to ｾ＠ limited 
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supplied by th e London ｮｕ ＬＢ ｪ ｩ ｮ ｣Ｚ Ｎ ｾ ＬＧ Ｓ＠ School a l d comp lt t c d LIS ; ng mont.h) y 
shar'c prices taken from th e Lhn!e Y(;' ''. t' perjod flnom 19711 Lo 1977. 1\ c· .. 
t.he London TIu s .i nes:' Scboo l Il rtf:' becn ｮ ｾ Ｚ Ｓ ｰｯｮ ＺＺｌ ｴ｢｝＠ C' f o r a v £l :-:L rna jo['.l l·. y or 
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Institutions wi Lh a beta ｢ Ｘｳｾ ｲｬ＠ Ri s k ｈ ｾ ｮ｡ｾ ｮ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ＠ ｾｾ＠ 'V iC8 , it l Q 
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the U. K. stock llla l'k e t. Con ::,;eqllen tJ Y J • r "" ilrc to (H r; c r C'ci5 t ou r beta 
value::; it is nec Gssar' y to conccnt l'Cl tc 0 11 the conceptual ｩｾ＠ U " S 1';:J ther 
than the complicated computRLional pro hlnms ""hieh t o ｾ＠ Ja r ge extent 
have been ｯｶ･ｲＨｾｭ ｣＠ by the London ｮｵ ｳ ｩｮ･ ｳ ｾ＠ School . 
The first major fl aw with our bet.a" i s ｌｨ ｾ ｴ＠ t hcy arc comput ed from ｾ＠
time period prlor to the time period cove l' d by t h is tllesis and 
therefore they can be describ d as hisLoric betas . Th e probl em ＢＢｾｴｨ＠
using hlstodc b8 ta .<] j s tha t this PI' C.')UPPOSCS thnt be tos are stable 
and that they have predicti v e ability . Purthcrmorc wc also assume 
that investors' future estimates of beLa are bas ed on his toric betas 
""hich may not b0 true In prar. Uce . Rco::,cnberr; and Guy( 1976) comment 
on this pl"oblem when ､ｩｳｃｬｬ ＬＬｾｪ＠ IlC "funr ... ｲｵＧＺＡ ｮＧ ｾ ｡ ｊ＠ betas " as [01101-;s: 
"The ｰｲｯ｢ｬｾ ｾ ｭ＠ of choosing amont; aj. t. c rn.:ttivc c3tirr.ators of the 
average value in the pa rt ｄｲｯｶ ｬ､｣ｾ＠ a good vehicle for introduci ng 
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the concepts of bias, variance and mean square error as employed 
in the context of estimation problems." 
In other words an ex post estimation of beta based on regress ing 
historic share returns and market returns can only be used as an ex 
ante estimation if certain assumptions hold true. The most important 
of these assumptions is that differences between the average past beta 
and the future beta have an expected value of zero. However, as 
Rosenberg and Guy argue: 
"if any information currently available to implement a decision 
rule contains implications about the difference between the 
future beta and historical average, the expected value of the 
change in beta, conditional upon that information, will be 
non-zero, and the prediction will.be biased." 
In order to overcome this deficiency in using ｨｩｳｴｯｾｩ｣＠ betas to 
forecast future betas, Rose?berg and Guy advocate the use of 
"fundamental betas" which are betas computed from the latest financial 
characteristics of the firm. Other work in this area has been 
conducted by Rosenberg and McKibben(1973), Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes(1970), Castagna and Matolcsy(1978), Gonedes(1973) and 
Eskew(1979), all of whom found that betas could be predicted more 
accurately using models based on accounting data. However, the 
significance of the difference between historic and fundamental betas 
is only marginal and, therefore, although we may question the accuracy 
of historic betas, it is unlikely that the extent of the difference 
would prevent beta from being a significant ･ｸｰｾ｡ｮ｡ｴｯｲｹ＠ variable. 
Furthermore, one of the few U.K. studies, that by Marsh(1980) has 
revealed fairly strong stability in the London Business School betas 
which therefore throws further doubt on the argument invalidating 
historic betas. Other studies on U.S.A. data such as Fabozzi and 
Francis(1978), ｾｯ･ｮｦ･ｬ､ｴ［＠ Griepentrog and Pflaum(1978) and Blume(1978) 
question fUrther the utility of forecast betas for determining 
portfolio risk. Finally, Bowman(1979) in a paper that examines the 
theoretical relationship between systematic risk and accounting 
variables concludes that there is no theoretical basis for systematic 
risk being a function of earnings variability, growth, size Or 
dividend policy and suggests that the results of some of the studies 
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referred to above only indicate that the varia ble being t es t ed i s a 
surrogate for another variable ego accounting beta. 
be proved. 
Th i s r emains t o 
A further factor that gives rise for concern is the element of bias 
introduced into the application of the CAPM in the U.K. Stock Market, 
by the large number of stocks which are thinly traded. The effect of 
this large body of thinly traded stocks must be to dilute the impact 
of active trading on the F.T.500 All Share Index. In other words the 
stocks which have no or only rare erratic share price movements due to 
lack of market interest are bound to restrict the overall movement · of 
an index based on these as well as actively traded stocks. If this 
logic is applied to the computation of betas using this index, it 
would be found that thinly traded shares would have low betas, which 
is a result of static prices, and highly traded stocks would have hi gh 
betas purely because they are the shares that move the index. 
Dimson(1979) in a paper that ｰｲｯｰｯｳｾｳ＠ a method to overcome this bia s 
of thin trading comments 
"Consequently positive serial correlation is induced into returns 
which are calculated from the index and the estimated variance of 
returns on the index is biased downwards." 
Roll(1981) in a paper that attempts to evaluate Dimson's method 
concludes that "Trading infrequency seems to be a powerful cause of 
bias in risk assessments • • • Rather herrendous bias is introduced in 
daily data and the bias is still large and s ignificant with r e turn s 
measured over in tervals as long as a month." The net result is to 
cast doubt on val i dity of beta s for thinly traded shares and 
consequently questions whether there is any purpose in attempting to 
produce a beta service to cover all quoted stocks rather than 
concentrating on a subset · of more tradeable stocks. 
If we look for corroboration of this theory in our study we find that 
beta is correlated with market liquidty and size (.27 and .37 
respectively) and with no other variables. Thus it would seem tha t 
large companies have more market risk and vice versa . However, thi s 
does not appear to be theoretically cogent. Castagna and 
Matolcsy(1978) argue that there is 
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"an expected inverse relationship between size and systematic 
risk as large firms are more diversified and therefore there is 
likely to be less variability in the factors that cause volatile 
share prices." 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the greater the inc i dence and 
frequency of trading the greater is the stock's price volatility and, 
consequently the greater its relative risk. However, this argument 
is only valid when comparing stocks that can be traded in without 
erratic share price movements, that is large companies. There is 
little point in using a sophisticated risk measure for a stock whose 
share price is very erratic when trading occurs but has a low beta due 
simply to thin trading. In conclusion this area of conjecture would 
seem to be one where research is required to clarify the utility of 
beta in the U.K. stock market. 
Finally, there is a line of thought that questions the validity of 
. beta because it is believed that the use of one parameter in the CAPM 
is an over-simplification of the real world. Roll and Ross(1980) 
present this view in a paper that advocates the use of Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT) which is a theory based upon similar assumptions 
as the CAPM for the pricing of assets. Essentially the main 
difference between these two lines of thought is that APT is based 
upon a multi-factor model, that is it tries to decompose beta into its 
constituent parts. Roll and Ross draw an analogy between APT and the 
work of Rosenburg and Guy referred to above, but point out that 
Rosenburg and Guy did not ascertain the separate influences of these 
multiple factors on individual stock expected returns. As a result, 
although this is not the place to examine these arguments in more 
depth, it would appear reasonable that the one paramter model may be 
suspect and requires further testing at least in the UK. 
Further evidence in this area is presented in a paper by Gooding(1978) 
who questions the assumption that investment risk is unidimensional 
and synonymous with price variability as measured by the beta 
coefficient. Gooding used a rather unconventional methodology for 
the finance area by conducting a questionnaire type of study which 
required fund managers to· assess the risk of eleven stocks. His 
multi-dimensional scaling analysis revealed that risk appeared to be 
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three-dimensional: company risk as measured by the perceived 
debt/equity ratio and the ｵｮｰｾ･､ｩ｣ｴ｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹ＠ of earnings per share, 
variation in share price as measured by perceived downside risk, and 
market sensitivity as measured by beta. Whilst his study is 
restricted by the number of respondents and the inherent 'bias caused 
by the questionnaire these results suggest that the CAPM in its pure 
form may not be a true model of reality. 
Finally, a study by Aharony, Jones and Swary(1980) investigated the 
systematic risk characteristics of non-bankrupt and bankrupt 
companies. They found that over time systematic risk was not a 
.useful indicator of firm deterioration. Furthermore, they suggest 
that the important component of risk that distinguishes between the 
two groups is unsystematic risk. Thus this evidence does not support 
the traditional theory that systematic risk is the only risk that 
needs assessment and therefore further questions the use of the CAPM 
in its pure form. 
To summarize, then, this discussion on the problems associated ｾｩｴｨ＠
measuring systematic risk, it does appear that there are some 
behavioural and theoretical arguments which cast doubt on whether beta 
as utilised by this study is an appropriate surrogate measure for 
share price variability. Firstly, we can question the use of 
historic betas when expected future betas are clearly in the minds of 
investors. Secondly, there are the inherent problems in the 
computation of beta in a market with a large number of infrequently 
traded shares and finally there is a question mark over the 
appropriateness of a one parameter risk model. In view of these 
serious misgivings we can justify our result that beta was not found 
to have a significant role to play in the investor's decision making 
process as modelled in our analyses. This area obviously requires 
more research. 
4. Specific Risk 
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that investment risk is 
a function of market factors and firm specific factors, and through 
diversification, it is argued, this second factor can be reduced to 
zero. As ' a direct result we ｷｯｾｬ､＠ assume that market risk is the 
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only relevant risk worthy of assessment by any fund manager. 
However, we have seen that the problems associated with this belief 
are both diverse and numerous, and therefore it is necessary to 
examine the particular issue of the relationship between specific risk 
and the investor. 
Specific risk is determined by those factors specific to the firm . 
rather than by those factors influencing the economy or the particular 
industry in which the firm is ·operating. In broad terms firm 
specific risk encompasses two distinct types of risk. The first type 
concerns the variability in earnings caused by high financial gearing 
and the second is the risk of insolvency. Although both types of 
risk are important to the fund manager, their impact on portfolio 
returns is likely to be quite different. In view of this we shall 
examine them separately under the headings of financial gearing and 
default risk. 
4.1 Financial Gearing 
The impact of financial gearing has been very small on the analyses 
conducted in this thesis. It was seen in the valuation ratio 
regression model that gearing was a significant variable but on 
subsequent analysis it was found that it could not be interpreted in 
an intuitively meaningful way. The only other risk variable of 
significance to enter the model was short term liquidity which entered 
both the earnings yield and valuation ratio AID models. On both 
-occasions the inference was that a good short term liquidity position 
is associated with a high relative share value. Our analysis of this 
phenomenon revealed that this ratio may possibly be a surrogate 
measure for overtrading and not financial risk per see It is 
stressed, however, that due to the low amount of variance explained by 
this ratio, it is important not to read too much into the 
relationship. Perhaps what is more important is that the traditional 
gearing measures employed by this study were found to have no 
significant influence in the investors decision making process. 
In chapter IV when the influence of gearing was discussed at length, 
we constructed a hypothesis which stated that financial gearing does 
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not adversely affect share values unless there is a strong chance of 
bankruptcy, which is broadly in line with the net income model of 
investor behaviour and follows Renwick's(1969) normative theory of 
investor preferences. The absence of gearing from our models could 
be interpreted as lending support to this hypothesis, but such a 
conclusion is quite wrong and unjustified as the absence of contrary 
evidence neither ratifies nor allows the rejection of the original 
hypothesis. Consequently, so far in this thesis, we have been unable 
to clarify the important issue of whe-ther gearing influences share 
values or not. 
One reason ｦｯｾ＠ the results obtained is that it is conceivable that the 
impact of gearing on share values has been obscured in our analyses 
due to the dominance of a return on capital ratio with a profit before 
tax numerator. It could be argued that as this number is stated 
after the interest charge, the impact of gearing has already to some 
extent been taken into account. There is -therefore a case for forcing 
a return on capital ratio based upon earnings before interest and tax 
into the model to see if gearing influences share values. By doing 
this there are three posssible types of tree that could develop after 
the impact of this new variable has been taken into account; These 
are as follows: 
1) gearing would be seen to have a positive relationship with share 
values that is high gearing is associated with higher share values, 
indicating that the net income model is appropriate. 
2) gearing would be seen to have a negative relationship with share 
values, that is high gear.ing would be associated with low share 
values, indicating that Modigliani's and Miller's Net Operating Income 
model is appropriate. 
3) gearing has no effect on share values which might lead us to 
suggest that investors do not perceive gearing as a useful ratio 1n 
share valuation. 
In order to test these possibilities the valuation ratio AID analyses 
were reconducted forcing a return on capital ratio based on earnings 
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before interest and tax into the model. The AID tree obtained is 
presented in figure 8.1 where it can be seen that the tree is very 
similar to the original valuation ratio tree except that gearing has 
now entered the model. Before examining the implications of this new 
set of relationships it is important to briefly examine the 
statistical qualities of the tree. 
The relevant statistics from this AID analysis are presented in tables 
8.1 and 8.2. · In table 8.1 the AID tree pattern features are 
presented and reveal that this model was able to explain only 41.9% of 
the total variance in the valuation ratio which compares unfavourably 
with the 50.4% obtained by the original model presented in the 
previous chapter. Our initial reaction is therefore one of caution 
in that we must realise we are examining an inferior model of the 
share valuation process. Also shown in the table is the variance 
explained by each variable. Operating return on capital is the most 
powerful measure explaining 34.8% of the total variance. The 
secondary variables are gearing, dividend payout and size which 
explain 2.9, 2.3 and 1.8% respectively. If these variables are 
compared with .the original tree statistics (table 7.6) it will be seen 
that return on capital, dividend payout and size/market interest are 
all weaker in terms of explanatory power and that ｳｨｯｲｴｾｴ･ｲｭ＠ liquidity 
has disappeared altogether. The gearing ratio is new and by 
explaining nearly 3% of the variance must be considered as a very 
influential variable. Finally, the table also shows that there is no 
significant competition between variables which is not satisfied later 
in the tree, except for the split on group 8 which is terminal. 
Table 8.2 presents the final group characteristics and it can be seen 
that the reason for the tree stopping is due in all but one group, to 
each terminal group possessing insufficient observations to form two 
new child groups. This clearly indicates that the AID analysis has 
been able to reduce the original sample into the smallest terminal 
groups ie. a thorough analysis has taken place. The only group which 
stopped splitting prematurely was group 10 which is at the end of the 
longest branch in the tree. 
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TABLE 8.1 
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SPLIT SPLITTING VARIATION TOTAL t COMPET ING 
GROUP VARIABLE EXPLAINED 
.LQE VALUE VARIABLES 
NO. (BSS) VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
EBIT/TA 1,213,253 25.8 13.8 NONE 
2 EBITITA 157,523 2.9 4.8 DIV/NI 
3 EBITITA 336,828 6.2 7.3 TLITNW 
4 TL/TNW 160,484 2.9 5.7 NONE 
6 DIV/NI 45,108 .8 2.7 NONE 
7 DIV/NI 80,543 1.5 3.7 NONE 
8 SIZE 97,499 1.8 4.7 EBITITA 
TOTAL VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 2,291,238 41.9% 
TOTAL VARIATION 5,458,346 
TABLE 8.2 
OPERATING INCOME VALUATION RATIO MODEL 
FINAL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
FI NAL VALUATION NO. OF UNEXPLAI NED STANDARD REASON FOR 
GROUl' RATIO COMP o VARIATION DEVIATION SPLIT 
NO. MEAN (TSS) STOPPING 
5 0.73 53 551,321 .101.9 TOO FEW CASES 
9 0.86 50 257,352 71.7 " " " 
10 1.09 171 724,129 65.1 NO SIGNIFICANT 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLE 
11 1.39 50 256,782 71.66 TOO FEVl CASES 
13 1.35 69 321,377 68.25 " II II 
12 1. 7 1 68 1-1 80,152 84.03 II II II 
17 1.80 51 275,937 73.6 " " " 
16 2.25 35 300 ,050 92.59 " " " 
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Having established that this new model is worthy of further analysis 
we turn our attention to the underlying economic logic of each split. 
In order to aid this task the AID tree pattern presented in figure 8.1 
has been redrawn to scale in figure 8.2 using the mean valuation ratio 
values of each group as the location for each split. If we now 
compare this new AID tree with the original valuation ratio AID tree 
presented in figure' 7.9 we will find several similarities and 
differences. 
Firstly, the most obvious similarity is that the first three splits in 
both trees are controlled by a retarn on capital variable. (Thus up 
to points A, B, C and D the trees have identical formats.) This 
trUnk-branch structure indicates that there is a remarkably strong 
relationship between return on capital add the valuation ratio across 
the whole sample. As we have already discussed in the previous 
chapter, this relationship indicates that the value placed on the book 
value of a company's assets is determined by the return generated by 
those assets. One subtle difference between the two trees which 
could go unnoticed is that the number of observations forming, the 
upper trunk of this tree is 324 as apposed to 278 in the previous 
model. Whilst we cannot read into this any real significance it does 
indicate that we have not simply replicated the previous model using a 
different ratio .. 
The lower trunk of this new tree follows exactly the same ' pattern as 
the old tree, with dividend payout controlling the splits at points C 
and D. - The only minor' difference is that the old tree continues with 
an extra split controlled by a size variable. However, this 
difference is not important as this new trunk commenced with fewer 
observations and therefore prohibits the subsequent 'number of splits. 
Our interpretation of this lower trunk is that earnings and dividends 
are the key to share values for companies with below average 
profitability. The absence of gearing from this trunk suggests that 
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investors view dividends to be ｭｯｾ･＠ important than gearing. However, 
we are unable to make any inferences as to whether gearing may 
subsequently have a role in the investor's decision making process 
because of the limitations imposed on the analysis by the sample s ize . 
It is conceivable that gearing may hpve entered the model at the next 
stage, but this seems ｾｮｬｩｫ･ｬｹ＠ as it was not seen to be a strong 
competitor with dividend payout on the final splits in this trunk. 
However, this result appears to be somewhat surprising given the high 
risk of failure attached to low return on capital companies. Under 
such conditions it is reasonable to expect an inverse relationship 
between gearing and share value to persist. 
absence of gearing suggests either: 
In conclusion the 
1) that investors are indifferent towards gearing 
2) that investors do utilise gearing ratios but they are secondary to 
dividends, or 
3) investors do utilise gearing ratios but there is no censensus in 
the way such risk is reflected in share values (ie. the impact of 
gearing on each individual decision making process is so different 
that no systematic adjustment appears to be present in the market.) 
In contrast the upper trunk of this new AID tree reveals some very 
interesting relationships. The format of this new tree up to points 
A and B is identical to the original tree ｡ｾ､Ｌ＠ had the same 
relationships persis ted, the next two splits would have been 
controlled by short-term liquidity (point A) and dividend payout 
(point B). However, it can be seen that in the new tree no split 
takes place at point A, which is to be a ttributed to thin highly 
profitable group possessing insufficient companies to form two new 
groups. Thus it is conceivable that with a bigger sample a split 
based on short-term liquidity may have taken place. 
The remaining point of interest in this new tree is Point B which 
shows a split controlled by the gearing variable, TL/TNW. This new 
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split replaces the dividend payout ratio found in the original tree. 
The two new groups formed reveal that the group with the higher 
gearing has the higher average share value and vice versa, which 
infers that investors have a preference for gearing. Whilst we are 
cautious in generalising from our results this finding is very 
interesting in that it provides some evidence to support the net 
income theory on investor behaviour which quite simply argues that 
when the return on capital is between 13% and 22% gearing has the 
effect of inceasing relative share values through increasing the after 
interest return to the investor. This is in complete contrast to the 
Modigl1ani and Miller(1958) theory which argues for the reverse 
relationship. In other words there appears to be, on the basis of 
-these results, no downward bias in share values due to the additional 
risk caused by the additional gearing. 
From a theoretical point of view this relationship between gearing and 
share values is very interesting. The AID tree proposes that when 
the operating return on capital is above, say 13%, there is a 
beneficial impact of gearing on share -values. Whilst we are unable 
to state whether the relationship would hold for companies with 
returns above 22% due to the group at point A possessing insufficient 
companies to form further groups, it is not unreasonable to argue that 
it may do so. However, the absence of gearing from the lower part of 
the tree indicates that this preference for gearing is not valid in 
all Circumstances, that is there is imperfect interaction present 
within the tree. We can possibly explain this interaction in terms 
of the marginal benefit of gearing which is only obtained when the 
weighed average cost of debt is less than the operating return on 
capital. When the operating return is below a certain level, in our 
case 13%, then it may be argued that the shareholder no longer 
benefits from gearing due to the opportunity cost of additional 
l1abil1 ties. For instance it may be that the interest charge on 
additional debt is either only slightly below the current return on 
capital and consequently insufficient to compensate for the additional 
risk incurred by the taking on any additional liability, or the 
operating return may be equal to or less than the cost of debt in 
which case there would be a negative effect on shareholder returns. 
Although this interpretation is limited to this one period AID tree, 
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the relationship found is broadly in agreement with normative 
expectations about rational market -behaviour. 
In conclusion this analysis has indicated that specific risk as 
measured by the TL/TNW does not appear to have an adverse impact on 
the investor's decision making process. Our results do in fact 
suggest that gearing is beneficial to investors when the operating 
return on capital is greater than 13%. Whilst these results suggest 
some very interesting behaviour by investors, we stress the need for 
caution in generalising from this single time period analysis. 
ｾＮＲ＠ Default Risk 
The other type of specific risk which we consider important to 
investors is default risk. The variable included in the database to 
measure this factor was z-score which was computed using the 
Taffler{1977) discriminant model. Despite our a priori expectations 
that this variable would be of prime importance to investors, the 
models developed in this study revealed that z-score was unable to 
explain any of the variation in either of our two measures of relative 
share valuation. We may conclude from this that either our 
methodology was inappropriate for revealing its "true" impact on the 
investor's decision making process or that investors do not account 
for bankrupty risk in their evaluation process in a systematic manner. 
As' the second of these would at first sight imply irrational behaviour 
by investors we shall firstly evaluate the validity of our 
methodology. 
The basic assumption made by using z-score is that it is an accurate 
measure of default risk. In a paper by Taffler(1981a) the track 
record of his z-score model over several years is reported. It is 
revealed that the model "exhibits true ex ante predictive ability in a 
statistical sense" and this is based upon the fact that the model was 
able to isolate all quoted manufacturing companies which failed over 
the .preceding five years. Futhermore, it 1s convincingly argued by 
Taffler that z-scores may not only be used for claSSifying companies 
as failing (that is at risk of failure) or not, but also .as a general 
measure of company performance applicable throughout the full 
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performance range. The evidence presented by Taffler on the ability 
of -the z-score variable to measure both bankruptcy risk and aggregate 
performance is overwhelming and consequently we believe that the 
variable was measuring default risk very accurately and should not be 
questioned. 
Amore likely explanation for the absence of the z-score from our 
results is that the constituent elements of the z-score model are 
correlated with the variables in our models which would have the 
effect of diluting the impact of the z-score in the analyses : The 
z-score model comprises of four variables, namely PBT/CL 
(profitability), CA/TL (working capital), CL/TA (financial risk) and 
the No-Credit -Interval (short-term liquidity), which when combined 
provide a holistic measure of company performance. It may be 
observed that the· first variable is measuring profitability and is 
therefore measuring the same financial dimension as the PBT/TNW 
variable which controls the valuation ratio model. However, the 
correlation between these two ratios is only .57, which is not high, 
and furthermore .37 between PBT/TNW and z-score. These low 
correlations would suggest that the holistic nature of the z-score 
model is capturing something quite different from the return on 
capital ratio alone and therefore its impact on share prices is 
unlikely to have been significantly diluted. 
Overall, therefore, we would suggest that had default risk been 
important to investors during the period examined it would have 
entered one of the models developed. Consequently, the next question 
we must address is what are the possible reasons why investors do not 
appear to assimilate default risk into relative share values? We 
suggest two explanations. Firstly, it may be that investors are 
unable to assess such risk with any degree of accuracy and secondly 
there are other factors at work preventing the share prices of failing 
companies falling to a low level that reflects their inherent risk. 
There is some empirical evidence to support the first of these 
explanations. In our discussion on default risk in chapter IV 
several studies were referred to which supported the conclusion that 
bankruptcy took investors by surprise (Altman and Brenner,1981; 
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Aharony, Jones and Swary,1980). Whilst these studies did reveal that 
there was a distinct downward trend in the share prices over the 
period ,prior to the failure point, ( see ｡ｬｾｯ＠ Beaver(1968) and 
'.' 
Westerfield(1971) for more evidence of this nature)', it would appear 
that there was a sharp decline in the seven week period prior to 
bankruptcy. Aharony et al(1980) state, "This implies that even 
shortly before the event, the market did not fully expect that these 
firms would soon file bankruptcy." 
From tbis evidence it would appear that share prices may not fully 
reflect the risk of bankruptcy and therefore it would seem as though 
investors are unable to accurately assess this type of risk. However 
·this conclusion is premature as there are other factors at work within 
the share price mechanism which may counteract the potential high 
losses from holding high risk companies. Taffler(1981a) provides 
some interesting facts on the performance of quoted companies on 
30.11.76 over the following four years. It is reported that only 
12.2% of the companies at risk ｡｣ｴｵ｡ｾｬｹ＠ went bankrupt, whereas of the 
rest 5.2% made major divestments, 7.0% received government, bank or 
other support, 39.1% recovered, ＱＰＮｾＥ＠ were taken over and the balance 
remained still at risk. From the investor's point of view and 
bearing in mind the large potential gains obtained when either a 
takeover or a recovery takes place these figures suggest that 
investing in f ·inancially unhealthy companies over the period 
considered may not have been such a bad investment policy. 
In a study by Shrieves and Stevens(1979) this issue of whether failing 
companies are likely to be taken over was examined from a different 
view point. Based on Altman's(1968) model, the authors compared the 
z-scores of two groups of companies, one containing companies that had 
been acquired and the other containing non-acquired companies. They 
found that 15.2% of the acquired firms were at risk compared with only 
ij.5% of the non-acquired sample. Shrieves 'and Stevens conclude, 
"An empirical corollary to our findings of high relative 
frequency of impending failure in acquired versus nonacquired 
firms is that many instances of severe financial crisis among 
large firms are resolved through the merger process." 
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In summary, we would suggest that the role of default risk in the 
investor's decision making process is not as simple as it may first 
appear and that share prices may not ,fully reflect this risk due to 
the probability of some event other than bankruptcy, taking place and 
thus yielding a capital gain. Consequently, we see this as an 
acceptable explanation for z-score not entering any of our resultant 
models. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this chapter was to examine the role of risk in the 
'investor's decision making process and to seek possib::'e explanat 4.ons 
for the absence of any risk variables from the models presented in the 
previous chapters. 
Initially, it was proposed that either the methodology of this study 
was inappropriate for establishing a systematic adjustment in share 
values for risk Or that the risk measures included in the database 
were misspecified in one form or another. Although it is difficult 
to prove in any rigorous manner, the methodology would appear to be 
capable of revealing the impact of any statistically significant risk 
measure providing the underlying model is not too complex. In view 
of this our attention was focused on the definitiion of risk and its 
measurement. 
Investment risk can be split into two main types, namely systematic 
and specific, of which in theory systematic risk is considered to be 
the only risk of importance to fund managers. It was revealed in 
closer examination of systematic risk that there are problems with its 
perceived utility to investors in the U.K. stock market and with its 
measurement. In the first place there is a reluctance by fund 
managers to accept the theory of the CAPM as the basis for formulating 
investment strategies. Secondly, there is the inherent -belief by 
fund managers that the market is inefficient and therefore there are 
perceived benefits from thorough fundamental analysis. 
Beta, the variable employed by this study to measure systematic risk, 
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was also questioned. It was shown that there are empirical and 
theoretical 'reasons for suggesting that historic beta, which does not 
reflect future expectations, may not be the best surrogate measure of 
investor expectations of systematic risk, although it was pointed out 
that the difference was likely to be small. Furthermore, given the 
large number of companies in the U.K. stock market which are thinly , 
traded there are sound reasons for questioning the validity of a beta ' 
based investment strategy. Finally, the one parameter model of the 
CAPM is considered too simplistic to be a useful measure of systematic 
risk, moll and Ross, 1980; Gooding, 1978; Aharony, Jones and 
Swary,1980). In summary the expected impact of the beta measure 
employed in 'this thesis on share prices is not as clear as theory 
would suggest with many questions unanswered and as a direct result 
the absence of beta from the models may not be unexpected. 
The second type of risk examined was specific risk which was examined 
from two view points, the risk due to financial gearing and the risk 
of default. In the first place it was suggested that the absence of a 
financial gearing ratio from our models could be due to the use of a 
variable based on after interest profit figure which may have diluted, 
to some extent, the true impact of gearing on share prices. In order 
to explore this possible weakness the valuation ratio AID model was 
reworked forcing in a return on capital variable based upon earnings 
before interest. The resultant AID tree revealed that although 
gearing appeared to influence share prices, its impact was contrary to 
theoretical expectations as defined by Modigtiani and Miller(1958) . 
The analysis proposed that . investors prefer gearing providing the 
return on capital was above 13% and below 22%. Below 13% no 
preference or dislike for gearing was revealed. This finding is in 
agreement with the net income ·model for share valuation and with 
Hypothesis III set out in Chapter IV. 
The absence of default risk from our models was examined from several 
view points. In the first place it was seen that the variable 
z-score, used to measure this type of risk, had a proven track record. 
Secondly, the z-score was not found to be highly correlated with any 
of the other ratios in the models. Thus it was concluded that our 
methodology should have been capable of revealing the impact of 
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de fault risk, and thus l ed ll S to que st.i.o n its impClct on inv'=!stm"nt 
returns . Evidence from ａｬｴｭ ｡ ｾ＠ and Br enner(l g8 1) a nd Ah arony , Jones 
and Swary(lg80) s ugges ts tha t default does come as a s urpr i s e to 
investors and ' the findin gs of Taffle r(1981 a ) and Shrieve s nnd 
Stevens(1979) indicate that ｴｨ ｾ＠ r eason for thts may he du e to th e high 
probability of bther events such as takeove r or r ecove ry taking place . 
; 
Consequ ently, it would s eem that default r isk may not t ake a ve ry 
dominant role in the share price fixing mechani s m. 
The overall conclus.ion from th ese analyses is tha t no evide nce to 
, 
confirm that investors utilise ri sk v'ariables in th e ir dec i s ion mak ing 
I 
proce ss can be found. If we accept this conclusion as valid and that 
our mOd els should have been able to reveal any ｳ ｹｾｴ ･ ｭ ｡ ｴｩ｣＠ relat i on s hip 
between risk and relative share values, if ｰｲ･ｳｾｮｴＡ＠ t hp. n ｴｨ ｾ ｲ ･＠ are a 
numbe r of plausib l e expla nations :-
! 
investors may not utilise ｾ ｩｳｫ＠ variables in th ei.r dec ision making 
process I 
2) or if they do, there is no consensus ' in th ej r use and th e r e for e 
there is no systematic relat i onship betweee n r isk and sha r e ｰｲｩ｣ ･ｾ＠
(Bart and Masse,19B1 provid e some ' evidence to support thi s 
explanation). 
3) or, there is a systematic relationship present but it s 
significance is so small when compared with the impact of the other 
share price determinants, that it becomes ｩｮｳｩｧｮｩｦｩ｣ｾｮｴ＠ from a 
statistical point of view. 
The implications of these possible explanation s a r e ve ry set'leu s for 
both the theory and practice of investment appraisal and there fore 
need to be SUbstantiated and extensively tested usi ng different t ime 
period s., different data and different me thodology. 
Finally, these results sugges t that if we adopt the decision 
usefulness criterion for improving the content of a ccounting 
statements, then it would appear that the arguments for ｩｮ｣ｬｵｾｬｮｧ＠
explicit risk measures are not substantiated. However, in view ot 
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Ｎ ｾ＠
the vast exposure given to risk it may be argued that risk per se 
could become important if there were some sort of consensus on its 
measurement, and that the standardising and reporting of specific risk 
measures in the annual report may help achieve this concensus. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
1. Introduction 
As stated in the first chapter the main theme of this study was to 
examine the relationship between accounting numbers and relative 
share values with a view to gaining more insight into the workings of 
the share price fixing mechanism. 
objectives were formulated: 
In the light of this, three broad 
1) to test the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
accounting numbers and relative share values. 
2) to test the hypothesis that the cognitive processes of the market 
as a whole are interactive by nature. 
3) to study the applicability of the various theories related to 
share valuation, dividend policy, fundamental risk and systematic 
risk in the U.K. stock ｭ｡ｲｫ･ｴｾ＠
It was also our purpose to further the understanding of user 
informational needs and thus contribute to the development of the 
decision-usefulness approach to accounting. In this chapter we 
summarise the results of our analyses relating to our objectives and 
to the other areas which have a bearing on financial ratio analysis 
such as the dimensionality of accounting data, the utility of linear 
additive analytical techniques etc. We shall also discuss the 
implications of our results for share valuation theory and practice 
and related areas, and recommend further areas for future ｲ･ｳ･ｾｲ｣ｨＮ＠
2. The Understanding of Relative Share Values 
The analyses conducted into the association between accounting 
numbers and relative share values indicated that there was a 
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statistically significant re lationship prese nt, a t last for t he ti m 
period cove r ed by this st ud y and the pa rti c ular sample of com panies 
used. It was shown t hRt whe n th e valuation ratio was userl ns th e 
measure of relative sha r e val ue , ove r 53% of the var i ance co uld he 
explained us ing a mod e l co nsisti. ng of onl y a few va rL a bles . Ollr 
hypothesis that t here is a re lations hi p be twee n acco lln tin g numbe rs 
and r e lative share values is t he refo r e clearly support e d by th se 
results. We conclude from this that acco untin g i nfo rmation is 
useful to investors and consequ ently a prime de t ermina nt dlre c tly or 
by surrogate, of share prices . 
Demonstra tion of th is li nk between t he i nput and output oE the 
investor's decision ma ki ng process is im porta nt fo r two rea sons . 
Firstly, it establishes t hat i nves tors find useful information i n 
modified historic cost fina ncial statements . SecondJ y formal mod 1s 
rep.resenting the functional r e lationship b tw e n th a nomic 
judgements of investors and acco unting numb rs ca n be used to shed 
light on the validity of various corporate fi na nce theo ri s . In 
chapter II the deci sion-usefulness criterion was d iscuss d at 1 ngth 
a nd whilst it was convi nci ngly demonst r a t ed t hat accountin g numbe r s 
do possess some hidd en st r e ngths ( see subsection 2 . 4) th g n ral 
belief within the accounti ng profession that thi s crit rion was not 
being met by current fi na ncial statements was highlighted ( ee 
subsection 2.2). Furthe rmore, i n chapter I V the survey of t he 
extant work on the dete rmi nants of shar pri ces r v aled 
\ 
inconsistent, and ｴｬ ｾｲｾｯ ｲ ･＠ i nconclus ive , res ults wit h no mpiricall y 
established theorie s (s ee Benston, 1981 for a rece nt re view). Thu s 
the need to identify the variables which genu i nely and m a ni ng£ully 
reflect the investors dec ision making process is a very important 
aspect in advancing the body of knowledge i n accounting and fi na nce . 
We hope the present study goes a little way towards h lpi ng to fill 
this gap in knowledge. 
The resultant models revea l ed that only a fe w accounting numbers were 
statistically significant i n explai ni ng relative s hare valu es , whi ch 
is consistent with our a pr io r i expectations given the enviromental 
complexity of the decision process in question (see subsection 3.2). 
This finding implies that the computation and i nter pre tation of other 
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financial ratios may not be very mea ni ngful i n th e exe r c ise of sha re 
valuation. Whilst our findings are limit e d to one ti me pe r iod and 
do not take into account non- fi nancial variables , it wou ld app ear 
that the financial analyst mi ght reas onably confine his El na ncial 
analysis to a few carefully se lecte d va ri a bles . Fa ilure to do so 
may only serve to complicat e and r e duce t he e ff ec tive ness of hi s 
decision making process (Taffler ,1981; Snowball,1980; Sc hrod e r e t 
al,1967; San Miguel,1976; Casey,1980). 
It was found that only four dimension s wer e abl e to co nt ribu te to 
explaining relative share valu es . Profit a bi lity was se n as th e 
most important determinant indicating that i nvesto r s a r e prima rily 
concerned with earnings pe r share. This fi nd ing is co nsis t e nt both 
with our hypothesis that earnings are th e domi nant facto r i n 
de t e rmining relative share values and with th e results of ot h r 
studies ego Ball and Brown(1968) Brown and Ke nne ll y(197 2). Quit 
clearly this result is to be expected as it impli es that the value of 
an investment is determined by the ea rning powe r oE und e rlyln g 
assets, the greater the earnings the hi ghe r the re l ative share va lu . 
Furthermore it was demonstrat ed that th e net i ncom mod 1 
(Durand,1959) appears to be a more ap propr iate descri pt ion of mArke t 
behaviour than the net operating income th eo r y (Modi. gJ ia ni and 
Miller,1958). The second most influential varlabl was th e div1.rl nd 
payout ratio indicating that divide nd s a r e a n jmporta nt as p ct of 
equity investment. This finding is consist ent with our hypoth es i s 
\ 
that dividends are important to . inves tor s a lthougl1 seconl a r y to 
earnings and with the norma tive theor ies of R nwL ck(1969) a nd 
Gordon(1959). However, it is contrary to th e Modi g lia ni and 
Miller(1961) dividend irrelevance th eo ry. Our int ' rpre tatLon of this 
phenomenon is that there was a "clientel" Ef ec t pres e nt wi t h l n th e 
U.K. stock market causing a preference for hi gh yi e ld i ng s t ocks . 
Whilst it is recognised that the effect of dlvide nd r s trai nt 
policies in force at the time of this study mRy have accentuat ed the 
impact of dividends on share prices, we be l ieve that t h is ftndi. ng ca n 
be explained in terms of reducing the uncer tainty a ttR ched to qu i ty 
investment and/or the legal requirement for ma ny in vestm nt fund s to 
generate a mi nimum dividend yield (see subsection 6.4.1). 
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The size and market liquidity variables were seen to be measuring the 
same factor, namely the marketability of a stock. Although this 
factor was ｳ･ｾｮ＠ to contribute only a relatively ｳｾ｡ｬｬ＠ amount to the 
models in terms of variance explained, the AID analyses revealed that 
it can have a dramatic effect on relative share values. It was seen 
in figure 7.9 that a company with all the financial attributes of 
highly valued companies in terms of earnings and dividends but with 
poor marketability could in fact be valued less than a company with 
the financial attributes of low valued companies but with good 
marketability. The reason for this phenomenon is that the trading 
problems incurred with stocks with poor marketability cause such 
stocks to stand at a discount and vice versa (see subsection 6.7). 
Consequently, .we conclude that at least for the period covered by 
this study marketability was a fundamental part of the U.K. share 
valuation process. 
The models also indicated that short-term liquidity was influential 
in determining share values. Our interpretation of this variable 
was that it was probably a surrogate measure for over-trading (see 
subsection 7.6.2). However we stress that we could find no 
corroboratory evidence in the literature for our interpretation of 
this variable and therefore caution needs to be taken in making too 
much of this finding. 
Of particular importance to the theory of share valuation was the 
absence of any risk measure from any of the resultant models, 
indicating that there may not be any consensus in the way investors 
evaluate investment risk, be it systematic or specific. Whilst we 
recognise that the absence of a variable from a model inhibits the 
scope of any inductive reasoning, our results were inconsistent with 
our three hypotheses on risk and consequently worthy of further 
discussion(see chapter VIII). 
The concept of systematic risk can be criticised from three points of 
view. In the first place it.is questionable how much fund managers 
accept the theory of the CAPM, and whether they can be convinced that 
good fundamental analysis does not yield results in the long term. 
Secondly, the ability of beta to reflect systematic risk was also 
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questioned, especially in a market consisting of many thinly traded 
shares. Finally, ·the one parameter model of the CAPM may be 
considered too simplistic to be a useful measure of risk (Roll and 
Ross,1980; Gooding, 1978; Aharony et al,1980). 
Specific risk was considered under two separate headings, namely 
financial gearing as measured by the debt/equity ratio and default 
risk as measured by z-score. To examine the role of financial 
gearing in the share price fixing process further analysis was 
conducted where it was found that the debt/equity ratio did not 
adversely affect share values. In fact the only influence this 
ratio had on share values was when the return on capital was ｧｲｾ｡ｴ･ｲ＠
than 13% and below 22% and then the higher the gearing the higher the 
relative share value. Although this is contrary to our initial 
hypothesis (see subsection 4) and to the theory 'of finance as 
presented by many texts, it is consistent with the normative theory 
of Renwick(1969) and the net income share valuation model. 
The discussion on default risk revealed that very often companies in 
severe financial difficulties were subject to other events such as 
take-overs or outside interference, and that bankruptcy was a 
relatively rare event (Taffler,1981aj Shrieves and Stevens,1979). 
Thus from the investor's point of view default risk may not be very 
important. Our overall conclusion was that there appears to be a 
distinct gap in the theory and practice of risk evaluation in the 
U.K. stock market. 
3. The Configural Nature of the Market's Share Valuation Process 
One of our initial hypotheses was that the market's share valuation 
process is configural in nature. The basis for this was that as the 
market's decision making process is simply the sum of all the 
individual investors' decision making processes, it is likely to 
reflect the characteristics of the human information processing 
system and consequently is likely to be configural (see Goldberg, 
1968; Clarkson, 1966 and Slovic, 1969 for further discussion in this 
area). The results from the AID models are clearly consistent with 
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this hypothesis and , a lth ough th e mod e l s may onl y ｣ｯ ｾｴ｡ｩｮ＠ a f w 
variables, th e int e raction he twee n th ese va ri a ble s i s complex . 
In subsection 7.5.1 t he interaction be tween th e ea rn i ngs yi e ld and 
return on capital was demonstr!'lted , wh e r e by a gr oup of co mp :1 nic.s wi.t h 
ve ry low return s on capital was isolat ed fro m th e ma in body of 
companies. This s e parat e group consis t ed of compilni es with 
"meaningless" earnings yields . Furthe r, evide nce of i nteract ion of 
a less obvious na tu re was re vea led by a close exnm i.n il t ion o[ the 
valuation ratio AID analysis ( see subsec tion 7.8.1). Tt w uld 
appea r from our one period analysis that th e ra t e of return on 
ca pital employed, has a direc t bea r i ng on the ma rket 's val ll atLo n of 
the firms earnings, contrary to "establLshed theory. A v r y l ow 
return was associated with a relative ly low cost of Q.u tty i.ndicati ng 
that factors other than ea rnings per se are support ing t h qha r 
price, eg asset values. As the re turn on capital Lnc r ei1F d so dLd 
the " cost of equity until a point was reach d wh r e th e i nc r ' i1s ' in 
the cost of equity was substantially les s than the i nc r nsf:' In he 
return on capital. This point signifies the leve l of th ave r ag 
cost of equity where earnings domina t e r l aelve shar vnlu es . 
However, it was seen that whe n the return on a pi t a l incr RS d st ll 1 
further this was also associat ed with a s light Inc r e ilse in t he cost 
of equity indicating that investors va lue ea rnings of hi p, h r t urn 
companies less than the ave r age re turn co mpa ny. Wh i l st we mu s t he 
careful in generalising from this findin g , it would app nr that th r e 
\ 
may be a kind of regression towards the In an xpectatlon I y 
investors. (Whittington, 1976 provides Some support for th is 
argument.) 
In addition it was seen in this valuat i.on ra tio ana lysis that 
dividends interacted with re turn on cap i t a l. Whe n the re turn on 
capital was low, the impact of a change i n divide nd policy was also 
low. As the return on capital increa s ed, however , so did the impact 
of dividends until a point was reached wh >re dividends we re seen to 
decline in their importance to investors. 
this U curve(see figure 7.12) is that 
Our interpretation of 
1) when the return on capital is low i nve t ors seek increases in 
earnings and are not heavily swayed by cha ng s in dividend policy, 
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2) when the l return is average, dividends are viewed by investors as a 
means of reducing uncertainty and consequently are very influential 
and 
3) when the return is high the opportunity value of retained earnings 
is higher than that of dividends and therefore investors appear to be 
indifferent towards dividends. This interesting set of 
relationships broadly agrees with Renwick's(1969) normative theory on 
the role of ､ｩｶｩ､･ｮｾｳＮ＠ Nevertheless, we express caution in 
generalising from our results, particularly as there was a government 
policy of dividend restraint at the time of our analysis, and stress 
the need for further examination of this interaction in other time 
periods. 
Another important finding from our analyses concerns the role of 
financial risk as measured by the debt/equity ratio. In subsection 
8.4.1 it was seen from the valuation ratio AID tree based upon net 
operating income that this ratio was influential in determining 
relative share values only when the operating return on capital was 
above the average. This interesting result suggests tha't investors 
prefer high gearing providing the return is high. This finding is 
consistent with the net income model of the firm although 
inconsistent with the theory of Modigliani and Miller(1958) and with 
our hypothesis on the debt/equity ratio. 
In conclusion, then, although the investor's decision making process 
may at first sight be considered ｳｩｭｰｬｩｳｴｾ｣＠ due to the few variables 
utilised, the interaction between these clearly demonstrates that the 
judgement process is configural and very complex. Furthermore, the 
nature of these interactions reveals a new area for further fruitful 
investigation on the processes at work within the stock market. 
4. Methodological Significance of the Study 
The results of our study provide some useful and interesting evidence 
relating to a number of issues concerned with the paramorphic 
representation of the market's valuation process. These are: 
1) the appropriate measure of relative share value 
2) the relative merits of linear additive and configural analytical 
278 
techniques 
3) the dimensionality and normality of the data 
It was indicated in subsections 4.4, 3.4 and 5.8, respectively, that 
these issues had in general not been resolved by theory, and that 
there was little empirical evidence to aid us in the selection of an 
appropriate research methodology. We thus consider the results from 
our analyses to be particularly useful from a methodological vantage 
point. 
4.1 Evidence on Relative Share Valuation Measures 
Two measures of relative share values were employed in this study in 
order to provide a means of overcoming some of the perceived problems 
with the earning yield ratio (subsection 5.4.1) and to enable some 
sort of cross yalidation of our. models. Contrary to expectations, 
. . 
the earnings yield ratio, despite its popularity in other studies and 
in the finance texts (see chapters IV and V), was found to be less 
informative about the factors at work within the share price fixing 
mechanism than the valuation ratio. The valuation ratio model was 
able to explain more of the variance in share values, even after 
allowing for differences between the constituents of each model 
(subsection 6.5). Closer examination of the two measures reveals 
that 
1) the valuation ratio model was able to explore and reveal the 
complex relationship between return on capital and share ｶｾｬｵ･ｳＬ＠ and 
thus was able to accommodate the problems of low return on capital 
companies and utilise the whole sample (subsection 6.7) 
2) the valuation ratio model did not assume a constant discount fate 
between earnings and share prices, regardless of the underlying 
quality of those earnings (subsection 7.8) 
3) by using the valuation ratio the analysis is commenced at one 
stage up the hierarchy in the share valuation process and thus 
provides a more complex picture of the characteristics of that· 
process. 
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Our conclusion is that the valuation ratio serves as a better measure 
of relative share valuation and is therefore more suitable for this 
type of research. 
4.2 Evidence on the Appropriate Analytical Technigue 
Three analytical techniques were employed in this study, two 
possessing linear additive algorithms and the other a configural 
algorithm. Whilst the configural approach was believed likely to be 
the most valuable for our purposes, unlike the two linear additive 
techniques, it has not been used before in this research area. As a 
result the two linear additive techniques were used for initial 
analysis of the data providing several models with which the 
configural analyses could be compared. 
following conclusions were reached: 
From our analyses the 
1) the linear additive techniques were severely limited in their 
ability to provide a clear understanding of the user model compared 
with the configural technique. This is consistent with the findings 
of Slovic(1969). 
2) there was little difference in the variance explained indicating 
that the linear additive approach is probably just as powerful from a 
predictive point of view as the configural approach. This finding 
was to some extent expected, given the similarity in the analytical 
principles of the techniques and has been found in studies in other 
areas (see Dawes, 1971 and Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). Nevertheless, 
as the configural approach used non-continuous explanatory variables 
as opposed to regression's continuous explanatory variables there was 
inevitably a loss of information in the analyses and thus effectively 
suggests that the configural approach was the more powerful. 
3) the main explanatory variables isolated by each approach were the 
same although the less significant variables proved to be unstable 
between techniques. Given the inherent limitations of the linear 
additive technique this result is not surprising and we would suggest 
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that the configural model to be more representative of the true 
nature of the decision task under examination. 
4) there would appear to be little benefit in using both linear 
discriminant analysis and mUltiple regression analysis on this type 
of data. This conclusion is consistent with the arguments of 
Altman(1981) and Eisenbeis(1977). 
Our conclusion is that the configural approach has convincing 
advantages over the linear additive approach for revealing the 
detailed characteristics of the decision making process. This does 
not mean that we dismiss the benefits of the linear additive approach 
for predictive model building which was not tested in this study. 
4.3 Evidence on Dimensionality and Ratio Normality 
ｾ＠
In chapter V we presented the results of the principal component 
analysis performed on our sample of 89 independent ratios. The 
purpose was to determine the underlying dimensions of the data. It 
was found that the data set was measuring only a few independent 
dimensions which is consistent with the results of ｔ｡ｦｦｬｾｲＨＱＹＸＱ｡ＩＬ＠
Sudarsanam(1981a), Pinches et al(1975) and Johnson(1979). The 
implication of this analysis means that it was possible to choose 
only a few ratios to represent all the important dimensions of the 
firm. Furthermore selection of variables on this basis avoids 
needless redundancy in the use of financial ratios and thereby 
simplifies the analyses. 
We also tested the assumption of normality of the ratio distributions 
on all the 91 ratios in the data base by using the chi-square, skew 
and kurtosis statistics. We also examined this assumption USing 
four transformations on each distribution. Although no ratio in its 
untransformed state was found to be normal, it was possible to 
diminish the degree of non-normality in the distribution by 
transformation (subsection 5.7). Once again these findings are 
consistent with the results of similar studies conducted by 
Sudarsanam(1981) and Bougen and Drury(1980) in the U.K. and by 
Deakin(1976) in the U.S.A. 
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5. The Decision-Usefulness Criterion 
In chapters I and II it was reported that there was general agreement 
that knowledge of the user's decision making process is important to 
the accountant for determining what information to provide in 
financial statements. It was argued that if it were possible to 
specify the properties of a particular judgement model, then these 
properties may form the basis for enhancing the format and content of 
financial statements. Furthermore, we initially proposed that as 
the investor was generally considered to be the most sophisticated 
. user of accounting information, understanding his user model subsumes 
all other users needs. Since our results have provided useful 
insight into the market's judgement process it should be possible to 
make inferences on the value of accounting information to investors. 
Our results revealed thak the investor would appear to need only a 
very limited set of accounting numbers which may consequently be 
interpreted as suggesting that financial statements should simply 
concentrate on presenting relevant information about these few items 
of data. However, this interpretation is clearly wrong as it is not 
possible to deduce from our study the relevance of all the other 
items of information in the accounts. All we can do is to conclude 
that these data items are important. The problem of trying to 
generalise from a study of this nature clearly demonstrates the 
difficulties of assessing the decision-usefulness criterion 
empirically. We would therefore suggest that the development of 
this decision-usefulness criterion should be based as well on 
normative theories and not merely pragmatic empiricism. Finally, 
the complexity of the way in which accounting numbers interact with 
share values clearly demonstrates that it may be inappropriate to 
aSSume that the investor's model subsumes all other user models. 
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, . 
O. ｲｕＨｴｉｈｾ ｲ＠ Resc;) el l 
This s tudy ,"as ｣ｯｮ｣Ｇ ｾ ｲｮ ･ ､＠ m;)i nl y '''ith es t abli.s hin g a r e lati. o ns hi p 
be tween accounting numb e r s a nd r e l a t lv e s ha r e valu"ltion s \·Ii Lh .J v i.,"'" 
t 0 she d din g li g h t on th e i n t r ic a c i e s 0 f th e in ve s t c r s ' U S) 0 f 
accounting informati on and his de c ision maki. ng process ;m d thu s h0. J ) 
to contribut e in a small way towards closing the g;) P be t w n th 
th eo ry a nd prac ti c of ｩｮ ｶｾｳ ｴｭ ｾｮ ｴ＠ a na l ys i s . 
th e re are only a f e '.oJ s i g nificant ke y a ccounti ng var ia bl es uS by he 
investor, although th e way in which these 'variables wer e combin ' d \";'1 S 
both complex and interes ting. Our conclusi ons have , howeve r, h n 
based upon a single time pe riod ana lysis durin g whi c h divid e nd 
rest r aint policie s were in force , and a limited numb e r of lndust ri ' 
and firms . A frUitful line of research t he r e for e 1s 0 ｩｮｶ ･ｾ＠ l 'a tc 
the inter-temp ora l stability of our models on an e nl a r g d s <1lll pl h:tl 
includes a br oad e r base of indus tri es ( t hilt i. s not i mpl y r ,., r i t d 
to man u facturin g co mpani e s) . The Aut omati.c Int e r actio n Dct'c Lor 
methodology us ed in this st udy appears t o be a us f ul ｰｰｲｯ ｾ｣ｨ＠ for 
analysing and identifying th e confi.gural nClture of th e rn:lrk . ' s 
decision making process and t h e results of a n exte nd d nnRly si rnny 
provide a basis for rea ppr<Jising and r e formulatin g c u rr ' n L co rp r , 'c 
fi nance theories. 
Since an implicit assumption be hind the formulation ;j ma r k I: mod, 
is that it is possibl e to CCl pt ur e the mai n ch;-lrac ri . i f, of h 
market. ' s decis 'ion ma ki ng p r oces3 , th e nex t lo g i.c rt l t p \"0 IJ I s ' m . 0 
be to t es t the utilit y (If su c h mode ls i n inves tm e nt ｾｰ ｰｲ ｆｬｩｳｒ ｊＮＮ＠ r t 
has bee n demon s trat e d i n oth e r r sea r c h arcas th Dt m drl s ' ; 111 
out-perform ma n due t o t:1e inh t!J:l.! l1t bLa ses pt' t!s c n n htl m.1 n 
information processin g ( se ", 'fa fr le r, 198tb and c h p r lI[ r !1 
r e vi ew ) . \.lhe the r th e! ... ｾ＠ ;1 me type of r es uJ. t co uld b . cxpec >d f r m 
ｭｾｲｫ･ｴ＠ mode l rema ins to ｢ ｾ＠ t es ted . If ho\·/cve r, 'lS t 11 lit r ;ltur c 
sugges ts, models can out-p e rform man th e n it may b pos 'ibl e 0 
isolate over - and under-valu e d s i1ar(!s a nd thu s aid in til makin g of 
buy and se ll decisions . Al thoug h) s uch a hnding would h- ve m.1 ny 
implications for market efiici e nc y , it could i nd icate t ha t 
unconventional r esea rch ma y prove be neficial i.n a very co n v nti o nal 
･ ｮ ｶｩ ｲ ｯｮｾｬｬＧｮｴ ﾷ＠ ;Aview supported by Trey no r( 197 6) . 
At the very l eas t the cost of id e ., ti Ey i ng out of 1 inp sll ::l r olf') ulcl e 
s ub s t a ntial ly r e duce d from ｾ［ ｵ ｣ ｨ＠ an :1utolO8t c d proces s . 
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SOlll' of be 
results of this study relating to the utility of risk measures to 
investors were seen to be inconsistent with our a priori expectations 
based upon traditional finance theories. Whilst we recognise the 
limitations of this study and the inability to make broad 
generalisations, we feel that there is a need to clarify whether 
there is any consensus in the market's evaluation of risk. With the 
increasing trend towards making investment analysis more 
sophisticated there may, in the near future, be a greater opportunity 
for examining these phenomena and their implications for corporate 
finance. 
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ｾｲｲｬｩｸａ＠
mE FINAN:IAL RATICE 
ｬｾ｡ｮ＠ Standard Constant No of Trans-
vaI'lE Deviation CUtliers fonnation 
> 3.1 S.D. 
'!he Depernent R3tios 
1 valuation ratio 3.06 1.15 3 log 
2 earnin3s y ie1d 16.10 7.23 4 mne 
'!he Indepeooent R3tios 
1 FF/S -1.85 0.33 0.06 4 log 
2 FF/AVICE ｾＮＵＵ＠ 0.10 ｾＮＰＶ＠ 6 sq.rt 
3 FF/AvrA 0t 46 0.07 0. ｾＵ＠ 5 sq.rt 
4 VA/S 0.56 ｾＮＱＰ＠ 1 sq.rt 
5 VA/AvrA 0. 70 ｾＮＱＳ＠ 1 sq.rt 
6 VA/AVICE ｾＮＸＶ＠ ｾＮＱＹ＠ 1 sq.rt 
7 VA/A'M:.E ｾＮＹＲ＠ 0.21 1 sq.rt 
8 EBrr/s -1. 78 0.28 0.00 4 ｾ＠
9 mrr/AvrA -1.57 ｾＮＲＹ＠ 0.07 4 ｾ＠
Ｑｾ＠ EBIT/AVICE -1.19 0.32 ｾＮＱＰ＠ ' 5 103 
11 VA/ER ｾＮＶＵ＠ 0.16 11 recip 
12 PBT/S -1.75 0.29 ｾＮＱＰ＠ 5 103 
13 PBT/AvrA -1.44 0.28 0.12 4 ｾ＠
14 PBT/AVlNtl ｾＮＶＵ＠ 0.24 ｾＮＳ･＠ 5 log 
15 PBT/AVI'L ｾＮＷＶ＠ 0.41 ｾＮｾ＠ 3 log 
16 PBT/A\cL -0.38 0.33 0.36 2 ｾ＠
17 PST/AVICE -1.06 0.31 0.17 4 ｾ＠
18 PST/A\N:E -0.83 ｾＮＲＶ＠ 0.24 4 ｾ＠
19 TNI/S -1.53 ｾＮＱＶ＠ 0.16 4 ｾ＠
20 TNI/AvrA 0.09 0.05 6 mne 
21 NI/AVN.-l ｾＮｦｩＷ＠ 0.18 0.34 5 ｾ＠
22 'INI/AVl'L -0.07 ｾＮＲＶ＠ 0.31 3 ｾ＠
23 'lNI/A\cL -0.17 0.19 0.60 1 ｾ＠
24 TNI/AVICE -1.12 0.22 ＰＮｾ＠ 4 ｾ＠
25 'lNI/A'M:.E ｾＮＸＷ＠ ｾＮＱＹ＠ ｾＮ＠ 27 3 log 
26 CF/S 2.33 ｾＮＲＱ＠ ｾＮＱＲ＠ 1 sq.recp 
27 CF/AVfA 0.46 ｾＮＰＵ＠ 0.11 4 sq.recp. 
28 ｃｆＯｾａ＠ 1. 72 1.85 3 mne 
29 CF/AVIL ｾＮＷＸ＠ 0.30 0.23 2 103 
30 CF/A\CL ｾＮＳＳ＠ 0.22 0.45 1 '103 
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M:an Standard Constant No of Trans-
ValLE Deviation OJtliers > for,uation 
3.1 S.D. 
31 CF/AVICE -1.30 0.28 0.13 3 10;1 
32 CF/A\N2E -1.19 0.27 0.14 3 10;1 
33 CSCF/Ai£6E --0.93 0.25 0.20 3 103 
34 DR,/CJl. 0.42 0.13 1 none 
35 DR/INV 0.92 0.25 6 sq.rt 
36 CA/CL 0.53 0.28 5 10;1 
37 FAITh -1.15 0.39 5 103 
38 W2/1tWJ 0.5.0 0.22 5 rone 
39 W2/IL --0.08 0.44 0.37 4 10;1 
40 TA/ER 0.55 0.15 1 sq.recp . 
41 WC/N:E 0.43 0.19 3 rone 
42 W2;tR 1. 92 0.18 2.66 10 sq.rt 
43 AVtIC/S --0.75 0.23 0.31 2 10;1 
44 TL/INtl --0.11 0.57 3 10;1 
45 TL/TI\ 0.68 0.10 1 sq.rt 
46 DEBT/QA 0.64 0.33 2 sq.rt 
47 ESIT/AvrL --0.77 0.39 3 10;1 
48 TA/1tWJ 0.53 0.13 0 recip 
49 Qt\I'INtl 0.80 0.19 5 sq .rt 
50 CA/ThW 0.93 0.18 9 5:l . r ecp 
51 CL/INtl --0.29 0.56 2 10;1 
52 AVThW/S -1."12 0.48 " 5 103 
53 DEBT/'lliW 0. 51 0.28 4 sq.rt 
54 DEBT/ICE 0.21 0.15 3 rone 
55 CA/'lL 0.35 0.32 1 10;1 
56 A'vCR,/aE 0.42 0.07 6 sq.rt 
57 CCJ3/AVINV 3.88 2.13 1 none 
58 AV)A/POOE 9.08 1.89 2 sq.rt 
59 AVJAlS 0.21 0.07 4 rone 
60 Av::A/S 0.64 0.10 5 sq.rt 
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Mean Standa rd Constant No of Trans-
ValLE Deviation CUtliers > foranation 
3.1 S. D. 
61 S/AVFA 1.62 0.55 5 log 
62 S/AvrA 0.45 0.31 4 log 
63 S/AVICE 0.84 0.42 6 log 
64 S/A\N::E 0.97 0.45 5 log 
65 S/AVlliV 0.45 0.10 3 sqrecp 
66 Dr\YS rEBTCRS 63.69 21. 73 1 none 
67 QA/CL 0.91 0.17 5 sq .rt 
68 QA/'IL ｾＮＳＹ＠ 0. 39 3 log 
69 ｾＯｉｎｖ＠ 1.19 0.13 2.49 1 log 
70 INV/CA. ＰＮｾ＠ 0.13 2 none 
71 Q\-CLjPIX)E -16.91 37.29 2 none 
72 DIV;tEEl -3.26 0.56 14 l og 
73 DIV;tENI 0.24 0.14 7 mne 
74 CL/D\ 0.62 0.09 0 sq .ct 
75 (N'TA 0.32 0.10 2 none 
76 CAlTA 0.66 0.13 9 mne 
77 DEBT/TA 0.14 0.10 3 mne 
78 DEBT/CA. 0.23 0.18 4 mne 
79 TNI/AVINtJ -'J.67 0.18 0.34 5 log 
80 INT/ffiIT 0.37 0.20 6 sq .rt 
81 aveR 1.15 0.45 6 mne 
82 CL/eR 0.65 0.15 2 rec ip 
83 INV/CL 0.92 0.19 4 sq .rt 
84 ASSET CRCWIH -0 .63 0.26 0.35 3 log 
85 PRCFIT mcwrd 1.23 0.15 3.12 1 log 
86 Z-5CffiE 6. 45 5.07 0 mne 
87 BETA 0.91 0.20 5 mne 
88 TOTAL ASSETS 0.25 0.15 6 sq·recp. 
89 NET CAPITAL EMP 0.34 0.20 6 sq.recp . 
90 IvtARKE'r LIQJIDITY n/a mne 
NJte the constant i s the anOLI1 t cdded to al l values in order to make all 
valLES p:>sitive ｾ ｩｯｲ＠ to transformation. 
I 
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ａｐｐｅ ｲｾ＠ Dr x G 
RATIO ELE ME NT DEF I NIT I ONS 
Abbreviation 
AQFA 
Asset Growth 
CA 
CF 
CL 
COS 
Daysdrs 
Debt 
Div 
Dr 
EBIT 
ER 
FA 
FF 
I NV 
Mk t Liq 
i'J CE 
Definition 
Aquisitions of Fixed Assets: The cha nge in 
the value of fixed assets during the trading 
period plus the depreciation char ge . 
Asset Growth: The percentage increas e in 
the net capital employed over the latest 
trading period. 
Current Assets: Tr adi tion a l de finition 
except for the cash and bank overdraft cont ra 
and the valuation of quoted invest men ts at 
market value. 
Cash Flow: Retained profits plu s deprecia-
tion, minority interests and deferred tax 
less any capitali sed costs. 
Current Liabilities: Tradition ·de f inition 
except for cash and bank overdraft co ntra 
and the medium term finance adjustment . 
Cost of Sales: Employees remuneration, raw 
materials. 
ｄｾｹｳ＠ Deb tors: De btors expres se d in number 
of da ys o f annual turnover. 
Debt : All interest bearing debt. 
Dividends: Ordinary share hol ders divid e nd 
De btors 
Ea r nings before I nt eres t and Tax 
Emp loyees Re muneration (includin g directors ) 
Fixed Ass ets: Ex cl udes an y in tangible ass ets. 
Fund Flow: Tradi ng profit prior to 
depreciation, interest and other income . 
Inventory: Includes stocks a nd work in 
progress. 
Mar ket Liquidity: A meas ure of th e trad -
abi lity of a particula r share (r e F. Lo nd on 
Busin ess School ). 
Net Cap i tal Employ ed : 
current li abi liti es . 
Total assets l ess 
( Note: ' the prefix 'AV' i nd icates that the a verage has bee n 
calculated from the latest and pre vious years' ba la nce shE ets.) 
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• 1 
OSCF 
OS E 
05E1 
PBT 
PDOE 
Profit Growth 
QA 
5 
TA 
TCE 
TL 
TNI 
TNW 
VA 
Z-Score 
Net Income: Profit distributabl e to 
shareholders • 
Net Worth: Or din ary and pref e rence s har e -
holder s ' capi tal plus deferred t a x , 
inta ngi ble asset adj ustm e nt, rnarket value 
of investments adj ustment an d res e rv es . 
Ordin a:ry Shareh o lde rs Cash Flow : Retain e d 
profits plu s de pre ci ation , defarred tax 
less any capit ali s e d costs. 
Ordinary Shareholders' Eq uity: Excl ud e s 
pr e fer en c e s hare holders ' interest s but 
inclu des defer red tax acc ount, int angible 
ass e ts adju s tm ent and market va lu e of Bssets 
adjustment. 
ｏｲ､ｩｮｾｲｹ＠ Ｕ ｨ ｾｲ･ ｨｯｬ､･ｲ ｳ Ｇ＠ Eq uity ｾｴ＠ start of 
Vear 
Profit before Tax 
Predicted Daily Opera tinQ Expense: 
calculated by divid ing the c os t of sa l es by 
365. 
Profit Growth: The ｾ･ｲ｣｣ｮｴ｡ｧ･＠ increase in 
earnings befo re interes t 3nd tax over the 
last year. 
Quick Assets: Current ｾｳｳ･ｴｳ＠ less inv e ntory. 
Sales 
Total Assets: Fixed Assets plus current 
assets and other assets. 
Total Capital Employed: Net ｾｯｲｴｨ＠ plu s long 
term debt Bl.d other interr.st pa ying ､ｾ｢ｴＮ＠
Total Liabilities: All external liabilities, 
does not include ｭｩｮｯｲｩｾｶ＠ interests. 
Total Net Income: Retained profits plus 
minority interests. 
Total Net Worth: Net worth plus minority 
interests. 
Valued Added: Fundsflow plus employees 
remuneration. 
Z - 5 cor e : De r i ve d fro rn T a f f 1 e r I S ( 1 981 a ) 
discriminunt mCd e l. 
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IV 
ｾ＠
N 
ABREVI-
ATION 
S . 
VA 
FF' 
EBI T 
XI NT 
PBT 
XNI 
EDIV 
THE STANDARDISED PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
SALES 
Less :Bought in Services 
VALUE ADDED 
Less : Directors & Employees Remunera t ion 
FUNDS FLOW (Trading Profit) 
Less : Deprec i a t ion 
Associated Companies Prof i t s 
Other Inc ome 
EARNI NGS BEFORE INTEREST & TAX 
Less: Total Interest 
PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
Less : Deferred Tax 
All Other Tax 
PROFIT AFTER TAX 
ｌ･ｳｳ Ｚ ｍｩｮｯｲｩｾｹ＠ Interest 
NET INCOME 
Less : Preferenc e Dividend 
£quity Dividend 
RETAINED PROFITS 
(Note : Ca pita lised Costs) 
cost of sales . 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
xx 
XX 
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XXX 
XX )t-'lt 
XXX ｾ＠
XX )+ S; 
XXX 
)+ f ｾ＠ ｾ＠ l 
XX s 
XXX @ 
XX ｾＳ＠ ｾ＠
XXX ｾｯ＠ H )+ . :r:: H _ 1i< (f)1i. 
XX ;:r:: 
XXX 
:>; :r:: [f) 
rr:(f) <r: 
XX )+ _ H_ c::r:c::r: ｾ ｯ＠
_ _ H Z ZO 
XXX ｾ Ｍｉ ｾ＠ｾ Ｘ＠ H H (f) Q ｾ＠
Ｍ ｾ＠ rr: E-i 
XX 0 0 ｘｘｘＩＫ ｾｾ＠
Ｈ ｾＩ Ｉ＠ - ----J--J 
COS 
OSNI 
TNI 
ordinary s ha reholders' net i ncome . 
total net income,i . e . i nclude s ｭｩｮｯｲ ｾｴｹ＠ interests . 
N 
\D 
W 
ABREVI-
ATION 
FA 
XINV 
DR 
GASH 
CA 
TA 
THE STANDARDISED BALANCE SHEET 
THE ASSETS· EMPLOYED 
FIXED ASSETS 
Property 
Less : Depreciation 
Other fixed assets 
Less : Depreciation 
NET ｆｉｘ ｾ ｄ＠ ASSETS 
o ri'HER ASSETS 
Assoc i ated companies 
Unqoted investments at 
directors valuation 
Inter-group accounts (non-current) 
Other assets 
CURRENT ASSETS 
Stocks & W. I . P . 
Debtors & bills receivable 
Quoted investments at market value 
Short term investments 
Cash (net of overdr aft) 
Inter - group accounts (current) 
Other current asse t s 
TOTAL CURHENT ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETS EMPLO·:rED 
APP DJ DIX C II 
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Not C : 0 . S . ｉＮ ｾ Ｎ＠ ord:lna r y sha r eholders' equity . 
APPENDIX D 
I ND USTRIES INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE 
Classification 
Aircraft and Components 
Bricks and Roofing Tiles 
Building Materials/Quarry Products/ 
Asbestos 
Cement and Concrete 
Paint 
Contracting and Construction 
Electricals (excluding Light 
Electronics, Radio and T.V.) 
BOiler Makers 
Founders and Stampers 
Industrial Plant, Engines and 
Compressors 
Mechanical Handling 
Pumps and V"alves 
Steel and Chemical Plant 
Wires and Ropes 
Misc. Engineering 
Machine and Other Tools 
Heating and Ventilating 
Instruments 
Special Steels 
Light Electronics, Radio and T.V. 
Floor Covering 
Furniture and Bedding 
Household Applicances 
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SEC Group No. 
11 
12 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
31 
33 
35 
37 
38 
39 
Kitchen and Tableware 
Motor Components 
Motor Vehicles 
Breweries 
Wines and Spirits 
General Food Manufacturing 
Milling and Flour Confectionery 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
. Publishing and Printing 
Packaging and Paper 
Clothing 
Cotton and Synthetic 
Wool 
Miscellaneous Textiles 
Tobacco 
Footwear 
Toys and Games 
Plastic and Rubber Fabricators 
Drugs and Pharmacy 
General Chemicals 
Office Equipment 
Industrial Holding (Conglomerate) 
296 
40 
41 
43 
45 
46 
49 
50 
52 
53 
54 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
73 
tv 
\D 
-.J 
ａｐｐｅ ｲｾ＠ Dr x E 
THE RAT IO TRANSFOR MATIONS AND NORMALITY TESTS 
Note: The u n der linin g signifies the bes t transformation 
RA TID 
UNTRANSFORH£O REC IPRO CAL ｌｏｾ＠ SQUA RE ROOT SQUARE ROOT Of REC IP 
------------- ---------- ----------. --------------------
CHISQ SKW 'KUR A B CHISQ SKH KUR A B CHISQ SKH KUR A B CHISQ SKW KUR A 0 CHISQ SKH KUR A B 
1 ff / S 
2 fF / AVrCE 
l Ff/ AVTA 
4 VA / S 
I) VA / AVTA 
6 VA / AVTCE 
7 VA / AV NCE 
1\ EBI r / S 
q EBIT /AVT A 
05.66 .62 .6 3 0 I) 
42.23 .56 
36.33 .33 
.66 0 7 
.5 0 0 4 
69.21 .04-.172 1 
47.14 .26 .32 3 1 
69.16 .36 .5 5 10 1 
74.33 .57 .91 9 1 
57.44 .43 .66 6 5 
44.04 .44 1.1 6 0 10 
10 EBI T/AVT C £ 56.65 .5 6 1.1 5 1 7 
11 VA / ER 1206. 4 7 1.30 6.02 10 4 
1 2 POT I S 62 .96 .J4 . 65 6 5 
13 POT I AVTA 40.97 .39 1.0 6 0 8 
1 4 PO T/ AVTNH 1)0.66 .50 1.49 2 1 
15 P BT/AVTL 113.60 .96 1.00 0 
16 PBT / AVCL 
17 PB T/AVT C E 
11\ ｐｉＳｔＯａｖｉｾｃﾣ＠
19 TNI / S 
20 TNI/AVTA 
2 1 XN IIAV/HI 
22 TNIIAVTL 
2 3 T Nj / AVGL 
2 4 TrlI/AVTCE 
2 1) TNI / AV NCE 
20 CF / S 
2 ( cr / AVJ" 
26 CF / Af A 
7.9 CF / AV fL 
\ 11 ｾ ｦ＠ I h\lCL 
72.43 .72 . 66 0 
5" . 9 7 .58 1.15 0 
59 . 62 • '. 0 1. 2 1 
66 .51 .31 . 05 0 
15. 9 1 -.0 0 .63 0 
36. 9 0 .15 1.17 0 
6 1.4 6 . 55 . 56 0 
33 . 65 .3 6 . 28 0 
38 . 80 . 26 . 99 0 
44.5 5 . 25 1. 04 t 
65 . 98 . SO .70 0 
2 7.33 . 02 . 5 4 4 
4 5 Q. 2 0 1 . 0 5 4 . 4 4 1 8 
6 1 . 15 . 7J . 5b 1 
ｾｾ Ｎ ｲｬ Ｔ＠ . 5& . JG 0 C 
- -
--- -
103.29 .49 .45 7 
29 1.76 . • 9 0 2.37 9 
236.49 . 93 2.41 9 
165.63 .94 1.15 12 
143.33 .63 .71 16 
165.11 .60 1.02 16 
155.65 .61 1.11 1 6 
84. 'H .2f, .66 5 
434.63 1 .26 4.42 5 
316.1 6 .99 2. 66 6 
63.89 -.72 .93 0 
1 910 .78 .66 2.19 4 
282.99 1.16 3.43 6 
573. 26 .90 3.43 5 
3 5 5 .37 1.07 2.97 4 
307. ':16 . 55 .81 4 
ＳＱｾＮｱｏ＠ 1.06 3.16 6 
464.22 1.36 5.31 4 
220.21 . 02 1.39 4 
431.14 1.14 3 . 91 4 
7310 . 21 .45 2.48 5 
ｾＱＰ Ｎ＠ f,2 • f>3 2 . 02 3 
746 . 20 1.110 7 . 34 1 
393 . 40 . 93 3.24 5 
506 . 43 1.06 4. ':12 4 
'n .73 . 20 1 . 06 .. 
220 .14 . 5(, t. 3 " r · 
ｊＹ ＳＲＮｲ ＱＭＱＮ ｾＰ Ｍ Ｒ Ｎ ＰＰ＠ !. 
In . 38 . 53 1 . 09 4 
4 116 . b7 . 5 7 1 . 'J 7 I 
- -----
--- --- - -
1 14.'.6 -.16 
• 42 0 4 
1 30.35 -.36 
• 82 2 4 
1 34.15 -.52 .90 1 4 
5 46.79 -.59 .46 0 4 
7 "5.96 -.56 
• 92 0 5 
6 36.1 " -.36 .65 1 
" 6 35.25 -.36 .60 0 4 
1 17.79 .14 .21 1\ 4 
2 29 .36 .05 .59 9 4 
1 27.79 .04 . 85 6 5 
11 133.50 .76 1.05 110 9 
2 16.15 -.01 .51 6 5 
1 27.05 -.09 . 66 6 4 
1 45.06 .031.1910 5 . 
1 15.69 -.i3 .45 0 3 
1 10.17-.10 
.2 3 0 2 
1 39.78 -. 29 1.17 .1 4 
1 35.21 . 081.1 5 7 4 
1 29 . 24 . 08 .2 6 8 4 
- ._. 
2 21 . 32 -.08 
• 21 11. 4 
1 32.'l7 -. 06 . 64 11 5 
1 17.B -.1 2 .4 1 1 3 
1 19 .53 . 07 -.1 6 6 1 
1 27 . 107 -. 05 . 52 q 4 
1 ',0 . .. 2 . 01 . 72 q 3 
1\ 22 .21 .1 3 .2 f> 6 2 
1 25 . 9 6 -. 09 .30 6 3 
1. 117':' . 1 il J . 1 & 9. 55 11 1 
l ' 13 . &0 - . ;)" • 3f> 0 2 
-- - --
1 1 3 . 7 6 • 02 I ? - 0 1 
-----
--- --- -
23.74 .21 .49 0 
25.15 .11 .74 0 
27.64-.11 .55 0 
17.34 -.14 -.23 5 
16.69 -.09 .11 
'" 16.47 .11 
.5" 6 
31.1" .24 .67 5 
39.35 .43 . 6 6 0 
41. 43 .02 .96 0 
35.32 .23 1.03 1 
306.47 1. 03 1. 99 13 
38.95 .37 . 9 8 0 
28.61 -.02 . 9 1 0 
51.D 3 .09 1.54 0 
J,). 7 5 .42 .64 . 0 
26.27 .31 .44 0 
48 .. 19 .15 1.07 0 
36 . 1\2 . • 12 1.26 1 
42. 68 .1 7 .78 0 
20.31 -.29 .79 0 
32.82 -.04 1.23 3 
2 8 . 97 .25 .36 0 
29. 310 . 27 .18 2 
31 . 25 -. 08 . 95 0 
3 7 . 15 -.04 1. 06 1 
36.11 . 25 . 59 a 
20.30 -. 09 .71 0 
471. 9 " 
. ')s '" .. 2 1 8 
26. 66 . 33 .'1 7 0 
26 . 2 II . 3 1 • ? r, 0 
-
4 
6 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
5 
S 
7 
6 
ｾ＠
ｾ＠
6 
6 
f 
a 
ｾ＠
ｾ＠
7 
f> 
4 
5 
fj 
4 
4 
3 
5 
I 
27.109 .20 .0 8 7 1 
61.31 
66.51 
.34 . 6 0 11 2 
.32 .55 12 2 
114.53 .':14 .99 1 7 
67.23 .42 .30 15 6 
71.89 .34 . 5 7 14 9 
62.21 .41 . 62 12 1 
23.93 .07 .29 7 1 
&6.53 . 22 . 60 11 3 
56 .03 .22 . 66 10 2 
9 0.07 -.46 .54 13 10 
36.57 .22 .72 8 2 
67.96 .21 .4 8 12 1 
78.&3 -.09 .89 12 1 
31.94 .18 .13 9 2 
22 .7 8 .32 .1 9 4 1 
52.68 .09 . 5 1 12 
63 .4 6 .07 . 82 11 
37.58 .0 2 .3 4 6 1 
62.05 .2 4 . 6 0 10 2 
74.50 .11 1. 26 8 
21 . 18 . 07 .1 6 6 1 
25 .4 6 .03 .0 & 4 
54 .4 5 .14 . 60 10 
5 ". 98 . 0 1 .7 5 10 1 
2 1. 50 -. 02 . 10 6 
42. 53 . 20 . 41 9 
.. '31 . 04-' •• 73 ····· 
2 1. 3 6 . 07 -. 07 6 
13 . g0 -. as -. (5 ｾ＠
1 
N 
-.0 
0:> 
APPENDIX E - Cont. 
UNfRA NSFORHEO RECIPROCAL LOG SQUARE ROOT SQUARE RCOT OF RECIP 
------------- ---------- ------ ----- --------------------
RATIO CHISQ SKW KUR A B CHISQ SKW KUR A B CHISQ SKW KJR A B CHISQ SKH KUR A B CHISQ SKW KUR A B 
31 CF I AVTCE 
32 CF I AVNCE 
ｾＵＮ ＸＳ＠ Ｎｾｯ＠ . 99 0 7 
39.66 . 05 . 91 3 1 
33 OSCF/AVOSE ｾＲＮＲＰ＠ ＮｾＳ＠ 1.17 9 
----- --- ---
272.37 .62 1.52 
511.82 1.71 7.91 
500.36 1. 22 6.13 
- -
7 
3 
4 
----- --- ---
1 23.62 -.01' 
• 32 
2 23.02 .06 • ｾ＠ 0 
1 ＲｾＮＵＲ＠ .04 • 50 
- - ----- --- --- - -
8 3 3 0.01 .0 6 . 84 0 ｾ＠
9 3 25.40 .05 .9 5 0 5 
10 3 41.46 . 06 1.12 1 7 
Ｓｾ＠ OR I CA 50 .21 ＭＮ Ｕｾ＠ Ｎｾ Ｒ＠ 0 ｾＰＵ Ｎ ＹＰ＠ 2.10 6 .93 9 1 ＱｾＶＮＲＢ＠ ＭＮＹｾ＠ 1.39 14 7 125.38-1.00 1.10 0 7 
728.41 2.13 7.39 7 1 &5 . 22 -. 58 1. 25 0 4 
44.98 . 53 . 34 1 4 ＲＰＮＳｾ＠ .12 •• 42 0 5 
35 OR / XINV. 
36 CA I CL 
37 FA I TA 
48.86 .35 .3 2 13 9 
01.57 .61 .76 0 
61.39 . 87 1.06 0 9 
25 .72 ＭＮｾＴ＠ .50 0 512 
62 .15 .88 .8 3 0 10 
61.310 . 57 .41 12 ｾ＠ . 20.40 -.23 .51 0 5 
311 we I fNW 
39 IIC I TL 
'10 T A I ER 
1,1 WC I XNCE 
ｾＲ＠ we / OR 
ｾＳ＠ AVIIC I S 
ｾＴ＠ TL /Hl H 
1, 5 TL / TA 
.. 6 OEOT I QA 
ｾＱ＠ E[Hf / AV TL 
.. 8 TA / TN Ii 
4 '1 QA / TNU 
50 C A I T Nil 
51 CL I Ttlll 
52 AVTrlW I S 
1627.03 1.65 6.37 9 3 
19 • 6 3 -. 44 • 2 6 0 311 
ＱｾＵＮＶＴ＠ . 37 1.59 20 71 
ｾＱＮＸＱ＠ . 5& . 57 1 5 
159. b & • 91 .7 4 12 10 
16. 22 
255 . Q9 
104.9 11 
.1 9 -. 30 
• ｾＹ＠ . 14 
.% 1.03 
o 
o 
o 
o. 
;12 
15') . 66 . 91 .7 4 12 10 
')2 . 02 . 97 1.16 0 8 
1"9 . 26 1. 03 1. 5 3 1 1 0 
220 . 88 1.37 1. 6 2 2 1 0 
58 . 2 0 . 39 . 0 1 12 4 
165.40 2.0016.30 1 1 
788.99 1.00 3.35 4 1 
55.05 .33 .07 3 ' 1 
172.09 1.25 3.71 3 1 
679.98 3.9350 .11 2 2 
251 . 87 .56 1.93 1 1 
163.26 1.12 1.03 1 . & 
163.26 1.12 1.03 1 & 
.. 35.57 . 28 5.28 1t6 .. & 
268 .09 . &9 1. 5& 5 1 
15.45 -. 19 - . 30 0 0 
0 .7 4 
• 55 • 86 21 13 
2 . Ｕｾ＠ .3 6 . &5 18 12 
2.15 1.00 . e5 2 6 
9 . 00 .I, b . 25 1 ') 10 
,J DEO T I rNW 162 . 33 ."0 .1 3 20 Ｑ Ｐｾ＠ ｾ Ｎ Ｐ Ｗ＠ . 65 &. 9 1 4 6 4 b 
5 1, DEBT /T CI: 
55 CA I TL 
5& ｾ ｶｃｒ Ｏ ｃｏｓ＠
169 . 29 . 5" -. 05 0 3 
8 4.5 9 . 8 4 . 65 C 
3') . 13 Ｎ ｾ＠ . 62 0 
0 . 2l 
9 . 55 
6 .1 ') 
• ｾＵ＠ &. 66 .. & .. b 
. 72 . 6& 0 II 
• II') 1. I 1 5 1 
,*8. 50 -.39 .28 10 1 
10.7& -.21 
• ｾＶ＠ 0 4 
75.60 .56 .73 12 10 
ＶｾＮＰＲ＠ -.47 .24 11 3 
81.77 .53 1.72 14 5 
13 . 93 .0 2 
• .. 3 1 2 
ＱｾＮ＠ 00 . 16 ' .03 0 3 , 
38 . 56 -. 52 
• ｏｾ＠ 0 1 
621.76-1.88 2.&6 0 0 
12.03 -. 05 
• itS 0 3 
7'i. 06 .83 . 54 0 7 
44.79 -.44 1.03 0 0 
57 . 55 -.27 1.12 0 6 
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APPENDIX F 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: THE ASSUMPTIONS AND 
STATISTICAL TESTS EMPLOYED 
This appendix decribes the assumptions and statistical test employed 
in the analyses referred to in chapter VI. The regression method 
employed in this study is based upon the least squares criterion which 
is summarised by Koutsoyiannis (1977: p61) as follows: 
"The rationale of this criterion is easy to understand. It is 
intuitively obvious that the smaller the deviations from the line 
of the regression, the better the fit of the line to the scatter 
of the observations. Consequently from all possible lines we 
choose the one for which the deviations from the points is the 
smallest possible. The 'least squares criterion' requires that 
the regression line be drawn in such a way as to minimise the sum 
of the squares of the observations from it." 
Koutsoyiannis also goes on to establish that the regression estimates 
derived in this way do actually possess the optimal properties 
accepted as desirable by traditional statistical theory. (For a more 
extensive and mathematical ､･ｳ｣ｲｩｰｾｩｯｮ＠ of MRA see Koutsoyiannis 
(1977:100).) 
The assumptions underlying MRA are as follows: 
1) the error term 'e' is a random variable, with a mean value of zero 
and a normal distribution. This means that errors due to bad 
measurement in the ､･ｾ･ｮ､･ｮｴ＠ varjable, to omitted variables and the 
mathematical form of the model should be random in nature. 
2) the probability distribution for 'e' remains the same over all 
observations, that is the er.'or term is homoscedastic. 
3) the explanatory variableS are uncorrelated, that is the model is 
free from multicollinearity. 
4) the model has no specificiation error in that all the important 
variables appear explicitly in the function and the mathematical form 
is correctly defined. In other words the model formulated is on a 
priori grounds correct and that the regression coefficients are 
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, statistically correct estimates of the true population parameters. 
This is not an exhaustive list of assumptions although it does cover 
the important issues. The first assumption concerning the random 
nature, of the error term cannot be tested directly (Koutsoyiannis 
1977:179) and therefore it has to be established on a priori grounds. 
As every effort was made to avoid any errors in the data and the 
formulation of the model, it is reasonable ' to assume ' that this 
assumption is valid. The second assumption concerning 
heteroscedasticity was tested by firstly transforming all the 
variables and bringing in the outliers, and secondly by plotting 
scatter diagrams of each of the , independent variables with the 
dependent variables. As no wide tails or unusual distributions were 
found on the scatters it was considered reasonable to conclude that 
the error term is homoscedastic and thus the second assumption is 
valid. 
The problems of multicollinearity, the third assumption, were avoided 
in two ways. Firslty by ensuring that all variables entering into a 
model were measuring a different financial characteristic according to 
the principal component analysis(see appendix G). In addition the 
correlation between any two independent variables had to be below a 
rule of thumb ' value of .60 and no greater than the variance explained 
by the model. 
The final assumption regarding the specification of the model was 
adhered to by ensuring that the model was statistically significant in 
all respects, and by using intuition and judgement when choosing the 
final models. 
The multiple regression analyses were conducted in a stepwise manner 
on the data 'described in chapter V. The stepwise technique is a 
method whereby the most significant explanatory variable enters the 
model first and this is successively added to by selecting other 
variables suquentially that explain more variance after taking into 
account the variance explained by their predecessors. (For more 
detailed explanation see Nie et aI, 1975). The models presented in 
this thesis were decided upon after condUcting numerous stepwise 
multiple regression analyses with various control criteria ego 
excluding certain variables and altering the levels of significance. 
It is believed that in this way it was possible to derive a "good" 
model from the data. 
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The Statistical Significance Tests 
When using multiple regression care has to be taken to ensure that the 
models formulated are statistically correct and provide unbiased 
estimates of the true models. If the basic tests are violated in 
anyway it could result in incorrect and spurious results. The tests 
for significance in MRA can be categorised into three separate aspects 
as follows: 
a) The Over-All Significance of the Model. 
It is pOSSible, especially with small samples, to incorrectly believe 
that the variance explained by the model is statistically significant. 
The F-Test provides the means for testing whether the causal 
relationship proposed by the model is significant or whether it could 
be caused by chance. The F-Value for the model is calculated as 
follows: 
Mean Square Error of Regression Model 
. 
F-Value = 
Mean Square Error of the Residual 
with degree of freedom: v1 = k - 1, v2 - n - k 
where k = no. of variables in model + 1,n - total number of 
observations. This F-Value is then examined to find whether or not 
it is significant at a given level of confidence. 
b) The Significance of the Independent Variables in a Model. 
It is quite a common fault to presume ' that because the overall model 
is statistically significant all the individual variables in the model 
are statistically significant. In order to ensure that each of the 
variables is adding significantly to the variance explained in the 
dependent variable the F-Test is used as follows: 
Mean Square Error of Xi Additional Variation 
F-Value = 
Mean Square Error of Residual 
with Degrees of Freedom, v1 = 1 and v2 = n - k 
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",{here k = number of variables in model + 1. 
Again the F-Value calculated would be compared with the F-Tables 
c) The Regression Coefficients 
One of the properties of a multiple regression model is that the model 
coefficients are unbiased and have minimum variance properties. To 
test for this a t-value is calculated as follows: 
Regression Coefficient i 
t-calc = 
Stand3rd Error of Coefficient i 
This t-value is then compared to the values in a T-Table for a given 
number of degress of freedom to see whether the coefficient is 
statistically significant at a given level of confidence. 
The above tests establish the signif1.cance of a M.R. model but from a 
utility point of view, the researcher requires to know a) how much of 
the variation in the dependent variable the model 'explains and b) what 
is the relative importance of each variable in the model. The first 
statistic is given by the coefficient of determination (or, as is it 
is often called, the adjusted R squared). This represents the amount 
of variance explained and ranges from ｏｾｏ＠ to 1.00, that is nil and all 
variance explained respectively. Obviously the lower the variance 
explained the less useful the model. 
The second statistic required is the standard partial regression 
coefficient (or beta coefficient) for each coefficient. This 
measures the amount of movement in the dependent variable, measured in 
standard deviations, caused by one standard deviation movement in an 
independent variable. When this statistic is calculated for all the 
independent variables it is then possible to compare the relative 
importance of each variable as measured by its influence of the 
dependent variable providing the variables are relatively orthogonal. 
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APPENDIX G 
THE RESULTS OF 
THE PRINCIP AL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
304 
AP P E ｲｾ＠ 0 I X G 1 
VA RIHAX R eTAT EO FACTOR HAT RIX ORTHOGANAL FACTOR ANALYSIS 
AFT ER NOTATION WITH KAI SE R NORMALI ZATI ON 
FACT OR 1 fJlCT OR 2 FACTO R 3 FAC TOR I, FACTOR 5 FAC TOR b FACTOR 7 FACT OR 8 FACTOR 9 FACTOR 10 
ｆｆ ｾ＠ .6b Y4 Q 
.3969 ', .0 1,351 • 0 gO 1 n .411 2 7'l -.05221 
-.0110&3 
- .0 70 'i6 -.01048 .03707 FFATCE .8 Y144 
-.1 &70 2 
-.01318 .0 6 7 .. 3 
-.07317 .17677 .139 .. 8 -.04', '.il 
-.011 6 5 .030 25 FFAT " • lI ' l268 • 1 ｾＳ＠ 9 8 .OSl 9 9 • 0 62 0 7 -.04 6 19 .02116 .0 <:I 8 7 9 -.0 3') 6& .03'J7] .00 0 0 9 1/ AS .1 ,.1 3 0 • J 74 'J 3 .0 >S O II 3 .042711 
.4937" .0130" .71561 • 0 '>5 7 Ii .0118'l .02142 VH T/I 
.2 11 3 6 7 .0 ;>.2 8 6 .07 2 27 • 0 1 /l .. 4 -.18988 .107 6 1 . eH 3 65 
.0 9 0 3 2 .0 30 14 .Gll '3 3 VAIIT CE . 3 18 r, .. 
-. 2t17 01 .0 1J 5 2 7 . 0 0%'1 -.1'l53 ,) . 2 5 0 17 .8 2 4') 9 .0 (, 1 3'l 
-.03330 .032 % VAII NC ( • 2 .. ] 3 7 -.', 22 118 
-.01 2 07 -.0 5511 7 
-.1 11 021 .1077 6 .1\1 5 05 .132 'J6 -.01316 -.01115 Erll r s 
. 6 7 2 01 
.3 9 31'> .0 3531 • 1 ｾ ＷＱｪＲ＠ .4 9 7',7 .01108 -.171 6 1 
-.066 .38 
-.0 6 1.1& .0 .. 711 EUlrATII 
. Y1S Z9 .1 1l .. 2
'
, 
.0', 6 0 8 .1 ')'.11 /I .0 lJ 56 • 08036 -.01391 -.08'< (,0 
-.0 2 4 9 5 .02'<79 E[HT ATCE ｾｾ＠ -.109 73 .00 525 .139',4 
-.00"67 .218 9 0 .01 6 17 
-.0 6869 -.O h O'l3 .04 3 44 I/ AER 
-. 5 16 ') 5 
-.118 9 2 .0 026 3 
-.0 5769 -.07S0,) 
.04617 .7 4 3/\ 1 .098 qz .04'l&3 
-.00342 PBTS ｾ Ｕ Ｔ Ｖ＠ .43 2 05 .0 30 4 9 · .1 74 65 .3')21 4 
.1 5 44 5 -.13720 -.074 5'4 -.0 3 780 • G6 8 4 7 PB TATA • all ｱｾ＠ J . 2')'.1':1 0 .0 5 3 3 2 .1 i 35 4 .0151<) .216]0 
-.0 2 028 -,0 &2 27 -.01 &49 .05285 po r AI NW • ') 2 41 2 -.1431 5 -
-.012/\ 7 .14 840 -.02373 
.0 8 122 -.01751 -.1 H 43 -.05413 .0 1H91 POTATl • 71.J r,S 
.5 50 14 .07 8 14 .1 f 85 9 • 03 6 01 • 30070 -.03175 .03155 -.01573 . 02401 I'L1T AC l • (",j(, b O • (, 04 6 4 . 056 02 • 2 0 770 • 0 so Z 4 • 1 bO & 9 -.0&&9& -.0 htl 24 -.041&4 .0 2 87 2 PUTArC E • ')0 ｾ＠ 1 2 .0 2U L .0 2 311& .1 El7 3 -.014 12 
.31&89 .01 9 40 - .0 6 5 85 -.05216 .07144 Ptl T.tINCt: - :92TIo 
-.0 61126 .017 &0 .120 3 3 
-.01 9 8 q 
.24435 .01572 -.0 2899 -.03 26 4 .0& 352 
v. Hil S • ? I, 2d 4 . 45 7 25 . 011892 .0 5343 . 39/\ 'l 0 
.04 86 7 
-.103 &8 .0 2 3 'jO 
-.01 6 77 .0 2'1<; 1 Co TNI ATA ｾＱＦＰＵ＠ .2 5') 2 1 .11543 .0 2', 0 0 -.0 211 Z 6 
.0 8 .. 5 3 .0 5 30 6 .0744 g 
.014 Z1 -.013 &7 ( .'1 XtlI ANW ｾ Ｇ ｾ＠ -.I <;'l 7 Q .U10 5 4 5 -.01136 -.O&]3 q 
-.0 5 056 . 0 3702 -.01401 -.01 9 41 . 035 0 5 T NI II T l 
_....uti!! .571. 5 r, 
.12859 . 04748 
-.001 'l 0 
. 2 1 0 01 .0133 6 .1 26'3 4 .OO o lt7 -. 02 1 2 6 TIll AC l • 717 50 • L 310 U5 .111 9 1 .0 1lb B .00772 
.05 9 1\1 -.0 2 0 99 .01 % 1 -.0 2 2 5 3 -. 0 19 2 1 T:n Ii TC E • '1 1,0 G 1 .01 5,}<) 
.074 6 0 • 0 1 314 '- •. 056 1. 2 .210 72 .07375 .0 3q 95 -.01£,6 4 . 03 0 75 TNI ANCE • q44 1 9 -. 01\ 147 . 0 71 0& -. 0 4 311 
- . 06551 .117 'l6 . 0 7 2 1 '.1 .!l 8 7 3 1 .0 O'l'1 'l . 02 1 2 7 ｃｆｾ＠ -=-:--T21lS 1) 
-.4 64 18 
-. 013 7 ':l -. 0220 'l -. H5'lS 
. 0327 1 . 0<;302 .0 579,} 
-. 028 1 3 .1 5027 CFIITA 
. lId5 1 '! . 233 14 . 0202 q 
-. 0 1.B5 -. 10', 72 . 00731 .lt 6'l 7 
- • 0 155
'
• . 05351) -. 2 0411 
r.F,'llFA 
. 25& 1 & . 0 14 &1 Ｎ ＲＶＹＰ ｾ＠ -.O QIl 1 9 
- . 004811 
-. 0 1 378 . 049 .. .. .0 76 20 .1 0%'l -.031 9 eFA Il 
.711 52 . 5%20 . 0 70t,) . 02 7'19 
-. 06 131 .1 &326 . 06B6 1 .0 75 .. 0 • 04 Oil 3 -.17 232 CFAC L . 61l 31 1 . 050 14 . 0 .. 853 • 0 753 q -. 051 311 -. 0 1 2')& 
. 0 31 1\5 
-.0 5 141 . 00 7 28 
-.1656 0 CFA I CE , 'Hi 1 02 -. 031l 1 6 
-. 0 11l511 - • 0 Z 3'l} · -.1 2'\<) 3 • 1 5052 .1 I, 39 5 - . 034QQ . 0 148 2 -.1 &2 1 5 CFA Nt E 
--:-AIl'l3 4 -.1 4'1j ') 
-. 02898 - • 0854 Q 
- .1 3327 . 0437& . 14614 
. 01(".0 . 0 4 2'1 3 
-.1 8746 
OSCFAC SE • 84':1J5 -. 242'; 7 
-. 06638 ＭＮ ＰＴ ｯ ｾ Ｔ＠ -.1 2Q27 
-.1 577'l .11 2 5 1 
-. 04381) • 0 1 6'J 3 - .17 26 4 ORCA 
-. 0 ｊｾ＠ '. Ii -. 1210'> 7 - • .1 3 1 8 3 • 3307 g -. 0 77 'l0 
-. 012E6 . 07 U 2 
-. Ot llbO . 825n . 0 11 80 OR X 1 t/V . 0 .12 95 -. 0&2 41 -.4 602 4 . 62Yb5 
-. 02632 . OJCjJ9 
. 04 4 43 . 00633 . 561\9 7 . 0404'J CAel • 0 11 1 <;.\ . 5 74 QO .7 47&11 . 24')? 4 . 06757 • 0 7 562 • 0 1 3 5 1 -. 02':lb0 
-. 017 22 . 00 4 101:' FAIII -. n.1 'J b 7 . 52H, 7 -.7 '>O'l4 
- . 0'l 17 1 . 00005 
-. 1 7 526 
-. 045 7 6 
- • 1 f:tI 26 .0 1<)00 
-. 0273 'l HC r NH .0 '1&1'1 -. 0 '156 1 . QO·. 7. 0 . 22711 1 . 0&2')4 
-. 0536S 
-. 01608 
-. 0 5436 
-. 037 ' j 1 
. 05 1 08 ue r L . 1102& . 52 '}4<; . 7 &5 1 G . 20]7'1 
. 056 1& 
. 2 1 20 1 . 0 41 2 2 . 06954 • 02352 . DOQ2 1 TA Eq 
-. 011<'/1 4 -. U2 7 6<; . 04 Qll, -. IJ O'. O.S 
-. 1fd 74 . 0'1& 7& . 90 1 60 
. 10 11 6 • 00389 . 02038 wf-XNCE • 1 25 u 7 -. 02 171 . qz7Q2 . 111 9 / 1 . 04160 • 1 ':44 Ii . 01858 . 08 1 6Z 
-. 00 4 03 . 052 4 S ｗｃｉｬｉｾ＠ • (j(,')4 C • 3 Ｗｾ＠ 3 'J . 6 6 4(' 7 . 0,)<,07 • 3 ＧＮｩ］ｊｲＬｾ＠ . 0 3 1 74 . 01512 
. 03717 -. 50Q75 
-. 04 764 A ｉｾｃＺ［＠ -. Olf,Jr, . 3 1> 4 7 4 . 7 5 Y55 • ? 07'>4 . '<27 &1; 
. 0 4 1 elo 
-. OIl2 5Q 
- • 0 ｾｏ＠ 55 
-. 0205 1 . 042 1 8 
r LI :m 
-. 09164 -. 11'1612 -. 147 '1 1 ＭＮ ＧｬＵＲＵｾ＠ ' . a .. ＰＶｾ＠ -. 34'150 . 1)02 '14 -. 1 7<l 14 _ . n 1 I. ( c:::: 
-
n .. I . o r.: 
A 
G -J 
C:. 
(>--
lLTA 
o ELJ l 'lA 
E!lI TATL 
1 .t r ｉｾ ｬ Ｍ ｉ＠
QA r rH{ 
CI\Trw 
ｃｕｉｾｾ＠
II I HW:; 
0 ':: 11 r I r!w 
IlEu rI el' 
CA lL 
/\ C'{'';U J 
COS/\ INV 
I\U ,'I' IJlJ t 
1\ C"S 
1\ ｣Ｎｾ＠ S 
S MH 
SA l A 
:.; 1\ r CE 
S J\:.IC E 
SAIU v 
DAY ＺＺＺＺｄ Ｇｾ ｓ＠
IJ AC L 
(JI\ I L 
ｾｉ ･＠ x I WJ 
XINVCA 
{JACL I'D,l E 
ｅｕｬｶｯｾｲＭ 1 
ｅｬｬ ｊＧｊ ｣ｾｲ ｬｬ＠
eLT": 
OAI I\ 
CIIT II 
IJ En rTII 
Il EU I C A 
TNI ATNfI 
XNl E Llr! 
ｉｬ ｉ＼ｃ Ｚ ｾ＠
CLCI< 
x trlV C L 
A ::·_.G I<! II 
P RIlGR TII 
ｴ ｓ ｃｉｾ＠
IJ E r 1\ 
L Cr, T ,. 
- lU GI ICi: 
11K TLIO 
FACTOR 
ＭＮｏｉｪＷＧＬｾ＠
- • ..su251 
• 71] II /I.i 
• U Ｇ ｊｾ［ Ｇ ｊ＠ j 
.01lY l 
• 0 ［ｾＨ ｦ＠ L 2 
-. o'-, Ｑ ＱＱ Ｇ ｾ＠
-. 0 ' )0 " (] 
-. ni!72 
-. 273Gd 
. 1?b3J 
-. U2tl '.)0 
• U ､ｴＡＮｾ＠ 0 
• u <)q ljo 
• IJ 1 7 <; 7 
-. 11 i' j') 
.1 5 ')7 j 
• 1 'J 2 70 
. 22<'> t. 2 
• 1 31J 7 7 
-.H,15 .S 
-. 0')1,0 i! 
.1 2 ':LII 
.If,77P, 
• 1 .10 /II 
-. O<J .. 11 3 
.171)01 
• :;1 'H 4 
-.n3 C7 
-. ｮｾ Ｔ ＲＳ＠
• 1311 0 ', 
• otl33 G 
- • .H 268 
- • ＮｬＱＱｾ｢＠
• '-l ', ld l 
ｾＷ ｴｩ ｾＲ＠
• ｾ＠ I,?', 2 
• il2 3 Ytl 
-. IJJ '-J 2 (j 
• ,, ', " y.) 
• 3l2J1 
• 'd 2u 1 
.0 2
'
,13 
-.O ') 'JllI 
-.1.10 08 
-. 0 '-j 'J 02 
FACT eR 7 
-.!\ <til 01 
-.1 25 11 2 
• ｾ＠ 12 80 
• /I Clil / 5 
-----
-.0 22 '-J7 
. !l'lt Il 
ＭＭＺｧ ｾ＠
.17173 
ｾＱＱＢ＠
-. 1,1'17 6 7 
• ｾ＠ 227', 
-. 5(,U 1 tl 
-.U:;-)I\O 
.0111 2 
-. O',7 8tl 
-. a 02'-l 3 
-. (, 2',7 1 
- • I, C 731 
-. (,13711 
- • 7 21',4 
• II 1 7 'J'l 
-.10 0UI\ 
• 3 IJ ') 72 
. 2 / 9 '13 
.4 /d '> 1 
.0 505] 
• I, 30 71 
-.0 66 IlZ 
.07 .H, IJ 
-.'35107 
-.4331\0 
-.5 3 i'46 
-.325111, 
-. 1 'old 1.3 
-.1 'J<J -:Jj 
-.36ll) lf 
.41047 
-.1 ,) 7 9£; 
• 41 '. 1t: 
-. 01''/\ 3 
-. 0 ｾＵＰＲ＠
-.!.. 74 ., 52 
-.1 '5'340 
• 04 a 10 
-.13 1) /,2 
• a tlJ tl i, 
ｆａｃｔｯｲｾ＠ 3 
-.t:s9S1 
-.1033', 
.U li 7 56 
.1 5 J (j 7 
• n I) .-S" '3 
-. 3 (,,9 U8 
ＭＮｴ ｾｓ ＰＶ＠
.1 i.J2 1 :; 
-. 0 '1 7 2 2 
ＭＮｕ ﾷ ﾷ Ｉｉ｜Ｚ ｾ Ｖ＠
• "11 tl /\;, 
-. 0 'J!l3 I, 
-. fl300 0 
.1I' il'3 ', 
.1 !IS ') 7 
. 5 / 68 1 
. 50 r,13 
-. 00 I, I' f. 
-. U',-; Y 1 
-. 0 'jf, ltf: 
• r, 11\ 07 
.17 6'.)Y 
. 2 I, R 7 a 
• ;> 70',1 
.4 .S6 00 
.44 3LO 
.2 2265 
.0 5133 
• n0775 
-.0 Il l!)3 
.162 56 
.7 '11 115 
-. 1)5 703 
-. 2 111 'Jd 
.0 ', 2 31' 
-.01 90 7 
. 2 '56 7 2 
. 00 7 5 1 
.1 112 Y 7 
• Q'l ()6'l 
• 01/1 tl ' J 
• 2 'tl 0 1 
-.1 2 11 9 
. 05732 
.(1 28'.;2 
• U 5'>6 1, 
FIIr:: lOR 4 
-.0559 4 
-.3 lb', 0 
.1 <; 25 'l 
.04 9711 
.'JOl.n 
-.0 20 '1', 
-.10I h9 
.03 21 ') 
-.1) '3 16 3 
ＭＮＰＷ ＶＵｾ＠
.1 36 70 
-.0'15(:) ' • 
. 3 :H ',Y . 
• bit Ib 5 
• 6Sj2 5 
.0 67 11 
• a '-l 3tl 7 
- • 0 1 34 ｾ＠
-. 01 iJU 2 
-. 0 77 ',1 
-.4 3'-J2 I, 
• 27 33 Y 
• II :'1\ 72 
.74l.7 2 
ｾｏｩｩＧｪ＠
- • 1Ir, 7l', 
ｾ＠
.07 62 ', 
• 0 082 a 
- • 14 5'12 
• tl 01\51\ 
ｾ＠
-.0 11 015 
-.09111 
-.01110 
-. 23 19 ,5 
• 3f: 50 5 
. IJ 42tl 2 
-.3 8 Ｙ ｾ ｪｊ＠
-. 09 7,,"1 
ＭＮＰｾＷ ｡Ｗ＠
.3 5/.3 7 
- • II 1, 3'1 '. 
.0 fO] 6 
.0 3 71 6 
• ｾ＠ 1 11 4 r, 
FACTOR 5 
-.04449 
.01947 
.0'>241 
.04129 
• 000 ｉＧｾ＠
.0',571 
ＭＮＰ ｾＶＵＵ＠
.5 5 628 
.03160 
.03410 
• D 35 Z 1 
• 6 1,30 9 
-. 583/11', 
.f, 95Z4 
• 67'l'.) 5 
.77043 
- .113625 
-. 1:12')9 7 
-. 6 "',77 
- .'.'j'-l 75 7 
. 511'1 70 
.';'J709 
.0 90-42 
. 0 G906 
.090 38 
-.0'.5'>0 
-.0060 .3 
-.0 Ｔ Ｎ ｾＵＵ＠
.0 2 0 &0 
-.07107 
.016 80 
-.01 2 11 
• n 1,4 103 
.03 53 5 
-.06<:;4& 
. 0308 4 
.01\ 95 0 
-.1.1l 5 1 0 
• U 0 39 7 
-. 1"0 ｾＧｊ＠
ＭＮＰｾ ｱ ＱＵ＠
.05111 7 
• 01)055 
.0 OS ! 6 
-.01 01',11 
.::J 03 86 
FI\C ｔｯｲｾ＠ 6 
-.341411 
-.71177 & 
. 2 30 :S8 
. 34 132 
-.10270 
.14551 
-.15 9 5& 
.10 2 11 
-.7 8 476 
-.7 11 147, ' 
.3<)976 
• 1 ') 12 4 
• a ,<31l8 
• a Z I. 4 0 
• fJ2738 
-. 03 5 .. 0 
• 1 CJ 113 
• U'l62 
.2 03 02 
.1 0'121 
- .0 66 113 
.C1461 
.1133 i' 
• 3 68 74 
• 1 2'. 06 
-.0743 8 
• 13'-l03 
.0', 9 11 
.0 3 7 2 1 
.01 6>\2 
• 1 64 811 
.14'H 9 
-. 8 4 ')19 
-. 1l21, 9Z 
-. G4 8 '(3 
-. 'd3 71 
-. 1'.7 ｾ＠ 3 
.43809 
-.00944 
-.00 1'13 0 
-.04 113 0 
.1 9 340 
.1022'! 
• 174 94 
• : 5 43i' 
• 1" 11 11 
fA Cl 0 R 7 
.00508 
-.15 '-l" 2 
-.0 /,212 
-.OOlH' 
• G I 'J6/1 
-. 0&9% 
.04607 
ＭＮＱ Ｐｾ ＷＲ＠
-.127 9& 
-.11'li17 
.0 8 55& 
- .055 76 
-.14 8 05 
-.11803 
-.1026 8 
- .12'3 % 
.130 32 
.231157 
.2 2'1 06 
.2111'-l 
-.07459 
-.01013 
- .01 30i' 
.0 1,1" & 
.0 0 119 
.030 8 5 
-.OD2 'lO 
.04 0 0'8 
.0 2 " &9 
.0 11 392 
.0 1,462 
.(1/15 11 1 
-.13 26 4 
ＭＮＱＴｾＳＷ＠
.0 3tl2 1 
-.0390 11 
-.0024 2 
.1 2 1\tllI 
.03 9 1 9 
- .1" Dill 
- . OU65 4 
-.03 811 0 
.053'l5 
.25<'75 
.2560 " 
-.00 212 
APPENDIX G1 - Cnnt . 
FACT ｏｬ ｾ＠ 1\ 
-.14070 
-.1 5922 
• 0 3502 
.1 25(J1) 
.00':l 1 2 
• 0 010 04 
.01l3! 
.0 39,)g 
-.113 21 
- .0 95 1 U 
• 2? 1 55 
-.137 5(1 
.0 2355 
.0415', 
• a 71 5'l 
.0 <, 62 4 
.11 &85 
• a 4& 0 2 
.0163 L 
.0 'l1" 5 
ＭＮＰＰｾＷ Ｖ＠
-.0 0381', 
- • 0 2 0 'll 
.1 65211 
-.01 92 1 
-.0 222 1 
-.01313 
-. 01:'%5 
-.007 /,,, 
.1 20 ｾＵ＠
.L 005Y 
.1<'17 'J 
-.0 %56 
-.150 1)5 
-. C I 508 
-.0 309 3 
.1 01' a 7 
- .2 52 fOg 
-.0 3 'J02 
-.0 306 1 
-. 060611 
-.on71 5 
-. b026 1 
. 8 5'l 00 
. tl5YO l 
----:-IT&28 
FAClOR 9 
.003 .31 
-.0083') 
-.01 956 
.01732 
• 08761 
-.0 2112 7 
.011143 
.018U3 
.0',07 3 
.03633 
.0<' 1' '' 10 
.00 "II', 
.00371 
.011 1',6 " 
• a &9 4 a 
-.01 5 411 
-.0377& 
.0"90 G 
.01031 
.01/140 
-.O','-l88 
• & 7 75 7 
.10331 
.lY7 I\Q 
.00324 
-.13 211 " 
-.04 9 11 
.0 6 ,,', 5 
.03137 
.0 5636 
.14 " 9 1, 
.0 2"81, 
.0 3 1111 
.01033 
-.01 5611 
• 0 2 07" 
• & 1',8 j 
-. 021Q5 
ＭＮｏ ｢ ｾｬ ｴｬ＠
ＮＲＱＱＱ Ｕ Ｎ ｾ＠
• 05 L 1, 0 
-.0 4114" 
I 
-.111 6 " 
-.0 20i' 1 
-.0 2 1 02 
-.0 50 '." 
F AC TOR 10 
-. DOIl03 
-.01337 
.0071L 
.Ul&1I1 
- • GOO 76 
.0 2 7 Y':l 
-.02777 
. 0333') 
-. O', G7,) 
-. 0',7 &" 
-. 019'-l0 
-.Oil 313 
.O G949 
• O',g 13 
.G '> 71'l 
• a a 113', 
. 0 1 ')&'1 
-.V 231l'l 
-.e0 2 I,1 
-. G 31', 7', 
-.C :Sb 2 1 
.01 990 
. 0201)0 
.01 5'14 
.OI, f, oO 
-. 053 17 
.04'l14 
• 751 711 
ｾＵ･ｱ＠
-.0 2879 
.0401 1) 
. 00 ',110 
-. [;3 6 37 
-.0 2175 
. 03', 22 
-. 038'. '-J 
.01, 0 11 
-.113 Y'1 
-.0 3035 
-. 01'1 113 
- • ',l' 2 bY 
• 014 'J2 
-.1 5 127 
-. 0007b 
- .OI 70G 
- • 1 0114 1 
ｾ｜＠ P P Er J D I X G 1 - C a fl t . 
f' At: ｔ ｴｊｬｾ＠ 11 
r ｆｾ［＠ • 1hl III 
I rtll Cf- Ｎ ｏ､ｾＵＵ＠
Ff'1I 1/1 • ｬｾ ｮ＠ J 
ｖａ Ｎ ｾ＠ • U d I ' ld 
V AA T i. • 0111 1 b 
Vr.,\II.t 
-. Il Ｂｾ＠ d 5 
VAllrlCI • 0 1 1 Ij-l 
L 'II T:: • <'l 'i tl j 
[ 13 1 I A 1 A . al?? 
I lHlAlce • ＱＵｯ Ｇ ｾＵ＠
VA tl< -.1 2 11.,1 
.... 1JI<; • 1111 07 
I' tll A I II . 1/1) % 
PljfA I ml 
· lS',', I 
I' Il TilT L • 1 hl)ll'J 
Pt3II1CL . 1')jYO 
PI)T 1\ r CF • 1'; 2 71 
ｃＭｾｊ＠ I'M lillCt .1 6 7/ 'j C> 
' J ) tI [:.; - . Q'>O Utl 
I IHIlIII -. 0115<,(' 
AI/ [A 1:.1 
- • 1 ',U 'd 
I N[ II I L 
-. U 1 Gil l 
TI/[,).I:L 
-. Of,O 'I;:> 
1 UI II I e,. 
- . 1 11 ','J 
I II I I\/ICI 
- . 111', 'J 
U'; • 1' . U 11 
CFA I 1\ 
-. ｚｾ＠ 4 "11 
crlllll-A 
-. 0 I tl 5 ', 
LFI\ TL -. lL jill> 
CFAt:L 
- . 1 ':>'. ::is 
CFIITCf Ｍ Ｎ ＲｾＶｴｬＧｊ＠
CIMIC£ -. 200',1 
I)<;CI' ,\ O:;E 
-. Z -lyJ', 
IJf<CA 
- . 0'.0 t..1 
URx'It<:V - • 0 ?ll 1 Y 
CAeL - . G .\ 7 U I, 
f Il r A - . Ot,dbll 
riC r ｉｉｉｾ＠ ＭＮ ｏＮｬｾＴＵ＠
we r L . OU5'17 
TIILI< - . Il '. t 16 
HCXllt;I: • O?O ｾＭｬ＠
IICIlr-( 
-. U <'I: ｾ＠ 3 
Awe, • U<"ltl-l 
1 l. T i 11< - . c S ＱＱｾ＠ Ｌｾ＠
T LT A 
- . U 0 1 I ', 
IlI:.UlUII • 0 ',2.1', 
l ] II II r L . 2222Y 
TIl 1 :11-1 • U'·265 
fl .,: r' " • (jUO 51) 
1" • 11 ＢｾＢ＿Ｂ＠
APPENDIX G1 - cant 
F Ae TOR 11 
GLTNH . 00354 
ATN I, S • Ii 1B 53 
OHlITNH • 0331 II 
OEIlT1GE . 052111 
GA T L • 0 Ｆ Ｎ ｾＴ＠ 5 
ACRCOS -.3 5536 
CUS A ItN -.032 j q 
AQAPOO f . 0HOl 
/lUAS • 00 <1 b 0 
ACA:-; . 070 1 ｾ＠
SArA ＮＰ Ｎ ｾｾＴＱ＠
'-'. 
S liT A -.U b7 1 6 
C> ｾｊ｜ｔｃｅ＠ - .11 0 <:;5 
co S /INCE -.Ol,foJd 
S Alrw .0 5542 
OIlYSOR:> 
- . 041"11 
UACL -.01 1148 
QAr l .0 t,1I tu 
"C.<INV - .0 367':) 
XINVCA - . Ol302 
QAC LPLl Ot -.02565 
£[11 vo se 1 • 00041 
EO IVC:WI .174<, 3 
elf II • U 31 S 1 
QA T A .03077 
CA l A .03fd2 
IJ E!HIA • 011 ｾ＠ ') 0 
UEU Tc r. . OlbU7 
TtHA I Nw 
-.1 '.6 94 
X IH E'J I I - . 0'.)215 
ORCR . 31<)18 
Clel< -.ft7211 
x I Nv e l - .04514 
AS S Gl< lH . 01l3U6 
P[{O(d lit 
. 111134 
ZSCR ＮＱｕｬＬｾＱ＠
ｾｅｔａ＠ • 153 d 1 
L OC 1 A • 10(, 5 u 
LC GN CE • ＱＰｾｱ ｅＭ
!1K1LfO . 0 r;tl3 6 
ａ ｐｐｅｲｾｄ ｉ ｘ＠ G 2 
AFTER RO TAT I ON WITH KAI SER NORrAlI ZATIC N OBLI qUE FAC TOR PATTE RN MA TRI X 
OEL r A o 
FIIC TOR 1 FA CT CR 2 F AC TOR 3 FA C T OR 4 FACTOR 5 FACTOR 6 FACTO R 7 FACT OR 8 FACT OR CJ FA C TOR 10 
FF !; Ｎ ＶｾＵ Ｑ Ｙ＠ - .264 ,:) 1, 
- . 06 1 2 4 • 47 61l tl . 06 <) 48 
- . 0 6 6 8 0 - . 0 2 011 
- . 011 6 66 • 013 5<) - . 0 6 20 1, FFA TC[ • 1123tl 4 Ｍ ＮＰＱＳ ｾ｝＠ -. 00<) 1, 2 -.071 5 ' . 00 <) 10'< . 1434':) 
-.10 %8 -.0105 2 8 . 0 3 105 .03 1H 6 HAT A • tltlY<) O - . 2 1, 2 /\ j • 0 11 ') I, -. OH13 . 05 5 01 • 1 0 6 63 -. 03142 - . 0 6/150 . 0707 6 . 02 371, 
--- Ｍ Ｎ ＲｾＱＶＳ＠ - . 062 71 • F, lll Y • 7 69 711 - . 0 4<) 1 2 VAS • 1 0 <) Y 'J • 0575 2 -. 01 3') 2 - . 014 &3 
- . 0633 3 VAA T A .I 'H <);> - .1 1,1, 1, II 
. 03':> 1 5 - • 06 / 2 7 . 036 41 .93 8 11 
-. 0 5 4 1. 6 . 01 f.. 76 • 0132 2 . 0 047 ,:) VAA TCE 
. 2'1':1 5 4 . 0 '34 1 9 • tln072 -. () /ltl:! 7 -. 0 04 0 1; • 111, 211 4 -. 1 2 50 2 . 025 H - . 020 70 • 00 g<) 3 ｖ ａａｲｬ ｃｾ＠ . 2100 j . 0
'
,255 . 0000 7 - • 0 71 1, 8 
- . 065 75 . B4 0 13 . 0 5 627 . 11 2 13 . 0 20 1, 2 • 0 3 1 71 EUI TS . • o 'tI ll <) -. 2 70 72 -.0 7(, 3 0 .4 6830 . 13 0<) 7 
- .1 5<) 03 
- . 0112 4 8 -. 0 ')86<) • 0 0 31 <) - .10 1, 05 £OrrATA • tl16 1 ', - . 266&0 . 004 5 1, .0 027 4 • 1 2 4 32 -. 0 2 484 -. 0 <)85 5 - .1 05 14 . 05 2 21 -.0331:1 0 EO fT AICE - . 1137 1 2 
- .0 6 0 75 
-. 00626 - . 1) 3 106 . 0 76 11' . 0 2 1 8 0 -. 1 0 4 n 
- . 0 8 570 . 0 2 0 71 
-. CI0 5 4 
1/ Af. ;< 
·. 523LJ4 . 0 71:1 0'1 -. 002'll . 0 4 2.]1, 
-. 02<)52 . 7622 1) . 0 0 74 0 .0<;7 6 '< 
- . 041 &7 . 0 44 55 Pil TS 
. 6 103 5 4 - . 23 010 1\ 
- . 0 7 25 1 • .3 663 () . 12710 - . 138 77 
- . 25 11& - . 0 % <)5 
-. 01441 -. 068'14 PUT AfA • I G6 1 2 -. 2 16 114 - . 00 0 £1 3 
-.011 2 3 . 1 2 196 
- . 02 5 70 - . 20 !l 00 -. 0 "1225 . 02 077 
-. 0 2 2 112 POTA TNII . 80')';0 
-. OL 1 2 1 - . 005511 
-. 057 9 1 . 103 58 
-. 0 0 0110 -. 0 0 4 66 - .1 22;' 3 
-. 0 1 CJ 0 2 - . 0 0 <)2<) I'O TATL • ｾＴ＠ 7 0 4 - . 3 05 7 ':1 -. 02 444 • 0 19 7 5 .124 <)2 -. 051) 8 10 - . 44 &0& 
-.0 7 172 . 01,622 
- . 0633 4 PUTAC L 
. 55 7 00 
-.311/1 -. 0 1, 1', II • 0 2 40 7 . 2048 1 - . 07 &11 -. 299 74 -.1 2069 . • 0 10 050 
- . 1 0592 w PO TAT CE 
. / LJ233 
-. 0 &1 5 4 -. 00 7 0 7 
- . O.3I:1Zl . 08<)5 2 . 01 265 - . 30 77;3 
-. 0 7 &4 8 -. 0 0 744 
- • 0 1 2 1, 5 C> f'I H !\I,C[ 
. 83/19 .3 - . 0 (31 <)3 
. 000 1 6 - . 04',10 . 0 '. 28 2 . 01 2 47 -. 2 10 22 
- . 0 31 55 • 0 0211', . 0 11 35 ..0 ｲ ｎｉ ｾ＠
. 7 31:19'3 
-.0 5<) UI 
-. 025 1\7 • I, 0 &14 . 0 45U -. 1 2 126 
- . 13 59 6 • 00& 77 . 02 4 6<) - . 07 3 [) 1\ TNI ATA • 1l6
'
, O 1\ - . 030 &9 . 060 Y 2 - .01 22 8 • a l 133 • 0 290 1 - . 11 62 7 . 0 SO 11 . 08<) 4 ] 
-. 02 1 7.') XN I ANH • <)11 7', 0 . 15& 3 6 . OS/\1I9 - .0 6 11 & 
- • a 09 7 9 . 0 3 4 <) 2 Ｎ ＱＱ ＬＶｾＲ＠ . 00252 . 02 7 02 . 00023 TNIA IL 
. 6 1 5511 - . 1 6 1, 1) 4 . 02 1, 78 . 0 10')3 . 0 41 1,7 
-. 02 7 25 
- . 3 50 0 5 . 07,) 70 . 093 1 0 -. 0660 ') TlH AC L . &3 1 0 '1 - .1 6 j 92 . 013 5 2 • a 1 37 8 . 1 26 10 - . 044 9 ,s - .1 '125 4 -. 0 .H02 . OlJ036 -.11 3 1.111 TNIA I CE • Il ' j YIIII . 140 06 . 0 4 1l68 -. 0 4 4!, 6 
- . a19 10 11 . 0 Io B5 B 
-.1 1:1&21 . 03492 . 033 77 . 000 0') T NI A I'\CE . ')jI:l26 
. 11 8 40 . 060 7 2 - . 0 4 8 ')<) 
-. 071123 . O', CJCJ 2 -. 0 &6 57 . 0'1119 . 0 44 "6 . C29]/l CF ::; 
- . 01:15 3 3 
-. OC60':1 . 0 8& 7 0 - . '11 1.)7 S -. 0522 7 .0 &28 1 . 05 .30 1 . 0 7 34'l -. 20Cl 3 ,) . 02926 CFA TA Ｎ ｉｉ｜＼Ｉｾ ｏ＠ . 0610 3 - . 0(902 
-. 0 Et O 7 . 02B 4 .1 0 0 65 - . 02 9](, Ｍ Ｎ ＰＳＷ Ｔ ｾ＠ . 21l 2 8 3 . 023 1 ':l Cf r. QF A . 2'. 2 tJ q . 0 123 7 . 27 1 ';) 1 • 01 298 -. 11 42 7 . 0 3 3 62 . 00 8 03 • G &1 72 . 05 <; 1 & .G 85 7 3 CFA TL 
. 55369 -.113 36 
-. 02 1 3 1 
-. 0 2602 . 050 17 . 0 3 1 0 7 
- . 306 72 • 02 1 E:5 . 248 7t - • 03', 27. CFACL • ':.16 1 tJl. -. 10 7 '37 - . O3 1,1l0 
- . 0 24 2 7 . 1 558 7 . 0 110 <;10 
-. 11'143 -. 1[353 
. 2396 7 -. ( tl 7 33 CFA TCE . 81&0 7 . 23 37 2 - . 0201Q 
- . 0874 I - . 0 1 &6 7 • 12 5CJ 0 -.1 0<)21:1 - . 035 14 . 228 4 , . 01, 20 1 CFArH:£ • I:ISIl Ol! • 2 04 7 tj -. OU 58 -. 08 7 <) 4 
- . 0 7 68 4 . 1 3236 . 0282 1 • a 76 Gil . 2510310 . 072 75 OSCFAOSE . 1:156':) 1 . 2 .131 5 - . Ol5 1 8 - . 0') 4')1 
. 000 52 . 1 23 11 . 21j222 
- . 0 I) 'l3 1 
. 233l0 • (0', 7 22 ORCA 
-.l ll23 4 
- . 0',1 <;;3 - .1 <)&311 
- . 050') J . 1 21, /,1 
. 06 1 23 - . 0 1 47<) 
- . 0 1.6 110 
- . OOlll! . 92 1 1, 1\ Ofn I NV 
-. OJ3 4 j 
-. 02'12'l - . 3 1l 7t. 0 
-. a (''J I g .4 15 17 . 0 4 22 5 -. 0350 10 
-: . a 04 75 - . 0 33 11 . 6 71 c,r, CAC L - . u51,6g 
-. 1 64 '" 0 • 6&0 I , 1 . 04342 . 3 04'd 
- . 0 0 1 15 -. lIl1Q'l 
-. 100 5 1 . 021 50 -.1 40 '37 FA I " - . 0') 5 16 Ｍ Ｎ Ｑ ｾＲ ｪ Ｒ＠
_=.!J 113 <''> .03 751, - . 03 171 -.0 3 1 <)0 . 00Q73 
- • 1 tl8 2 2 . 02706 - • 0 1 ') (,4 
IJC I IlH • OllOh ｾ＠ . U3 .. ')5 . Ylln40 • 0 1 (' 1 6 . 2&221} -. 001:105 .14 6 .H 
-. 0 6 tllB 
-. 0', " a 1\ - • Gil <:;" 1 WCTL 
- . 0'>5ILI -.17 51 4 . 6 74 51 • 03 1:12 CJ • 22tf,5 . 0 1 05 1 -. 32965 
-. 00 .5 4 11 . 028 ', 2 - . OIl SYZ 
I AER 
- . 13'1:'3 . - . 0 473:! . (ll55 7 
-. 021l 1, O . 032112 • <)878 1 -. 033 14 . 033 1, 7 - . on<) 4 
-. 011175 HCXtJCt . U.S5 11, 
-. U11'IO • ') 0 I, Cj I 
-. oe01 4 . 1750 .3 Ｎ Ｐｏｏｉ｜ Ｎ ｾ＠
-. 110 2 3 . 0 5 ,sE:0 
-. 03760 - . 0', 8 72 HCllf.( Ｎ ｏｬｬ｜ｾ ｬ＠ - . ＰＱｾ ｦＬＷ＠ . 51'1 3'1 . 0332'2 . 2 3 5 4 & • G 1 2 (1 3 -.02 &35 .O tT (J3 
.0628 8 -. &3 8QU Ｎｾ＠ He'; 
-. 0 7J 7 l 
- . 11 U'J7 . 1;(,2 17 . 391>115 . 22 13& - . J 1\i;':l 6 
- . O':l 771 - • G Ｎ ｾｲ Ｌ Ｔ＠ 'j 
- . 03 G!lS 
- • 11 21'.11 
APPENDIX G2 - Ca n t 
F ,\[; I 01< 1 !-AC rUK (I FACTOR 3 FAC TOR I, FACTO R 5 FAC TOR 6 F ACT OR 7 FACT OR 8 FAC TOR 9 FAC TO R 10 
TLT A • 0 tl O 60 . 29472 .O O5'JO -. I) ') 551, . 
-.05102 .0 5593 . 6 14 66 -.0 570tl 
-.0 22111\ .115 79 ()EllIO A -. 07114 7 
-.lYl71 -.U 26 67 • (J IId6 -.2 6 144 -.0 ')9 13 .R ｾＴ ＵＧｬ＠
-.131 57 -.005 .31, 
-,U 7520 Etl IT Al l . 5',Y47 -.3 655Y -. 0 17 t, 1 • 0 327 4 .1 20 45 -.06205 -.3171 6 -.01 887 . 0658') 
-. 07YiII TATNW 
-.U7240 
-. 290Y2 . 01211., .0 <;30 2 .041 8 4 -.0<;140 
-. 6150 7 .0 :1'1 1 J .01422 
-.10041 ｾａｲｎＢ＠ .1l72YJ . 256113 .1 0']54 
-. 0 4532 .451!27 . 0506 0 .3 999 7 .011 20 1 -.01 3 4 2 . 226211 CA HIH ＭＮ ｏＬＬｾ Ｏ ｱ＠ ＭＮｾ ＶｮＹ＠
-.4 tl'J'j I. • 06607 .004 93 
-. U% 73 -.4l,)4 9 -.G 5 7I, d 
-.00852 - .1 209,) CLl NI\ • 0 f,8 56 . 28 1 ') 0 . U0658 -. 0 5917 
-.1466'1 .07542 .4 2270 . • 0 9552 .000Ul .1 5 0 86 ATNHS 
-. 1:5662 -. 21,5:\6 
-. 05197 . 56105 .O UI5& 
-.1 8 721 
-.3304 6 
-. 0 0',g 9 -.03 382 
-.0 8404 UEIHTNW 
-. 0 ',6S '. -. 0 ｾＶｬＱｬＱ＠ .0 121') .0 lOll 7 
-.0 01 5 1 -.0 6 061 . 96463 
- • 0 5407 .0 2516 .C31165 Ocrl T TCE 
-. 0',11 0') 
-.0 (,913 .0 0 -l 7 8 .01 24 f) .01114 -.05224 . 96g4? -.031, 6 0 
.02635 .0 3f)52 CAll 
-. 0 flll6 G 
-.!fdOIl . 62152 • 0 ('l41 • 09513 .0 :1352 
-.51901 .1 541 7 .0411 86 -. 03421 AC RCOS 
.0 6 201 .6Y8'l7 -. 0 1.150 . 611U911 
-.1 097'1 
-.0 5601 
-.04 &58 
-.0 5421 .0 311l 1 .1 3382 CO:;A [/-IV 
.07835 
.0'.52 3 -. 562 00 -. &332 8 . 339Cj4 
-.1 595 1 
-.01686 .0 1. 2 t4 -. 05345 .07377 I\QAI'OOE 
.11'.11 2 .0 <;12 7 . 0 BI, 511 . 6571l5 . 58210 -.1C7'j4 
.0 '>6 34 .0 61120 -. 0 51,1, 3 .117 811 ＬＭ Ｎ ｾ＠ l\(ll\ S 
• u4795 • 100 l3 .10 581:1 • &1,27;; .59853 
-. ｏｱＴ Ｎ ｾＴ＠ . 07 41, 8 
.1 038d -.07055 • 10603 
..::.> ACIIS -.07132 • 0 G9 7 7 . 4 1FJ1l2 
-!.,.7 5 42§ .0 5622 
-.1<'3411 .0 6 1 03 .0 61, 23 
-.0 3 13 2 -. 04738 S AFA 
. 0') 6 4 6 .1 5 119 . 5 'lbIl4 -. 1,7304 
.0571 6 .11 930 -.00 2'1<) 
.t:B20 -.0 0822 . 02d75 SA TA 
• Itl 3 28 .lC357 .1 22QO 
-.1128113 
- • 0 Ｑ ｾ＠ 99 • 22572 -.04 0211 .0 35 Il J .04 958 .11 014 SAlCE • H.l.56 . 2tlY(j2 .076 U 9 
-. F,39S 7 
-.0 595') 
. 2 1 64 7 
-.11 276 .0 3332 .01 311l .1 2233 SANCE 
.1 2327 . 2 2 370 . 077'19 -.5<)160 
-.1111, 2 
. 2062" .07 5113 .1 731 7 • 0431) 5 .1 2573 ｾ ［＠ AI ｲｾｶ＠
-.1230 2 
-.036 76 Ｎ ﾣ､ｾＧｪ＠ 7 
. 53300 
-.4'.254 -. 07334 .0 2800 
-.-01234 .0147 6 - • 1 22 1,3 DAY S OPS 
-. 1211J IJ . 01255 . 21474 . 6200& .0 h2 Ii 3 
-.015'14 
-.0451<) 
-. 01722 -. 03727 • 73 11 1 1 OACl 
-.0 1 H2 
-.O lJ 71! 8 .1 A238 . 0382 'I . 11 41, 72 
-. 0160 0 
-.1 2265 
-. 05 1.1'.2 
-.0011 3 . 080(, 1 OAlL 
-. 02421 -.011/1117 . 20318 . 03314 . 65 7 0 7 .0074 9 
-.3 9d62 .1 2531\ . 0 1 21 1 . 2 1 0B WCXl rJv • 00111 -.07 17f1 . 35211 . 01,2511 .7 15 1, 1 
-. 00537 
- .1 1• ll 'j8 
-. 06425 
-.0 2240 -.(5 265 X ＯＮｉｾｖ｛［ａ＠
-.G '';617 
-. O3/l01l . 1. 4.9 16 • 0 00 17 - . 1\0779 . 02095 -. 01'324 
-. 04 1.34 . 04571 -. 22''(,5 QAClPOOE 
. 0 " 52 tj -. 0704 7 . 13895 -.Of.20,) . 1\1.442 
-. 00698 -.1 4365 -. O',Ii')O 
-. 02050 
-. Od498 EOtvCSf. l . 75 (,'19 
-. 00207 .0 <1320 
- • 08390 -. 0454 7 • 0 <;566 -.0 20 7 ') - • 0 g2 40 
-.74 66 1:1 . 08S!)7 ED Iv OSra 
- • 04 1,'. 'J -. 18yyq . 0172 8 -. 03137 
-.021101 .037 85 - . 0 7 9 31 
- • 0 42 77 
-. 85578 . 02352 CLfA . 06388 . 2 7 .. '17 . 0307t 
-. 0 b6 1 2 -.23662 .0 <) 1 <) 6 
. 21746 .1 %1,9 
. 00415 .1 '11:177 ()1I1A • O&tl'i 2 .1 1, 0 9 5 . 214 '. (' 
-.0 "19 1 . • 7 2653 . 04685 . 037 '1 2 .1 29 11 -.U33 32 
. 251 dd L:AlA . 0 .1'3')8 . 13624 • 83<) 1 'I 
-.0 "12& • 0268 1 . 074&2 .0111 Cd .1 <;&52 
-. 004111 • 0& Z 2 S Il EtHTA 
-. 0117 4 II -.177 70 . 03305 . 0;'015 .0 2>1 0 6 
-. 06226 . 9':1 72 1, ＭＮ Ｐｾｏ｢Ｕ＠
. 018111 
- • 004 :16 Ot: uTCA -. O<iYdtl 
-. 2 C2114 - . 201155 • 0 1 11f) 2 . 0 I <;l 7':l -. 0 77 116 , . 9 1 50b , 
-.1 1. 25 3 . 0041 4 
-. 03146 TNTArNW • ')8921 .1 529 1 . 05 5911 ＭＮ ＰｾＸｱＷ＠
- . 0113 1 . G3625 .14 555 . 001111 
. 02dlS .( 0', 66 XNI Eu IT 
-. 2 '30 65 .0 ',548 . 06039 • f) 3Y.19 - ·.16 102 
-. 000 29 . 6 1,5:1 6 
. 0 I 0 '.', -. 00214 • 010 76 UI<CR -. U,\5l fl 
-. 1:>.5 1':1 5 . 26 7 06 . 06625 . 222211 -. OU 4l', . 0 0 0 1 2 . 0;> 1 03 
-. 007n . 55973 CLC R - . U5/11\1 ｾ Ｑ ＲＷ＠ . 0 5 79(\ ＭＮＱ Ｚ ｾｦ＾ ｙＳ＠ . 07115 
. 0%24 -.3 YOI\8 
-. 2 3d 31. 
. 0 /1I11 'l • OGb 17 X I NV(; l 
-.C/ 'H,) 
- • 1 4U 5tl . 73509 • 01 gy 9 - • 12270 . 02343 -.1 24 &3 
-.1 0l1S 
. 04Y',9 -. 2 052 (', ａ ｓｾ ｇｒｔｈ＠ . 3(.205 
-. 136 5 11 .1 6516 -. 15717 
-. 18617 
-. 1<)311 -. 029118 
-. 04104 
. 1 26 7'1 . 301 9Q PIWl, I{ TH • 1 81.Y 7 ＭＮ ＢｃＲ Ｑｾ＠ . 03127 ＭＮＰ ｾＱＰＦ＠
-. 02') 63 
. 00467 . 050 6 'l 
-. Of033 Ｎ ＴＷ Ｖ ｾＶ＠ . ( 5995 ｚ ｓ ｃｾ＠ . 2526Y -.3 0'jF-.O .11 602 . 02910 . 37 88 1 
-. 0571" 
-. 35" 1 0 -.07':113 
• 0 4 0 13 - • 1" 34 tl UErA 
-. 1.32 /j 6 
-. 000 '.1 -. 06652 ＮｏｾＱｉＱＱ＠
-. 0211,,3 •• 11 921 - .0'10117 
-. 60370 
. 1 42LS 
-. GS2 1 9 l Or, r Ii 
-. 05 2j 3 
- .H 552 -. 0 632 11 • 05216 .01 6&4 '- 1I10 B4 -. 1507 0 .Il (,0 41 
. 01642 -. 0':d2tl L a'Juc £ - . U 4 ｾ＠ 1. 5 - . 0 '1 1, /1 - .. U b .' .l ｜ｾ ｊ＠ • () 35 7 ;> -. )1567 • 1 p. G 0 3 -. 0 11 2 f) 7 ---Ｎ ｈ Ｗ ｊＺＺ［ ｾ＠
. 02 2AO -. 021 <>2 T, , , 
- " I ' 1 7 - . 11 {, 'P 1 - • 0 1/ 1 E • f) ? DI I) - • 0 Of) (, a -.0 7:1711 
- . 111 7'. 
--:7 3 '127 . • 1111 7 0 -. or,<) ')7 
-----
APPENDIX G2 ｾ＠ Cont 
FACTOR 11 
FF S • Oi'9'.j 2 
FFATCE -. 2 1,1, ｾ＠ 7 
FFATA 
-. 0 331', 
VII S • 1 5 513 
V AAT II .010 0':; 
VAATC E -.141:.6
'
, 
VAANCE -.2U247 
E8ITS -.OuAl'} 
EIHTIITA -.1431"1 
EOUAICE -.32525 
VAlOR .l1b 54 
POT S -.04040 
POTATA -.1061u 
P13TATNW 
-.27312 
" lITATL • 03582 
PBTACL • 12411 0 
POTIIT C.E -. 2'> 70') 
POUNC E -. 2'l8 Id 
TNI S • 2l6u 4 
TNIATA .1Y256 
I:""'; Xl'll f\lW .0 .ll, 2 0 
TNIATL . 2781') 
INIACL .311151 
INIAT Ct: • 027 1,2 
TNIAN CE .0071 '3 
CF::; 
-. ,51841 
CFATA .2'1470 
CFAQFA .12741 
CFATL .3761 5 
CFACL .4 11112 0 
CF,' TCE .0 gldZ 
CFANCE .' 0 6 4 51 
OSCFAO SE • 0 /\ 6 '>0 
URCA .1!1 6 4<1 
｜ｬｾ ｘ ｉｕｖ＠ • 0 50 57 
CACL • j 42 2 7 
FAT A .3-3') 71l 
HCTN.I -.UU'J':JO 
HCTL .2 <; 47':> 
TAER • 1 011'12 
WCXtlCE -. CJ5734 
ｗｃｄｉｾ＠ .1273 6 
AWCS .1W0 6 
TLT NW -. H7 60 
T LT A - • . i h5 'j2 
[JEUI(J/\ • 1 ')5') 3 
EI:II1 ATL .0',730 
T.n U:i • 3 7114 5 
11A ;r i H -. 4 712 1 
APPENDIX G2 - Cont 
FACTOR 11 
CLTNH 
-." gg.!J!. . 
A TUrI 5 . 211751 
OEUT TNrl -.OO&:.B 
IlEUTTCE 
-. 012 .12 
CA TL 
.10 02'1 
A CRC CS 
-.200'15 
ｃｏｾａ＠ INV 
-.0(,35 8 
A()APOO E 
-.1536 /" 
AQAS 
- '.1 63';10 
ACAS 
-. l.StlO j 
ｾ＠ AFA 
-. 3t1730 
SA r A 
-.100" !) 
SIITCE 
-.2ti236 
c..J S MIC to -.32I1Yn 
SAIN V 
-.0 3'd .. I'J OAvSDRS 
. 036 U 1 
CAGL 
.1 5115 8 
[JA TL 
-.00 5'>0 
WCXINV 
.20051 
lIltlVCA .1352(\ 
O(,CLPIlOE 
• 160 12 
EOI VC SEl 
.0 2193 
EIJ I VC 3 NI 
-.015111 
CLlA 
-. 55 1dJ 1{ 
lJA r A ""=";""356'J?' 
CAT 1\ 
- • • ｾＵＱＧＺｊＳ＠
IJEI1TTA 
. 06596 
I)£O[CII 
• 1 5 01'1 
TN I 1\ T NW • U30'l5 
xNI E nI T • 055 U 7 
ｉｉｦＮｬ ｃ ｾ＠ .1 gn6 5 
CLCf{ 
. 2U6'38 
X It/VeL .3B0 2 
ASSG RTIi 
-.OJ ,)91 
f->IWC, fHlf 
-.172 tH .. 
ZSCf{ 
. 2 '13 5 0 
BErA -. JtJD '5 I) 
LOG I A 
-. 00 ':11'1 
L OG: ICE -.110U7 
11 K r L I Q 
-.0 3 7 0 1 
APP EN DI X G2 - Cant 
ｆａｃｔｏｾ＠ PAT TE HN ｃｏ ｾ ｒ ｅ ｌ ａｔｉｏｾｓ＠
fACTOR 1 FA C T OR 2 FACTOI<! 3 fACT OR 4 fACTOR 5 FAC T OR & fACT 0 R 7 FA C TOR 6 FA CTOR q FIICTOR 10 
fACT OR 1.0 000 0 -. H')<17 . 0 6 '126 -.0 5308 .13023 .0 6 22', -.2 '1'16 4 -.1 24 06 .26033 . 05427 
F AC r OR 2 -. 10<)<)7 1.0 000 0 ＭＮｏＱ ｾ＼Ｉ＼Ｉ＠ -.201179 -.1 51, 45 ＮＱＷ ｾＳＦ＠ . 2 4 258 .04 6 38 -.001 53 .1 &208 
('J FIIC l OR 3 . OU<)28 -.01 5<)') 1.00 000 .1314 8 . 0 &27 0 . 0 I,'l 78 -.11 222 .1 22 15 .0 2537 - .0 7 0 1 5 
ｃ ｾ ｊ＠ f AC T 0'< I, - . 0 5 3UII -. 2011 7 ':1 . 131411 1. 00UO 0 • 1321 " -.-1 683<) -.073 3!l -. 0'5512 -.03 %2 -. 0 11 602 
FA C TO R 5 . 13623 -.1 544 5 . 0&27 0 .1 3214 1 . 00000 -. 05&32 -. 2'l 320 .01 'l 'l 1 -.0 653 '1 • 1 60 06 
f AC TOR 0 • tl 6 ll l , .1 7113& . 0 4 ':176 -.1 8!!],} -. 05032 1.00 000 -.07 4 71 . 1 0 7 ':13 . 03C55 • G713 6 
FACT Otl -. 2Y 'ld 4 . 2425 6 -.11 222 -. 07338 ＭＮ ＲＧｬＳｾＰ＠ -. 07 471 1.0 0000 - • 0 3007 -.07 8 5 '1 .1 0'31 8 
FA C TOR b -. 1 2 4 0 G .0 1,638 .12·2 1 5 -. 055 1 2 . 01'1 9 1 .1 f, 7'l3 -. 03007 1. 0 0 000 -.0 722 '1 . 074 2 3 
F II C T OR Y . 2 6 033 -. 00 1 53 . 02537 -. 0 3%2 -.0 65313 . 03055 -.07 8 ') 'l -. 072 2Y 1 . 00 0 00 -. (;21301\ 
ｆ ａ ｬ Ｚ ｲ ｮ ｾ＠ 1 ', • 0 5 4 2 7 .11-.2011 -. 07 6 15 -.0 11 8 02 .160 0 /\ • 07 1 38 .1 :' '1 1 tl . 074 2 3 -.0 29 0 8 1. 00 0 00 
F AC T OR 11 -. U25 2 (, -. 34f,O,) -. 001 2 <; .1 3 l 6 6 . 0 30711 -. O'ln'l -. 21) '1111 - . 07411 0 .072 55 -. 200 0 8 
FA C TOR 11 
F AC l OR 1 -. 02520 
FA C TOR 2 -. -S4 0 0 '1 
F AC T 0/.1 3 -. 0 :H 2 'j 
F M; TOI< 
" 
. 13766 
F AC TOI' 5 .0 -S o 7 6 
f AG I 0 ,< 0 -. UY /-S q 
ｆａｉｾ ｔ ｏｒ＠ 7 -. 2(,')6 1 
Ft.i: r Of? Ｌ ｾ＠
-. 07"r' 
F AU OP Y . 01 2 OJ 
F ,11; r 01< 1 ｾ Ｉ＠
-. 7. U 0 11 II 
I ,1 1 1 I ' I ' ;' ,111' ' 
ｾｎｄ ｉ ｘ＠ G 3 
AF r £N RO T Ari ON wr rH KACSE N NORHA lC ZA rC ON 
llEL TA o 
OB LI QUE FACTOR ·STRUCTURE MATR I X 
FAC TOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FAC TOR 4 F AC TO R 5 FA:: TOR 6 FAC TOR 7 FACTO R 8 F AC TOR <) FAC TOR 10 
FFS . 6753 0 
-. 4 1\ 7(, '. . 0 616tl .52654 . 2 <;6 7 0 -. 1<) 0 3<) 
-. 34131 -. 233 0 7 . 161111 -.11 6 70 
f F ATCC: . 8Y 333 -. 0112') 3 .0 6 764 -. l fi 722 . 131 3<) . 2 3 2 8 9 - . 2Y5 8 8 - . 0 <)8 116 . 24',77 . 1 2<;5 1 
FFA l A 
-:8 92 77 - . 3 07 32 . 0 H5 8 6 - .0<;404 . 1 95 77 • 118 0 .J - . 345fi9 ＭＮＱ ｾＱＱ Ｑ＠ . 28705 . 04220 
VA :; • 1 r;('? ':l -. n9 .i 'J • U 112 0 0 . 550% • 1 56GII . 5<) 0 01 -.3U 5[)2 . 03 & 16 .0 2 37 <J - . 1 2 373 
• VilA Til 
. 2'HII I - . 0 2tl62 • l llU 7 -. 2 01 88 . 0"412 • 93682 - . 2 ', 825 . 1 " 7 II 0 .1 0100 • or, t.l r.. 
VA/\ T l;E 
. 32 cJ07 • 2 Sgt. Il . 0 6 7 ':>3 - . 293':> 0 
-. () 01\64 ｾｔｉ＠ - .lG0 2 .J .1 ('2 13 .0 70112 . 1166d 
VAll tl CE . 21911 1• . 2 /1775 .0 5273 -. 300(,0 
- . 1111 0 2 • <)15':> 7 . 01 II ,)'l . 2'. 5 3 7 . 0 1l256 . 163 71 
£ urr :, • 611 1 0 0 ＭＮ ｾＧＨ Ｚ ｬｴＳＨｴ＠ .0 5245 . 5 3926 . 3 2811 0 -.2 71\00 - .3/1 ,) 2g - . 2'i063 . 1456g -.1 4 7 2 0 
Elll rill II • <) 1 961\ - . 3b5 '.E! .0 909 '. • 0 30 q 5 . 290'. 5 -. 02602 
-. 411" ':> - .21 2 73 . 25 G8 2 -. 01 2 41 
Eal TIdC( • '129 7/. - .0 11 7 2 5 . 0 IU OO - . 0 tl55'3 . 2250 5 . O'l380 -. 3 6 /.7 1 
- • 1 5' j 2" • 22'lI\ ', . 0727 6 V lit I{ Ｍ Ｎ ＧＮＩ ＱＲｊ ｾ＠ . ('3u90 
- . 00770 - . 0 11 425 
-. 13fi53 • nfol:lO . 11003 .2 '.il3 7 -.1 5 1 71 . 0511 3 8 
f' UTS . 7 .32£,/\ 
- .4 11 1 29 . 05' )15 . 4"!o 10 7 . 3 622 0 -. 21 ?q2 
-. 540ft3 
-. no 3 1 .1 1.737 - . 1274 5 
PUTIII/l • <)041 ') -. 3511 4 2 • 0 ') 7 1 3 • 0 2 553 . 327 1 4 - . 00761 -. 557 3 1 -. 1 115'l l . 230 45 -. OZYU ｦＧｾｔａｲｎｈ＠ - . CJ?M 
-. O76 3 ':! .O ')y .. 2 
-. UtlO 0 . 21 47 4 . 0 53 3 0 - .233 2 2 -. 20%4 .1 9 46 1 . 0% 2 6 
PBTAIL 
-:7 3? Il'; 
- . S .HOb • 0 9 0 2 I . .1 2 117 . 361\5 1 - . 06h 23 -. 73t172 
-. 11 22 1 . 2 1 6 36 -.15266 
P[l l ACL 
. 71GUO -. ')u 14 0 . 0 5 .Li7 • 14 Y7 0 . 403
'
, a 
-. 13163 -. 64506 
-. 2305 1 . 201\57 -.1 8356 p o r ll TCE 
. 9 10.3 13 
-.1 4339 • 0 'J2 1 I, -. 0 f6Z 1 . 2 7/\ 66 • 08 6tl7 -. ')1374 - • 1 443 7 . 20 443 • G3367 I'U TA:JCE - -. 9}31l /. ＭＮ Ｑ ｾＶ Ｗｚ＠ . OY3 .H -. O'l 119 . 2 1641 .0 9 4 5 5 - . 4 111 7 
-. 1052 0 . 2 1 668 . 0 7 5 33 
T NIS 
.7 5 7 1 4 
- . 373 1. 5 . 113 3 1 .'.4 'l 7 1 . 24800 - . 1Il 05 0 -. 47 6 1 3 
-.1 52 0 7 . 220'l1 - . 1 4493 I NTA TA ｾＲＴ ＱＷ＠ -. 2 1tl3 5 .1 625 1• -. 01572 .1 75 41\ . 08 1 02 -.4 6 1 25 " . 0 E', 06 . 33562 -.G 3 1.47 
Ｈ ｾ ｊ＠ ll.N IAtHl . 9 410 -S • 0 'J 1 '> 7 .1 2 1 g 3 -. l S3 73 . 0,. 9 79 . 12612 
-. 1 2 317 - . 10')45 . 28031 • O'l 8[>1 
.... TNIA TL .7"!!45 - .113 4112 · l '.a (,1 • . 0 !lU56 . 25112 -. 0 11 5tl -. 61141 1 -. 0 .11 ,) 7 . 29357 -. 16') t.. 7 
TNI ACL 
. 73326 -. t,f,26a . 10 1lZ7 • 1 1 630 . Z66 1,S - .07726 -. '> 86 05 Ｍ ＮＱ ＵＸｾＲ＠ • Z90'l2 -.20 522 Ttllll I C;: - .-If'; l t 'f • Olltl :SU .1 1.11 G 7 
-. 11 2 67 . 1 2'H6 • 1 5'l 65 -. 43315 - . 052 YO . 28 8 0 1 • . 03DY 
T N 1 A. Nl: £ ｾ ＷＳＰ＠ . 0 3575 • 1 5 1 2 3 -.1 31)75 . 0 4 /\ 37 . 1F, 'l 1 3 -. 30638 
- .0 02.34 • 29/\ 3 3 . O(l2
'
J''; C f :; 
_ - . 7 7.7 4 t\ • 3 Ii 6 .j 3 - . 033112 
-. " 356 1 - . 20156 .1 40 5 3 . 3 YH5 . 240 <] 4 -. 3LJI, Y7 • 1 0 1 (, 9 
Cfll T Il . 8 7 (,£,5 
-. l C6tlY . Ob30 4 -. 1 OC'5 /, . 110 5 0 • 1 47 6 ') -. 3 ';8 43 - • 1 5211 3 • ,)1 69 '. . 01 6 111 CFAC11-.\ 
. 256? 7 
-. 0 2 31 '. .2YOIl'l . 0 15 71 - . 053 71 . 073 56 - .0 1\ 1l01l . 06077. . 136g <) • !i/. 1 'l 1 CFA I L 
.717 t\'l 
-. 311 11 2 . 0770Y . 03337 .2 2006 . 04106 -. 64220 ＭＮ Ｐ ＸＶ ｾｙ＠ . 1.1. 04<) - . 1/, 0 17 
CFAC L ｾ ｴｉｔ＠
-. 40 2b') . 03715 .0 616 4 . 2 5 'H 1 -. 03 Cfo<) - . 51643 
-.2 3240 .42 80& -.17') /l I, CFA TC£ 
. tH5U • 1 33 ｾ＠ 7 . 0')311 -. 1g7,)5 . 0 6 0 ')5 • 2J 7 ill, -. 32 635 -. 11 g,)5 . 4 fl5 5.3 . 09311 
CFlItl CE . 1'.7327 
.1 6'.1 4 . 048<]8 
-. 22 3'.4 -.0 31&2 . 25044 - .17 80'l 
-. Ofi2 6 1 . 4 11 4 53 .1 4343 OSCFAOS to • IiZ6 7 11 . 22ZY3 . 003 36 -. 23358 -. 03301 • 20377 . 0'>016 - • 1 70 '13 • "50 ') 3 • l oll 77 Or/CA 
-. OJdltl • a 54 1 2 -.2 7 ') 47 -. 10116'l . 2 5 3 " 2 • 0 110 5 q • O'l 8 1/. . 0 Og 6 3 
-. 05 4 72 ｾｊｌ＠ｯ［ｾｸ＠ I N" 
• A" 1 7 tl . 0035 6 -. 413 5 1 -. a E 5', ｾ＠ . 'j 6 71.S .03 624 
- . 02623 . 0111 43 -.1 024<) . 761 39 C AC L 
• 11 7111 ＭＮ ｾＱ ＵＵ Ｖ＠ • 7U 1 tI 9 . 2B,)h1 . " OgO q -. 072311 -.4 66i1 7 -. 04')38 . 0 470 1 -. 21l324 F lIT A 
- .103 <;2 
-. 25MY 4 --=-:tl n 7 2 c;- • 02<)73 -. 0 &020 - . 17211'l 
- .013t£. 
- . 3 241 2 . 0:; 53 9 - . 011580 WCT tlH .1 2 11)3 
-.0 01l2 1 ｾﾣＡＡ＠ • 1 ｾ＠ 77 a . 26870 • 000 <)8 -. 0"6 fo 2 • 0 .12 23 -. 03 1 4 1 - . 011 1 5 7 lI e fL • 1 4 11 16 - . 4 02 U7 .73511, . 2 595 II • .3 77 CJ J -. 0162 1 
-. 58 4 75 • a (,4 Ｎ ｾＴ＠ . 0 5822 -. 24 1 52 1 /1 [1< 
- . (j 7 (j 7 /, 
• CLJ 7 h.3 . 05 <) 7 6 - .172 ,+ 5 
- . 023 52 . 'l 70 26 -. 117 25 . 2 1 206 -. 0 26fi 7 . 0 1 g 00 
we xllc'O 
. 15656 
- .0 6Y 33 • . ｾ＠ 4 il <) 11 • t ｴＮｾｾ＠ r. . 26 ·, g 'l .0 'i " 11 -. 26110 1 • 1 h ') ｾ＠ 7 -. Olfl3 5 - . O'l 1 S6 l'ICIl f< 
. 0'1272 
-. 2 2 17 1 ---:--(;07'1"5 • 2 ｾ ＺＬｆＩｉｉ＠ . 1 113 41 - . ｩ ｌｾ ＳＲ Ｖ＠ - . 31 11 43 • G 72 loY . oSl no - • 6 7 '. 11 7 ａ ｜Ｍ Ｌｃ ｾ＠
. 0 1 5Y U -. 3 34 'Jlj 
__ !.J 32 9 ｾ＠ . 5CJ555 . 345/. a - . 1 rlS 2 <) 
- . 31l,37 . 0 a 363 -. 055 4 1, - . 23 ') 0 1 
TL nl\1 
- . 1 2 /• ] 1. 
. 602 fot. - . oCn (.o 
-. 2:!fJl'l 
- . 26730 . lU 95 
_ ._7 -'l.2..2L -. 0 11 51 - . 06 .. 5fi • ]27 tl') 
APPE ND IX G3 - Cont 
ｆ ｊ ｜ｃｔｏｾ＠ 1 FAC rOR ? FACT OR 3 FA C TOR 4 FACTOR Ｌ ｾ＠ 5 FA:: TOR [, FACTOR 7 FACT OR tl FACTOR 9 FACTOR lil 
TLl A 
-.11 'J 4 6 . 6 Or, 98 
-. 011 1.21 
-.2 3Y5 0 -.26990 • 11479 .79791 -.02212 -.06600 .31,171 
OELJT I1A -.34666 -.040 5') -.1 5 44 1, • 0 1903 -.461150 -.23056 . B3042 -. 20159 
-.04710 
-.06 647 E'llllATL • ＷｩＧｾｧＵ＠ -. 'j HI. 0 2 .0 9 311 .144115 .3 5199 -.09016 
- .6 9259 -.116 6 7 .23233 -.17 250 TATNW .1 28 b"l -. 60 4 5 3 • 0 cJC) I, 2 • 23794 .26534 -.11056 -.7 9'3 10 .0071 5 .0 6478 -.33137 QAT ｎｾｉ＠
.01 2611 • I, ')') 44 .0 1 140 
-.1 5014 .33011 2 .1 3 445 .45773 .1 58'H -.101)07 .5134 9 C,' TrW • Il 1,4 ,S 5 -. ')5855 -. 4.5 6(,( 
.1 11211 4 .14238 -.21329 -.541141 
- • 1 71 61 • C 3328 -.3021 0 CLHIH 
-. O'H8 0 .6 26<J u -.ll ':; 1 65 
-.2727 8 - ,.30 872 
.1 '3355 .6f>1I65 .14'116 -.045'36 .3 6526 Ar NW5 
-.0''<11 -. ') 7638 .0 1, (O 2 .7 ;>3S2 . 21&01, 
-.3599a 
-.4 &'. BO 
- .0 11314 
-.05023 
- • 2')985 U£U Tr NH 
-.31 72 1 • 1 Ｗ ｾ＠ 13 -.1 0'127 -. 0 3 50 ll -. 2 7.152 
-.151% .97540 -.011767 
-.06214 .1 11017 O£ll fT C!: 
-. 3UIJII .17 27 5 -.1U 1I6S 
-.0 35tl8 -.2017 9 
- .14165 .'37 ｾＵＵ＠
- • 0 65 11l -.0651.16 • 1 8 5 90 C 1\ TL 
. tfd07 
-. 33 '3'.U .71 02'1 • 1 9951\ .30123 • 07415 -. 68101 .23898 .070 65 
-.1 9 445 ａｃＢｃｏｾ＠ -. Il.5UII5 .6 S5113 ｾＱＶＲＸ＠ .1, 7t1ll 4 
-.0 9 736 -.02U,I. 
.1 111nO -.0 55 :16 .0111 2 . 2 11 9 0 COSA r NV • 01131
'
, • 1 0/1 0 3 -. 6254 C) -. ('5171l .25577 -.061'}'} .001l74 
-. a 0%3 -.06035 .22 '371 Af)flPOOE • Ｑ ［ｾ＠ 5 1 5 -.1 2002 • ZO 31, 11 • 71 212 .6 '3a 91 -.21 519 -.12244 .046 :s 7 -.12546 .200 113 AQAS • tJ 4'12'.) -.0 534 0 .2 205 7 . 68976 .68374 -.16977 
-.07'1 55 .0 9Y 1 6 -.16332 • 2U 4 112 ACII S 
-.1 0 4 03 
-.11 903 . 51l316 • 82902 • 153 '34 -.2 32 17 .00 2'J 7 • 0 ＷＧ ｾ Ｒ Ｑ＠ • -.0 '3 41, t\ 
-.10 8 49 S ArA 
.1 6 7 00 .3 8&62 . 56505 -. 50tl91! .0 oen 0 • 3:\ 003 .05307 . 21102 4 .010 ')4 
.1 5961 
(,i S AT 'A .l d73 7 . 35 0 9 4 .0 33 43 - • ') 0'13 4 -.11315 .44213 . 030 :S9 .13<,)37 
.110116 .2 2369 SATC", 
. 2225 5 • 'j ld t <; .01 691 -.7 Q092 -.132 3 ｾ＠ .4 56 35 .0 4353 .1 3 'H 7 • 07 1) 13 .273 e7 (..'1 ｓａＺｴｃｾ＠
.1 2 315 . 5 1,469 .00 9 1,0 
-.7 51.10 1\ 
- .2 2949 .4 3278 . 2'.797 . 2;' 1B • 071,15 . 298 1 S SA IIIV' 
-. 16 44 1, 
-.O 'J113 • (,65 <,)4 . 51\9/\ 0 
-.37005 -.14065 . 0 6 869 .019<;6 .0 1303 
-. 29623 01\ Y S LlI< S -. 01\1,27 
-.O l 40 2 . 2 .5410 . 60919 .27 061 -.0 8 21,2 .0 2617 • C 1,52(, 
-. 1 Oil 0', . 65652 
LlIl C L • 17 0 47 -.3 0S 12 . 2 40 2 1 . 222'3 1 .92779 
-.0 88 411 -.437 ('0 
-.0 21l117 
-.05 0 5 1 .1 26211 QflTL 
.21 055 
-. 252 13 . 2Y272 • 1 6 79 Il . 8 31) 22 .0 2356 
- . 59% 0 • 18d'';tI 
-.03020 . 22 4 53 HCX !tIV • 17S 0 7 -. 322<)1 .41 573 . 24868 .7 q9q 
-.U73 9 5 
- .1,800 3 
-.0 269 1 -.04 356 -. oso % X IrIVC A 
-.11 307 
-.or 06 4 .41 000 -.o rOlJfJ 
-. 8 12112 .04400 . 0%52 -.0 26 37 .13] 22 
-.'d1 33 QACL POOE . 2 1 8 1, I 
-. 302£:5 . 20 1,4<; • 1 250 4 .89752 -. 06545 -.41l 69 7 
-. 03425 
-.04 h02 
-. 02325 EOIVU SE 1 . 5'337 4 -. a ｾＱ ＮＱＶ＠ .10 5 31 
-.09746 .1311,6 . 0<)208 
-.17 233 - • 1 0 19 1 -. 5 ,H16 . 1304Y 
EOfvC S NI 
-. 213tl tI -.1711 60 -. 00 74 5 .0 40C 2 . 08878 
-.U1470 -.02 '1 70 . 0 3 0 7U 
-. 85 Id O • 00 1 29 CUA 
-. ｏ ｾＩｏ＠ 11 • (,20 3 t, -. 00 160 -. 29240 -.33114 
. 25 7 103 . 5[1599 . 2 hll tl5 
-. G29n • 38 1 08 af, Til 
.1(, 29 .1 • 21446 . 2S2f> 1 -.03 '1:;6 .7 4103 .1244'3 -.04 8',2 . 224611 -.11473 .1.74 26 CA l fI 
. 0 'J511 5 • 2 7 ':l'j6 . 11 1. ':1 1 5 
- • 0 ｾＨＬＳ＠ 3 .048 9 7 • 212 72 . 0360'1 .30600 -.011 39 • 12141 OE 'I TT A 
-. Ｓ ＵＵ Ｏｪｾ＠ . 02773 
-. U 117 '18 .0 2 004 -.2 1,14 6 
-.1'l23 1• . 9S311 -.O CJ1f:O 
-.07 1116 .1 0YU') OEU Tef, ＭＮＳ ｾ ｴＬＱＷ＠
-. 05071\ 
-. 32763 . 017'll -.237 3 3 
-. Ｒ Ｚ ｾｴｬＶＵ＠ . 67207 -.1 <) 1 36 
-.0 8 102 . 051193 TNIA fllri Ｎ ＼ｪＴＴｾＵ＠ . 08':112 .11 'nJ -.1 '.:2 H . 050 33 .1 27 1 2 -.1 2<;12 
-.1 0nlj') 
. 211 1 115 .1 0252 X In [u r T 
-. 5 1ll I, 7 . 23279 -.0 1.330 
-.0091 0 -.3 11 37 <; 
-.05 &73 .7 6 1 9 3 .0 27'1'1 
-.111 95 • 06 7 1, 0 
ｄｦ＼ｴＬ［ｾ＠ • O') S 17 -. &5 3 21 . 2 5 174 . 2
'
,72 <j 
.432 5 7 
-.11 055 -.1 6631\ . 0 (:2 Ot! 
-.0473 9 .42 360 t:LCR . 04490 .714 66 .U1, 222 ＭＮ＿ｌｴ ＹｾＲ＠ • O..! J 92 .24 3 74 
-.2 38 0 '1 
- • 1 h5 11 2 
.13 639 • fi9 747 XlI lVC L • De111J ｾｔｩＳｱ＠ • 73l (,11 • 1 Ｗ ｙ Ｇ ｾＹ＠ -. 2<;4113 
-. 009 15 -. 2511.2 
-.0 5361• .1 2259 -.'.37 0 7 A::;C;GP lIi 
.4 2'JIIO 
-. OYtl'l . 13 82 4 ＭＮＱ ｾ Ｔ ＵＳ＠
-. 07338 
-.0 620 7 -.0 59 3') 
-. 076.s3 . 23656 . 25&U 7 PROljR 1 Ii • 332/1 7 -. 1 ;> II E. 1 . 0.573& -.0 6 77 .1 
-. 03173 . 014 7 2 
-. 02 40 8 - • 1 04 I. U . 516 40 • G5 q 73 ｚｾ ｃＧ＿＠ • 1, 5'. '5 7 -.I.tJb') l 
.21"1 1 • ::' 30 1 fJ . 5 <;<j 0 1 -. ,13 6 00 
-.71 411
'
• 
-.1 31 3 4 .1 2902 - • 24 6 gl. 
nfTA 
. OOl1l3 .1 0311 -. 12 4 90 .01 0 1<) -.0 7053 
. 0423'3 . 05311 0 - . 501 9<; .1 347 1 -. 01,306 L LG r ｾ＠
-. U' j 1 tJ <; 
-. 12217 . n 77 l17 . 0 12C 7 . 0 7 5 5 5 
. ?'l098 - . 2 1 n ;> • II /i0 ! 7 -. OI,Jf,O -.0 2 4 .51 I /JI , ' I: ' I 
-. 1 II I Ii. ＭＮ ｕｾ Ｓｊ ｉ［＠ • 'j f,t, 7 7 -. 0 1, <; 2 il . 013 Rf. . 323,, 5 
-. 0':l 'J'J 2 • g 0<; !I \ -. 0411 17 • a', a 6'l 
(' " "(O"l 
- ｾ＠ '1 it r.; " ｾ＠ ---:7 ;-'11 r,1 • os i:' '1 ? -. 0' · 0 '>7 
APPENDIX G3 - Cant 
FAC TOR 11 
FFS . 2054 1 
FFATC E -. 25628 
FFAT 1\ . 0l':l'J6 
V,'S . 2118'j 
VAATA • C 35') 4 
VAATCE ＭＮ ＲｾＱＶｴｬ＠
"AANCt:: -. 34 5 1 9 
I:: UIT S • 1', ｾ＠ 12 
LIII T,\ l A 
-. 01 9 17 
f: l3 lTAT CL - .. 271. Lt If 
VA ER . 014 S'l 
P I) TS 
. 1731 2 
I' U I A T A • U 1,0 2 4 
pu r A 11 11. -. 2b t l t S 
I' ll TAT L . 2f8U 
I' UT ACL .. .s51US 
f' iJ I " ret - . H, Ue ') 
ｬＧｉｉＱａｉｾｃｆ＠ - . 2 Ｎ ｬ｢ ｾ ｌｉ＠
T NIS • .14 a u7 
r UI ATII . 215Y1 
Y II I fl t:H 
-. 09'd 'l 
r:"-J TNl f. TL • '.3/,0 I. 
ｲｲｊｉＬｾｴＺｌ＠ • 5 L (, ti l 
Cr· T tH t, TCE 
-. 0 u 'i 4 tl 
T IH .'l.ilr.r 
- • U'>3 ') I) 
ｌｆｾ＠ -. ,. U '.) 7 Ii 
CFA T A • 263 U b 
Crill1FII • OY 1 r.: ') 
Cf A I L . 5 fJ c 'J U 
CfACL . 5!l 701 
t:FArCE: • U UlleO 
ｃｾｉ｜ｉ ｊ ｌｴＮ＠ -. 11I.>l 14 
OSCI r,o:.;1' 
-. 1 0236 
Il RCI\ • 0 III U 'J 
[lla r !!v ＭＮ ｵｴＩｾ｢ｨ＠
CAeL • !)!J :1', t1 
F ｾ＠ r 1\ • 1, 64 'Jo 
\ ;C ｲ ｬｾｈ＠
- . ｕｾＮｬＢ＠ 4 
,i C 1 L • '. 3l1 3 'J 
T IH R . 0,,\11 0 5 
r/cxr,Cf 
-. Dlll16 
HC' W • tHGS 
At/I; :; • 2 ｾ Ｇ ｬｴｬ＠ Z 
lL 1 111: 
-. II I Ii DG 
TL T 1\ -. b/OY 4 
() E. II , ) 1\ • U (,l.-, I) 't 
1 ,I I I Po I L 
· ? Jrl ll 'J 
Tf<1 !J W . o I BY5 
fJ A Jr.:, ｟ Ｍ ｾＭＮＡ＠ 1" 1 ｾ＠
.: .,-
APPEND I X G3 - Cont 
FAC TOR 11 
CL TNW 
- - 170]2. 
AT tl ll S • 5 76 1 2 
DE ll TT NW -. 2'. Clt 2 
DEllT TCE - . 2( 4 01) 
CI\ T L . 3 1)011 6 
ACRe cs 
-.4 U:")0 
C OSA I NV -. O'H Ob 
ArlI\P[)O t:: 
- • O':l':lf: 1 
I\ QA:; 
-. 1 3'.2 tl 
AeA:; 
-.0 3l ti2 
.;..J SI\FA -
-. 5J359 
"..1 SA T 1\ -. 2 :1£>3 1 
SA TCE -. 4936 3 
S/\r/Ci:: - . 5670 '+ 
SA l /I V . 0('3Q4 
(JAY"IlR S -. 0 1 30 7 
UI\C L • 2 41J 2 3 
n HL . 11 259 
I-iCX I NV • J ttd '. 
XHI VCA . 17 ', oS '> 
ｉＩ Ｌ ｾｉ［＠ L POOE • 2& 1.32 
ｅｏ ｉｖ ｃ ｾ ｆ Ｑ＠ - . O7 3':l !l 
E OI V'( S IH . 00 04 5 
C Ll A -. 7'11 32 
00'1 T A -=-:,,61. 'Iiz 
C AT A 
-.442 5 7 
ll t: fH r A -.1 2 3 56 
OEIITCA • 0 ｾ＠ 1 cJ 3 
TNI ATN W -. OY735 
XN I EO IT -.1 -SUJ8 
ｌｊｾｃｒ＠ . 3230 S 
CLCf< .0 080 7 
x IrNC L . '.5 7 .3 6 
A:';SGk l ll 
-. O'.i56 4 
P}<OGR TI I 
-. 1:1 279 
LSCI< • 4 'JIl 5 !l 
ou /\ - . 2 ') 20!J 
L OG T A . 02 11'+ 
L Or,NCf -.1 2 737 
I1K. Lf f) ＭＮ Ｚｬｏ ｾ Ｕ Ｎ ＧＱ＠
APPENDIX H 
LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: 
THE ASSUMPTIONS AND STATISTICAL TESTS EMPLOYED 
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a technique that is able to 
analyse the characteristics of two or more groups and create a model 
based on those characteristics which best differentiate between the 
groups in question. The end ' result from using this technique is a 
model that transforms a set of characteristics into a single variable, 
normally called a z-score'. Once the z-score for an observation has 
been computed, it is then compared with a predetermined z-score cutoff 
value. Depending upon whether the observation's z-score is greater 
or less than this cutoff value, the observation is then categorised as 
belonging to a particular group. This technique has been widely 
employed, but in the finance ' area the research has concentrated on 
creating models that best discriminate between failed and non-failed 
companies. ' The discriminating variables used in these stUdies were 
the financial characteristics of the companies, (Taffler,1976; 
Artman,1968;- Deakin,1972 and Edmister,1972 are examples). Further 
examples of how L.D.A. has been used in the finance area are consumer 
credit assessment, bond ratings (see Foster, 1978 for review) and to a 
much lesser extent in investment appraisal (Walters,f959 and Schick 
and Verbrugge, 1975). 
The first ' step in LDA ' is to establish the groups that are to be 
analysed and then to decide on the variables that are likely to be the 
best discriminators. In this study the groups analysed are "low 
valued" and "high valued" companies and the variables are the 
financial ratios described in chapter V. The objective of the 
analysis is to ascertain which linear combination of variables best 
discriminates between companies with high and low share values. The 
final model takes the following form: 
where z = the discriminant score 
G = the discriminant ｣ｯ･ｦｦｩ｣ｩ･ｾｴｳ＠ for n variables 
R = the discriminatory variables 
By comparing the discriminant score for a given observation with the 
Z-scale it is then possible to attach a probability to which group the 
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observation is likely to come from. 
This is best demonstrated in geometric fo m. Figure H.' shows two 
groups of data plotted on a graph using variables X and Y. It can be 
seen that the data forms two highly correlated groups with a slight 
overlap in the middle. The graph shows that neither X nor Y can 
alone discriminate between the two groups with any degree of success. 
However, if a line A is drawn through the two groups at a point that 
minimises the overlap and a line Z is drawn perpendicular to A, it can 
be seen that the dimensions of X and Y nave been transformed into one 
variable represented by line Z. To emphasize this transformation 
further, the distributions of the two groups have been drawn on line 
Z, .thus revealing two distinct groups with only a small overlap. 
Obviously the smaller the overlap in the middle the less the error 
term of the model. The point where line A crossed line Z is the 
cutoff point between the two groups. 
v 
FIGURE H.' 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 
A Diagramatic Example 
I 
x 
z 
By using LDA it is possible to compute the z-value for any observation 
by using variables X and ｙｾ＠ This z-value would then be compared with 
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the line Z to see which group the observation was likely to belong. 
In addition the more this z-value differs from the cutoff point the 
higher the probability of the observation belonging to that particular 
ｧｲｯｵｰｾ＠
This general principle of transforming two variables X andY to one 
dimension, Z, can be applied to many variables, although the optimum 
is normally between five and seven. Lachenbruch(1975) suggests it is 
unusual to have more than ｾ＠ or 5 in a model. For more technical 
discussion of LDA the reader is referred to Tatsuoka(1970) or Cooley 
and Lohnes(1971). 
The Use of LDA for Valuing Shares 
As previously stated this study describes how LDA has been used to 
discriminate between high and low valued companies on the basis of 
financial ratios. The purpose is to find a linear combination of 
financial characteristics that best discriminate between the two 
groups and thus indicate which are the important variables that 
, 
influence share values. The proposition which underlies the analysis 
is that even after allowing for market imperfections, there should be 
some sort of consensus of opinion as to which factors determine the 
market valuation of a stock. 
The use of LDA should not be considered as a substitute for multiple 
regression and should be viewed as a method for unravelling the 
complexities of share valuation in its own right. Use of this 
technique has the purpose of determining directly those 
characteristics which distinguish between high and low valued 
companies using only a relatively small sample. As a result it will 
be useful to compare relationships derived with those of the multiple 
regression for consistency. 
The methodology adopted in this study has been to use LDA to create 
models for both the Earnings Yield and Valuation Ratio. The groups 
upon which the analyses were performed consisted of the top sixty and 
bottom sixty companies in each distribution. In this way it was 
Possible to discriminate between high and low valued companies. 
Obviously, the characteristics upon which the models are based are the 
independent variables' referred to in chapter V. 
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The use of LDA in this manner has been heavily criticised by 
Eisenbeis (1977) and by Altman (1981) who argue that some major 
assumptions are violated and therefore the technique is not 
appropriate for this type of research. However, all of their 
arguments can to some extent be disregarded providing the purpose and 
the subsequent application of the models are clearly defined. In the 
follwing section we examine each of these arguments in turn. 
The Assumptions and Statistical Tests 
One of the basic assumptions put forward by Eisenbeis (1977) in his 
article decribing the pitfalls of LDA is that the groups being 
examined should be descrete and indentifiable. In the application of 
LDA ｾｮ＠ this thesis we use "segmented continuous variables" to form the 
groups with the cut-off points .for these groups are subject to the 
researchers whim. Eisenbeis goes so far as to state that the Walter 
study is a prime example of the violation of the principles of LDA. 
In his paper Eisenbeis quotes four main reasons for his criticism: 
1) the groups are arbitrary and not truly distinct and therefore 
allow scope for manipulation. 
2) by using only the top and bottom parts of a distribution this 
excludes the middle and therefore the discriminant function can only 
be used to compare whether a given observation appears to be more like 
the upper of lower portions. 
3) the error rates are not meaningful "since to select the example 
one must already know which firms are from which part and this is 
precisely what one is trying to predict". 
4) finally, "such problems do not lend themselves to predictive 
discriminant analysis because they involve forming groups ｾｮ＠ the basis 
of a variable that is in fact observable at the same time". 
Although some of these criticisms are well founded and supported by 
Altman (1981', they are not considered sufficiently strong to 
invalidate the use of LDA in this study. We would argue that LDA has 
a wide number of applications and that providing one is careful in the 
interpretation of the results and limits are set to the subsequent use 
of such models it is possible to use LDA as an exploratory tool. 
More specifically the following points can be argued in reply to 
Eisenbeis's criticism: 
1) although the cut-off limits for groups are choosen arbitarily 
providing there is logic in the underlying principle for choosing 
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these groups then LDA is an appropriate technique for finding the 
differences between the groups. In this study the emphasis is on 
identifying the factors which distinguish high and low share values. 
2) our derived models are not used to classify companies as either 
having high or low share values. 
3) the error rates are meaningful as their purpose is to establish 
the extent to which the models explain the underlying relationships 
and not merely to determine predictive ability. A high error rate 
indicating poor discriminatory power has the same implication as for 
all LDA models. 
ｾＩ＠ lastly the models are not used for prediction purposes and 
therefore we do not try to predict what is already known. 
For valid application of LDA as Eisenbeis points out 1) the variables 
used should be multivariate normal and 2) the group dispersion 
matrices should be equal across all groups. The first of these 
assumptions is difficult to test in practice for although there are 
many univariate distribution tests, there are few multivariate 
normality tests. The solution suggested in the literature is that 
the data should be transformed on a univariate basis to improve 
univariate normality and this should have the desired effect of 
increaSing the probability of multivariate normality. It was with 
this in mind that all the variables in the database were transformed 
where necessary (see chapter V). 
The second assumption of equal group dispersion matrices was tested 
using the Bartlett-Box test criterion (see Cooley and Lohnes, 1977: 
230). Unfortunately it was found that the hypothesis that the 
disperSion matrices were equal could not be supported at the 5% level 
of confidence. Whilst this is a disappointing result several other 
studies ego Taffler(1976) and Sudarsanam(1981) with similar results 
argue that this does not appear to lead to serious bias in the 
subsequent application of the models. In view of this we do not 
believe that the violation of this assumption is a serious problem and 
consequently believe our analyses to be acceptable from the 
exploratory pOint ｯｾ＠ view. 
The other criteria employed for testing our LDA models are as follows: 
1) the independent variables were selected on the basis of the 
Mahalanobis D squared statistic, which was ｴｲ｡ｮｳｦｯｲｭｾ､＠ into a 
F-statistic for ease ,of interpretation (Morrison, 1969). The 
variable with the largest F-value was selected providing it was 
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statistically significant. 
2) the individual variables had to be measuring different financial 
characteristics. Despite arguments that multicollinearity is not 
important in LDA (eg. Eisenbeis, 1977:883) it was considered for the 
purpose of this study to be more appropriate to limit the variables to 
one per factor. 
3) the influence of each variable in a model was measured by the 
Mosteller and Wallace (1963) method, which computes the percentage 
contribution of each variable to the Mahalanobis distance between the 
two groups. This is the method recommended by Joy and Tollefson 
(i975) and Taffler (1976). 
ｾＩ＠ the percentage of the observations misclassified was used as a 
measure of how much discriminatory power the model possessed. Note 
that problems with prior probabilities did not arise as the prior 
probability of an observation coming from either group was equal and 
there were no misclassification costs. 
5) finally, in order to test the stability of the models created and 
to daetermine whether any individual observations were causing any 
'untoward influence on the model, a Lachenbruch holdout test was 
performed (Lachenbruch, 1967). It was found that when this test was 
performed on both models no bias was present in that the resulting 
classifiction matrix was identical to that obtained by resubstituting 
the data from which the model was derived into the wodel. 
In conclusion we would argue that by keeping to the above assumptions 
and controlling criteria the models created can be interpreted as 
being statistically valid and significant. We shall now examine the 
statistics relating to the models presented in chapter VI in more 
detail. 
the Earning Yield Model 
The LDA performed on the top sixty and the bottom sixty companies in 
the earning yield distribution produced the following model (table 
ｾＱＩ＠ : 
z = -1.28 + 8.05 x DIV/NI - 1.15 x Market Liquidity 
Table H.1 shows the statistics obtained from the stepwise LDA package 
(SPSS Version 6.0). It can be seen that the most significant 
variable in the model is the dividend payout ratio, DIV/NI, 
contributing 87.5% of the distance between the group means. The 
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tABLE H.1 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
Earning Yield Model 
Step No. 
1 
2 
Variable 
DIV/NI 
Market Liquidity 
Misclassification Matrix 
No. of 
Actual Group Comp. 
High E.Y. 60 
% 100 
Low EV 60 
% 100 
Total Correctly classified. 79.2% 
Actual Model 
F 
Value 
62 .. Ｐｾ＠
15.31 
Predicted 
High 
E¥ 
-
51 
85.0 
16 
26.7 
z ｾ＠ -1.28 + 8.05 x DIV/NI - 1.15 x MKT LIQ. 
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GrouE 
Low 
EV 
-
9 
15.0 
44 
72.3 
% 
Cont 
-
87.5 
12.5 
100.0 
other variable, market liquidity, contributed only 12.5%. The 
F-values for both variables entering the model at each step and in the 
final model are statistically significant. 
Table H.1 also includes the misclassification matrix obtained when the 
model is used on the data that created the model. The overall ability 
of the model to correctly classify these companies is 79.2%, which 
compares favourably ｷｩｾｨ＠ the 50% expected by chance alone. However, 
when the arbitrary manner by which ' the groups were formed is taken 
into account, this ｰ･ｾ｣･ｮｴ｡ｧ･＠ is considered to be low, indicating that 
the model is not that ･ｦｦ･｣ Ｇ ｾｩｶ･＠ in discriminating between the two 
groups. Further this percentage is lower than the 87% found by the 
Walter's (1959) ｾｴｕ､ｹＮ＠
A more detailed examination of the misclassification matrix reveals 
that' the model was ｡｢ｬｾ＠ to classify the high yielding companies more 
accurately than the low yielding companies (85% and 73% respectively). 
This infers that the factors which influence whether a company has a 
low or high earnings yield are not only the factors included in the 
model. It is quite reasonable to expect that for certain "high 
flying" companies, growth potential leads to a the low earnings yield 
rather than just dividend policy alone. 
The extent of the misclassification can be seen diagrammaticcally in 
figure H.2 where the histograms of the two groups are provided. The 
low yielding group can be seen to extend much further over the zero 
cut off point than the high yielding group giving a slightly skewed 
appearance. The historgram drawn at the foot of the page shows how 
the companies in the middle of the sample have been classified. " The 
balance can be seen to be slightly skewed towards the high yielding 
group with 55% of this middle group falling to the left of the zero 
cut off point. 
One final statistic, which provides a measure of how well the 
discriminant model explains the earnings yield distribution, is the 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient (Yoemans 1968:302). This 
correlation coefficient is computed by ranking companies on their 
z-scores and Earnings Yields, and then comparing the difference in 
ranks. In this instance the correlation coefficient squared was 
.253, which is not very different from the R-squared of .26 found in 
the regression analysis. 
325 
F i g ure " f-1 . 2 
HI STOGRAf·1S OF EA HI'"I Ir'JGS YI EL D r10D EL Z- SCORE S 
[,Ja .o f Compan ies 
20 
· 
High Ea r n i nqs Yie l d Samo le 
· 
ｾ＠15 
,-
10 r-
""""'" 
5 
""""'" 
0 1"":1 , . I , . • . 
-3 -2. 5 - 2 -1. 5 -1 -. 5 0 .5 1 1. 5 2 2 . 5 3 3 . 5 4 
Z- Sc or e 
20 
15 - Low Earn ing s Yie l d Sa mele 
10 
5 
. I r , I 
-3 -2. 5 -2 -1. 5 -1 -. 5 0 . 5 1 1. 5 2 3 3 . 5 4 
Z- Score 
no 
-
ｾ＠
60 r-- ｾ＠ Hid d.le CornptJnies 
· 
n r-
r--- I i 
-
I -
40 
20 
n o ｾ＠ --'=1 . . r1 . 
\ , , • • . 
- 3 - 2.5 - 2 - 1. 5 - 1 - • 5 0 .5 1 1. 5 2 2 . 5 3 3 . 5 4 
Z- Score 
326 
These results suggest that dividend payout is the main ractor that 
distinguishes a low yielding company from a high yielding company in 
terms of their earnings yield. In addition the amount of active 
trading in a share would appear to have some discriminatory power but 
to a much lesser extent. The signs of the coefficients indicate that 
a high dividend payout is associpted with a low earnings yield and 
that a high degree of trading is ,also associated with a low earnings 
yield. This might infer two things, the first is that investors 
appear to have a preference for dividends in that they attach a 
greater value to companies which payout a higher proportion of their 
earnings in the form of dividends. The second is that the more a 
share is in the stock market limelight the higher its relative share 
price. This infers that there is a discount on the less active 
stocks, probably caused by a general lack of interest in the shares 
due, inter alia, to their size and thus tradeability. 
The Valuation Ratio Model 
The LDA ·on the top sixty and bottom sixty companies in the Valuation 
Ratio distribution produced the following model: 
Z = 0.62 + Log PBT/AVNW 
The statistics and classification matrix for this one variable model 
are shown in Table H.2. It can be seen that the one discriminatory 
variable, PBT/AVNW, is statistically significant. The obvious 
conclusion to be drawn from the model 1s that return on capital, as 
measured by PBT IAVNW, is the key to discriminating between high and 
low valued companies. ａ Ｇ ｾｯｷ＠ valuation ratio appears associated with 
a high return on capital and vice versa. It is interesting to note 
ｴｨ｡ｾ＠ this was the key variable in the valuation ratio regression 
model. These results infer that a company is valued more, that is 
the higher its share price relative to its net assets value, the more 
the return on those assets. 
The classification matrix in Table H.2 shows that when the model was 
used on the original data set 95% of the companies were correctly 
classified. This high success rate reflects that the model is very 
accurate even though it is based on only one variable. Nevertheless , 
it should be noted that this accuracy test does have an upward bias, 
and that the original group selection technique would accentuate this 
bias. A 'closer look at the mislcassification matrix reveals that the 
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TABLE H. 2 
Discrimin ant ａｮｾｬｹｳｩｳ＠
Valuati on Rati o Mod el 
Step No. Variab 12 F Valu e % Co nt 
1 P8 T/AVT NW 168. 9 100.0 
Misclassification Ma trix 
Predicted Group 
Actual Group No. of High LOld 
Camp. VR \TR 
High VR 60 55 ' 5 
% 100.0 91.7 8.3 
Low VR 60 1 59 
% 100.0 1.7 98.3 
95% of companies co rrectly classified 
Actual Madel 
Z = 0.62 + Log( PBT / AV TNIiJ) 
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high valuation ratio group had more companies misclassified than the 
low valuation ratio group (8.3% and 1.7% respectively). This 
suggests that not all companies with a high valuation ratio (ie.low 
share price relative to asset value) have a low return on capital, and 
that other factors have some · influence on the share price of these 
companies. On the other hand these results imply that companies are 
only highly valued, (ie. have low valuation ratios), when they have a 
high return on capital. 
In figure H.3 the histograms of the two samples are shown. It can be 
seen that the overlap between the two groups is far less than that of 
the Earnings Yield model, reflecting the increased discriminatory 
power of the model. Below the two sample histograms, the histogram 
for the middle portion of companies is drawn and it can be seen 
clearly to lie between the two peaks of the sample distributions. 
From this it is reasonable to conclude that the z index not only 
applies to the high and low valued groups, but can be employed to rank 
all companies on a relative basis. Further evidence to reinforce 
this conclusion is that the Spearmans rank correlation squared between 
the Z-score and Valuation Ratio is .47 indicating a strong 
relationship. This .47 is very similar to the amount of variance 
explained by the return on capital ｶ｡ｲｩ｡｢ｬｾ＠ in the multiple regression 
model, .46. 
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HISTOGRAM OF THE VALUATIO N RA TI O MOD EL Z-SCORES 
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3 4 
1 2 3 4 
Figure H. 3 
5 6 7 
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APPENDIX I 
THE AUTOMATIC INTERACTION DETECTION ALGORITHM 
AID (Automatic Interaction Deteotor) was devised at the Institue of 
Social Research at the University of Michigan and grew out of a paper 
of Sonquist and Morgan(1g63) which aimed to show some limitations of 
existing survey analysis tecnniques and suggested the development of 
AID in" this context. 
AID is applicable to data sets consisting of one dependent variable 
and a number of predictors, the dependent variable being on an 
interval scale and the predictors on categorical scales. It is a 
hierarchical binary segmentation technique, wich at each stage divides 
the data set on a chosen predictor into two groups chosen so as to 
maximise a certain criterion. This criterion is the ratio of the 
between groups sum of squares variation to the total sum of squares 
(on the dependent variable), called BSS/TSS. The predictor chosen 
for the split at any stage is that which gives the highest maximum 
value of the criterion subject to the constraint on the groups which 
can be formed. 
The group to be split at any stage is termed the parent group. This 
is split into two child groups which in turn form the parent groups 
for the next splits. The whole structure produced is a Ｈｬ｡｢･ｾｬ･､Ｉ＠
tree where each node corresponds to a particular group and (apart from 
the first) can be labelled by the characteristics of the split 
producing the group and by the predictor categories selected. This 
is called the tree structure. By analogy with graph theory, the 
final groups are sometimes called terminal groups (corresponding to 
terminal nodes). 
Two modes of operation are possible. The free case reorders the 
categories of the predictor (in terms of increasing values of the 
dependent variable for the adjacent categories). The splitting point 
used is that which maximises the criterion value. No combination of 
predictor categories into two groups can increase the criterion value 
in this case. The monotonic case eliminates the reordering stage and 
so constrains the new groups to the original adjacencies. 
Three cut-off rules operate to limit the extent of splitting. The 
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size of the child groups has to be greater than a specified value 
(minimum group size) for a split to occur; the total sum of squares, 
TSS, of the parent group must be greater than a fixed proportion of 
the original TSS; and the BSS/TSS (where TSS is the original TSS) 
must be greater than a fixed value. Recommended values are given for 
these by Sonquist and Morgan but they can be set at any level by the 
user. Without any cut-off rules the technique would be of little use 
1n terms of the final groups produced as these would correspond to 
cells in the original cross-classification of predictors. This 
suggests the use of AID as a data reduction device forming the set of 
final groups at any specified stage of the splitting process. 
The ratio of the sum of all BSS produced at each stage to the TSS is 
called the-Explanation of AID. Sometimes it is preferred to express 
this as a ratio of the total between cell sum of squa_res, called the 
explainable variation, which when the cut-off rules are varied would 
give an upper bound of 1 for the explanation, this occurring when all 
values of the cut-off rules are set to zero. 
Description of the Algorithm 
1. The total input ｳ｡ｭｰｬ･ Ｍ ｩｾ＠ considered the first (and , indeed only) 
group at the start. 
2. Select that unsplit sample', group i, which has the largest total 
sum of squares. 
N;' 2 E y 
Ｈｾ＠ ｹｾＲ＠
, N". 
1 
Y = the dependent variable 
where Ni = the number of observations in ,group i 
. " 
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such that for the i'th group 
TSSi > R (TSS,J and Ni > M 
where R is an arbitrary parameter (normally .01 < R < .10) 
and M is an arbitrary integer (normally 20 < S < 40). 
The requirement is made to prevent groups with little variation in 
them, or small numbers of observations, or both, from being split. 
That group with the largest total sum of squares (around its own mean) 
is selected, provided that this quantity is larger than a specified 
fraction of the original total sum of squares (around the grand mean), 
and that this group contains more than some minimum number of cases 
(so that any further splits will be credible and have some sampling 
stability as well as reducing the error variance in the sample). 
3. - Find the division ot the Ck classes of any single predictor Xk 
such that combining classes to form the partition p of this group i 
into two nonoverlapping subgroups on this basis provides the largest 
reduction in the unexplained sum of squares. Thus, choose a 
partition so as to maximize the expression 
where Ni = n 1 + n2 
and Vi =n 1Y1 + n2Y2 
Ni 
tor group i over all possible binary ｾｰｬｩｴｳ＠ on all predictors, with 
restrictions that (a) the classes of each preictor are ordered into 
descending sequence, using ｴｨ･ｩｾ＠ means as a key and (b) observations 
belonging to classes which ar& not contiguous (after sorting) are not 
placed together in one of the new groups to be formed. Restriction 
(a) may be removed, by option, for any predictor Xk. 
4. For a partition p on variable k over group i to take place after 
the completion of step 3, it is required that 
where Q is an arbitrary parameter in the range .001 < ' Q < r, and TSS r 
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is the total sum of squares for the input sample. ｏｴｨｾｲｷｩｳ･＠ group i 
is not capable of being split; that is, no variable is "useful" in 
rducing the predictive error in this group. The next most promising 
group (TSSj = maximum) is selected via step 2 and step 3 is then 
applied to it, etc. 
5. If there are no more unsplit groups such that requirement (2 
above) is met, or if, for those groups meeting it, requirement (4 
above) is not met (i.e., there is no "useful" predictor), or if the 
ｮｵｭｾ･ｲ＠ of currently unsplit groups exceeds a specified input 
parameter. the process terminates. 
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23 
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31 
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35 
36 
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·38 
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S2 
53 
54 
S5 
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L p ｾ＠ V. H L D G'S 
A 8 E ROE ENe c Ｎ ＧｾＮｳ＠ T R lJ C rr 0 N G R 0 U p 
A 3 E ;:l T H A \·1 1\ :3 P IS f C H i1 ｾ＠ It' I r 0 'n L :::::: '-1 .::: 0 
ａｾａｒｉｇｈｔ＠ ,,' ｾ ｊｉｌｓ ｉＩｾＱ＠
Al LEBO NE 1\ SONS 
ALLEN Ｈｾ ｏｇａ＠ R) Ｘａ ｌｆ ｏＧｊｾ＠
ALLIE D I3R fW[RIES 
ALLIED INSUL ATODS 
ALLIED ｐｏｌｙｾｅｾ＠ GROUP 
ALL lED f E X f I L E CO '! PAN I E S 
ａｌｐｉｎｾ＠ HLDGS 
AMALGAMATED DISTILLFD ｐｒｏｾｕｃｔｓ＠
AMALGAMATED INDUST RIALS 
AMALGAMATED POWE R ｾｎｇｉｎ ｅ ｅｄｉｎｇ＠
ANCHOR CHE ｾｉｃａｌ＠ Cr) 
ANDERSON ｓｔｾａｔｈｃｌｙｏｅ＠
MIORE SILENTBLOC 
ａ ｾ ｍｉｔａｇｅ＠ SHANKS ｇｾｏｕ＿＠
ASH 1\ LACY 
ASSOCIATED BISCUIT MA NUFACTUR ERS 
ASSOCIATEO nOOK PIJElLISHERS 
ASSOCIATED 9RITISH FOODS 
ASSOCIATED ENGINf FR ING 
ASSOCIATED -NEHSPAPERS GROUP 
ASSOCIATED PAPER INDUST RI ES 
ASSOCIATED PORTLA 'JO CE MfN T MANF 
ATKINS ｛ＳｒｏｓＨｈｏｓｉｅｾｙｉ＠
AUL T 1\ ' ' viI9 eRG,: GROUP - -- -, ' 
AUROl'A HLDGS 
AUTOMOTIVE PRQOUCTS 
AV E RY S 
AVON RUB[3ER CO 
AYRSHIRE METAL PRODUCTS 
BABCOCK 1\ WILCOX 
BAlkO(WILLIAMlft ｃｾ＠
BAKER ' PERKINS HLO GS 
BAM FOP,DS " , _, __ 
:3 AN 20 ｾ｟ ｃｏｎ＠ SOLI OA TED _ LNDUS TR I ES ｾ＠ _, 
ｉｊａｒｾ＠ Ｈａ Ｍ ｾ＠ G-.) 1\ ｾ ｃｏ＠ - --- ----- - - ---
(3ARP.OW HEPBUR N GR.O UP -
BARTON ' " SONS 
BASS CHARRINGTON 
8A TH " ｐｏｾｔｌａ ｎ ｄ＠ ｇ ｾ ｏｕｐ＠
80 A GROUP 9E ALEseJOHNlASSOCIATEQ ｃｏｍｐａｎｉｾｓ＠
HEA TSON,CLA RK 1\ ｃｾ＠
REEC HAM GROUP 
Ｖｾ ｌｌＨａｒｔｈｬｊｒＩＱ｜＠ SON') 
3EMQOSE CORP QC NFORO ｃｏｎ ｃｒｅ ｔ ｾ＠ Ｑａｃｈｉｎ ｾｒ ｙ＠
eJEP\HCK TIMPO 
a::STOBELL 
OE TT Oq OS 
fJIO>] Y(J.)1\ SONS 
l3ICC Q:FU RCATE O ｅｎｇｉｎｅ ｅ ｾ ｉｎｇ＠
::3IR :HO QUL\LCAST 
ｂｉｒｾｉｎｇｈａｍ＠ ,1IN T 
OLACK 1\ EDGINGTON 
GLACKMAN A r.ONRAD 
BLAGDEN A NOAKES(HLDGS) 
[3 L A KE Y • S Ci1 ALL E A B L E CAS TIN G S ) 
BLUEMEL ｂｾｏｓ＠
BlUNOELl-PERMCGLAZE HLDGS 
BOC HIT ' 
BODnINGTONS Ｘｒｅｗｅｾｉｅｓ＠
BODVCOTE INTERNATIO NAL 
GONO STREET FABRI CS 
Ｘｭ ｾ ｓｅｒ＠ ｅｲｾｇｉｎｅｦｒｉｎｇ＠
300SEY A HAHKES 
BOOT(HENRY)I\ SONS 
ＸＰｒｏｅｾ＠ Ｘｱｅｗ｛ｒｉｅｓ Ｈ ｗｒｅｘ ｙａ ｾ Ｉ＠
9nI-JA TE;;:' CORP 
UOH THO RPE HLDGS 
BPS I NDUS TRiES 
t32A DY LESLIE: 
RR ADY I NDU SfRIES 
B Ｇｾａ＠ '1 M E ｾ＠ ( H. ) 1\ C 0 
ｏｾｅｎｔ＠ CHE MICALS ｉｾｔｅｒ ｎａ ｔｉ ｏｾａ ｌ＠
337 
t30 
-8 i 
ｾＲ＠
83 
-84 
-as 
86 
-87 
8 ') 
Bg 
gO 
91 
<?2 
93 
134 
-<35 
'96 
-e: 7 
9 13 g g 
:100 
-101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
,112 
113 
"114 
115 
.... 116 
117 
-118 
11 CJ 
'"120 
121 
'"122 
.12 3 
-12 4 
125 
12 6 
127 
'lZ H 
l2 g 
130 
131 
Ｑｾ Ｒ＠
'13 3 
134 
135 
136 
137 
13R 
13Y 
140 
141 
142 
14 3 
14! .. 
145 
146 
147 
14 11 
1 4 '1 
150 
151 
152 
153 
"154 
15 5 
156 
157 
15 8 
15g 
A P P E \'JD I X r; corn . 
ｂｾ ｉ ｃｋｈｏｕｓｅ＠ nUO Lf Y 
:3q 1001 
｡ｾ ｬ ｇｈｔ Ｈｊｏ ｾｎ ｉｇ ｒ ｏｕｄ＠
ｧｾ ｉｾｔｏｌ＠ EVEN I NG P1 ST 
Ｘ ｾ ｉｔｉ ｓｈ＠ ENK AL ON 
｡ｾｉｔｉｓｈ＠ LEYLAND 
｡ｾｉｔｉｓｈ＠ ｾｏｈｾｉｾ＠ ｓｐｉｾ ｎ ｅ ｾ ｓ＠
E3 IHTI SH PkHH H/G CO Rr 
3R ITI SH RO LL MAKE RS ｃ ｏ ｾｐ＠
EFH TIS H S T E !l11 S PEe I A L TI E S G R 0 lJ f) 
BR ITISH SUGAR CO pD 
ｂｾｉｔｉｓｈ＠ ｓｙｐｈｏｾ＠ I ND USTRIES 
B? ITISH TAR P RonUCT S 
BRITI SH VE ND I NG ｉ ｾｄｕｓ ｔ ｐｉｅｓ＠
BR IT ISH I I T A CO 
BR ITT A I NS 
BROCKHOUS E 
BRoeKS GROUP OF COH FA NIFS 
Ｓｾ ｏ ｎｘ＠ ENGINEERIN G HLDGS 
Ｘｾｏ ｏｋｅ＠ TOO L ENGIN fER ING(rLO GS ) 
BR OttiN BROS CORP 
BR Ot-lN(JOH N)" CO 
ｏｒｏｾｎＨｍａｔｔｈｅｗＩＢ＠ cn 
ｂ ｒ ｕｎｔｏｎｓＨ ｍ ｕ ｓｓｅ ｌ ｂｕ ｾ ｇｈ Ｉ＠
8SR 
BT R 
au C K LEY I S 8 R £VI E R Y 
ｾｕ ｌｇｉｎＨａＮｆＮＩｾ＠ CO 
BULLOUGH [3ULt1ER(H.P.) 
BULMER ft LUMB (HL OGS I 
au N Z L PU L P 1\ PAP E :'. t 
BURCO DEAN 
BURNE TT 1\ HALLA MSH I RE HLDG S 
E3URRELL " CO BUR Y ft 11 A S C 0 ( H LOG') ) _ 
E3UTTERFIELD-HARVEY 
CAO BURY SCHWEPPES CAM REX(HLOGS L _______ . ____ .. 
CANNING(W. ) 
CAP E INDUS TRIES -_ -- __ =._.-. 
CAPPER-NEILL: ------ --:--- --
CARA VANS INTER NATI ONA L 
GARG LO ENG I NEERING GROUP 
ｇ ａｒ ｌｅ ｓｓｃａ ｐｅｾ＠ " LEONARO -
CA RLTON I NDUST RI ES 
CARPETS I NTERNATIONAL 
ｃａｒ ｾ ｉｓ＠ ｾ ｉｌｌｉ ｎｇ＠ I NDUS TRI ES 
CARR H/ GTO N ｖｉｙｅｌｌ ｉ ｾ＠
GAR RON CO (HLD GS ) 
CATALIN 
CAWOAW I NDUS TRIAL HLOGS 
C: LESTICN I NDUST RIES 
CE NTRA L " SHEERW000 
ｃｈａｍｂｅｾ ｌ ａ ｉｎ＠ GROUP 
ｃｈａｾＳｆｒ ｌ ａｉｎ＠ ｐｈｉｐｐ ｾ＠
CH LORIDE GqOUp 
CHUOB ft SON 
CHU =? CH " CO CLARKE CHAP t1A N 
CLAY ( R I CHARD ) /\ CO 
CLAYTO N OEWANDRE HLDGS 
ｃｾａ ｙｔｏ ｎ Ｌ ｓｏｎ＠ ft CO(HL DGS ) 
CL I FFO ? O(C HAR LES I IN DUS TFIFS 
COATE S 3?O S " CO 
COA TS PATONS 
CDC KSEOGE ( HLO GS I 
ｃｏｾ ｦＺ ｎ Ｈ ａ ＮＩＱ｜＠ GO 
ｃ ｏ ｌｅ＼ｲｾＮｈＮＩ＠
COLL HJS ( HI LLI AM I/\ SONS ( f-l L nG I 
COM [l EN GRO UD 
CUMPl\ IR 
C J N P TON ( J. , S 0 ｴｾ＠ S /\ ｾ＠ E [3 t] ( H LOG S I 
CONCENT RIC 
CORAH 
CO Ri' IE RCROFT 
COR Y( HORA CEI" CO 
CO SA L T 
COS TAl N ( RIC HA iH l) 
COURTAUL OS 
3:38 
15 0 ｃｾ ａｎｅ＠ FRUEHAU F ' 
161 C2EST NI CHOLSC N 
1 52 C'::' 0 fJ ;4 PIT ::: R t I A T:L 0 N.\ L 
1 63 ｃ ｾｏｐ＿ｅｒ Ｈｊ ａｍｾｓ Ｉ ｾ＠ C2 
1 64 CROSS LEY ｑ ｕ ｉ ｌ ｏｉ ｾ ｇ＠ ｐｾｃｄｕ ｃ ｔ ｓ＠
1 6::; C ｲｾ＠ 0 U C H (n [ =< E ｾ Ｉ＠ ( C 0 N r ｾ＠ AC T 0 r; S ) 
iSS ｃ ｾｏｗ ｔ ｈｆ ｒ Ｈ ｊｃ ｈ ｎ Ｉ ｇ ｒ｡ ｊ ＿＠
1 6 7 CU LT ER GUARD ｩｊｒｉｄｾｅ＠ HLOGS 
Ｑ Ｖｾ＠ ｄ ａ ｖｾ ｎｲｏｯＮ ｔ ｓｪ Ｙｒ ＧＺＺｗ｣ｹｹ＠ ( HU1GS > 
.1C:g DAWSON IN TERNA TI O"IAL 
170 Of: LA RUE CO 
171 DELTA ME TAL CO 
172 ｏｅｎ ｾ ｙｗａ ｒｅ＠
173 DERITE NO ST .AM PI NG CO 
174 ｄ ｅ ｒｾｉｔ ｒｏｎ＠
173 DESOUTT ER BR OS ( HLOGS I 
176 DEH(G.)" CO 
177 DEW HUR ST A ｐａｒ ｔ ｎｅ ｾ＠
17 8 DIC KINSO N ROBINS ON GROUP 
179 DISTILL FRS CO 
180 Doo seN PA RK It\OU STRI ES 
1 8 1 ｄｏｒｾａｎ＠ SMITH HLDGS 
182 DOW NI NG{G.H.)A CO 
183 DOW NS SURGICAL 
184 DU8 I lIER 
185 DUFAY BITUM,'\STIC -
186 ｏ ｕｎｂ ｅｅＭｃｏ ｍｂｅｘ Ｍｍａ ｾｋ＠
187 DUNFORD A ELLIOTT 
18 g UUNHILL(ALF RE O) 
1 89 DUNLOP HLDGS 
190 DUPLE I NTERN ATI ONA L 
191 DUP OR T 
1 9 2 0 U R 1\ PIP E I NT E P.. N A rIO N A L 
1 93 n Y K E S ( J • 1 (HL 0 G S ) 
194 [.R.F. (HLO GS ) 
1 9 5 EAR L Y ( C H A R L E S I A ｲｬ ｾ＠ R RIO T T HII HI:: Y ) 
196 EAsr LANCA SH I RE ｐｾｐｅ ｒ＠ ｇ ｲ ｾ ｏｕｐ＠
1 g7 EDOR.O (HLDGSI 
19 3 ELECT RICAL A INOU5T RIAL SECUR ITI ES 
199 ELLIOTT(B.IA CO . 
200 ELLIOTT GROUP OF PETERBOROU GH 
201 ELLI S A GOLDSTEIN(HLDGSI 
202 ELSON A ｒｏｏｏ ｉｾ ｓ＠
2J3 ｅｾｅＲｇ ｙ＠ SE RV I CES ｾ＠ ELECT RONIC S 
204 ENGLISH CARD CLOTHING cn 
205 ENGLIS H CHINA CLAYS . 
206 EUCA LYPTU S PU LP HILLS ' 
207 EVA INDU STRIES . 
208 ｅｖｅｾ＠ ｒ ｾ ａｄｙ＠ CO(HLDGS) . 
ZOg E"E RE n A CO HLnGS 
21 0 EVODE HLQ GS 
211 EXPANDED ME TAL CO 
21 2 ｆＮｐ Ｎ ａ Ｎ ｃｏｎｓ ｔ ｒ ｕｃｔｉ ｏｾ＠ GROU P 
213 ｆａｉｾﾣＳａ ｉ ｾｎ＠ LAWSON 
.zit.. ｆｃｩｉｾｃｌｏｕｇｈ＠ CONS TRU CTION GPClJf'l 
215 FARNE LL ELECTRON I CS 
21 6 FEB INT ERNA TIO NA L 
217 ｆ ｅｏｾｒａ ｔ ｅｄ＠ CHEMICAL HLDG S 
218 FEEO EX 
219 FEN NER(J.H.)A CO( HlOG S I 
220 FIDE LITY RA DIO 
221 FI S QNS 
222 FLI GH T RE FU F. LLI NG {HLDG S ) 
223 FLUI OR IV E ｅｎｇｉｎｅｅ ｾ ｉ ｾ ｇ＠ CO 
2 2 4 FOD ENS 
22? FOGAR TY(E.)A CO 
226 FOLKES (J OHN IH EFO 
227 FOSE CO ｾ ｉ ｎｓｅ ｐ＠
228 F 0S TER(J OHN IA SON 
229 FOTHE RGILL A ｈａｒｖｾｙ＠
230 FRAN CIS I NDUS TRIES 
231 FRENCH KI ER HLOGS 
ｾＳＲ＠ G.E.I.I NTERNA TI ON4L 
233 G.H.P.G ROUP · 
2 34 GARDNER(L.)A SONS 
235 ｇａｾｎａｒ＠ SCO T8 Ln I R 
236 GCi SKE LL A ｃｏＨ ｑａ ｃｕｾＩ＠
2 37 GES TET NER HL DGS 
238 GIB80NS DUDLEY 
239 GLAS S ｾ＠ ME TAL ｈｌｮｾｓ＠
339 
J 
24 Q 
241 
21;2 
243 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
24g 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
255 
255 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
2E2 
2E3 
264 
·2 E: 5 
266 
257 
26R 
269 
,70 
. 271 
272 
273 
274 
Z 75 
276 
277 
271:\ 
-279 
-280 
281 
282 
·2 R3 
284 
' 2135 
-28 b 
28 7 
2 8;) 
-28 q 
-290 
! 291 
292 
2 ｧ Ｇ ｾ＠
294 
2'95 
'2'96 
297 
29,q 
2 gg 
300 
ｾ＠ 0 1 
302 
30:3 
304 
305 
306 
307 
J08 
309 
3 1 0 
ｾＱＱ＠
312 
Ｎ ｾ＠ ｌｾ＠
314 
315 
316 
3 17 
318 
.319 
A P P E ｲ ｾ＠ 0 1 )< 11 CO lIlT • 
GLENLIV ET ｏｉｓｔｉｌｌ ｾｾｓ＠
GL ｙ ｾ ｉｗ ｆ ｏ＠
G!J L IJRE I(CH.IF OUCI'I"f) 1\ S Ci'l 
GOUGH COOPE R 1\ CO 
G P. A'1 PI MI H LOG S 
ｇｾｅｅｎＧｓ＠ ｅｃｏｎｏｾｉｓｅ ｾ＠ GROU e 
GUEST, Kr EQ " NE TTL :::FO Lns 
ｇｬｊｐＡｾｬ ｅ ｓ ｓ＠ ( AR T HUR l s rHl " CO 
H:WEN CI'I KR IF R 
HAL LEN G I 0/ E E R I N G ( Ll L [) G S ) 
HALLCMATTHEW)/\ CO 
ｈａｌｌａｾＱＬｓｌｅｉｇｈ＠ 1\ ｃ ｈ ｅｓｔｏｾｬ＠
HARnvs 1\ HANSONS 
HA RR IS 1\ SHELDON GROUP 
HARRISON(JA MES IHLOG S 
ｈａｒｾｉｓｏｎ＠ " SONS 
HAHKER SIOOELEY ｇｾｏｕｐ＠
ｈａｗｋｈｾｓＢ＠ TIPSON 
HENJERSON1P.C. )G R'J UP 
HEPHO RTH ｃｅ ｾａｍｉｃ＠ HLDGS 
HESTAIR 
HICKING PENTECOST " CO 
ｈｉｃｾｓｏｎ＠ 1\ WELCH(HLOGS) 
HIELD B?OS 
HIGHMIS _ 
HIGHLAND ｏｉｓｔｉｌｌｅｾｉｅｓ＠ CO 
HIGSONS BREWERY . 
HI-LL - " '- SMITH ": - --=- .-.-:: .... 
HaLLAS GROUP 
HOLT LLOYD INTE RNnTIONAL 
ｈｏｾＧｆｒａｙ＠ 1\ CO 
HOPKINSONS HLDGS 
HOUSE OF LEKOSE 
W1V7:RHH;HA M GROUP 
HOWARD MAC HINERY 
ｉＮｄＮｃＮｇ ｾｄ ｕｐ＠
ICL 
IMPERIAL CH EMI CAL INDUSTRIES 
H1PERIAL GROUP 
IMPERIAL METAL ｉｾ ｄ ｕｓｔ ｒ ｉ ｛ｓ＠
I N T ERN A T ION A L C 0 r-1 3 US TI 0 N ( H LnG S ) 
VHERNATICf\>AL PAI NT CO 
INV ERESK GROUP 
INVERGO KOON ｄｉｓｔｉｌｌｾｒｓＨ ｈｌｏｇｓ Ｉ＠
J.8.HLOGS 
J EROME tS.) 1\ SONS(HLOGS) 
JOH NS ON,MATTH EY 1\ CO 
JOH NSON - RI CHA RDS(H.I\ R.)TIL ES 
JONES (A.A.)I\ SHIP r1 AN 
K ｓ ｾ Ｑｏｅｓ＠
KA YSER 8 0NDOR 
ｋｾｌｓｅｙ＠ lNOUSTRIES . 
KLEEMAN ｉｎｏｕｓｔ ｒ ｉａｾ＠ HLDGS 
LADIES PRIDE ｏｕｔｅｾｗ ｅ ａｑ＠
LAFARGE ORGANISAT I ON 
LA ING (JOH N)" SO tl 
LAI RD GROUP 
LAMBER T HOWARTH ｇｾｏｕｐ＠
LAN K ROC HE 111 CAL S G· 0 UP 
LAPORTE INOUSTRIE) (HLOG S) 
ｌ ｾ＠ Ｓ ａｓＨｅｕｗａ ｾ ｄＩ＠
LEAD ｉｎ ｏ ｕ ｓ ｔ ｾ ｉｅｓ＠ ｇｾｏｕｐ＠
LE8US(HARRIS) 
LEC ｒｆＮｆｒｉｇｅｾａｲｉｏｎ＠
LE ECARTHU R )I\ SONS 
LEE COOPE R GROUP 
LES NE Y PRODUCTS 1\ CO 
Lr:: V·S FOU NO 'HES /\ ENGHI::: c,< H lG 
LEY LAN D P A HIT 1\ HA L L PAP E R 
LILLEY (F.J .C,,' 
L[NC ROFT ｋｉｌｇｏｕｾ＠ ｇｾｯｵｲ＠
LINOUSTRI ES 
L I t\l E f-? CO NG RE T E ｾＱ＠ A C H PI ｾ＠ ｾ＠ yeO 
UV:: RPOO l OIlILY ｐ ｾ Ｉｓ ｔ＠ 1\ ｅ ｃｾｉｃ＠
LLOY D (F. H. ) HLDGS 
ｕＱｃｋｅｒｃｔｈｏｾａｓＩ＠ ( HL'lGS ) 
ｌ ｯｾ ｭｏ ｎ＠ Si< IC K co 
L () N f) 0 N 1\ /1 I D L A I n I N [) US T f? I A L S 
LO NIJ ON " NCr.:: THE RN G "\ OUP 
L1 NS DAL E UNIVERSAL 
340 
"220 
221 
:!22 
323 
324 
325 
32 6 
-327 
32.1 
329 
;330 
:331 
-332 
' 333 
ｾＳＳＴ＠
' 3"35 
-336 
337 
338 
33g 
-240 
341 
ｾＱＮＲ＠
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
34g 
350 
351 
ＭＺｾ＠ 5 2 
·353 
354 
355 
356 
'357 
358 
359 
260 
ｾｅＮＱ＠
362 
363 
3E 4 
·365 
36 6 
367 
36 Pl 
-:569 
370 
ＭｾＷＱ＠
ｾＳＷＲ＠
373 
3 74 
375 
376 
377 
371} 
37 9 
ｾ Ｘｵ＠
ｾｂＱ＠
3132 
3 8 ｾｾ＠
3'34 
385 
3H6 
387 
38 )l 
3 8 Y 
ｾｧ＠ 0 
ｾｧｬ＠
392 
393 
394 
ＳｾＵ＠
396 
3 c: 7 
J 98 
J 99 
A P P D ,] D I X KeD iH • 
LOVE LL( Y.J.) (HL OGS ) 
LOW A Ｙ Ｐ ｎｾｒ＠ GROUP 
LYO NS {J.).-. CO 
ｍ Ｎ ｋ Ｎ ｅｬｅｃｔ ｾ ｉ ｃ＠ ｾｌｏｇｓ＠
11. K • Rt: ｆｾ＠ I G ｅｾａ＠ T I ON 
MC CLEERY ｌｉ ａｴｬ ｉ ｾ＠ ｇ ｾ ｏ ｕｾ＠
MCCOR QUO DA LE A CO 
ｍａ ｃ ｏ ｏ ｾａ ｌｮ＠ MARTI N ｾ ｉ ｓ ｔｲｌｌ ｅ ｒ ｉ ｾ ｓ＠
:11\ CKA Y( HUGH J A CO 
ｍｾ ｃｌｅｌｌａ ｎ ＨｐＮａ＠ w.) 
ｍａｃｐｈ ｅｒｓｏｎ Ｈ ｄｏ ｾ ａ ｌｮｊ ｇｒｏｕｐ＠
MANOfRS ( HLDGS ) 
MA RCHWIEL HLOGS 
MARLEY 
M,l\RSHALL CAVE ND I SH 
MARTINCALBERT)HLDGS 
MARTIN- BLACK 
MATTHEWSCgE RNA RO) 
i1 E A ｾ＠ S B R 0 S H LOG S 
ｍｅｌｖｉｌｌｾＬｏｕ ｎｏ ａｓ＠ A WHIT snN 
MENTMORE MANUFACTURING CO 
METAL BOX . 
ｍｾ ｔａｌ＠ CL OSURES GR OUP 
METtiL F- AX(HL DGSJ 
METTO Y CO 
MIDLAND ｉｾｏｕｓｔ ｒ ｉ ｅｓ＠
MINING SUr'PLIES - - . 
11 IT C H ELL t S C ｾ Ｇ ｉ＠ E R S 
MIXCONCRETE(HLOSS) 
HONl«(A.)A CO 
MONO CO NTAI NERS 
-- ｾＭ .. ---
M0NTFOPT( KN ITTI NG MILLS ) 
MORGAN - CRUCIBLE en 
1'10RGAN -G ｾａ＠ MP I A N 
MOSS ENGI NEE RING GROUP 
MO SS(ROaER T) 
MOW LE M(JOHN)A CO 
ｾ Ｑｕｉ ｒｈｅａｄ＠ . 
HYSON GROUP 
NEE Cl LE RS 
NEI L A SPENCER HLQG S 
NEILLCJAHES)HLDGS 
ｎｅｲ ｬ ａｾｈｇｌｌ＠ . 
NEWROLO A BURTON HLOGS 
NEWEY GROUP 
ｎｅｗｾａｎ＠ INDUSTRIES 
NEWMANS Tue ES 
ｎｾｗｓ＠ INTERNATIONAL 
N!)BLE A LU ND 
WJRCROS 
NORTH BRI TI SH STe CL GROUP ( HLDGS ) 
NOr;-. ｾ ｾ＠ EST H 0 L 3 T 
tWTTI I'I GHM1 i1ANUF AC TU R I NG CO 
NU - SHIFT INQUSTRI ES 
OFREX GROUP . 
ｏｌｙ ｍ ｐｉａＨ ｒｅ ｄ ａ ｃｾｅＩ＠ . 
OS B'JR I (SA t--l lJ EL ).-. en 
OXLEY ｐ ｾ ｉ ｎ ｔｉｎｇ＠ GROUP 
ｐｾ ｒｬＨ ｌ ａｎｏ＠ TEXTILE(HLOGS) 
PAT ERSON ( R.)A SONS 
P AU LS A WHITES 
PEGL ER -HATTERSLEY 
PEN TOS 
PETl30W HLOGS 
PHILLIPS PAT ENTSCHLDGS) 
PIC KLES(WILLI AM )A CO 
PI LKING TO N GR OS 
PITTARD GROUP 
PLA XTON1S(SCARGOR OUGH) 
PLESSEY CO 
PORK FA PMS 
PORTALS HLOG S 
PORTS MO UTH A SU NDER LAND ｎｅｗ ｓ ｐａｐｅｾｓ＠
ｐ ｾ ａｔｔＨｆＮＩｾ ｎｇ ｉ ｎｅｾｾ ｉ ｎｇ＠ ｃ ｃｾ ｐ＠
＿ ｒ ｅ ｾ ｓＨｗｉｌｌｉ ａｍ Ｉａ＠ SJ N 
ｐ ｒ ｅｓｔｉｇｾ＠ GROUP 
PYE HLDGS 
RACl\ L ｅｌｅｃｔｾｏｾｉｃｓ＠
ｾａ＠ N n A lU J. A L. I 
RANI( ORGANISA TION 
341 
400 
.4 01 
402 
4 0 3 
,+ 0 4 
405 
4 06 
4U 7 
4U i1 
'40 Y 
'410 
-411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
41 8 
419 
l.j20 
l.j21 
422 
423 
424 
425 
426 
427 
428 
429 
430 
4,31 
432 
·433 
434 
433 
436 
437 
438 
439 
440 
t.41 
44 2 
44 3 
444 
4 4 3 
446 
'447 
..:.. :. R 
4 t. g 
450 
45 1 
43 2 
4'=3 
454 
4 55 
456 
4 57 
' 4 :; /'3 
45 g 
(; E': 0 
ｾ ＴＶＱ＠
4E':2 
4E :3 
4EL. 
4E S 
46 6 
467 
4 68 
40 g 
' 470 
: 471 
--472 
"473 
"4 74 
47S 
47 t) 
L. 77 
47 8 
Lt 7 Y 
A P P E : JD I X K C lJ 'H • 
RQNK S HOVI S ｍ ｃｄ ｏ ｕｾａｌｌ＠
ｾ Ｏ ｜ｎ ｓ ｏ ｜ ＧＱｅ＠ ｈ ｏ ｆｆ ｍａｎｾ ｉ＠ PO LL ARD 
ｒ ａｎｓ ｏ ｾｅｓ＠ ｓ ｉ ｾｓ＠ A ｊ ｾ ｆｆ ｅｾ Ａ ｦ ｓ＠
ｒ ａ ｔ ｇ ｌｉ ｆｆｓ Ｈ ｇ ｾｅａ ｔ＠ ｊ ｾ ｉｮｇ ｦ Ｉ＠
RA l-l LI tlGS "' ROS 
REA i) I CUT I NT E i< "Ii\ TI t) ｾｌＧｉ＠ L 
RF AJ Y MI XE D CONCRE TF 
ｾＺＺ ｃ＠ '< 1 T T A ｃ ｏｕ ＢｌＬ｜ｾ Ａ＠
R:: C n R 0 R I f) G ,.J A '( 
ｒ｣ ｏｆｅ ｮｾｎ＠ ｎａ ｲｉｏ ｎｾ ｌ＠ GLAS J 
ｒ ＺＺＺＺ ｏｍａｾＱ＠ H:::Ef\:QN ｉ ｩｈＺＺｒｎａ ｔｉ ｃ ｾｑ ｌ＠
RE ED ｉｎｔｅ ｾ ｎａｔｉ ｏｎａ ｾ＠
REED A SMITH HLOG S 
RF.:NOLO 
REV ERTEX CH EMIC ALS 
RE X '1 0RE 
REY ROLLE PA RSONS 
RICHARDS 
RIC rl ARDSO N ｗ ｅｓｔｇａ ｾ ｔｈ＠ A CO 
ROBE IHSON FOODS 
ROCKHARE GROUP 
ROLLS-ROYCE MOTORS HLOG S 
ROTAFLE)'(G 8 ) 
ROTAPRIH 
ROT HHANS INTE RNATIO NAL 
ROTORK 
ROW NTREE ｾ ａｃｋｉｎｔｏ ｓ ｈ＠
ROYlIL WORCESTER 
RU£3EROIO 
RUGAY PORTLAND ｃｆｾｅｎｔ＠ CO 
SnLF. TILNEY A CO 
SAN DERSON KAYSE R 
SCAPA ' GROUP 
SCOTT ｾ＠ ｒＰＸｅｒｔｓｏｾ＠
SCOTTISH ｾ＠ UNIVE RS AL ｉ ｎｖｅｓ ｔ ｾｅｎ ｔ ｓ＠
SELINCOU RT 
SENIO R ENGINEERIN G GR OU P 
SERCK 
ｓｈａ ｾ ｐｅＨ＠ ｗＮ ｾ ｊＮＩ＠
SHAW CARPETS 
ｓｈａｗＨｆｒａｎｃｉｓＩｾ＠ CO 
SHEEPBRIlJGE E fGINEEP I NG 
SHILOH SPIN NERS 
SIOlAW INDU STRIE S 
SIE GE ｇｏｒ ｾ ａ ｾ＠ HL 8GS 
SIL ENTNIGHT HlOGS 
SI LHOUETTE(LO NDO N) 
ｓ ｉｎＡｊａｌｬＨｗｉｌｌｉｍｾＩ＠
6U O GROUP 
S1ITH A NEPHEW AS SOCIAT ED COS 
SOLICITCRSiLAW ST 4 TIO NEP Y ｓ ｏｃ ｉ ｾ ｔｙ＠
SO UTH ERN ｃｏ ｎ ｓｔ ｒ ｕｃｔｉｏ ｎｓ Ｈ ｾ ｌ ｄ ｇ ｓ Ｉ＠
SPEAR A JACK SON I NTER JATI ON AL 
SPE NCER (GEO RGE) 
SP ILLE RS . 
ｓｐ ｉ ｾａｘ Ｍ ｓ ａ ｒ ｃ ｏ＠ EN GI NE e RI NG 
s PO 0 N E R HI D lJ S TfU E S 
ｓｑ ｕｉ ｒｾ ｅｌ＠ ｈ ｏ ｾ ｎ＠
ST AFLE X I NTE RN ATI ONAL 
STA NDARD FIREWO RKS 
ｓｔ ａｖ ｅｌｾｙ＠ INOUST RI :: S _ 
ｓｔｅ ｾ ｔｌｅｙ＠ CO '. 
ｓｔｏ ｾ ｅＭｐｌ ａ ｔｔ＠ I NDUSTRIES 
STO NEHILL HLDGS 
STO REY 8K OS' A CO 
STR EETERS OF GOOALMING 
ST RO UD ｾ ｉｌｅｙ＠ ｏｒｕｍ ｾ ｏ ｎ ｮ＠
SUM NER (FRANCIS) (HLOGS) 
ｳ ｵｲＱｾ ｉｅ＠ CLOT HES 
ｓ ｕ ｔｃｌｉｆｆ ｅ Ｌｓ＿ｦａ ｋｍ ａｾ＠ A CO 
T.P.T. 
TACE 
T 1\ P ｾ Ｑ＠ A C 
T 1\ Y L a K (I U a 0 ｾ＠ 0 W 
TECALOHT 
TEPN-CO NSU Lt\ TE 
THERMA L SYND ICAT E 
THORN ｅｌ ｅ ｃｔ ｾ ｉｃ ａ ｌ＠ ｉ ｎｮ ｕ ｓ ｔ ｾ ｉ ｅｓ＠
ｔｉｌ ｒ ｕ ｾ ｙ＠ ｃｏｎ ｔ ｒａ ｃｔｉ ｾｇ＠ GROUP 
Fl L L E M t\ C HE A CO B r: fl L f1 :3 R [ W F. ｾ＠ I E S 
342 
-413 0 
1;81 
- L8? 
483 
'4 t1lt 
,4 a 5 
-4 86 
41', 7 
48 13 
-4 B Y 
4 gO 
' 491 
d;92 
' 493 
494 
495 
49 6 
'497 
498 
499 
:; a a 
501 
,502 
': a 3 
504 
50S 
' 506 
507 
:508 
509 
510 
511 
-512 
-513 
514 
515 
51b 
517 
518 
51g 
520 
521 
522 
523 
ｾＲＴ＠
-5 2 c; 
526 
·527 
Ｇ ＵＲｾ＠
52g 
Ｓｾｏ＠
531 
ｾ ＳＲ＠
53 3 
5 34 
535 
536 
5 3 7 
538 
53 Y 
:5 40 
541 
542 
ｾＴＳ＠
-544 
Slt5 
54 6 
547 
APPENJ I X K CO NT. 
T ｭｾ＠ A r HI 0 1ST I l LE P. 3 en 
TOOTA L 
T () ｜ ｾ＠ L ｾ＠ S 
ｔ Ｎ ｾａｆｆ ｏ ｒ｛ｊ＠ CAR;:>:;: T:; ( Hl l1GS l 
r p- JU ISo .4 P E ｾ ｉ＠ T P AP [ R 
T P I 'J AN T G P ClJ P p t., PH!:' C S 
ｔ ｾ ｉ ｅｆｕｓ＠ " CO 
ｔ ｾｉｐｌ ｅ ｘ＠ ｆ ｏｕ ｾｏｾ ｉ ｦｓ＠ ｇ ｾ ｏｕｐ＠
TUSE I N VE S H1EN TS 
TlJNNE L f-L fJGS 
TU RN ER MANUFAC TU RING CO 
ｔ ｕｒｾ ｉｅｒ＠ " ｎ ｅ ｉｾ ａｌｌ＠
ｔｕｒ ｾ ｉｆｆ＠ CO RP 
UKO ｉｎｔ ｅｾｎ ａｔｉｏｎａｌ＠
UNICORN INDUSTRI ES 
UNILEVE R . 
UNITED e rSCUITS( HLnGS ) 
UNITED ｅｎｇｉ ｲ ｾｅｅｒｉ ｎｇ＠ IN DUS TRI ES 
UNITED GAS ｉｎ ｄ ｕ ｓ ｔ ｾ ｉ ｆｓ＠
UNITED NEWSPAPE RS 
UNITED SPRING" STE EL GROU P 
UNITED WIRE GROUP 
VALO R CO 
VANTO NA GROUP 
ｖｉｃｊ＼ｅｲｾｓ＠
VINE: RS 
VISCOSE DEVELOPt1 0 1T co 
W.G. I. 
WADDINGTON(JOHN) 
WADJ<IN 
WARD" GOLDSTON E 
WARD ＨｔｈｏｓＮ｜ｾＮＩ＠
WARD WHITE GROUP 
WAR DLE(BERNARO)" r.O 
HARNE WRIGHT ｾ＠ ｒｏｾｌａｎｏ＠
vi A R R ｾ＠ N (J A 1-1 E S )" C 0 
HA T T S , 0 L A K E , B E A K ｾ ｉ ＡＺＺ＠ " CO 
WEOGWOOO 
HE I R GROU P 
WESTBRICK PRODUCT S 
ｾｅｓｔｉｎｇｈｏｕｓｅ＠ Ｘ ｒ ａｋ ｾ＠ A SI GNAL CO 
ｗｾｓｔｌａｎｏ＠ AIKCRAFT 
WES TON-EVA NS GROUP 
HE YBURN ｅｎｇｉｎｅｅ ｒ ｉ ｾ ｇ＠ CO 
WHATLINGS 
'ri"iESS DE 
HH IL EY (G:::ORGE ｴ ｾ ＮＩ＠
HH IT 8REAO " CO 
WHITEC ROF T 
H HI T E L EY (J. S • A ;-/ .) 
Ｇ ｾｈｉｔｔｉｎｇｈａｾＨｗｉｌｌｉ ｉ｜ｴＱ Ｉ＠ (HL OGS) 
W I L i( E S (J M l E S ) 
WILKINSON ｾａｔｃｈ＠
HI LLIA i1S {JO HN )O F CAPDI FF 
ｗｉ ｌ ｾｏｔ Ｍ Ｘｒｅ ｅ ｏ ｅｎｬｈ ｌ ｮｇｓ Ｉ＠
HI LSON aROS 
WI LSON (CONN OLLYlHLO GS 
rl[,'lPEY { GEORGE> " C!) 
H I ｎＧｾ＠ I NOUS ｔｾ＠ I ES 
ｗｉ ｔｔ ｅｾ Ｈｔ ｈｏｴＱ ａ ｓ ｬＢ＠ ｾｊ＠
WOLF ELECTRIC TOO LS(HLOGS) 
HO l S T E N i1 OL i1C ERO NZE P 0 ｜ｾ ｏ ｅ＠ RS 
HOLVERHAMP TON " OUD LEY Ｘ ｒｅｗｅｐ ｉ ｾｓ＠
ｗｏｏｾｈｅａｏＨｊｏ ｎ ａｓ Ｉｾ＠ ｾ ｏ ｎ ｓ＠
ｾｉ＠ 0 0 ｾＩ＠ H 0 US:: " R I X S 0 ｾ ｉ＠ ( H LnG S) 
YORK TRA ILER HO LD INGS 
YORKS HI RE ｃ ｈｅｍｉｃｾｌｓ＠
YOU NG ｾ＠ COt'S Ｘｒｅ ｾｅｐｙ＠
343 
REFERENCES 
344 
REFERENCES 
ABDEL-KRALIK, A.R. ＨＱＹＷｾＩ＠
"On the Efficiency of Subject Surrogation in Acc9unting Research", The 
Accounting Review, October 1974, pp ＷＴＳＭｾＰＮ＠
-------(1975) 
"Research Methods in Ac-counting Research", Lec(.ure Notes from Duke 
University, July 1975. 
-------(1977) 
"Earnings, Dividend Paying Ability and ｏ｢ｪ･｣ｴｩｾ･ｳ＠ of Financial 
Statements; An Experiment on the Effects of Functional Fixation on the 
Valutaion of the Firm", ARC Working Paper 1977-5. 
-------AND AJINKYA, B.B. (1979) 
"Empirical Research in Accounting. A ｍ･ｴｨｯ､ｯｬｯｾｩ｣｡ｬ＠ Viewpoint", 
American Accounting Association, Accounting Education Series, Vol. 4, 
1979. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS STEERING COMMITTEE (1971) 
"Disclosure of Accounting Policies", Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice 2,The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 
1971. 
-------------------(1975) 
"The Corporate Report", The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, 1975. 
AHARONY, J. -AND SWARY, -I. (1980) 
"Quarterly Dividend and Earning Announcements and Stockholders' Returns: 
An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Finance XXXV, no 1, March 1980 • 
-----, JONES, C.P. AND SWARY; 1. (1980) 
"An Analysis of Risk and Return Characteristics of Corporate Bankruptcy 
Using Capital Market Data", Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXV, No.2, 
September 1980. 
AHLERS, D.M. (1966) 
"S.E.M.: A Security Evaluation Model", In Analytical Methods in Banking, 
ed. Cohen, K.J. and Hammer, F. S., Holwood, Ill.: Irwin 1966. 
ALI, M.A., HICKMAN, P.J. AND CLEMENTSON, A.T. (1975) 
"The Application of Automatic Interaction Dectection (AID) in 
Operational Research", Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 26, no 2, 
1975, pp ＲｾＳＭＲＵＲＮ＠
ALTMAN, E.I. (1968) 
"Financial Ratios, Discriminant An-alysis and the Prediction of 
Bankruptcy", Journal of Finance, Vol XXIII, ｮｯｾＬ＠ September 19-68. 
345 
-----(1981) 
"Statistical Classification Models Applied to Common Stock Analysis", 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 9, 1981, pp 123-149. 
-----AND BRENNER, M. (1981) 
"Information Effects and Stock Market Response to Signs of Firms 
Detoriation", Journal of Finance and Quantitative AnalYSis, "Vol XVI, no. 
1, March 1981. 
ALTMAN,E.I. AND EISENBEIS, R.A. (1978) 
"Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis: A -Clarification", 
Journal of Finance and QUantitative AnalYSiS", March 1978. 
AMBACHTSHEER, K.P. AND FARRELL, "J. (1979) 
"Can Ac-ti ve Management Add Value", Financial Analysts Journal, November 
- December 1979, pp 39-47. 
AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION (1977) 
"Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance", (SOATATA), 
Report of the Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial 
Reporting, 1977. 
ANDREWS, F., MORGAN, J. AND SONGUIST, J. (1967) 
"Multiple Classification Analysis: A Report on a Computer Program for 
Multiple Regression using Categorical Predictors. The Survey Research 
Centre, The Institute of Social Science, The University of Michigan, may 
1967. 
ARBEL, A., KOLODNY, "R. AND LAKONISHOK, J. (1977) 
"The Relationship Between Risk of Default and Return on Equity: An 
Empirical Investigation", Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 
November 1977. 
ASHTON,R.H. (1974) 
"The Predictive Ability Criterion and User Predictive Models", The 
Accounting Review, October 1974. 
----(1976) 
"The Robustness of Linear Models for Decision-Making", Omega, The 
Institute of Management Science, Vol 4, no 5, 1976 P 616. 
----(1979) 
"Some Implications of Parameter Sensitivity Research for Judgement 
Modelling in Accounting", "The Accounting Review, Vol. LIV, no. 1, 
January 1979, pp ＱＷＰｾＱＷＹＮ＠
-----AND KRAMER, S.S. (1980) 
"Students as Surrogates in Behavioral Accounting Research: Some" 
Evidence", Journal of Accounting Research, "Vol. 18, no 1, Spring 1980, 
pp 1-15. 
ASSAEL, H. (1970) 
"Segmenting Markets by Group Purchasing Behaviour: An Application of the 
A. I.D.Technique", Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 7, 1970, pp 
153-158. " 
346 
BALL, "R. AND BROWN, P. (1968) 
"The Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income -Numbers", Journal of 
Accounting _Research, Autumn 1968, pp 159-178. 
---------, ｾｉｎｎ＠ F. AND CFFICER, "R. (1979) 
"Dividends and the Value of the Firm: Evidence from the Australian 
Market", "Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 4 , no 1, April 1979, pp 
13-25. 
BALL, R., WALKER, R.G. AND WHITTRED, G.P. (1979) 
"Audit Qualifications and Share Prices", Abacus, Vol 15, no 1, -June 
1979, pp 23-34. 
BART, J., AND MASSE, I.J. (1981) 
"Divergence of Opinion and Risk", Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
AnalYSis, March 1981, pp 23-34. 
- BASU, ｓｾ＠ (1977) 
"Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to their 
Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis", 
Journal of Finance, Vol XXXII, no 3, June 1977, pp 663-682. 
---(1978) 
"The Effect of -Earnings Yield on Assessments of the ａｾｩｳｯ｣ｩ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ between 
Annual Accounting Numbers and Security Prices", The Accounting Review, 
Vol LIIl, no 3, July 1978, pp 599-625. 
BEAVER, W.H. (1966) 
"Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure", Empirical Research in 
Accounting, Selected Studies 1966. Supplement to the Journal of 
Accounting Research 1967, pp 71-111. 
-----(1968) 
"Alternative Accounting Measures as Predictors of Failure", ｾ｣｣ｯｵｮｴｩｮｧ＠
ReView, Vol XLIII, January 1968. 
-----(1979) 
"Current Trends in AC'counting Research", London Business School Seminar 
Paper, -June 1979. 
------, KETTLER, P. AND SCHOLES, M. (1970) 
"The Association between Market Determined and Accounting Determined 
Risk Measures", The Accounting Review, Vol. XLV, October 1970, pp 
654-82. 
BEAVER, W.H. AND MORSE, D. (1978) 
"What Determines Price Earnings Ratios? ", Financial Analysts Journal, 
July - August, 1978, pp 65-85. 
BEAVER, W.H., CHRISTIE, A.A. AND GRIFFEN, P.A. (1980) 
"The Information Content of SEC Ac"counting Release 190", Journal of 
AC'ounting and Economics, no 2, 1980, pp 127-157. 
BELKAOUI, -A. AND COUSINEAU, A. (1977) 
"Accounting Information, Nonaccounting Information, and Common Stock 
Perception", Journal of BUSiness, Vol 50, "1977, pp 334-342. 
BENISHAY, "H. (1961) 
"Variability in Earnings-Price Ratios of Corporate Equities", The 
Allierican Economic Review, Vol 51, March 1961, pp 81-94. 
BENSTON, N.(1967) 
"Published Corporate Accounting Data and Stock Prices", Empirical 
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, Supplement to Journal of 
Ac-counting Research 1967, pp 1-54. 
----(1981) 
"Investor's use of Financial Accounting Statement Numbers: A Review of 
Evidence from Stock Market Research", 2nd Aurther Young Lecture 
delivered on 23rd October 1979, University of Glasgow Press, 1981. 
BIERMAN, H. ＨＱＹＷｾＩ＠
"The Implications of Ac-counting to Efficient Markets and the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model", The Accounting Review, July ＱＹＷｾＬ＠ pp 557-562. 
BLACK AND SCHOLES (1975) 
"The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock 
Prices and Returns", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 1, "1975, pp 
1-22. 
BLUME, M.E. (1971) 
flOn the Assessment of Risk", The Journal of Finance, Vol XXVI, no 1, 
March 1971, pp 1-10, reprinted in Modern Developements in Investment 
Management by Lorie, J and Brealey, ｾＮＬ＠ The Dryden Press, 1978. 
BOLITHO, "N. (1973) 
"How to Spot Insolvency before it Happens", Investors' Chronicle and 
Stock Exchange Gazette, March 23 '973, pp ＱＱｾＶＭＷＮ＠
BOUGEN, ｾＮｄＮ＠ AND DURY, J.C. (1980) 
"U.K. Statistical Distribution of Financial RatiOS, 1975", The Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol 7, no 1, "'980, pp 39-117. 
BOWER, R.S. AND BOWER, D.M. (1969) 
"Risk and the Valuation of Common Stocks", "Journal of Political Economy, 
May-June 1969. 
BOWMAN, R.G. (1979) 
"The Theoretical Relationship Between Systematic Risk and Financial 
(Ae-counting) Variables", "The Journal of Finance, Vol XXXIV, no 3, June 
1979, pp "617-630. 
BREALEY, R.A. (1970) 
"The Distribution and Independence of Successive Rates of Return from 
the British Equity Market", Journal of Business Finance 1970, pp 29-110. 
-----(1975) 
"The Role of Dividends", The Investment Analyst, September 1975. 
ＭＭＭＭｾＨＱＹＷＶＩ＠
flRecommendations Regarding the Contents of Published Financial Reports", 
In Research Committee Occasional Paper no 8, "The Institute 'of Chartered 
Accountants, 1976. 
ＳｾＸ＠
BRENNER, V.C. (1970) 
"Financial Statement Users' Views of the Desirability of Reporting 
Current Cost Information", Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1970, 
pp 159-166. 
BRISCOE, G., SAMUELS, J.M. AND SMYTH, D.J. (1969) 
"The Treament of Risk in the Stockmarket", Journal of Finance, Vol 24, 
1969, pp707-713. 
BROWN, P. AND KENNELLY, 'J. (1972) 
"The Informational Content of Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some 
Further Evidence", Journal of Business, July 1972, pp 403-415. 
, BROWN, ｾＮＬ＠ FINN, F.J. AND HANCOCK, P. (1977) 
"Dividend Changes, Profit Reports and Share Prices: Some Australian 
Findings", Au'straHan Journal of Management, October 1977. 
BROWN, S.L. (1978) 
"Earnings Changes, Stock Prices and Market Efficiency", ｾｨ･＠ Journal of 
Finance, Vol XXXIII, no 1, March 1978, pp 17-28. 
CASEY: C.J. (1980) 
"Variation in Accounting Information Load: The Effect on Loan Officers' 
Predictions of Bankruptcy", 'The Accounting Review, Vol LV, no 1, "January 
1980. 
CASTAGNA, A.D. AND MATOLCSY, Z.P. (1978) 
"The Relationship Between Accounting Variables and Systematic Risk and 
the Prediction of Systematic Risk", AU'stralian Journal of Management, 
Vol 3, no 2, October 1978. 
CATTELL,R.B. (1978) 
"The Scientific use of Factor Analysis in Behavioural Sciences", Plenum 
Press, New York 1978. 
CHAMBERS, 'R.J. (1974) 
"Stock Market Prices and Ac'counting Research" ,Abacus, Vol 10, 1974, pp 
39-54. 
CHANDRA, G. (1974) 
"A Study of the Consensus on Disclosure luiiongPublic Accountants and 
Security Analysts", The Ac"count1ng Review, October 1974, pp 733-742. 
CHEN, K.H. AND SHlMERDA, 'T.A. (1979) 
"On The Formulation of an Empirical Base of Financial Ratio Analysis: 
Synthesis", Faculty Working Paper, The Unveristy of Warwick, no 64, 
January 1979. 
----------- (1981) 
"An Empirical Analysis of Useful Financial RatiOS", Financial 
Management, Vol. 10, no. 1, ｾｰｲｬｮｧ＠ 1981. 
CHILD, D. (1976) 
"The Essentials of Factor An'alysis", Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. 
CLARK, C.T. AND SCHKADE, L.L. (1974) 
Ｂｓｴ｡ｴｩｳｾｩ｣｡ｬ＠ Analysis for Administrative DeciSions", South-Western 
Publishing Co., Cincinrlati, ,1974. 
3-49 
CLARKSON, G.P.E. (1962) 
"Portfolio Selection: A Simulation of Trust Investment", Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., N.J., 1962. 
------(1966) 
"A Model of Trust Investment Behaviour", in Analytical Methods in 
Banking by Cohen, K.T. and Hammer, F.S., -Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966. 
COOLEY, W.W. AND LOHNES, P.R. (1971) 
"Multivariate Data Analysis", John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1971. 
CUNNINGHAM,S.W. (1973) 
"The PredictabiHty of Britisb Stock Market Prices", "Applied Statistics, 
Vol "22, 1973. 
DAWES, R.M. (1971) " 
"A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Applications of Three Principles 
of Human Decision Making", Am'erican Psychologist, Vol 26, no 2, "February 
1971, pp 180-188. 
-----AND CORRIGAN, B. (197l1) 
"Linear Models in Decision Making", Psychological Bulletin, Vol 81, no 
lI, February 19711. 
DEAKIN, E.B. (1972) 
"A Discriminant Analysis of Predictors of Business Failure", Journal of 
AC'counting Research, Spring 1972, pp 167-179. 
-----4(1976) 
"Distribution of Financial Ratios: Some Empirical Evidence", The 
Accounting Review,January 1976, pp 90-96. 
DIMSON, E. (1979) 
"Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading", 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 7, 1979, pp 197-226. 
DOYLE, }>. ( 1 973 ) 
"The Use of Automatic Interaction Detector and Similar Search 
Techniques", Operational Research Quarterly ,Vol. 2l1, 1973, pp lI6S-lI67. 
DRIVER, M.J. "AND MOCK, T.J. (1975) 
"Human Information Processing, Decision Style Theory and Accounting 
Information Systems", AC'counting Review, July 1975. 
DRYDEN, M.M. (1970) 
"A Statistical Study of U.K. Share Prices", Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, November 1970. 
DRURY, J. AND BOUGEN, P. (1980) 
"U.K. Gearing Levels: An' Investigation", AC'countancy, -July 1980, pp 
103-106. 
DURAND, D. (1959) 
"The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment: 
Comment", American Economic ReView, Vol XLIX, "September 1959. 
350 
ｅｃｏｂｾｊＮｒＮ＠ (1978a) 
"An Empirical Examination of the Behaviour 'of Selected Measures of Tree 
and Partition Similarity in Relation to the Sampling Stability of AID", 
The Egyptian Statistical Journal, Vol. 22, ' No 1, 1978, pp 1-20. 
----(1978b) 
"The Distribution and Power of the AID Criterion", Proceedings of 
COMSTAT, -Leiden, 1978, pp 253-258. 
-----, FIELDING, A. AND O'MUIRCHEARTAIGH, C.A. (1979) 
"An Evaluation of the Au-tomatic Interaction Detector on Real and 
Simlualted Data Sets", Discussion Paper from the Faculty of Commence and 
Social SCience, University of Birmingham, Series E, Social Science 
Methodology, September 1979. 
EDMINSTER, R.O. ('972) 
"An Empirical Test of Financial Ratio Analysis for Small -Business. 
Failure Prediction", -Journal of Financial and Quahtitative Analysis, 
March 1972, pp 1477-1493. 
EINHORN, H.J. (1976) 
"A Synthesis: Ac-counting and Behavioural Science Studies in HIP", 
Journal of Ac-counting Research, Vo1.14, supplement, 1976. 
EISENBEIS, ｾＮａＮ＠ (1977) 
"Pitfalls in the Application of Discriminant Analysis in Business 
Finance and Economics", Journal of Finance, June 1977. 
ESKEW, R.K. (1979) 
"The Forecasting Ability of Accounting Risk Measures: Some Additional 
Evidence", The Accounting Review, Vol LIV, no 1, January 1979, pp 
107-118. 
ESTES, "R.W-. (1968) 
"An" ａｾｬｳ･ｳｳｭ･ｮｴ＠ of the Usefulness of Current Cost and Price-Level 
Information by Financial Statements Users", Journal of Accounting 
ｾ･ｳ･｡ｲ｣ｨＬ＠ Autumn 1968, pp 200-207. 
FABOZZI, F.J. AND FRANCIS, ｾＮｃＮ＠ (1979) 
"Industry Effects and the Determinants of Beta", Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Business, Vol. -3, 1979, pp 61-74. 
FADEL, -H. (1977) 
"The Predictive Power of Financial Ratios in the -British Construction 
Industry", -Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 4, no 3, 
1977, pp 339-352. 
FAMA, E.F. (1970) ' 
"Efficient Capital Markets: A-Review of Theory and Empirical Work", 
Journal of Finance, ｖｾｬＮ＠ XXV, no 2, May 1970, pp 383-417. 
FIRTH, M. (1975) 
"Investment Analysis", Harper and Row, 1975. 
----(1976) 
"The Impact of Earnigs Announcements on the Share Price Behaviour of 
Similar Types of Firms", The Economic Journal, June 1976, pp 296-306., 
351 
• - 0- _ _ _ _ ._ _ . • _ -_. ... ... __________ 
----(1977a) 
"The Valuation of Shares and the Efficient Market Theory", The Macmillan 
Press, -1977. 
----( 1977b) 
"An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of the Announcement of 
Capitalisation Issues on Share Prices", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, ｾＯＱＬ＠ -1977, pp ｾＷＭＵＹＮ＠
----(1978a) 
"Qualified Atidit Reports: Their Impact on Investment Decisions", The 
Accounting Review, Vol LII, no 3, July 1978, pp ＶｾＲＭＶＵＰＮ＠
----(1978b) 
"A Study of the Consensus of the Perceived Importance of Disclosure of 
Individual Items in Coporate Annual Reports", The International Journal 
of Accounting, Vol. ＱｾＬ＠ no 1, Fall 1918. 
FISHER, L. (1959) 
"The Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds", Journal of 
Political ｅ｣ｯｮｯｭｹｾ＠ -June 1959, pp 217-37. 
----(1966) 
"Some -New Stock-Market Indexes", Journal of Business, Vol. 39, 
Supplement, 1966, pp 191-225. 
FITZPATRICK, P.J. (1932) 
"A Comparison of Ratios of Successful Industrial Enterprises with those 
of Failed Firms", Certified Public Accountant, November-December 1932 .p 
598. . 
FOSTER, G. (1978) 
"Financial Statement Analysis", Prentice-Hall, Inc., 'Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., U.S.A, 1978. 
FRANK, W. AND WEYGANDT, J. (1971) 
"A Prediction Model of Convertible Debentures", Journal of Accounting 
Research, no. 9, Spring 1971, pp 116-126. 
FRANKS J.R. AND BROYLES, J.E. (1979) 
"Modern Managerial Finance", Wiley 1979. 
GHEYARA, K. AND BOATSMAN, J. (1980) 
"Market Reaction to the 1976 Replacement Cost Displosures", Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, no. 2, 1980, pp 107-125. 
GIRMES, D.H. AND BENJAMIN, -A.F. (1975) 
"Random Walk Hypothesis for ＵｾＳ＠ Stocks and Shares Registered on the 
London Stock Exchange", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Spring 1975. 
GIRMES, D.H. AND DAMANT D.C. (1975) 
"Charts and the Random Walk", The Investment Analyst, no ｾＱＬ＠ May 1975. 
GOLDBERG, L.R. (1968) 
"Simple Models or Simple Processess? Some Research on Clinical 
Judgements", American Psychologist, Vol 23, 1968 ｰｰｾＸＳＭＹＶＮ＠
352 
------(1970) 
"Man Versus Model of Man. A Rationale, plus some Evidence, for a Method 
of Improving on Clinical Inferences", Psychological Bulletin, June 1970, 
pp 422-32. 
GONEDES, -N. J. ( 1973 ) 
"Evidence on the Informational Content of Accounting Numbers: 
Accounting-Based and Market-Based Estimates of Systematic Risk", -Journal 
of Financial and QUantitative Analysis, June 1973, pp 407-443. 
------(1974) 
"Capital Market Equilibrium and Annual Accounting Numbers: Empirical 
Evidence", "Journal of Acounting Research, Spring 1974, pp 26-62. 
------(1978) 
"Coporate Signaling, External Accounting, and Capital Market 
Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items", 
Journal of Accountng Research, "Vol 16, no 1, -Spring 1978, pp 26-79. 
------AND DOPUCH, D. (1974) 
"Capital Market Equilibrium, Information-Production and Selecting 
Accounting Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of Empirical 
Work", Studies on Financial Accounting Objectives; 1974. Supplement to 
Journal of Accounting Research 12" pp 48-169. 
------------ (1979) 
"Economic Analysis and Accounting Techniques: Perspective and 
Proposals", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17, no. 2, "1979, pp 
384-410. 
GOODING, A,E. (1978) 
"Perceived Risk and Capital Asset Pricing", -Journal of Finance, Vol. 
XXXIII, no 5, December 1978. 
GORDON, M.J. (1959) 
"Dividends, Earnings and Stock Prices", Review of Economics and 
StatistiCS, ｾｯｬ＠ 41, no 1, May 1959, pp 96-105. 
-----(1962a) 
"The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corporation", Homewood, 
Ill: Irwin, 1962. 
-----(1962b) 
"Optimal Investment and Financing Policy", Journal of Finance, Vol 18, 
May 1963, pp 264-72. 
GOVINDARAJAN, v. (1980) 
"The Objectives of Financial Statements: Art" Empirical Study of the use 
of Cash Flow and Earnings by Security Analysts", Accounting 
Organisations and SOCiety, Vol 5, no 4, 1980, pp 383-392. 
GREENBALL, M.N. (1971) 
"The Predictive Ability Criteria; Its Relevance in Evaluating 
Accounting Data", "Abacus, Vol III, June 1971. 
353 
GUTER, A. AND GUTER, M. (1978) 
"Financial Accounting", Business and Management Studies, Hodder and 
Stoughton Paperbacks, 1978. 
HALL, M.G. (1972) 
"Forecasting Movements in the U.K. Equity Market", Mathematics in the 
Stock Exchange, The Institute of Mathematics and its Applications, 1972. 
HARMAN, ｾＮｈＮ＠ (1976) 
ｾｯ､･ｲｮ＠ Factor Analysis", University of Chicago, 3rd Edition, 1976. 
HASLEM, J.AND LONGBRAKE, W. (1971) 
"A Discriminant Analysis of Commercial Bank Profitability", Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Business, no 11, ·Autumn 1971, pp 26-62. 
HEALD, G.J.(1972) 
"The Application of the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) Programme 
and Multiple Regression Techniques to the Assessment of Store 
Performance and Site Selection", Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 
23, 1972, pp 445. 
HENFREY, A.W., ALBRECHT, B. AND RICHARDS, P. (1977) 
"The U. K. Stock.market and the Efficient Market Model: A Review", The 
Investment Analyst, no 48, September 1977, pp 5-24. 
HOFFMAN, F.J. (1960) 
"The Paramorphic Representation of Clinical Judgement", Pschological 
Bulletin, Vol. 57, 1960, pp 116-131. 
HORRIGAN, J.O. (1965) 
"Some Empirical Bases of Financial Ratio Analysis", The Accounting 
Review, Vol. XL, July 1965, pp ＵＵＸＭｾＶＸＮ＠
------(1966) 
"The Determination of Long-Term Credit Standing with Financial Ratios", 
Empirical Research in Accounting; Selected Studies, 1966, "Supplement to 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 4, 1967, pp 44-62. 
-----(1968) 
"A Short History of Ratio AnalYSis", The Accounting Review, April 1968, 
pp 284-294. 
THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS (1916) 
"The Corporate Report: An Academic View", ｾ･ｳ･｡ｲ｣ｨ＠ Committee Occasional 
Paper no. -8, 1976. 
JACOBY, -J., SPELLER, D.E. AND KOHN, C.A (1974) 
"Brand Choice Behaviour as a Function of Information Load", Journal of 
Marketing Research, Vol XI, February 1974, pp 63-9. 
----(1977) 
"Information Load and Decion ·QUality: Some Contested Issues", The 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol XIV, November 1971, pp 569-73. 
JENSEN, M.C. (1968) 
"The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-64", Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 23, May 1968. 
354 
JENSEN, R.E. (1970) 
"Empirical Evidence from the Behaviourial Sciences: Fish Out of Water", 
The Accounting Review, July 1970, pp 502-3. 
JOHNSON, C.C. (1970) 
"Ratio Analysis and the Prediction of Firm Failure", Journal of Finance, 
Vol. XXV, December 1970, pp 1166-1168. 
JOHNSON, W.B. (1979) 
"The Cross-Sectional Stability of Financial Ratio Patterns", -Journal of 
Financial and Quatitative Analysis, Vol XIV, no 5, December 1979, pp 
1035-1048. 
JOY, O.M. ANP TELLEFSON, J.O. (1975) 
"On the Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis", Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 1975, pp 723-739. 
KAMATH, R.R. (1980) 
"Determinants of Premiums and Discounts on Commercial Bank Common 
Stocks", Review of Business ans Economic ｒ･ｳｾ｡ｲ｣ｨＬ＠ Vol. XVI, no. 1, Fall 
1980, pp 54-68. 
KAPLAN, R.S. AND URWITZ, G. (1979) 
"Statistical Models of Bond Ratings: A Methodology Inquiry", Journal of 
Business, Vol. 52, no. 2, 1979. 
KASS, G.V. (1975) 
"Significance Testing in Automatic Interaction Detection (AID)", Applied 
Statistics, Vol. 24, no. 2, 1975 pp. 178-89. 
KEANE, ｾＮｍＮ＠ (1977) 
"Examining the Problems of Understandability", Accountancy, June 1977. 
KEENAN, M. ( 1970 ) 
"Models of Equity Valuation: The Serm Bubble", Journal of Finance, 
1970. 
KEMP, A.G. AND REID, G.C. (1971) 
"The Random Walk Hypothesis and the Recent Behaviour of Equity Prices in 
Britain", Economica, Vol 38, -1971. 
KENDALL, M.G. (1953) 
"The Analysis of Economic Time Series Part 1: Prices", Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Vol 96(1), 1953. 
KENTON ZUMWALT, -J. AND SHIN, T.S. (1979) 
"Industrial Classification, Business Risk and Optimal Financial 
Structure", Working Paper from the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, 1979 ｾ＠ 613. 
KIGER, -J.E. (1972) 
"An Empirical Investigation of The NYSE Volume and Price Reactions to 
the Announcement of Quarterly Earnings", Journal of Accounting Research, 
Spring 1972, pp 113-128. 
355 
KING, B.F. (1966) 
"Market and Industry Factors in Share Price Behaviour", Journal of 
Business, January 1966, pp 139-190. 
ICLEMKOSKY, "R. C. AND PETTY ,J. W. (1973) 
"A Multivariate Analysis of Stock Price Variability", Journal of 
Business Research, Vol 1, no 1, ·Summer 1973, pp 1-10. 
KOUTSOYIANNIS, A. (1977) 
"The Theory of Econometrics", Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1977. 
KUH, E. AND MEYER, J.R. (1955) 
"Correlation and Regression Estimates when the Data are Ratios", 
Econometrica, Vol. XXIII, October 1955. 
KUH, E. (1960) 
"Capital Theory and Capital Budgeting", Metroeconomica, Vol XII, 
August-December 1960. 
ｌａｃｈｅｾｭｒｕｃｈＬ＠ P.A. (1967) 
"An Almost Unbiased Method of Obtaining Confidence Intervals for the 
Probability of Misclassification in Discriminant Analysis", Biometrics, 
December 1967, pp 639-465. 
-------(1975) 
"Discriminant Analysis. Hafner Press, 1975. 
LARCIER, R. (1977) 
"The Rise and Fall of the PIE Ratio", The Investment Analyst,1977, pp 
25-30. 
LATANE, ｾＮａＮ＠ AND JONES, C.P. (1977) 
"Standardised Unexpected Earnings:- a Progress Report", Journal of 
Finance, ｾｯｬ＠ 32, no 5, December 1977, pp 1457-1465. 
LAUE, M.P. (1968) 
"Some Aspects of the Aggregation Problem in the Dividend Earnings 
Relationship", Journal of the American Statistical Association, no 68, 
September 1968. 
----(1976) 
"On the Informational Content of Dividends", Journal of Business, no 49, 
January 1976. 
LAWSON, G.H. (1980) 
"The Measurement of Corporate Profitability on a Cash Flow Basis", The 
International Journal of Accounting, Vol 16, no 1, Fall 1980, pp 11-46. 
LEE, ｾＮａＮ＠ AND TWEEDIE, D.P. (1977) 
"The Private Shareholder and The Corporate Report", The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 1977. 
LEV ,B. AND SUNDER, s. (1977) 
"Financial Ratio An"alysis: Some Methodological Issues", Working Paper" 
University of Chicago, 1977. 
356 
LEWELLEN, W.G., LEASE, R.C. AND SCHIARBAUM, G.C. (1976) 
"Patterns of Investment Strategy and Behaviour Among Individual 
Investors", Journal of Business, 1976, pp 296-333. 
LEWELLEN, W.G., STANLEY, K.L., LEASE, R.C. AND SCHLARBAUM, G.G. (1978) 
"Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon", Journal of 
Finance, Vol. XXXIII, no 5, December 1978. 
LIBBY, "R. (1975) 
"The Use of Simulated Decsion Makers in Information Evaluation", The 
Accounting Review, July 1975" pp 473-489. 
AND LEWIS, B. (1977) 
"Human Information Processing: ,The State of the Art", Accounting 
Orga'nisa tion and Society, Vol 2, no 3, 1977, pp 245-268. 
LINTNER, J. (1962) 
"Di vidends, 'Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and the Supply of Capital 
to Corporations", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol XLIV, no 
3, "August 1962. 
LITTLE, I.M.D. (1962) 
"Higgledy Piggledy Growth", Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of 
Economics and Statistics, November 1962, pp 389-412. 
------AND RAYNER, A.C. (1966) 
"Higgledy Piggledy Growth Again", Blackwell's, Oxford, 1966. 
LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL (1979) 
"Risk Management Service", London Business School, Vol 1, no 3, 1979. 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (1972) 
"AID: A Version of the Michigan AID Program", computer package on ULCC 
written by L.S.E., "1972 .. 
LORIE, 'J.H. AND HAMILTON, M.T. (1975) 
"The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence", Richard D. Irwin, inc., 1975. 
LORIE, J.H. AND BREALEY, "R. (1978) 
"Modern Developments in Investment Management: A Book of Readings", 
Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1978. 
MALKIEL, "B.G. AND GRAGG, "J .G. (1970) 
"Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices", The American Economic 
Review, September 1970, pp 601-17. 
MARAIS, D.A. (1979) 
"A Method of Quantifying Companies' Relative Financial Strength", Bank 
of England Discussion Paper, 1979. 
MARRIS, "R. (1967) 
"The Economic Theory of 'Managerial' Captialism", Macmillan, 1967. 
" 357 
MARSH, P. (1979) 
"Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the U.K. Stock Market", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXIV, no. 4, September 1979. 
-----,AND DIMSON, E. (1980) 
"The Stability of U.K. Risk Measures ｡ｮｾ＠ the Problem of Thin Trading", 
London Business School Finance Workshop Paper, Octob.er 1980. 
MARTIN, ·A. (1971) 
"An Empirical Test of the Relevance of ａ｣｣ｯｵｮｾｩｮｧ＠ Information for 
Investment Decisions", Journal of Accounting Research Supplement, 
Empirical Research in Accounting, Selected ｓｾｵ､ｩ･ｳＬ＠ 1971, pp 1-25. 
MARTIN, J. AND SCOTT, D. (1974) 
"A Discriminant An-alysis of the Corporate Debt Equity Decision", 
Financial management, no 3-4, Winter 1974, Pf 71-79. 
MASON, ｾＮｊＮ＠ AND HARRIS, F.C. (1979) 
"Predicting Failure in the Construction Industry") Proceedings of the 
Institute of Civil Engineers, Vol. 66, part 1, May1979, pp 71-79. 
MEADER, J.W. (1935) 
"A Formula for Determining Basic Values Underlying Common Stock Price", 
The An'nalyst, November 29, 1935, p749. 
-----(1940) 
"Stock Price Estimating Formulas, 1930-1940", The Analyst, June 27, 
1940, p -890. 
MERWIN, C.L. (1942) 
"Financing Small Corporations: In Five Manufacturing Industries 
1926-36", National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942. 
MEYER, F.V., CORNER, D.C. AND PARKER, J.E.S. (1970) 
"Problems in a' Mature Economy", Mamillan, 1970. 
MILLER, 11. ( 1972) 
"Enviromental Complexity of Financial Reports", The Accounting Review, 
Vol XLVII, no 1, January 1972 pp31-38. 
MODIGLIANI, F. AND MILLER, M.H. (1958) 
"The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment", 
The American Economic Review ｾ＠ Vol 48, 'June 1958, pp 261-297. 
------------ (1961) 
"Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Share Prices", Journal of 
BUSiness, Vol 34, no 4, October 1961, pp 411-433. 
MOLES, P. AND TAYLOR, B. (1977) 
"Unit Trust Risk-Return Performance 1966-1975", The Investment Analyst, 
May 1977, no 47. 
MOORE, B. ( 1980 ) 
"Equity Values and Inflation: The Importance of, Dividends", Lloyds Bank 
Review, July 1980, pp 1-15. 
358 
MORIARITY, S. (1979) 
"Communicating Financial Information through Multidimensional Graphics, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.17, No.1, ·Spring 1979, pp 205-224. 
MORRISON, D.G. (1969) 
ｾｏｮ＠ the Interpretaton of Discriminant Analysis", Journal of Marketing 
Research, Vol VI, May 1969, pp 156-163. 
MOSTELLER, F. AND WALLACE, D.F. (1963) 
"Inference in the Authorship Problem", Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, June 1963, pp 875-90. 
NAIR, ｾＮｄＮ＠ (1979) 
"Economic Analysis and Accounting Techniques: An- Empirical Study", 
Jour·nal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17, no 1, "Spring 1979. 
NERLOVE, M. (1968) 
"Factors Affecting Differences Among Rates of Return on Investment in 
Individual Common Stocks", Review of Economic and Satatistics, Au"gust 
1968, pp 312-331. 
NETER, J. (1966) 
"Discussion of Financial Ratios as the Prd1ctors of Failure", Empirical 
Research in Accounting, Selected Studies 1966, Supplement to the Journal 
of Accounting Research, January 1967, pp 112-118. 
NEUMANN, B.R. (1979) 
"An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between an AID Hospital 
Classification Model and Accounting Measures of Performance", Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol 17, no 1, Spring 1979, pp 123-139. 
NEWMAN, "J. W. AND STAELIN, R. (1973) 
"Information Sources of Durable Goods", "Journal of Advertising 
Reasearch, Vol. 13, No.2, April 1973, pp 19-28. 
NORGAARD, C. AND · NORGAARD, R. (1974) 
"A Critical Examination of Share Repurchases", Financial Management, no 
3-4, Spring 1974, pp 44-51. 
O'CONNOR, M_D.(1973) 
"Usefulnss of Financial Ratios to Investors", The Accounting Review, 
January 1973. 
OLDFIELD, G.S. AND ROGALSKI, R.J. (1980) 
"Theory of Common Stock Returns Over Trading and Non-Trading Periods", 
The Journal of Finance, Vol XXXV, no 3, June · 1980. 
ORR, L. (1972) 
"The Dependence of Transition Proportions in the Education System on 
Observed Social Factors and School Characteristics", Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, no. 135, 1972, pp 74-95. 
359 
OSKAMP, S. (1965) 
"Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgements", Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, Vol 29, 1965, pp 261-265. 
PARKER, C.R. (1967) 
"Discussio]l of Publi'shed Corporate Accounting Data and Stock Prices", 
Empirical Research in Accounting, Selected Studies, Supplement to Vol 5 
of the Journal of Accounting Research, 1967 ｰｰＱｾＭＧＸＮ＠
PEASNELL, K.V. (1978) 
"Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance : A Review 
Article", Article from The University of Lancaster, February 1978. 
PEAVoY, J.W. (1980) 
"The Classification of Bank Holding Company Bank Ratings", Review of 
Business and Economic Research, Vol. XVI, no 1, Fall 1980. 
PERRIN, 'J.R. (1976) 
"The Problem of Meeting User Needs", ｾ･ｳ･｡ｲ｣ｨ＠ Committee Occasional Paper 
no. 8, The Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1976. 
PETTIT, R. (1972) 
"Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Market 
Efficiency", Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, December 1972. 
-----«1976) 
"The Impact of Dividend and Earnings Announcements: A Ｇ ｒ･｣ｯｮｾｩｬｩ｡ｴｩｯｮＢＬ＠
Journal of Business, no ｾＹＬ＠ January 1976. 
PINCHES, G.E. (1973) 
"A Multivariate Analysis of Industrial Bond Ratings", Journal of 
Finance, March 1973, pp 1-18. 
-----, MINGO, K.A. AND CARUTHERS, J.K. (1973) 
"The Stability of Financial Patterns in Industrial Organisations", 
Journal of Finance, May 1973. 
PINCHES, G.E., EUBANK, A.A., MINGO, K.A. AND CARUTHERS, ,J.K. (1975) 
"The Hierarchical Classification of Financial ｾ｡ｴｩｯｳＢＬ＠ Journal of 
Business Research, October 1975. 
RAMSER, J.R. AND FOSTER, L.O. (1931) 
"A Demonstration on Ratio AnalysiS", Bulletin ｾｏＬ＠ University of 
IllinOis, Bureau of Business Research, 1931. 
RENWICK, F.B. (1969) 
"Asset Management and Investor Portfolio Behaviour: Theory and 
Practice", Journal of Finance, May 1969, pp 181-206. 
REVSINE, L. (1970) 
"Data' Expansion and Conceptual Structure", The Accounting Review, 
October 1970, pp ＷＰｾＭＱＱＮ＠
RICHARDS, P. (1976) 
flDividend Control- Fact or Fancy", The Investment Analyst, April 1976. 
360 
RO, B.T. (1980) 
"The Adjustment of Security Returns to the Disclosures of Replacement 
Cost Accounting Information", Journal of Accounting and Economics, no. 
2, 1980, pp 159-189. 
ROENFELDT, R.L., GRIEPENTROG G.L. AND PFLAUM, C.C. (1978) 
"Further Evidence on the Stationarity of Beta Coefficients", Journal of 
Financial and QUantitative 'Analysis", March 1978, pp 117-121. 
ROLL, R. AND ROSS, S.A. (1980) 
"An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory", Journal of 
Finance, Vol. XXXV, no 5, December 1980, pp 1073-1103. 
ROLL., R. (1981) . 
A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect, The Journal of Finance, 
September 1981, pp 879-888. 
ROSENBURG, B. AND MCKIBBEN, W. (1973) 
"The Prediction of Systematic and Specific Risk in CODDnon Stocks", 
Journal of Finance and QUantitative Analysis, March 1973. 
ROSENBURG, B. AND MARATHE, V. (1975) 
"Tests of Capital Asset Pricing Hypothesis", Working Paper from 
University of California, No 32, 1975. 
ROSENBURG, B. AND GUY, J. (1976) 
"Prediction of Beta from Investment Fundamentals", Financial Analysts' 
Journal, 'July-August 1976, pp 62-70. 
ROSS, J.A. AND BAtiG, ·S. (1966) 
"The AID Computer Program, used to Predict Ad'option of Family Planning 
in Koyang", Population Studies, Vol.20, 1966, pp 61-75. 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DISTRIBUTION CF INCOME AND WEALTH (1975) 
The Investment Analyst, May 1975. 
RUMMELL, ｾＮｊＮ Ｇ＠ (1970) 
"Applied Factor Analysis", North Western University Press, Chicago, 
1970. 
RYAN, T.M. ＨＱＹＷｾＩ＠
"Dividend Policy and Valuation in British Industry", Journal of Business 
Finance and AC'counting, Vol. I, no 3, ＧＹＷｾＬ＠ pp Ｇ ｾＧＵＭｾＲＸＮ＠
SAMUELS, ·J.M. AND SMYTHE, D.J. (1968) 
"Profits, Variability of Profits and Firm Size", Economica, Hay 1968, pp 
127-140. 
SAN MIGUEL, J.G. (1976) 
"Human Information Processing and its Relevance to Accounting: A 
Laboratory Study", Accounting Organisations and Society, Vol. 1, no 4, 
1976, pp 357-373. 
361 
SANDILANDS, F.E.P. (1975) 
"Inflation Ac-counting; A -Report of the Inflation Accounting COlIDDittee", 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, September 1975. 
SCHRODER, H.M., DRIVER, M.J. AND STREUFERT, s. (1967) 
"Human Information Processing: Individuals and Groups Functioning in 
Complex Social Structures", Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., U.S.A., 
1967. 
SCOTT, A.J. AND KNOTT, M. (1976) 
"An Approximate Test for Use With AID", Applied Statistics, Vol. 25, No. 
2, 1976, pp 103-6. 
SCOTT, D.F. AND MARTIN, J.D. (1977) 
"Accounting Information and Corporate Financing Decisions", ]eview of 
Business and Economic Research, Vol. XII, no 3, Spring 1977 pp20-33. 
SHANTEAU, J AND PHELPS, R.H. (1977) 
"Judgement and Swine: Approaches and Issues in Applied Judgement 
Analysis", in Human Judgement and Decision Processes in Applied 
Settings by Kaplan, M.F. and Schwartz, S., ｾ｣｡､･ｭｩ｣＠ Press, 1977. 
SHICK, R.A. AND VERBRUGGE, J.A. (1975) 
"An Analysis of Bank Price-Earnings RatiOS", Journal of Bank Research, 
SUlIDDer 1975 pp140-149. 
SHRIEVES, D.E. AND STEVENS, D.L. (1979) 
"Bankruptcy Avoidance as a Motive for Merger", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative An'a1ysis, Vol. XIV , 'No.3, September '1979,pp 501-515. 
SIBLEY, A. (1979) 
"The Obsolete PIE RatiO", The Accountants Magazine, May 1979, pp 204-6. 
SINGH,A. AND WHITTINGTON, G. (1968) 
"Growth, Profitability and Valuation", Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
SLOVIC, P. ('1969) 
"Analysing the ' Expert Judge: A Descriptive Study of a Stockbroker's 
Dec1sionProcessess", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 53, no ｾＬ＠
August 1969. 
----(1972) 
"Psychological Study of Human Judgement: Implications for Investment 
Decision Making", Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, 1972, pp 201-228. 
----AND LICHTENSTEIN, s. (1971) 
"Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of 
Information Processing in Judgement", Organizational Behaviour and Human 
ｾ･ｲｦｯｲｭ｡ｮ｣･Ｌ＠ November 1971. 
SLOVIC, P., FLEISSNER, D. AND SCOTT BAUMAN, w. (1972) 
"Analysing the Use of Information in Investment Decision Making: A 
Methodological Proposal", The Journal of Business, Vol ｾＵＬ＠ April 1972, 
pp -283-301. 
362 
SNOWBALL, D·' ( 1972) 
"On the Integration of Accounting Research and Human Information 
Processing", Accounting and Business Research, no 39, Summer 1980, pp 
307-318. 
SOLOMON, E. (1955) 
"Ecomomic Growth and Common Stock Values", Journal of Business, Vol 28, 
no 3, ｾｵｬｹ＠ 1955, pp 213-21. 
SONQUIST, 'J. A. AND MORGAN, J. N. (1963) 
ｾｐｲｯ｢ｬ･ｭｳ＠ in the Analysis of Survey Data and a Proposal", Journal of 
American Statistical Assoc:1.ation, Vo1.58, 1963, pp lJ15-lJ3lJ. 
ＭＭｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ (196lJ) 
"The Detection of Interactiori Effects", Monograph No. 35, Survey 
Research Centre, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 
1964. 
------(1970) . 
"Multivariate Model Building; The Validation of a Search Strategy", 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970. 
SPROUSE, ·R. AND MOONITZ, M. (1962) 
"AICPA ｾ･ｳ･｡ｲ｣ｨ＠ Study No.3", 1962. 
ｓｐｅｌｌｍａｎｾ＠ K.J. (1978) 
"Predicting Failure Among Constuction Companies", Chartered Surveyor B 
and QsQUarterly, 'January 1978, pp 39-41. 
SUDARSANAM, P.S. (1977) 
"Corporate Financial Dimensions: A ｾ｡｣ｴｯｲ＠ Analytic Study", M.Sc. 
Dissertation, The City University Business School, November 1977. 
-------( 1981a) 
"Inter-Industry Differences in the Accounting Numbers of U.K. Quoted 
Companies: A'Multivariate Analysis", Ph.D TheSis, The .City University 
BUSiness School, 1981. 
-------(1981b) 
"Spurious Correlation Analysis- Concepts and Mathematical Formualtion", 
Appendix 5.6 in "Inter-Industry Differences in the Accounting Numbers of 
U.K. Quoted Companies: A Multivariate Analysis", Ph.D. Thesis, The City 
Unversity Business School, 1981. 
TAFFLER, R.J. (1976) 
"Companies at Risk: A Multivariate Analysis of Company Performance using 
AC'counting Data", Ph.D TheSis, The City Unversity Business School, 1976. 
------(1977) 
"The Correct Way to Use Published Financial Statement Data: The 
Assessment of Financial Viability " Example", Ｂ ｗｯｲｾｩｾ｡＠ Paner, City 
University Business School, 1977. 
363 
------ (1981a) 
"The As'sessment of Financial Viability and the Measurement of Company 
Performance", The City Unversity Business School Working Paper Series, 
no 27, 1981. 
------(1981b) 
"The Bank of England Solvency Model: Some Problems", The City Universtiy 
Business School Working Paper Series, forthcoming, 1981. 
------(1981c) 
"Improving Man's Ability to use Accounting Information: A Cognitve 
Synegesis", The City University Working Paper Series, 1981. 
------AND SUDARSANAM, P.S. (1980) 
"Auditing the Board: A New Approach to the Measurement of Company 
Performance", Managerial Finance, no.2, 1980. 
TATSUOKA, M.M. (1970) 
"Discriminant An'alysis", Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 
Champaign, Ill., 1970. 
THOMPSON, D.J. (1976) 
"Sources of Systematic Risk in Common Stocks", Journal of Business, 
April 1976, pp 173-188. 
TREYNOR, J.L. (1976) 
Long Term Investing, Financial Analysts' Journal, May-June 1976. 
TRICKER, R.I. (1976) 
"Improving the Informational Potential", Research Committee Occasional 
Paper no. 8, ｾｨ･＠ Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1976. 
-----(1979) 
"Research in Accounting- Purpose, Process and Potential", Accounting and 
Business Research, Winter 1979, pp 3-15. 
UECKER, W.C. (1980) 
"The Effects of Knowledge of the Users Decision Model ,in Simplified 
Information' Evaluation", ,Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 18, no 1, 
Spring 1980, pp 191-213. 
VAN HORNE, 'J. (1977) 
"Fundamentals of Financial Management", Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., U.S.A. 1977. 
WALTER, J.E. (1959) 
"Dividend Policies and Common Stock Prices", Journal of Finance, Vol II, 
no 1, March 1959, pp ＲＹＭｾＱＮ＠
-----1(1967) 
"Dividend Policy and Enterprise Valuation", Wadsworth Publishing co., 
Belmont, California, 1967. 
WARD, C. AND SAUNDERS, A. (1976) 
,1'U .K. Unit Trust Performance 1964-1974", Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Winter 1976. 
364 
WATTS, ｾＮｌＮ＠ (1973) 
"The Informational Content of Dividends", Journal of Business, April 
1973, pp 191-211. 
-----AND ZIMMERMAN, J. L. (1980) 
"On the Irrelevance of Replacement Cost Disclosures for Securtiy 
Prices", Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 2, 1980, pp 95-106. 
WEAVER, D. (1971) 
"Investment Analysis", Longman Group, 1971. 
----AND HALL, W.G. (1967) 
"The · Evaluation of Ordinary Shares Using a Computer", Journal of the 
Institute of A?tuaries, September 1967. 
WEIRICH, T.R. (1976) 
"A Determination of the Acceptability of Using Accounting Data in the 
Explanation and Prediction of Risk", Ph.D. ThesiS, University of 
Missouri, Columbia, 1976. 
WEST, R.R (1973) 
"Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial Regulation: Some Findings", 
Journal of Law and Economics, no 16, April 1973, pp 159-68. 
----(1975) 
"Two Kinds of Market Efficiency", Financial Analysts Journal, 
November-December 1975. 
WESTERFIELD, R. (1971) 
"Assessment of Bankruptcy Risk", Seminar Paper, Rodney L. White Center 
for Financial Research, University of Pennsylivania, February 1971. 
WESTON, J.F. AND BRIGHAM, E.F. (1979) 
"Managerial Finance", Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979. 
WHITBECK, V.S. AND KISOR, M. (1963) 
"A New Tool In Investment Decision-Making", Financial Analysts Journal, 
Vol 19.3, May-June 1963, pp 55-62. 
WHITE, R. (1975) 
"A M1Jltivariate Analysis of Common Stock Quality Ratings", paper from 
The Fianancial Management Association meeting , October 1975. 
WHITTINGTON, G.(1971) 
"The Prediction of PrOfitability and Other Studies of Company 
Behaviour", Cambridge press, 1971. 
------(1980a) 
"Some Basic Properties of Accounting Ratios", Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 7, no 2, Summer 1980. 
------(1980b) 
"The Profitability and Size of United Kingdom Companies, 1960-74", The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XXVIII, no 4, 1980, pp 335-352. 
365 
WILKIE , W. G. ＨＱ ＹＷｾ Ｉ＠
"Analysis of Effects of Information Load ", Joul'1al of l1a r keti ng 
Resea rch, Nov enilier 1974 p 462. 
\-lILLIAMS, J. B. (1938) 
"The Theory of I nvestment Value"t Cambridge Mas, Harvard UJ,iver s ity 
Press 1938. 
WILLIAMSON, J.P (1971) 
"Investments: New Analytic Technique", Longman Group Ltd., 1971. 
WILSON, D.A. (1973) 
Ｂｃｯｬｾｲ･ ｳ ｰＨＩｮ､･ｮ｣･Ｚ＠ A Note on 'Enviromental Complexity and ｆｩｮ ｾ＠ lcia1 
Reports'", Account i ng Rrview , July 1973. 
WINAKOR, A.H. AND SMITH, R.F. ＨＱＹｾＵＩ＠
ｾｃ ｨ｡ ｮｧ･ｳ＠ in the Finaricial Structure of Uns uccessful Corporati0ns", 
University of Illinois, Bureau of ｢ｕｄｾｮ ･ ｳｳ＠ Research, 1935. 
WRIG9T, W.F. (1917) 
"Financial Information Processing Models: An Empirical St" dy", The 
Ac'(;ountiug Tkvi ew , Vol LII, no 3, July 1977, pp 6'16-689. 
---(1980) 
"Cogni ti ve Information Processing Biases : Imi,'liea tions 1:' or Prod ucel's 
and Users of Financial Information", Decisiou ｓ｣ｩ･ｮ｣｣ ｾ Ｂ＠ \'\,1 II, no 2, 
1980, pp 284 -298. 
YOEMANS, K.A. (1968) 
"Statis tics for the 80Jia1 Scientist:2 Applied ｓｴ｡ｴｾ ｳ ｴＬ＠ cs" , Penguin, ' 
1968. 
360 
